ORBIS

Library
REFERENCE COPY

a quarterly journal of world affairs

Volume XI Spring 1967 Number 1

A Proposal for New Initiatives in U.S. Foreign Trade Policy *Ralph I. Straus*

The Coming Chinese Communist Nuclear Threat and U.S. Sea-Based ABM Options *Paul C. Davis*

ABM and Nonproliferation: Related Issues *Lewis A. Frank*

The World Through De Gaulle's Looking Glass *Elliot R. Goodman*

The Christian Democratic "International" *Charles R. Dechert*

The Communist Parties of the "Third World" in Soviet Strategy *Edward Taborsky*

Mao's Strategic Initiative of 1965 and the U.S. Response *Stefan T. Possony*

Psychological Warfare: Key to Success in Viet Nam *Reuben S. Nathan*

History and the American Role *Lionel Gelber*

Soviet Domestic Propaganda and Liberalization *Lorand B. Szalay*

The Development of Chinese Communist Policy toward the United States, 1922-1933 *Warren I. Cohen*

The State-Idea, the National Idea and the Image of the Fatherland *Ladis K. D. Kristof*

Political Structural Development in Tropical Africa *P. J. Idenburg*

The Legality of the McMahon Line: An Indian Perspective *Bishwanath Singh*

China's Militia and Mao Tse-tung's "People's War" *Hyobom Pak*

Reviews *Bryce F. Denno, David B. King, René Peritz, David S. Crist*

0930

FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
University of Pennsylvania

V 11-#1
STATE DUPLICATE
UNAUTHORIZED DUPLICATION
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ORBIS, a quarterly journal of world affairs
published by the
Foreign Policy Research Institute
University of Pennsylvania

EDITOR: Robert Strausz-Hupé
MANAGING EDITOR: Robert C. Herber
ASSOCIATE EDITOR: Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.
ASSISTANT EDITOR: Margaret M. Capotrio
CIRCULATION MANAGER: Carol P. Engleberth

EDITORIAL BOARD: Hans Kohn, Norman D. Palmer, Stefan T. Possony, Arthur P. Whitaker.

EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD: James E. Dougherty, William R. Kintner, Lawrence B. Krause, Sidney I. Ploss, Froelich G. Rainey, Frank N. Trager, J. K. Zawodny.

EDITORIAL RESEARCH STAFF: Heino Beckmann, Malcolm Hoenlein, Wolfgang Klaiber, Diane A. Kressler, Gerhard Mally.

SECRETARIAL STAFF: Marie Burke, Lynne Koch.

The Editors welcome articles that examine problems in international relations. Articles should be submitted in the original, accompanied by a self-addressed, stamped envelope if the author desires to have his manuscript returned. Articles should conform to ORBIS style and format; text and footnotes should be double-spaced, and the latter placed at the end of the article. Address editorial communications and manuscripts to the Managing Editor.

Books, monographs and pamphlets for review or listing should be sent to the Managing Editor. Address correspondence relating to advertising to the Assistant Editor and communications relating to subscriptions and bulk orders to the Circulation Manager.

ORBIS is indexed by *Public Affairs Information Service* and *Social Sciences and Humanities Index*. Abstracts of ORBIS articles appear regularly in *Historical Abstracts* and *America: History and Life*, both of which are publications of the American Bibliographical Center, as well as in *International Political Science Abstracts*, published in Paris by the International Political Science Association.

The opinions expressed in articles and reviews in this journal are those of the contributors and should not be construed as representing those of the Foreign Policy Research Institute or the Editors of ORBIS.

Copyright © 1967 by the Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania

Out-of-print issues of ORBIS, volumes I-V, are available in reprint editions from the Kraus Reprint Corporation, 16 East 46th Street, New York, N.Y. 10017, at $90.00 for the five volumes, clothbound; $80.00, paperbound; and $16 a volume, paperbound. Individual issues and complete volumes from Volume VI on are obtainable by writing to the Circulation Manager; please note, however, that Volume VI, No. 4, is now out of print. Prices for complete volumes are at the yearly subscription rate of $6.00; individual copies are $2.00. Reprints of articles published in ORBIS, as long as they are available, are 25 cents each.

ORBIS is published four times a year, February, May, August, and November, by the Foreign Policy Research Institute of the University of Pennsylvania. Editorial and business address: 133 South 36th Street, Room 102, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104. Subscription rates: one year, $6.00; two years, $11.00; three years, $16.00. Single copy, $2.00. Second-class postage paid at Philadelphia, Pa. and at additional mailing offices.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ORBIS

A Quarterly Journal of World Affairs

VOLUME XI SPRING 1967 NUMBER 1

Reflections on the Quarter 7

A Proposal for New Initiatives in U.S. Foreign Trade Policy . *Ralph I. Straus* 19

The Coming Chinese Communist Nuclear Threat and U.S. Sea-Based ABM Options . . . . . *Paul C. Davis* 45

ABM and Nonproliferation: Related Issues . . . . *Lewis A. Frank* 67

The World Through De Gaulle's Looking Glass . . . *Elliot R. Goodman* 80

The Christian Democratic "International" . . . . *Charles R. Dechert* 106

The Communist Parties of the "Third World" in Soviet Strategy . . . . . *Edward Taborsky* 128

Mao's Strategic Initiative of 1965 and the U.S. Response . . . . . *Stefan T. Possony* 149

Psychological Warfare: Key to Success in Viet Nam . . *Reuben S. Nathan* 182

History and the American Role . . . . . *Lionel Gelber* 199

Soviet Domestic Propaganda and Liberalization . . . *Lorand B. Szalay* 210

The Development of Chinese Communist Policy toward the United States, 1922-1933 . . . . *Warren I. Cohen* 219

The State-Idea, the National Idea and the Image of the Fatherland . . . . . *Ladis K. D. Kristof* 238

Political Structural Development in Tropical Africa . . *P. J. Idenburg* 256

The Legality of the McMahon Line: An Indian Perspective . . . . . *Bishwanath Singh* 271

China's Militia and Mao Tse-tung's "People's War" . . . *Hyobom Pak* 285

Reviews:

On "Out-Administering" the Insurgent . . . . *Bryce F. Denno* 295

An American-Soviet Concert? . . . . . *David B. King* 297

Communist Parties in Asia . . . . . *René Peritz* 301

Communist China and the Security of Asia . . . *David S. Crist* 304

Books Received 310

Contributors to this Issue 326

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA
FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

Robert Strausz-Hupé, Director

Research Monograph Series:

No. 2. *The Realities of Soviet Anti-Semitism.* By Elehie Skoczylas. $1.50. January 1965.

No. 3. *Nationalism in the Atlantic Community.* By Hans Kohn. $1.25. January 1965.

No. 4. *Soviet Politics Since the Fall of Khrushchev.* By Sidney I. Ploss. $1.25. January 1965.

No. 5. *Measuring International Alignments.* By Henry Teune and Sig Synnestvedt. $1.00. April 1965.

No. 6. *Aggression and Self-Defense: The Legality of U.S. Action in South Vietnam.* By Stefan T. Possony. $2.50. September 1966.

No. 7. *The British Common Market Decision and Beyond.* By Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. $1.50. March 1966.

No. 8. *To the Twenty-third Congress of the Soviet Communist Party.* By Sidney I. Ploss. $2.00. October 1965.

No. 9. *New Trends in Soviet Policy and the 23rd Party Congress.* By Sidney I. Ploss. $1.25. August 1966.

No. 10. *A Scale of Events Along the Conflict-Cooperation Continuum.* By Alvin Richman. $1.75. March 1967.

Recent Books in the Institute Series:

Building the Atlantic World. By Robert Strausz-Hupé, James E. Dougherty and William R. Kintner. New York: Harper & Row, 1963. 400 pp. $6.00.

The United States and the United Nations. Edited by Franz B. Gross. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1964. 356 pp. $6.95.

A Concise History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. By John S. Reshetar, Jr. (Revised and expanded edition.) New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964. 372 pp. $7.00.

Strategy for the Americas. By Joseph W. Reidy. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966. 204 pp. $6.75.

Man and International Relations: Contributions of the Social Sciences to the Study of Conflict and Integration. Edited by J. K. Zawodny. (Two volumes.) San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1966. 728 pp. and 960 pp. $45.00, the set.

Copies of Institute monographs may be obtained from The Foreign Policy Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania, 133 South 36th Street, Room 102, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104. Institute books may be obtained from the publisher or from your local bookstore.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

COLUMBIA  COLUMBIA

BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF REPUBLICAN CHINA

Howard L. Boorman, Editor

Richard C. Howard, Associate Editor

Volume I: Ai-Ch'ü

Columbia University Press is proud to announce the publication of the most important reference work on modern China to appear since the Second World War.

Over ten years in the making, this biographical dictionary will provide a massive reference work for all organizations, libraries, and individuals concerned with twentieth century China. The projected five volume series will furnish life stories of some six hundred Chinese of this century.

Volume I, published in March, contains 150 biographical articles on Chinese with surnames from Ai through Ch'ü, prominent in the republican period (1911-49). Among those included are Chiang Kai-shek, his son Chiang-Ching-Kuo and other senior figures of the Government of the Republic of China in Taiwan; leading figures of the Central People's Government at Peking such as Chou En-lai; scientists such as Ch'en San-chiang, director of the Institute of Atomic Energy of the Academy of Sciences; and modern scholars including Ch'en Yin-k'o, regarded by many as the world's leading sinologist and Chao Yuen-ren, internationally distinguished linguist of the University of California at Berkeley.

"The editors have maintained an admirable objectivity throughout . . . the appearance of this publication can justly be claimed to be a major event in American Sinology."—*Library Journal*

Volume I: $20.00

(*A special subscription plan is available. Please write for details.*)

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS

440 West 110th Street
New York, N. Y. 10025



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE INTERCOLLEGIATE REVIEW

Contributors to recent issues:

William C. Bark
Karl Brandt
Louis I. Bredvold
William Henry Chamberlin
Colin Clark
Donald Davidson
Gottfried Dietze
Lev E. Dobriansky
Albert H. Hobbs
Gerhart Niemeyer
Robert Strausz-Hupé
Frank N. Trager
Frederick D. Wilhelmsen

A journal of scholarship and opinion publishing articles in the fields of philosophy, political science, economics, literature and social criticism. THE INTERCOLLEGIATE REVIEW is made available free of charge to faculty and students six times during the academic year by The Intercollegiate Studies Institute. Subscriptions are invited from those outside the academic community: one year, four dollars; two years, seven dollars; three years, nine dollars. Subscriptions and inquiries should be addressed to: ISI, 629 Public Ledger Building, Philadelphia, Pa. 19106.

THE CHINA QUARTERLY

January-March 1967 **No. 29**

THE GREAT PROLETARIAN CULTURAL REVOLUTION: *Origin and Development* — Philip Bridgham

The "Regularisation" of Cadres — Ezra F. Vogel

CHINESE COMMUNIST HISTORY

The Guerrilla Movement in Northwest China (Part II) — Mark Selden

The Urban Communes in Communist China — Janet Salaff

Peking and the Latin American Communists — Ernst Halperin

BOOK REVIEWS

QUARTERLY CHRONICLE AND DOCUMENTATION

Editorial and Business Offices:

Ilford House, 133 Oxford Street, London W.1

Subscription rates: £2 or $6 a year, post free
Student rates: £1 or $4

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF THE USSR

The Institute for the Study of the USSR
is located in Munich, Germany, and has been engaged since 1950 in continuous research and publication on the Soviet Union. Its purpose is to study developments in the Soviet Union and to make the results of its studies available to persons and institutions everywhere.

Its Library
of more than 55,000 volumes is one of the richest specialized collections on the Soviet Union in Europe and is widely used by visiting researchers from all parts of the world.

Its Publications
include books, based on the results of research by staff members and by outside contributors, and periodicals, such as the monthly *Bulletin,* the quarterly *Studies on the Soviet Union* and the weekly *Analysis of Current Developments in the Soviet Union.* Periodicals are also published in Turkish, Arabic, Spanish, German and French and are mailed to more than 25,000 serious students of Soviet affairs throughout the world.

Its Activities
include an accredited summer school, international symposiums, conferences, study seminars and lectures by émigré scholars and other specialists on Soviet affairs.

Its Services
include furnishing information in response to requests from individuals and organizations and providing facilities for advanced resident research.

FOR INFORMATION AND SUBSCRIPTIONS:

New York Office • 9 E. 41st St. • New York, N. Y. 10017

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Politique Etrangère

la grande revue des questions internationales

No. 1/1967

Hans APEL	Les nouveaux aspects de la politique étrangère allemande
Jacques VERNANT	Perspectives franco-allemandes
Joachim VILLMANN	La communauté européenne et la Grande-Bretagne
Mario LEVI	Les difficultés économiques de la Grande-Bretagne
Marianne BASTID	Origines et developpement de la révolution culturelle
Pierre GENEVEY	Le désarmement après le traité de Versailles

Prix de l'abonnement:

France ..... 30 F

Etranger ..... 42 F

Le numéro: 5, 70 F

Publiée tous les deux mois

Adresser les abonnements au Centre d'études de Politique étrangère 54, rue de Varenne—Paris 7ème—C.C.P. 1865-41 Paris

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Reflections on the Quarter

The Nonproliferation Treaty and the Nonnuclear Nations

THE closer the nonproliferation treaty came to being within grasp of the diplomats at Geneva, the more elusive and harder-to-pin-down it seemed to become. The obstacle of the MLF had long since been hurdled with the shelving of that project. The United States had eliminated from its draft treaty a controversial article which had been the storm center of debate during 1966—an article that would have authorized the Federal Republic of Germany to acquire "co-ownership" of nuclear weapons in a hypothetical NATO multilateral force, subject to a Washington veto over its use. The United States had also sought to circumvent the question of the "European option" by resorting to ambiguous phraseology that would neither support nor preclude the possible future establishment of a joint European atomic deterrent with which the British or the French deterrent, or both, might some day be fused.

The West Germans were not particularly happy about Washington's semantic efforts; but, as good legalists, they decided that they could live with ambiguity if they must, since in any event a federated Europe would constitute a new political entity not bound by a treaty to which individual states had been signatory. Meanwhile, Soviet objections to West German participation in NATO nuclear planning became somewhat less strident. In view of these developments, it appeared to many at the beginning of 1967 that—with odds of better than fifty-fifty—the two superpowers would probably be able to submit a joint draft treaty to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee when it reconvened in Geneva on February 21.

This mood of optimism, which had been generated largely by the Rusk-Gromyko talks of the previous September, was soon dispelled. Some of the other, older issues persisted—the demand that there be a balance of obligations between the nuclear-weapon states and the nonnuclear-weapon states; the desire of the latter for security guarantees; and the impact of an expanding Viet Nam war upon the prospects for *détente* and arms control agreements. Moreover, the early months of the year witnessed a sharpening in the debate of issues which had been muted in the 1966 discussions. This had to do especially with ballistic missile defense, the future development of peaceful atomic technology, and the control system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The older issues blended with the newer, producing a rising chorus of attacks not so much on the whole idea of the treaty as on some of its specific provisions. The criticism came not only from India and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

West Germany, but also from Sweden, Japan, Israel and Italy. Nevertheless, the first two countries named were undoubtedly the principal source of opposition preventing the two superpowers from tabling a joint draft (assuming for the moment that both of them wished to do so).

Among the nonaligned states, India has continued to serve as the leading spokesman of those with misgivings about the proposed treaty. Indian leaders have remained apprehensive over the future security of their country. They are suspicious of Pakistan, which they frequently accuse of rejecting Indian offers to normalize relations and thus to carry out the Tashkent Agreement. But they are more fearful of the long-range threat posed by China. In their minds, the two national enemies are linked: they allege that China has been shipping arms to Pakistan and training guerrillas within the borders of the latter country. But there is little doubt that China, with her growing nuclear capability, is regarded as the major adversary, anxious to demonstrate—either by a new military incursion into India or support for a war of national liberation near India's frontiers—that her position as the first power in Asia has not been degraded by the "cultural revolution."

While the nonproliferation talks have been going on, India has continued to strengthen her position within the nuclear energy field. The government has concluded an agreement with Canada to enlarge the scope of the Rajasthan Atomic Power Plant from 200 to 400 megawatts. Meanwhile, a 380 MW station is under construction at Tarapur in Maharashtra, and a third power station with a capacity of 400 MW is scheduled to be built at Kalpakham in Madras by 1971. During the last year, there has been no perceptible increase in India's readiness to subscribe fully to the inspection system of the IAEA. In her agreements with Canada, she has consented only to consult from time to time to determine the extent to which the two governments may wish to avail themselves of IAEA assistance.

Some Indians may have detected in President Johnson's Message on Food for India, delivered to the Congress on February 2, a hint that the United States might link the question of U.S. food aid to the willingness of Prime Minister Gandhi's government to renounce nuclear weapons. The President said: "Agriculture must receive a much higher priority in development plans and programs. The developing nations can no longer take food supplies for granted, while they concentrate on industrial development alone, or spend vitally needed resources on unnecessary military equipment." If Indian leaders thought the United States was using the food negotiations as a means of obtaining an Indian promise to adhere to a nonproliferation treaty, they gave no signs of it. India's Foreign Office was busy gathering support in other Asian capitals for a cautious approach to the treaty. Joint communiqués issued in the first quarter of 1967 by India and three other

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

countries—Indonesia, Afghanistan and Iraq—stressed the need for "an acceptable balance of obligations between nuclear weapon States and non-nuclear weapon States." This formula is not intended solely to mean that the two superpowers should start making progress toward the reduction of their nuclear stockpiles. The Indians know perfectly well that it would be highly unrealistic at this time to make the nonproliferation treaty contingent upon substantial progress toward disarmament.

Perhaps the formula is directed more toward China than any other state. Indeed, since the Chinese are not expected to adhere to the treaty, and since they are pushing as fast as possible to acquire a nuclear missile capability, it is questionable whether the Indians really want to see the Soviets and the Americans make sizeable cuts in the margin of military-technological superiority they now enjoy over Peking. Hence the demand for "an acceptable balance of obligations" takes on somewhat the character of a diplomatic charade.

At Geneva in April, Indian Foreign Minister M. C. Chagla kept emphasizing the fact that India was not a member of a military alliance and was not under the nuclear umbrella of any country; that she is a nuclear state even though not a nuclear weapon state; that her policy of restraint has already placed her in a disadvantageous position vis-à-vis China; and that she regards the draft treaty in its present form as discriminatory. As to whether India would sign the treaty, Chagla said: "We can only take a final decision . . . after we have seen the final shape [the draft] takes. . . ."

West Germany's misgivings about the nonproliferation treaty in its present form arose primarily over three issues: (1) the possibility that a nonproliferation treaty might hinder the development of peaceful nuclear technology and lead to industrial espionage in that sector; (2) the relations between the IAEA and Euratom, which were fraught with implications for the future of European unity; and (3) the political problem of German unification and the strategic problem of West German security.

The United States has maintained all along that a treaty would not in any way obstruct a country's progress in the area of "atoms for peace." As early as mid-1966, Washington had offered to make available to signatory nations nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes on a nondiscriminatory basis and under appropriate international safeguards. President Johnson reiterated this offer when the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee resumed its talks in February. He argued that adherence to the treaty would create a climate in which nations not already possessing nuclear weapons would be freed from the "agonizing decision" whether to pursue security through the acquisition of nuclear arms or to concentrate on developing peaceful atomic programs.

Nevertheless, West Germany remained worried on several counts. The Federal Republic has invested heavily in fast breeder reactors,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

which require a supply of competitively priced fuel and which produce plutonium surpluses. West Germany, like all Euratom members, still depends heavily upon American fuel supplies. The Federal Republic expects to become independent in respect to fuel supply within about ten years, but the United States is opposed to allowing the Germans to export plutonium, which can be used to produce nuclear weapons—or even to retain sovereign control over the plutonium they produce. According to *Die Welt,* a Bonn proposal toward the end of last year to build a large-scale reactor in Spain "was contested by an American rival firm which pointed out that once the non-proliferation treaty comes into force the Federal Republic will no longer be in a position to supply the plant with fissile material." (Later, the Department of State identified the firm as General Electric, which finally received the contract.) It is not surprising that the Germans might view a nonproliferation treaty as a means whereby American business can insure its competitive advantage over European producers of nuclear reactors and fissionable materials.

The Germans also fear industrial espionage from the communist states, and perhaps others. There are probably not many scientific secrets in the Federal Republic that are unknown to the Soviets; but there do exist secrets pertaining to the construction design of reactors which the Germans do not wish to see passed along by the inspectors of the Vienna Agency. They have not been entirely reassured by a generous U.S. offer (which might later be repudiated by the Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy) to subject all American civilian reactors to IAEA inspection.

The fear of espionage furnishes one motive for preferring a continuation of the Euratom inspection system. Another relates to the question of European unity. Back in 1958, when the United States entered into an agreement to supply fuels to Euratom, an important concession was made to the latter: the Community was allowed to apply its own inspection system. Since then, Euratom has never come under IAEA controls, much to the chagrin of neutrals required to submit to Agency safeguards to qualify for U.S. "atoms for peace" assistance. Euratom is the nuclear instrument of the Six; it would play an important role if the European Community should ever decide to acquire a joint deterrent. Aside from that possibility, the Community is reluctant to divest itself of its prerogatives simply to "jump through the hoop" of the U.S.-Soviet *détente*. In defending Euratom against IAEA controls, the Federal Republic has had the full backing of Italy and France.

During the first four months of 1967, Article III of the draft (which deals with inspection) was usually cited as the chief stumbling block to progress on the treaty. The Soviets had always been cool to suggestions that the treaty should be effectively policed; but they insisted that if inspection were neces-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sary it must be performed solely by the IAEA, and that no exceptions could be made for the members of Euratom. In late April, the United States attempted to meet the objections of its European allies by proposing that inspection of Euratom countries by the IAEA be delayed until three years after the effective date of the treaty. At one point, West Germany and Italy indicated that they might regard the three-year transition period as one of "trial" for the treaty, to see how it works in practice before they would undertake permanent obligations under its terms.

By late spring, the fate of the treaty appeared to be linked also to progress in the U.S.-Soviet talks concerning a freeze on the deployment of ballistic missile defense. Increasingly, European statesmen, worried about security and the future cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance, wondered whether, by signing a nonproliferation treaty, they might be foreclosing an opportunity to receive or acquire anti-missile defenses which might enhance their countries' security, stabilize the deterrent further, and help to reunify a dissolving NATO. When the Geneva talks reopened on May 18, some of the diplomats were asking whether the nonproliferation treaty was necessary, desirable or feasible.

The Kennedy Round Agreements

ON May 15, the representatives of fifty-three nations, accounting for about 80 per cent of world trade, reached agreement in Geneva on tariff reductions. The negotiations were the product of tariff cutting authority granted the President by the U.S. Congress in the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. In the so-called Kennedy Round, the major parties were the United States and the Common Market Six, together with two other important industrial and trading nations, Britain and Japan. At Geneva, the negotiators faced formidable problems. In the months preceding the conclusion of the agreement announced in May, these cast doubt upon the prospects for a successful outcome. Particular problems related to the lowering of EEC restrictions on agricultural imports; the reduction of U.S. tariffs on certain industrial products, especially chemicals; the liberalization of British steel tariffs; and agreement among industrialized countries on a food aid program for less-developed countries, many of which face the prospect of severe agricultural shortages. In each of these broad categories of issues, the Kennedy Round registered success.

The outcome of the Geneva trade negotiations is important for several reasons. Failure of the negotiations would have represented a major setback to the long-term movement toward liberalization of international trade. Moreover, failure would have strengthened doubts both in Europe and the United States about the existence of a community of common interest in the North Atlantic area, for the Trade Expansion Act was the first major

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

step of the Kennedy Administration toward the creation of an Atlantic Partnership. Whatever the psychological effect upon U.S.-European relations, the agreement reached in Geneva will result in important tariff cuts of at least $40 billion on a wide range of products. The tariff reductions are expected to affect about 60,000 items. In the United States alone, tariffs will be lowered on some 6,300 products, accounting for more than $15 billion in trade.

Between the United States and the Common Market Six, the main issues concerned the future of agricultural trade, and trade in certain industrial products. The U.S. interest lies in expanding, or at least stabilizing, markets for U.S. agricultural exports to Europe, and, at the same time, in assuring European participation in programs of agricultural aid to less-developed countries. In the Kennedy Round negotiations, the United States sought to mitigate the effects of the EEC farm policy on Common Market imports of agricultural products. The EEC has already become, or is expected to become, largely self-sufficient in certain staples, including bread grains, potatoes, butter, sugar, eggs and cheese. The agreement on agriculture represents a major breakthrough in international trade accords—the first such pertaining to this highly protected industry.

Of particular importance is the agreement on grains, which sets a minimum price of $1.73 per bushel for hard red winter wheat, and a maximum price some $.40 higher. In practice, the world price will be set between these extremes. This agreement was the result of a compromise between wheat importing countries such as Britain and Japan and exporters such as Australia and Canada. The price agreed upon is about 20 per cent higher than that paid for this kind of wheat exported from the United States. Hence, this part of the agreement concluded at Geneva is likely to benefit American grain producers and exporters, and to assure a market for U.S. grains in Western Europe and elsewhere in the world.

While the United States sought to reduce the protectionist features of the EEC agricultural policy, the Common Market Six had as a major objective to achieve a lowering of U.S. tariff levels in industrial products, especially chemicals. Of particular concern to European negotiators was the U.S. practice of establishing the valuation of certain chemical products, for the purpose of calculating U.S. tariffs, on the basis of what is known as the American Selling Price: instead of being calculated on the product's price in the country of origin, the tariff is based on the substantially higher price of a competing product in the United States. The Six sought to induce the United States to abandon this practice. U.S. trade negotiators had no authority to remove the American Selling Price, since this procedure for valuation was established by the U.S. Congress. However, the United States agreed to reduce tariffs on chemicals by 50 per cent, in return for a reduction of 20 per cent on simi-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lar products by the Common Market. The EEC agreed to lower chemical tariffs by an additional 30 per cent, thus matching U.S. reductions, in return for U.S. repeal of the American Selling Price valuation procedure. This agreement, together with the accords on agriculture, contributed considerably to the successful outcome of the Kennedy Round. In fact, it is unlikely that the Six would have been prepared to make concessions in agricultural trade had the United States not been willing to lower tariffs on imports of chemicals.

Agreement was also reached for the reduction of tariffs on steel. Steel tariffs in the United States, the EEC and Britain total 7, 9 and 12 per cent respectively. Till the end, British negotiators maintained stiff opposition to major tariff cuts into this category, perhaps because Britain's steel tariffs are the steepest of all major steel producers. But in the final agreement they assented to a reduction of more than 2 per cent.

The Kennedy Round was notable for the agreement on food aid to developing areas. Over the next decade the so-called food gap is likely to increase to such proportions that many less-developed countries may face famine. Because of domestic farm policy and the increase in U.S. population, the United States is not likely to have food surpluses as large as in former years to sell or give to needy peoples overseas. The inability of less-developed countries to meet their food needs, together with a reduction in U.S. surpluses, could lead to an international food crisis. Hence, there is an increasing need for those countries with agricultural surpluses to collaborate in the development of food aid programs.

In recognition of this prospect, the negotiators in Geneva reached agreement on a food aid program which would siphon about five million tons of wheat from the commercial market for the benefit of less-developed countries. The cost of this aid program is estimated to total $350 million; the burden is to be shared by major industrialized countries, including the United States, the Common Market Six and Japan. Although it is questionable whether this program will prove adequate given the likely dimensions of the "food gap," it may provide at least the framework for greater collaboration among industrialized and food-surplus countries, especially those of the North Atlantic area.

When the Kennedy Round reductions are put into effect, the levels of tariffs will be such as to render the tariff unimportant as a means of restricting the flow of trade on a wide range of products of major importance in international commerce. The chief remaining obstacles to increased trade will be such nontariff barriers as border taxes, import licensing requirements, quotas, exchange control, sanitary and health regulations, and road taxes imposed by certain countries on imports of vehicles. These, because they differ so widely among nations, may be the subject of bilateral negotiations rather than another multilateral round of talks.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

However such negotiations are conducted, the reduction of nontariff barriers to international trade might usefully form the next important objective of the governments which participated in the Kennedy Round. In fact, the reduction and eventual elimination of nontariff barriers is essential if the full benefits of increased trade, as envisaged by the framers of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, are to be realized.

In all likelihood, future negotiations will be focused upon increasing trade between the industrialized nations and the less-developed countries. Over the past generation, the greatest increases in international trade have taken place among the industrialized nations, rather than between developed and less-developed countries. It is doubtful whether even the granting of tariff preferences for less-developed countries, as has been proposed, can reverse this trend. Future trade negotiations can be expected to center upon their trading problems. Finally, with the successful conclusion of the Kennedy Round, a topic for further consideration is likely to be the formation of free trade areas, in Latin America and perhaps between the United States and Canada and eventually other North Atlantic countries.

Viet Nam: From Tactical Victories to Strategic Defeat?

AMERICAN strategy in Viet Nam is based on the assumption that sustained tactical victories by U.S. and allied forces will lead the Vietnamese communists to de-escalate the conflict or face ultimate defeat. Viet Cong cadres will be decimated, soldiers will desert en masse, surviving units will be demoralized, and the regular North Vietnamese units will no longer be able to fight effectively. More and more territory will be lost, and the civilian population now under communist rule will resist or escape into areas controlled by the government in Saigon. Such developments, it is anticipated, will result in substantial numerical inferiority for the communists and, as a result, Hanoi will see the wisdom, or the necessity, of halting the conflict. To what extent are such assumptions realistic?

At the present level of the conflict, and assuming that the prevailing enemy casualty rate is maintained or increased (between 15,000 and 20,000 casualties per month), communist forces now fighting in South Viet Nam can be expected to lose their military effectiveness by the summer of 1968. The deterioration of Viet Cong morale and an increase in Allied combat troop strength might advance this timetable.

Although the communists are encountering increasing difficulties in their recruiting efforts in South Viet Nam, between 300,000 and 400,000 North Vietnamese troops still form the strategic reserve for the forces in the South. These reserves, kept at full strength through conscription, are large enough to enable the communists to maintain substantial forces in combat, and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

yet to preserve the defense system of North Viet Nam.

The North Vietnamese regulars have not given a good account of themselves in action in South Viet Nam. They depend heavily upon Viet Cong scouts, guides and combat leaders. Moreover, they appear to be far less interested than Ho Chi Minh in a protracted people's war, lasting at least another decade. Nevertheless, merely destroying communist units presently fighting in South Viet Nam might not achieve the political-strategic objectives the United States has set for itself. If the United States is to attain its objectives, two other conditions must be met: First, South Viet Nam must be pacified in order to inhibit substantial local recruiting by the Viet Cong. Second, North Viet Nam must be prevented from infiltrating troops and supplies into the South.

The first condition may be attainable. It is uncertain how the second can be achieved, and, in particular, how the Hanoi leadership can be induced to alter its present policy. Although the United States has won major tactical victories in the South, it has not yet exerted sufficient pressure on Hanoi to force Ho Chi Minh to end the conflict. Little material or psychological pressure is being applied against the North Vietnamese government; nor has there been a sustained effort to increase popular opposition in the North against the war and to counter the "nationalist" appeals Hanoi has used to secure mass support.

In recent years, North Viet Nam has faced a food shortage. In 1966, due to transport difficulties, conditions worsened. However, because of the natural fertility of the country and the austerity demanded of its inhabitants, the food shortage has not been serious enough to bring about the cessation of hostilities. For example, rice has been rationed at 450-700 grams a day per person, but this has not proved an unbearable burden. Evacuation from the cities to the countryside (reportedly 75 per cent of Hanoi's population has been evacuated) has helped considerably in alleviating the most serious shortages. The United States has not used its air power to attack North Viet Nam's food production facilities. Although the communists have asserted that the United States has destroyed certain dams, the rice acreage affected has been small.

Until recently, U.S. bombing has been designed not to put economic and political pressure on North Viet Nam but to reduce the flow of reinforcements and supplies to South Viet Nam. The few "strategic targets" that have been attacked, such as a steel mill complex, power stations, and means of transportation, have had only a limited impact. The relocation of shops and factories in the countryside has even provided certain advantages, including additional employment at higher wages to some in North Viet Nam. Evacuation and aid have resulted in the sudden emergence throughout the provinces of small factories producing such goods as fertilizers, insecticides, construction

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

materials, matches and simple transport equipment. New repair shops and food processing plants have been set up. Coal and power production have fallen behind planning goals; yet it continued to expand until 1965 and may have kept steady through 1966. In addition, the evacuation of the city population appears to have had a beneficial effect on education in the rural areas.

Undoubtedly, Ho Chi Minh realizes that North Viet Nam lacks the strength to dislodge U.S. forces by military means. But, thus far, he need not contemplate the dislodgment of his hard-core strength from South Viet Nam. Apparently he believes that the U.S. position in the South is politically, if not militarily, vulnerable.

Ho appears to have foreseen larger-scale U.S. bombings than have occurred. Despite U.S. raids, North Viet Nam is still able to maintain an effective contribution to the conflict, and the North Vietnamese economy has not been crippled. He anticipated a protracted war; consequently, he is likely to expect that his military situation will improve sooner or later.

Ho Chi Minh has reason to be optimistic about the flow of aid to North Viet Nam. The port of Haiphong has an annual capacity of 4,500 ocean-going ships (about fifteen ships daily). The communists claim that they are unloading ships beyond the port's stated capacity. Although this claim might be exaggerated, U.S. aerial reconnaissance of Haiphong has confirmed the presence of at least ten foreign ocean-going ships at almost any given time. About four-fifths of these ships are owned by communist countries or have been chartered to communist governments; the rest carry the flag of countries allied with the United States.

It is important to appreciate the magnitude of the foreign aid the North is receiving. During 1960, North Viet Nam's foreign trade was valued at about $170 million. Present exports and imports amount to about $250 million annually. Most of this trade is with communist countries. Yet foreign aid greatly exceeds foreign trade. During 1966, Soviet aid initially was estimated at $550 million, but is now believed to have exceeded $800 million. Taking account of supplies from other communist countries, including China, North Viet Nam undoubtedly received aid worth about one billion dollars last year. By contrast, the North Vietnamese budget of 1963 totaled about $500 million. The GNP of the country stands at about $1.5 billion. (The official exchange rate, used in these calculations, is 3.5 dong per U.S. dollar.) Thus, communist aid amounts to two-thirds of the GNP; it is considerably larger than the national budget. Three-quarters to four-fifths of this aid and trade pass through the port of Haiphong. If the total of GNP and aid is prorated, the per capita income, which normally is about one-fifth lower than that of South Viet Nam, exceeds the South Vietnamese income by about one-third.

Much of the aid consists of mis-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

siles, aircraft, guns, radars, and small arms. Other imports such as trucks, rolling stock, rails, bridge building and communications equipment, and medical supplies, serve both military and civilian purposes. Finally, the Soviet Union has promised North Viet Nam the delivery of fifty plants for the manufacture of goods for civilian consumption.

Much of the food shipped in as aid is stored away as a reserve. Petroleum products are dispersed and used with great economy. Reportedly, weapons and ammunition are received in quantities larger than presently needed in combat. Claiming that it must repair bomb damage, the Hanoi government indefatigably calls for the instant replacement of machines it asserts were destroyed. To be sure, much of this aid, such as spare bridges, transportation equipment and copper wire, will be applied to military purposes. But what remains will be carefully preserved and used to speed the future development of the North Vietnamese economy.

Although, according to official statements from Hanoi, industrial production has increased, little progress has been registered in agriculture. Despite anticipated increases in yield, North Viet Nam has a deficit of about two million tons. Only two-thirds of its rice requirements are produced domestically. Moreover, conscription gradually is drawing able-bodied young men from industrial and agricultural employment. Nevertheless, the country is now "accumulating capital."

Without substantial capital accumulation, North Viet Nam will be unable to achieve major economic advances. Unless it perseveres in the conflict, it will not continue to receive industrial aid at prevailing levels. During 1955-1961, the annual average aid given to North Viet Nam by other communist countries totaled only $140 million. Without the war this aid would not have risen sevenfold. From Hanoi's vantage point, therefore, the war, far from weakening North Viet Nam, may even have strengthened it economically, and have increased its military and political power.

For a small country to fight a superpower and to use conflict as a developmental method would appear to be a hazardous course of action. The North Vietnamese government's hopes of victory are probably based on two sets of considerations:

(1) Hanoi apparently hopes that the Johnson Administration, loath to confront the issue of the "war" in the November 1968 U.S. elections, will before then offer substantial concessions; or that, failing termination of the conflict, President Johnson will be replaced by a chief executive amenable to settling it on terms more agreeable to Hanoi. Buoyed by this hope, North Vietnamese leaders see no reason to end the war, especially since, barring a substantial modification in U.S. strategy or other untoward events, the political situation in South Viet Nam might again deteriorate.

(2) The United States is enter-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing a period in which much of its strategic superiority vis-à-vis the Soviet Union will have been eroded. No program, except for the accelerated production of Poseidon missiles, has been announced for preserving or increasing U.S. nuclear superiority. Even if such a program were adopted, the United States might not be able to place it in operation quickly enough to improve the U.S. strategic position in Viet Nam. In contrast, the Soviet Union is expected to increase its strategic capabilities and thereby gain nuclear superiority over the United States. The Soviets are deploying an ABM system, while the United States remains without antimissile defenses; a portion of the Soviet ICBM force (the so-called SCRAG missile) will be capable of launching 30-megaton space bombs, for which the United States has no equivalent and against which it possesses no defense. The Soviet MRBM force of nearly 1,000 missiles will continue to threaten Western Europe; and missile for missile the Soviet weapons will pose a substantially greater firepower threat by the end of 1968 than they do today.

If the North Vietnamese leaders understand the changing strategic force relationships between the United States and the Soviet Union, they are likely to gear their strategy to the anticipated increase in Soviet strength. Unless the United States alters its strategy in Viet Nam it faces the ominous prospect of a long conflict of attrition.

The elements of U.S. strategy have long been debated in Washington. They include an early, speedy and more massive combined military assault on the war-making capabilities in North Viet Nam. The forces, firepower and related instruments of assault must be equal to the requirements for incapacitating further North Vietnamese military effort. However, the key element of this strategy is its speedy and massive, rather than "graduated" and "limited," execution. Since it does not necessarily entail the elimination of the North Vietnamese government as such, there is little additional risk vis-à-vis the Soviet Union or Communist China.

The United States faces a quandary in Viet Nam. It can seek an early victory to achieve its objective—an independent South Viet Nam—by accelerating the application of military, economic, political and psychological pressures against North Viet Nam while simultaneously speeding up the liberation of areas in the South from Viet Cong control. Or it can continue its present policy, namely, waging a lengthy, inconclusive and needlessly cruel conflict during which it will become increasingly more isolated from its European allies, additional destruction will be inflicted on the peoples of both North and South Viet Nam, and anti-war sentiment in the United States will grow. If U.S. policymakers are unwilling to pursue a policy aimed at achieving an early settlement of the conflict, sooner or later they may face the prospect of cutting their losses even at the risk of great damage to American political and security positions in Asia.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A PROPOSAL FOR NEW INITIATIVES IN U.S. FOREIGN TRADE POLICY

by Ralph I. Straus

THE Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (TEA), which inspired the Kennedy Round of trade negotiations, will expire on June 30, 1967. Thus, the President and the Congress are confronted with the necessity of making some basic and crucial decisions regarding future U.S. foreign trade policy. Five years ago, when the last major review of the entire U.S. trade program was carried out, President Kennedy and the Congress agreed upon substantial changes, embodied in the Trade Expansion Act. In my judgment, preparation should now be made for new trade legislation authorizing even more far-reaching initiatives. Before examining these proposals, it will be instructive to review briefly the history of U.S. trade and tariff policy since 1930, with emphasis on the TEA and the Kennedy Round negotiations.

At the beginning of the great economic depression, Congress passed the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 establishing the highest tariff rates in U.S. history, hoping thereby to protect U.S. industries rather than to increase exports. Inevitably, this legislation set off a series of tariff retaliations abroad, and world trade declined precipitously. In effect, depressions were exported from one country to another. Disillusionment quickly followed, and there was growing awareness that an expansion in world trade must depend on reciprocal tariff reductions by all major nations. To lead the way, the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 authorized the President to reduce U.S. import duties by not more than 50 per cent in exchange for equivalent concessions from other governments. By 1945, several bilateral trade agreements had been negotiated by the United States, thereby reversing the trend to protectionism.

In 1945, with World War II coming to a close, Congress extended the Trade Agreements Act, authorizing the President to reduce existing tariffs by an additional 50 per cent. Most of the authority under the original act had been exhausted. Concern about potential injury to U.S. industries led Congress to add a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"peril point clause"[1] in the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1948 and an "escape clause"[2] in the 1951 Act. In the 1955 and 1958 extensions of the act more "escape clause" restrictions were added, including safeguards dealing with national security.

By 1962 it appeared that the old form of trade legislation had become outmoded for a variety of reasons. The 1958 renewal of the Trade Agreements Act, permitting a 20 per cent reduction in the U.S. tariff on an item-by-item basis, resulted in the Dillon Round of 1960—the fifth series of trade negotiations since the war. This produced only marginal tariff cuts.

When President Kennedy proposed the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, he was motivated by other considerations: the potential threat of the European Common Market (EEC) to American exports and the desire to promote unity in the Atlantic Alliance. The new legislation was framed, not so much to protect our import-competing industries, but to enable our export industries to keep their dominant positions in world trade, and to "bargain down" the common external tariff of the six-nation Common Market or of an enlarged Common Market. (In 1962 it was anticipated that Great Britain and possibly many other European countries would soon join the EEC.)

Moreover, the Common Market was offering a 20 per cent across-the-board or "linear" reduction in its common external tariff which the United States, because of its item-by-item method of tariff reduction, was unable to match. To achieve results the President would have to be given authority to offer linear tariff cuts, unrestricted by peril points. The Congress gave him this authority. Protection to American industry was provided by the TEA's "adjustment assistance" provisions for both industry and labor in addition to tightened escape-clause criteria. Tariffs could be cut by 50 per cent, reductions of tariffs to zero were permitted on certain tropical products of interest to the less-developed countries, tariffs of 5 per cent or less (nuisance taxes) could be reduced to zero. Under the "dominant supplier" provision the President was authorized to reduce to zero the tariff on articles in which 80 per cent of Free World trade was accounted for by the United States and the EEC. But this latter provision was based on the assumption that the United Kingdom would soon become

[1]The "peril point clause" directs the Tariff Commission to determine—prior to negotiations—the minimum level of duties necessary to prevent injury to domestic producers.

[2]The "escape clause" authorizes the U.S. Executive to withdraw tariff concessions that result in substantial injury to domestic industries.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

an EEC member; it became virtually meaningless when President de Gaulle vetoed Britain's application in January 1963.

This brief outline of U.S. trade legislation brings us to spring 1967, when the fate of the Kennedy Round hangs in the balance. The U.S. government must now decide whether the momentum achieved in liberalizing international trade can or should be continued, or whether the frustrations that have attended tariff negotiations in the Kennedy Round should be allowed to slow down or actually bring to a halt the gradual lowering of trade barriers by the nations of the Free World.

Three Courses of Action

Three possible courses of action appear to be available to the President in making recommendations for trade policy legislation to succeed the TEA. (1) The President could decide that no new trade legislation is necessary. (2) He could ask Congress to extend the Trade Expansion Act for one or more years, in its present form or with certain changes. Or (3) he could request the enactment of new legislation, either modifying the Kennedy Round approach or proposing a bold new initiative in foreign trade policy.

Failure to enact new trade legislation would slow progress toward lowering trade barriers, raise doubts about the United States' determination to continue in this effort, and sacrifice U.S. world leadership in this vital area of economic policy. Moreover, continuing participation in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) requires that the President be empowered to enter into limited trade agreements from time to time. If the United States invokes the escape clause of the TEA, we must be in a position to offer compensatory concessions to the injured parties, or face retaliation in the form of countervailing barriers to U.S. exports. It would seem imperative, therefore, to enact some legislation not long after the TEA expires.

A decision to extend the Trade Expansion Act in its present form for one or two years would preserve the basic authority necessary for the President to handle routine trade problems arising from our obligations under GATT. Such a simple extension, however, would sidestep certain imperatives of the present situation both here and abroad. An evaluation of domestic and foreign political factors suggests a two-step approach: first, a request to extend the TEA, with certain additions and modi-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fications, for a period of two years; and second, preparation for a major new foreign trade initiative in 1969.

In support of this two-stage approach, postponing major new legislation until 1969, it can be argued that both government and private industry want a respite from further intensive negotiations. It may be necessary, therefore, for the President to give assurances to the Congress that no major tariff negotiations are contemplated during the period of the extended legislation. Thus the residual authority would be used only for such adjustments as become necessary. Certainly it will take time to evaluate the effects of reductions negotiated in the Kennedy Round.

Moreover, since 1968 will be a Presidential election year, the political climate probably would make it inadvisable to introduce any strikingly new and potentially controversial trade legislation before the election. Whether or not President Johnson wins a second term in 1968, the year 1969 would appear to be an appropriate time for setting forth new and forward-looking trade proposals. Thus, it would be logical to request a two-year extension of the present act.

Any modifications of the present TEA requiring extensive Congressional hearings should probably be avoided because of the pressures for protectionist amendments that could arise from certain industries which fear the effects of the Kennedy Round, as well as from those Members of Congress who think that tariff reductions will adversely affect the U.S. balance-of-payments position. There are a number of desirable changes, however, which might not require such extensive public hearings. First, a liberalization of the adjustment assistance provisions of the present act would make them more easily applicable to cases of import injury to both industry and labor. They could be patterned after the trade adjustment provisions of the Canadian-American Automobile Agreement.

Second, some of the legitimate complaints of the less-developed countries could be met in part by granting them immediate application of reductions negotiated in the Kennedy Round rather than phasing these over a period of five years, as specified in the present Trade Expansion Act.

Third, little progress has been made in negotiating the elimination of nontariff barriers in the Kennedy Round. The only possibility appears to be an agreement on a code of anti-dumping rules. It might be well, therefore, for the President to seek ap-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

proval from Congress to conclude agreements with other countries on nontariff barriers, with the proviso that any agreements requiring new legislation or changes in present U.S. laws would be sent to the Congress for approval. Obviously, any treaties negotiated would require approval of two-thirds of the Senate.

During the two-year extension of the present or modified TEA, the United States should explore with other nations the possibilities, advantages and disadvantages of a bold new approach to trade problems involving Western Europe and other developed countries, the less-developed countries, and those communist nations willing to make some adaptation of their state trading systems to the market economies of the West.

A New Foreign Trade Initiative: A World Free Trade Association

The 1969 Trade Bill should project a bold and far-reaching new initiative in the field of foreign trade policy. Its introduction should afford the President a unique opportunity to assume world leadership in the continuing effort to expand friendly and profitable economic intercourse among all nations. Such an initiative, to be politically acceptable, should appeal not only to the pragmatic judgment of business and labor, but also to the deep feelings of idealism of the American people. It was just such a mixture of pragmatism and idealism that enabled President Kennedy to push through the TEA of 1962.

Any new initiative should, of course, be designed to provide benefits to other industrialized nations. It should offer some promise of action to meet the increasingly vehement demands of the developing countries for a more positive treatment of their problems. It should aim to reduce international political tensions. Most important, it must contribute to increased employment and profitable economic activity and a greater volume of international trade.

To achieve these objectives, this writer suggests that the United States propose to the other developed countries of the Free World the establishment of a World Free Trade Association (WFTA). It would be patterned after the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and established within the broad framework of the GATT, under whose rules the great postwar expansion of international trade has taken place. It would be open to all countries

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

willing to chart a course toward the greatest possible elimination of trade barriers.

WFTA, GATT AND MFN

The proposed WFTA should include in the first instance the United States, Canada, and the seven members of EFTA (Great Britain, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland, Portugal and Austria). It would be desirable to have Australia, New Zealand, and possibly Japan as founding members. The EEC should be invited to join as a unit, with the sincere hope that it would do so—but the WFTA should be formed with or without the accession of the EEC at the start.

The proposed WFTA could be patterned after EFTA with some notable exceptions, such as the inclusion of agricultural products which are left out of the EFTA agreements. The WFTA would eventually include a great many countries, both developing and developed, with economic systems, resources and requirements of much greater variety than those of the EFTA Seven. Consequently the proposed association's charter should be less demanding than that of EFTA in terms of uniformity and timing of tariff reductions, but not so loose as to violate the basic Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) provision of a free trade association permissible under GATT rules, or to permit members to find loopholes which could invalidate the basic purposes of the organization.

Basic to the GATT is the principle of unconditional Most-Favored-Nation treatment, which specifies that all tariff concessions negotiated between any members shall be extended to all other GATT members on the same basis. U.S. tariff policy has been based on this principle of almost universal MFN since 1923.

The GATT has proved to be extremely adaptable to new developments.[3] Under Article XXIV, free trade areas, such as EFTA and the Latin American LAFTA, and common markets, such as

[3]The GATT was founded in 1948 and its membership now includes 70 Full Contracting Parties plus 14 other countries in some stage of accession (as of November 1, 1966). GATT includes all the industrialized nations of the West except Ireland; as well as Japan, Australia and New Zealand. Fifty-one developing countries are full or partial members, including India, 9 Latin American and Caribbean nations (notably Brazil, Argentina and Chile), and 29 African countries. Two communist nations, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, are Full Contracting Parties, and Rumania has made special arrangements. Poland's request to become a full member has been backed by most Western trading countries. All of these 84 nations subscribe to GATT rules and regulations in their trading relations.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the EEC and the Central American CACM, have been permitted as exceptions to the Most-Favored-Nation clause.[4] GATT's flexibility in response to changing conditions of politics and trade has been achieved both by unanimous decision of the membership to amend the agreement (a form seldom employed) and by the waiver provision of Article XXV-5, which empowers the membership by a two-thirds vote to waive any obligation in the agreement and to set forth conditions of ratification for any such waiver.[5]

In proposing a World Free Trade Association the United States would be following precedent as established in EEC, EFTA and other regional groupings, whereby departure from the unconditional Most-Favored-Nation principle is authorized in return for achieving substantially free-trade conditions over a broad area within a designated time period. This is a compromise—a second choice to our traditional MFN policies—but one that has received GATT endorsement and now is generally accepted among Free World trading nations. It should permit an important measure of progress toward a major policy goal of trade expansion.

The proposed WFTA should provide, as permitted under GATT rules, a plan whereby certain countries would be empowered to lower their tariffs according to a slower time schedule than other countries, either for all of their trade or for the trade of certain of their industries which might not be able, without causing serious economic hardship, to adhere to the overall WFTA uniform time schedule for the complete abolition of duties. This would seem to be consistent with policies approved in previous GATT Ministerial Resolutions and in particular with GATT's avowed determination to exercise a firm influence

[4]Article XXIV recognizes that the closer integration of national economies is a desirable objective and that a customs union or free trade area may serve to facilitate trade between the participating countries while not raising barriers against the trade of others. Accordingly, the Agreement permits violation of the MFN standard only when the scheme takes the form of a free trade area or customs union (or an interim arrangement leading to either) with certain characteristics: (a) complete, not partial, elimination of trade restrictions among members, and with commodity coverage accounting for "substantially all the trade" among its participants; (b) no increase in the restrictiveness of trade barriers against nonmember countries; and (c) a definite plan and schedule calling for the complete elimination of duties within a "reasonable length of time." Where a free trade project fails to meet these standards, a waiver must be granted by two-thirds of the GATT members. The difference between a free trade area and a customs union is that the countries forming a free trade area are not required to adopt a common external tariff.

[5]Such a waiver was granted when the United States and Canada concluded their bilateral agreement on free trade in automobiles and auto parts in 1965.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

toward helping less-developed countries to expand their exports. Precedent for such exceptions is found in the rules of EFTA, which permit Portugal to apply alternative and more favorable rates of reduction of import duties on certain categories of products and according to a different time schedule than that required of the other EFTA countries.[6]

There may well be difficulties in this proposal, including the potentially divisive implications of such an arrangement. Nevertheless, the initiative should be aimed at the widest possible membership, and should always be open-ended. It should not be undertaken at all unless the subscribing nations comprise a significant sector of GATT's industrialized membership. The determination of these countries to carry out such a program would present a powerful incentive for other nations to join.

The time period during which tariffs would gradually be reduced to zero should be flexible, so as to accommodate the different stages of development of the member countries and the vulnerabilities of special industries. In order to maximize the growth of world trade with a minimum of dislocation to domestic industries in each country, the schedule for the reduction of tariffs to zero might be set at ten or fifteen years or longer, with a consequent 10 per cent or even lower annual reduction. Special provisions might be proposed to specify no reduction of less than one percentage point per year, and to encourage total removal of duties of 5 per cent or less. Somewhat similar provisions are already included in the current U.S. Trade Expansion Act.

WFTA should also urge its members to adopt adequate adjustment assistance provisions to cushion the economic dislocation that might be caused by increased import competition. It is interesting to note that companies and unions in EEC and EFTA countries have made very little use of the adjustment assistance provisions embodied in their respective treaties, although tariffs on industrial goods have been almost completely eliminated on internal trade within the two groups.

The proposed WFTA should provide for continuing negotiations, after adoption of the agreement, on all nontariff barriers —for example, border taxes, domestic purchase requirements

[6]In general, the EFTA agreement allows Portugal to proceed to the elimination of duties on certain products at half-speed until 1970, by which time these duties must be reduced by 50 per cent; according to the overall EFTA timetable, virtually all other duties on industrial products among EFTA members were abolished January 1, 1967.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(whether official policies such as "Buy American" requirements in the United States, or unofficial practice as in most other countries), customs evaluation methods, labeling requirements, technical regulations, and the like.

It is important to stress that the new Free Trade Association should be established within the framework of the GATT. Any changes in present GATT rules that may be necessary or desirable under the new initiative could be submitted to the GATT membership for approval, either through amendments to the GATT agreement, or, preferably, under the waiver procedure noted above.

Preferences for the Less-Developed Countries

Special treatment for the less-developed countries will be a basic feature of the proposed WFTA. The GATT has already made such a provision in a Protocol and a New Part IV section on trade and development adopted and incorporated in its new charter of February 1965. In essence this section states that complete reciprocity by the less-developed countries is not required when tariff and trade barriers are reduced or eliminated under MFN agreements of the other GATT members.

The U.S. Congress has also recognized the special status of the less-developed countries. The 1962 Trade Expansion Act provides for elimination of U.S. tariffs on tropical products which are of prime concern to them and which are not produced in substantial quantities in the United States. It exempts these reductions from the five-year staging requirements so that the total agreed reduction in duties is effective immediately.

The less-developed countries, on their part, have been seeking preferential treatment for exports through the United Nations Commission on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).[7] The United States in particular has opposed such preferences as violations of traditional MFN policy. Analyses of trends in international trade during the last thirty years show that preferences are of value only when the exporting country exports goods (1) which are not produced in the importing country, or produced in quantities insufficient to meet the total demand of the import-

[7]UNCTAD, which first met in 1964, has a membership of 119 nations, including 77 developing countries.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing country; or (2) which it produces more economically than the importing country can.[8]

If preferences could be granted to certain selected exports of major importance to the less-developed countries, to enable these exports to compete with similar products of industrialized nations without causing market disruption, the result would be as valuable to developing economies as granting overall preferences on all their exports. Equally important, developed countries would no doubt be more amenable to negotiating preferences under such conditions.

Since it appears that relatively few of the less-developed countries will have the confidence to forgo protectionism at their present stage of development, the staged concessions industrialized members would grant to each other under the proposed WFTA should be offered equally to all less-developed countries without demanding immediate reciprocity. This means that the latter might be granted either free or preferential access to the markets of the developed countries according to an accelerated timetable.

International Trade Review Board

An International Trade Review Board (ITRB) should be established to define criteria by which a nation qualifies as a less-developed country, to determine which countries and which industries are eligible for special preferences, and to conduct continuing reviews to determine at what point such countries or industries within them would be able to withstand the rigors of world competition under nonpreferential world trading rules. At this point of time in its development a former less-developed country could become a candidate for full membership in the WFTA.

Since the proposed Review Board would have to make judgments charged with highly explosive political implications, it should be composed of individuals meriting the confidence of the majority of nations. There are three international organizations that have existed since World War II which enjoy such international confidence. Members of the ITRB should be nominated from among their ranks:

[8]For example, for many years India enjoyed substantial benefits as a result of the Imperial Preference system in trade with Great Britain on primary products and certain light consumer goods such as cotton and jute textiles and leather, which India could produce more efficiently than could British producers. Despite preferences, however, Indian exports to the United Kingdom of all other manufactured goods—bicycles, electric motors, electric fans and the like—remained negligible.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(1) One member could be named by the World Bank, which has made detailed analyses of most less-developed countries. The Bank should be able to develop criteria determining whether a country should be considered less-developed; how long it should remain in that category; and whether all or only certain of its industries should be eligible for special preferences.

(2) Because of the acute balance-of-payments problems experienced by most less-developed countries, it would be appropriate for the International Monetary Fund to furnish one ITRB member. These payments deficits are usually associated with fluctuations in prices of raw materials on which many less-developed economies depend. They also derive from the heavy burdens of principal and interest payments on development and other loans.

(3) The third member of the ITRB should be nominated by the Director General of the GATT, for it is under GATT rules and covenants that international trade has flourished in the years since World War II.

The members of the ITRB should probably be nominated for a fixed term, and should be provided with a permanent operating staff. Substantive questions could be referred for guidance to any one of the three international organizations represented on the Board. Provision should be made for appealing decisions of the Board through the type of conciliation procedure worked out by the Secretary-General of the United Nations for unresolved disputes arising in UNCTAD and its committees.[9]

It is suggested that requests for tariff preferences be forwarded to the ITRB by one or more less-developed countries. The request would list the product or products involved, and would include all the necessary data concerning the supply position and the price at which the goods could be delivered. If the ITRB approved the request and if a majority of industrial countries was prepared to grant such preferences, a decision would be taken to depart from the MFN rule and preferences would be authorized, subject to the following terms and conditions:

(1) Preferences would be granted only if all or a substantial number of importing countries were prepared to open their markets to such products, so as to spread the possible adverse effects of increased import competition over the domestic industries of many countries.

[9]See Richard N. Gardner, *In Pursuit of World Order* (New York: Praeger, 1964), p. 276.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(2) Importing countries would be permitted to exclude certain less-developed countries from the benefits of preferential treatment should the ITRB determine that these countries had already reached a level of economic development and efficiency in the industries involved to permit competition on relatively equal terms with the industries of importing countries.

(3) Preferences would be granted for a limited period only—perhaps not to exceed ten years. The decision should probably stipulate that, barring a decision to the contrary, preferences would be reduced gradually after five years, with a view to their elimination at the end of ten years. The preference might be eliminated even sooner if the ITRB ascertained that preferential treatment was no longer required. All decisions would be subject to review to determine whether adjustments were necessary due to changing conditions.

If developed countries should decide not to grant preferences for unlimited quantities of goods, tariff quotas could be set for limited quantities or for a certain percentage of the domestic market. Imports in excess of these quotas would carry a higher tariff rate. All such quotas should be global, however, and should be applied in a nondiscriminatory manner to all less-developed countries accepted as eligible for such preferential treatment.

While the less-developed countries should receive the benefits of the WFTA trade liberalization program without the requirement of strict reciprocity, they too should be asked to make commitments. They should be invited, and in every appropriate way persuaded, to liberalize the flow of goods and capital into their countries and to ensure fair treatment of both. All less-developed countries receiving preferential treatment should be required to report annually to the ITRB on the steps taken to fulfill their commitments. At the same time, they should be encouraged to form regional free trade associations similar to the Latin American Free Trade Association, so as to derive the advantages of lower trade barriers.

Thus, WFTA would grant all less-developed countries the same privilege of exemption from MFN obligations, and in certain cases even preferential tariff treatment, subject to periodic review by the proposed ITRB. Special treatment of certain countries for historical, political and geographic reasons, such as that accorded the former African colonies by the six members of the Common Market, would be barred.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Tariff Reductions by Sectors

Since negotiations for establishing the proposed WFTA will be extraordinarily complex, involving many disparate countries, industries and commodities, provision should be made for reducing duties on particular products or groups of products according to an accelerated time schedule.

It has been suggested that if a substantial proportion of any one industry in the United States and in other nations deemed it to be in its best interest to negotiate a reduction of tariffs to zero among the several countries, this industry could initiate such negotiations through the respective governments without waiting for a full-scale tariff conference such as the Kennedy Round.[10] This approach to tariff reduction was advocated by Eric Wyndham-White, Director General of the GATT, in a speech at Bad Godesberg, Germany, on October 27, 1966. He said:

> It has become apparent in the course of the Kennedy Round that there are certain sectors of industrial production—characterized by modern equipment, high technology and large scale production, and by the international character of their operations and markets—where there are evident gains to all in arriving, within a defined period, at free trade. As has been seen in the EEC and EFTA, a "defined period" is extremely important since it provides industry with a clear indication both of the need for adjustment and adaptation to conditions of free trade, and an assurance of a reasonable period in which to make these adjustments. While, initially, the period has to be made sufficiently extensive to provide this assurance to industry, experience in the EEC and EFTA suggests that, in practice, it is likely to be curtailed. Industry tends to adjust more quickly than its fears suggest and once the adjustments are made, there is evident advantage in moving more rapidly to attain the benefits of freedom of trade.

Such special negotiations, of course, would have to be conducted within the broad established rules of the proposed association. They could be conducted among members of WFTA as well as with those nations that did not join WFTA but might want to join in negotiations on the particular product or group of products in question. It should be emphasized that MFN treatment would have to be extended to all WFTA member nations, regardless of whether they were parties to the special negotiations.

The principle of negotiating for complete elimination of tariffs has already been accepted as U.S. policy. The 1962 Trade Expansion Act gave the Administration authority to negotiate to

[10]Due consideration would have to be given to U.S. anti-trust laws in this connection.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

zero on those items for which the United States and the Common Market together accounted for at least 80 per cent of world trade —the so-called "dominant supplier provision." In drawing up enabling legislation for the WFTA, Congress should have less hesitation in broadening the zero tariff authority to cover items for which the United States and all other developed countries (not merely the United States and the EEC) account for at least 80 per cent of Free World exports.

Trade in Agricultural Products

The foregoing discussion of a proposed WFTA has been concerned primarily with industrial products. The EFTA Convention specifically excludes trade in agricultural and fish products from its rules. However, the Congress specified that the United States must negotiate on both industrial and agricultural products, and the Common Market has made its common agricultural policy a keystone of its operations. Therefore, the proposed WFTA must be given authority to deal with both industrial and agricultural products.

Agriculture is clearly a most difficult issue. Practically every country in the world protects its agricultural producers and its home markets for food products in a variety of ways. Tariffs are not the major barriers to the flow of trade. Instead, such devices as import quotas, tied to internal price supports, direct payments and other controls aimed at ensuring a reasonable income for the farmer and protecting the home market, are the principal restraints to international trade in agricultural products. Processed and manufactured foods, including canned foods, meats and dairy products, are exceptions to this general rule, and tariffs do play a significant role in trade in these items. In most countries this whole complex of controls is widely regarded as coming within the realm of domestic policy; for the net importing countries, particularly, their effects on foreign trade are regarded as of secondary concern.

The problem of agricultural trade in a sense falls into two categories, whose characteristics differ considerably. There is, first, the trade in temperate products, i.e., those grown or produced in the industrial nations, primarily in the North; and second the trade in tropical products grown primarily in the South. In the northern half the major question concerns the relationship between major exporters and major importers of food-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

stuffs; in the South, the chief concern is the relationship between less-developed countries and the major markets in the North.

Frequently the products of the South—coffee, cocoa, tea, fruits —are taxed by northern states both to produce revenue and to cut consumption. The less-developed countries are deeply disturbed by these measures. The solution would seem to be a concerted effort, which is now under way in the GATT, to reduce impediments against such products and to urge importing countries to find their tax revenues in other ways. There remains the continuing problem of overproduction and price instability in many products of importance to the South. Commodity agreements now in force seem to be less than adequate; unless more steps are taken in the direction of broadening their geographic coverage and increasing the discipline on the participants, both importers and exporters, it would seem that these agreements will fall short of providing a long-term solution to commodity problems.

The problem of trade in temperate agricultural products is even more difficult and complex. If production is to be maintained at lowest cost and under the most favorable circumstances, the whole question of domestic agricultural policies and farm income in each industrialized country must be the subject of intensive international consultation. There must be a willingness on the part of every government to make concessions if trade among these countries is to be freer and more economic. On the other hand, in the coming years we must expect to be in a race against famine as the world's rapidly growing population begins to outrun its food supply. It may be necessary to maintain high-cost production on a subsidized basis in order to supply the food needs of underdeveloped countries. While this may mitigate trade problems among the countries of the North, the relationship between subsidized agriculture and commercial trade and the question of how costs are to be divided among the rich countries in supplying the food needs of the poor will remain critical.

For the United States, it seems clear that the President must be in a position to negotiate with other countries on U.S. domestic agricultural policies and to revise them in the interest of an international agreement. As an exporter, the United States is interested both in its commercial exports because of their importance to its balance-of-payments position and in its role as a major provider of foreign aid to the less-developed countries. These

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

two interests can and ought to be reconciled in the larger context of international trade and comity. The essential point is that the President, under proper Congressional safeguards, should be authorized to proceed in this direction.

In the case of some agricultural products that present no serious problems, agreement might be reached to treat them as industrial goods subject to normal gradual tariff reductions. This technique was applied by the EFTA countries in 1963 for a number of items, mainly on Portugal's behalf. The special treatment of tropical products of particular interest to the less-developed countries is already under consideration by the United States and the GATT.

WFTA and the United States: Legislative Proposals

The proposed World Free Trade Association offers a plan for removing tariffs and nontariff barriers over a minimum of ten years (and more probably twenty years), at the initiative of the United States but with the initial participation of a majority of the developed nations of the world. During these ten years there are bound to be great and rapid changes in the world economy as well as in political relations between countries and among groups of countries. To meet these contingencies, Congress should give the President broad and flexible negotiating authority, subject to broad criteria defining the national interest and emphasizing the economic, defense and other objectives of the nation as a whole, including its formidable international political responsibilities.

A principal consideration will be the potential impact of WFTA on the U.S. domestic economy. Advantages for U.S. export trade must be carefully weighed against possible disadvantages to domestic industry and agriculture. The legislation should provide for Presidential accountability to Congress in the form of annual reports detailing (1) actual use of the authority, and (2) the effect of WFTA operations on the American economy (with recommendations for remedial legislation if necessary) and the overall objectives of the United States.

It is important that the legislation authorizing U.S. participation in a World Free Trade Association include adjustment provisions similiar to those recommended above for the revision and proposed two-year extension of the 1962 Trade Expansion Act.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Measures for the protection of countries encountering balance-of-payments difficulties are currently being applied successfully by the IMF and the GATT, and of course will be applicable to WFTA members. No special balance-of-payments problems should be anticipated for the United States as a result of its participation in this free trade association. While average U.S. tariffs have decreased substantially from the rates in force when the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act was passed in 1934, our volume of exports has increased and we have enjoyed a favorable balance of trade on merchandise account in all of the intervening years. Our current balance-of-payments difficulties arise not from any inability to compete in world markets, but from military and foreign aid commitments, foreign investments and tourism. Consequently there is no reason to fear that U.S. industry and agriculture will be unable to sustain in the future, as they have over the past thirty-odd years, their overall predominance during the contemplated gradual reduction of tariffs. Complaints against U.S. technological superiority voiced by other countries—notably by the Common Market nations—are most reassuring on this score.

At this point a brief comment on the present TEA is necessary because of the possibility that future legislation might follow the postwar pattern of holding general trade conferences instead of seeking to form a free trade area. New legislation should delegate broad authority to the President to negotiate trade agreements without specific restrictions such as the 50 per cent limit on tariff reductions under the present act. This will allay a frequent (and justifiable) criticism of our current legislation. The United States is the only country that places such restrictions on its negotiators, primarily because the fixing of tariffs is, under the Constitution, a prerogative of the Congress. Delegation of this authority has always been hedged with strict limitations, presumably because of Congressional distrust of the Executive branch, or Congressional anxiety over import competition and possible injury to certain sectors of industry or agriculture. Government negotiators, however, backed as they are by nongovernment technical advisers from both industry and agriculture, might better serve both the national interest and various private interests if they were not hampered in their negotiations by arbitrary numerical and other limitations. There is nothing magical about a 50 per cent tariff reduction, instead of a figure of 25, 75 or

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

100 per cent, as being in the best interests of an industry or of the nation as a whole. If our negotiators should make unwise decisions, these could normally be rectified by adjustment assistance, or in extreme cases by Congressional action.

The Atlantic Community, EEC and EFTA

Let us now examine the possible effects of a WFTA on the relations of the United States with the Common Market, the European Free Trade Association, NATO and the Atlantic Community.

The six countries of the EEC (France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg) have enjoyed increasing economic prosperity since the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957. As internal tariffs have fallen, trade among Community members (1958-1966) has increased by 242 per cent, as compared with an increase of 89 per cent in their trade with the rest of the world. As a unit, the Six has become a formidable trading bloc. Currently the fastest-growing internal market in the world, the EEC commands, by virtue of its common external tariff and a volume of external trade surpassing that of the United States, greater bargaining power than the United States in trade negotiations. Primarily as a result of French pressure, the Common Market has adopted an isolationist-protectionist attitude during the tariff negotiations of the Kennedy Round. The common external tariff is the principal cement now holding the Six together. Unless other sections of the Treaty of Rome are implemented over the next several years, this bond may not prove strong enough to prevent the dissolution of the Community.

The EFTA countries, often called the "Outer Seven," abolished tariffs on trade among themselves (with some exceptions) on January 1, 1967. As tariff barriers within the EEC and EFTA are removed, maintenance of the Common Market common external tariff threatens to disrupt European trade and investment patterns between the Six and the Seven as well as with other countries—unless substantial tariff reductions are negotiated in the Kennedy Round.

If the Common Market continues its inward-looking policies and other European countries cannot gain admission to it, the latter may find in the proposed WFTA an alternative method of expanding their markets, as well as a potential counterbalance to the EEC in any future trade negotiations. It is also possible

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that an agreement by the EFTA countries to form the WFTA together with the United States, Canada and other nations may either be so attractive to the EEC or, conversely, pose a sufficient threat to the EEC, as to cause it to consider joining the WFTA.

To cope with Great Britain's economic difficulties, Prime Minister Wilson and the Labour Party decreed a policy of drastic deflation and have determined to renew Britain's application to join the Common Market. However, in doing this the United Kingdom will face some very real problems. Acceptance of Common Market agricultural policies will inevitably result in higher food costs to the British consumer; and the delicate issue of the pound sterling is bound to complicate negotiations. If the EEC nations deem it necessary that sterling be devalued in order to make British industry more competitive and to rectify Britain's adverse balance of payments, and the British refuse to take this step, it is questionable whether France or even the other five EEC nations would vote for British membership.

It is also questionable whether sterling as a reserve currency entailing world financial obligations has a place within the EEC as presently constituted. On the other hand, the recent reorientation of the German government toward a stronger and more independent position within the EEC may cause France to accede to the British request to join the Common Market. Britain's inclusion would create a counterbalance to a Germany that is stronger than France both economically and militarily (except for nuclear capability), and for the first time since 1945 threatens to pursue policies independent of both France and the United States.

In any case, Britain's request for membership in the EEC may not be granted for a few years—and perhaps not at all. Britain wants and needs membership for political and economic reasons. Her exclusion has eliminated her political influence in maintaining the balance of power on the Continent. Economically she needs a larger market for her industrial products as well as the tough competition that would be provided by the industries of the Common Market, and that is not afforded now by her six EFTA partners. An enlarged free trade area such as the proposed WFTA might well be an attractive solution. Conversely, an agreement by Great Britain to join the WFTA might block her way into the EEC unless the latter were to become a member also.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

From the point of view of the United States, it would be to our advantage if the British were to join the Common Market and if the Six as a unit were to join the Seven in an enlarged free trade association. A united Europe, including the United Kingdom and working in cooperation with the United States and Canada, could become a major force in establishing a solid foundation for world peace and prosperity. The danger exists, however, that a united Europe might pursue protectionist trade policies, might develop antagonistic attitudes toward the United States, with the avowed purpose of becoming a political "third force," and might not assume its share of responsibilities to the less-developed countries. As such it would pose a serious threat to the United States and to the security of the Western world. By proposing a WFTA the United States could help to reduce these dangers and retard the threat to established patterns of trade resulting from tariff and other barriers erected by the two rival European trading blocs.

In proposing a WFTA, the United States would be laying the foundation for an economic structure compatible with its commitments to GATT and the IMF and yet broad enough to include dissimilar economic groups. Because the WFTA would seek to include all developed nations, Washington would be able to counteract the probable accusation that it was trying to undermine the EEC or to dominate the nations of Europe. Indeed, a WFTA proposal might result in giving new expression and meaning to the concept of an Atlantic Community, both militarily and economically. Constructive economic cooperation in a WFTA might counteract the disintegration of NATO, a symptom of the changing political attitudes and increasing economic strength of Europe during the last decade. It might encourage the EEC to divert some of its attention from internal concerns to those of the Atlantic Community and the world as a whole.

A New Look at East-West Trade

A review of U.S. East-West trade policy should be undertaken in developing a U.S. foreign trade policy for the coming decade and in planning for the proposed WFTA. In the first instance, it will be necessary to formulate policies and procedures for trading with countries maintaining collectivist economies. This includes all the communist countries of Eastern Europe and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Asia, except Yugoslavia.[11] Second, when any communist country adopts sufficient features of a free economy, similar to Yugoslavia's, it should become eligible for membership in the WFTA. In other words, the development of East-West trade could proceed side by side with the development of WFTA. As the Eastern bloc acquires trade and payments procedures similar to those of the market economies of the industrialized West, steps could and should be taken to explore mechanisms to enable the collectivist nations to become partial or full members of the WFTA.

On February 16, 1965, President Johnson appointed a special committee, with J. Irwin Miller of the Cummins Engine Company as chairman, to "explore all aspects of expanding peaceful trade in support of the President's policy of widening constructive relations with the countries of Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R." In its report of April 29, 1965, the Miller Committee recommended that the United States use trade negotiations with individual communist countries more actively, aggressively and confidently in the pursuit of our national welfare and world peace. The committee emphasized, however, that political, and not commercial or economic, considerations should determine the formulation and execution of our trade policies with communist nations.

Several of the Miller Committee's recommendations (notably proposals to expand credit guarantees and to extend MFN treatment to communist nations other than Poland and Yugoslavia) were embodied in the Administration's East-West Trade bill of 1966. But Congress took no action on this measure, and the President has not yet submitted a new East-West Trade bill to the 90th Congress.

The United States will undoubtedly liberalize its policy in the direction of expanding East-West trade in the years ahead. Such liberalization, however, should be judged against the political reality of Soviet statements and actions antagonistic to U.S. interests. Despite recent steps which suggest that there may be areas in which American and Soviet interests coincide—the recent treaty (still to be ratified by the U.S. Senate) to outlaw the use of outer space for military purposes, the agreement to open a direct Moscow-New York air service, the Consular Treaty, and the continuing negotiations on a nuclear nonproliferation treaty

[11]Modifications in its economic and monetary system have allowed Yugoslavia to adhere to the GATT and conduct trade in a manner not greatly different from that practiced between nations with free economies.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

—we must not forget that it is scarcely six years since the Berlin Wall was built, and not yet five years since the Cuban nuclear confrontation. In addition, the Soviets currently are providing large-scale military assistance to North Viet Nam, thus prolonging the Vietnamese war. On the other hand, the communist countries no longer constitute a monolithic bloc. The apparently irrevocable split between China and the Soviet Union and the efforts of certain East European countries to assert increasing independence of the USSR afford opportunities for the United States to use its dominant position in world trade in furtherance of its policies.

Until very recently, it has been U.S. policy to limit trade with most communist countries to minimum levels. This policy has been based largely on the theory (or the fear) that such trade would be of greater benefit to the communists than to ourselves. During periods of acute crisis or war, many Americans have felt moral compunctions about trading with the enemy. Most West European countries and Japan, however, have deliberately and steadily increased their trade with communist nations. They have acted jointly with the United States only in embargoing trade in certain strategic military hardware and goods having direct military application, the so-called COCOM list, which has been steadily shrinking in length over the years. The U.S. list of embargoed items is considerably more extensive than the COCOM list.

Because of our more rigid and uncompromising attitude—official or popular—toward expanding trade with communist nations, many U.S. firms have either been prohibited from competing for such business or inhibited from bidding because of fear of adverse publicity in this country. In many cases they have been unable to match the more liberal credit terms offered by competitors in other industrialized countries.

While the communist states have generally been punctilious in the prompt repayment of commercial credits in convertible currencies, private firms are nevertheless reluctant to extend such credits without guarantees. The Export-Import Bank has been cautious in extending such guarantees to American traders, adhering to the rules of the Berne Convention in limiting guarantees to five years, and then only for major capital exports.[12] Our government has taken the view that guarantees are in effect a

[12]The President can authorize the Export-Import Bank to guarantee commercial credits to a communist country when he determines that guarantees to such a country are in the national interest. The terms of such credits must be within the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

form of foreign aid, and can be equated with the transfer of capital, releasing scarce foreign exchange which communist governments might use for purposes hostile to U.S. interests. Other Western countries have been more liberal in guaranteeing commercial credits, and efforts to hammer out agreements on credit terms with our NATO allies and Japan have so far been unsuccessful.

The first recommendation for future U.S. East-West trade policy is procedural in nature: The President should be granted sufficient authority to determine a course of action without the burden of Congressional prohibitions. Since communist trade policies are rarely established without regard to their political implications, the President should have the freedom to determine U.S. measures of economic intercourse so as to achieve the greatest political and security, as well as economic, advantage for the United States. He should be accountable to Congress for his actions, of course, and should be required to present an annual report on steps taken to expand or contract trade with communist nations.

Specifically, the President should be authorized to extend or withdraw MFN treatment in trade relations with selected communist countries when he finds this to be in the national interest of the United States. (At present, this authority exists only for trade with Poland and Yugoslavia.) He should also be given authority to permit appropriate government agencies to extend credits or to guarantee private credit for nonstrategic trade with communist countries up to a maximum of five years, or, if forced by competition from other noncommunist countries, for an even longer period.

Finally, our policy of a complete embargo on trade with Communist China should be reviewed. Despite that country's intransigent and aggressive posture, there is always the possibility that limited trade with China could be of distinct advantage to us. For example, the United States might have been able to bid successfully against Canada for its recent huge sales of wheat to China, and this would have enabled us to reduce our balance-of-payments deficit. In sum, the Congress should not make it impossible for the President to take action in regard to trade with

range of common commercial practices, but in any event it is U.S. government policy to limit such credits to five years. This limit is also consistent with the Berne Union—a long-standing, though informal, agreement reached by leading insuring and guaranteeing institutions in the field of international credit.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Communist China when he deems this to be in our national interest.

Summary

This paper has proposed a new approach for an international trade policy to meet the complex political and economic issues that will confront the United States over the coming decade. It would appear to be impolitic to introduce major new legislative proposals involving controversial foreign trade policy initiatives in 1967 or 1968. During these two years, the President should explore with all other countries (with a view to introducing the necessary legislative proposals to the U.S. Congress in 1969) the possibility of establishing a World Free Trade Association patterned after the European Free Trade Association.

Congress should give the President broad and flexible negotiating authority, permitting such initiatives. The legislation should set forth broad criteria defining the national interest, emphasizing the economic, defense and other international objectives of the nation. Congress should also delegate to the President certain powers in connection with East-West trade designed (1) to open the proposed WFTA to communist countries under certain conditions, (2) to extend or withdraw MFN treatment consonant with the national interest, (3) to extend credits or guarantee private credits for nonstrategic trade, and (4) to consider limited trade with China.

The WFTA, established within the framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, would be open to all nations at any time. It should be established at the outset, however, only if a substantial number of the developed countries became founding members. This initial group should include the United States, Canada, the seven EFTA nations (Great Britain, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland, Portugal and Austria), and hopefully, Australia, New Zealand and Japan. The EEC should be urged to join as a unit, but WFTA should be formed regardless of whether EEC acceded at the start.

In proposing WFTA, the United States would be following the precedent, established in the formation of EEC, EFTA and other regional groupings, of departing from the unconditional MFN principle—a cornerstone of U.S. tariff policy since 1923—in return for achieving substantially free-trade conditions over a broad area within a designated time period. Such conditional (as

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

opposed to unconditional) free trade arrangements are permitted under the rules of GATT.

An International Trade Review Board should be established to define the criteria by which a nation qualifies as a less-developed country; to determine which countries and which industries are eligible for special tariff preferences; and to conduct continuing reviews to ascertain at what point special preferences should be withdrawn from such countries or industries within those countries. The ITRB would be composed of three individuals, one from each of three organizations enjoying great international confidence: the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the GATT.

The ITRB should be empowered to grant special tariff preferences subject to certain limitations: (1) preferences should be granted only if all or a substantial number of importing countries are prepared to open their markets to selected products; (2) importing countries should be permitted to exclude certain less-developed countries from the benefits of preferential treatment if the ITRB should determine that such countries were able to compete on relatively equal economic terms with the industries of importing countries; and (3) preferences should be granted for a limited period—perhaps not to exceed ten years and with gradual reductions—and should be subject to review and termination by the ITRB.

It is important that the less-developed countries, for their part, commit themselves to liberalize the flow of goods and capital into their countries and to assure fair treatment for both. Those receiving preferential treatment should be required to report annually to the ITRB on steps taken to fulfill these commitments.

The WFTA, combining the advantages of both multilateralism and regionalism, should have a salutary effect on political, economic and military developments in Western Europe and on relationships among the nations of the Atlantic Community. It could reduce current threats to established patterns of trade resulting from tariff and other trade barriers erected by the two rival European trade blocs. If the Common Market should decide against joining WFTA, the other European countries may find in the WFTA an alternative method of expanding their markets. If Great Britain is unsuccessful in winning entrance into the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

European Common Market, she may find an enlarged free trade area an attractive alternative.

From the American point of view, it would be most advantageous if the British were to join the Common Market, and the EEC and EFTA were to come to an agreement which, with U.S. and Canadian participation, would be the basis of an Atlantic Community. There is a danger to the United States and to the security of the Western world in an inward-looking united Europe pursuing protectionist trade policies with little regard for its relationships with the United States and its responsibilities to the less-developed countries, and bent on becoming a political "third force" between the United States and the Soviet Union.

This two-step policy should help to sustain the continuing expansion of commerce among nations, strengthen U.S. leadership in the international trade field, and contribute to the lowering of international tensions.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE COMING CHINESE COMMUNIST NUCLEAR THREAT AND U.S. SEA-BASED ABM OPTIONS

by Paul C. Davis

FOR some years now the debate has raged, notably in the Department of Defense and in Congress, over the merits of deploying the Nike-X AICBM (anti-intercontinental ballistic missile) system to deter or degrade a Soviet ICBM attack on the United States. Year after year the McNamara decision has been to postpone deployment, partly because of its enormous cost, but primarily because it appears that the Soviet Union could refine its ICBM system to nullify Nike-X in the time it would take to deploy the latter.

The dawn of the nuclear weapon age in the Chinese Peoples' Republic (CPR) has evoked renewed interest in AICBM's at the highest levels of the Defense Department. Interest intensified particularly during 1966-1967, as the pace of Communist China's nuclear testing outstripped Western expectations, culminating in the October and December 1966 tests, including a nuclear-missile combination, and the June 1967 test of a hydrogen device. Defense planners are rightly asking whether an effective anti-Chinese missile defense system such as Nike-X may be feasible, since Chinese first-generation nuclear missiles would pose technical difficulties of a lesser order than those of the sophisticated Soviet system.[1] The Department of Defense assumption that a deployed "thin" Nike-X system, costing on the order of $4 billion, could be damage-denying against a small-scale first-generation Chinese attack in 1975 permits an optimism about defending against the coming Chinese nuclear threat to the United States which has long been absent from consideration of the Soviet problem.[2] Nike-X or its follow-on may well have a new lease on life.

The renewed debate, however, has been marked by virtually no

[1]The possibility of threats to the United States from other new nuclear states is not examined here because of space limitations. The writer believes that possibilities over the next decade would not invalidate the approach taken in the present study.

[2]The new mood is reflected notably in testimony contained in the *Department of Defense Appropriations for FY 1967, Hearings,* before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, 89th Congress, 2nd Session, 1966.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

discussion of the possibilities of a sea-based anti-ballistic missile system as an alternative to Nike-X.[3] Nor has a dialogue yet developed which examines anti-CPR system choices in light of the psycho-political implications of a nuclear-armed China menacing an unstable, divided Asia. Specifically, the debate has not viewed the defense problem in the context of the full range of nuclear missile combinations likely to become available to Communist China in the coming years—not only ICBM's but shorter-range offensive missiles.

This study explores basic political, strategic and semi-technical considerations affecting the possible utility of sea-based AICBM, AIRBM (intermediate-range) and AMRBM (medium-range) systems as counters to the potential nuclear threat from Communist China a decade hence. There will be no attempt to investigate the entire range of alternatives, inasmuch as Nike-X and space-based systems have been extensively discussed elsewhere. Nor will we analyze the complete interplay of offensive and defensive missile systems, for this topic, too, has been explored and debated at length.[4] Rather, by concentrating upon sea-based options, I hope to stimulate consideration of a fuller range of defense system alternatives, and to provoke at the same time a dialogue over the military implications of U.S. nuclear credibility in Asia which sooner or later must be joined by those scholars and officials interested in or responsible for broad defense and security matters.

We are concerned particularly with the unique merits and limitations of sea-based defense systems. Nevertheless, the analysis is developed within the context of the politico-strategic problem of choice among AICBM and AIRBM alternatives or combinations. For the AICBM problem can be fully understood and the full range of sea-based possibilities illuminated only when they are examined in a comprehensive conceptual framework. This framework provides the organizing principle of the analysis. The merits of AICBM and AIRBM responses are treated in sequence, each in the context of (1) the strategic character of the Chinese threat invoking need for that response and (2) the applicability of the

[3]See, however, J. I. Coffey, "The Chinese and Ballistic Missile Defense," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, December 1965, pp. 17-19.

[4]One exception is the little-discussed area of the relationship of AIRBM defense in Asia to the problem of retaliation. It seems essential, in this geographic context, to introduce a new perspective of measured nuclear retaliation short of general war as an indispensable system aspect of nuclear deterrence localized to Asia. This is discussed on pp. 60-62 below.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sea-based alternative to the particular threat. The AMRBM problem is then explored, but only briefly, because it does not prove amenable to solution within the next decade by either land-based or sea-based defensive means. Finally, we summarize the relative merits of sea-based AICBM and AIRBM alternatives or a combination of such systems.

There are various possible forms of a sea-based ballistic missile defense system. Theoretically, for example, one could devise a system based solely on submersible and airborne or spaceborne components. Since, however, a sea-based anti-Chinese system would be needed, if at all, by 1975 or even earlier, the present analysis is premised upon a relatively unsophisticated system, one in which the main elements are mounted on surface vessels. The launching platform might be a converted transport or small carrier; the missile system might be an adaptation of the Nike Zeus (the system would be designed for mid-course rather than terminal intercept); and detection systems might be carried by picket ships or converted destroyers, supplemented by carrier-based picket aircraft. Since our analysis is essentially a preliminary politico-strategic exploration, more precise definition of the technical aspects of the system is unnecessary.

The Coming ICBM Threat from Communist China

China will likely remain a serious strategic adversary of the United States in the 1975-1980 period, as well as a serious political and military threat to Asian states whose security is vital to U.S. interests. By then it will undoubtedly have been admitted to the United Nations and accorded diplomatic recognition by most of the world's states, including the United States. Strengthened by this added prestige and possibly a faster developing economy, the Peoples' Republic of China will have a greater capability to menace its neighbors in 1975 than it has today. China can be expected to threaten India, Taiwan and the states of Southeast Asia. It may also seek to intimidate Japan, particularly if U.S. nuclear forces have been withdrawn from the immediate area. Whatever admixture of influences motivates it ("Middle Kingdom" restoration, the securing of a sphere of influence along its borders, or Maoist-Marxist ideology), the CPR is likely to seek to establish its reputation as a world power and its hegemony in Asia through political, military and psychological pressures.

By 1975 Communist China is likely to have a limited ICBM

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

capability. The present line of technological development and testing suggests that the decision to attain this goal has already been made. Recent Defense Department interest in deploying a "thin" Nike-X system (minus the terminal Sprint intercept missile) suggests that there is confirmation of the Chinese decision to develop these weapons.[5] A limited ICBM capability would probably be something less than fifty weapons. It may be that, faced with thousands of U.S. ICBM's and a competing demand for more regionally useful shorter-range missiles, China will decide, after having developed them, not to deploy any ICBM's. It seems, however, far more likely that it will deploy at least a token force for political and psychological reasons, including the hope of compelling the United States to take smaller risks in Asia.

If we conclude that Communist China can deploy its ICBM system by 1975, the question arises whether a U.S. anti-China AICBM system would be necessary on purely military grounds by that date. Assuming no fundamental change in the U.S./USSR strategic balance, and reasoning solely from the example of the U.S.-Soviet nuclear confrontation, one would have to doubt its necessity. China's arsenal will be but a fraction of the American. The Soviet Union, with a nuclear arsenal much closer to parity with that of the United States, has been effectively deterred—as evidenced by her appraisal of the risks of nuclear war expressed in the continuing Sino-Soviet debate, by the outcome of the Cuban missile crisis, and by her actions in other confrontations with the United States. U.S. retaliation could effectively destroy China. In addition, China must reckon not with one but with two major enemies; she must calculate how Moscow would react as well. As the Sino-Soviet rift may be expected to continue through 1975-1985, China could not afford to expend her small arsenal of ICBM's against the United States; we can almost certainly assume that they will be used only for the blackmail of weaker states, and to a limited degree for nuclear deterrence. The only situation in which a threatened U.S. retaliatory strike would probably not be feasible as a deterrent to a Chinese ICBM attack would be one in which the Soviet Union deployed an effective AICBM system and the United States did not. The Soviet Union might then be able to "punish" the United States for an attack against the CPR, or at least deter such U.S. action. It is hard to conceive that the United States would permit

[5]See *DOD Appropriations for FY 1967, Hearings, op. cit.*, e.g., pp. 127 ff.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

so serious an imbalance in U.S.-Soviet retaliatory and defensive capabilities at the nuclear level, despite current arguments against ABM deployment.

While a Chinese ICBM attack on the United States seems improbable on military grounds, a number of nonmilitary considerations make U.S. leaders somewhat uncertain about the deterrent effect upon the CPR of our retaliatory forces: for example, China's revolutionary fervor and ideological dogmatism, the historical animosity of her leaders toward the United States, her great willingness to bluff which derives from her weakness, the primitiveness of her economic stake in survival, and the protection the Soviet nuclear posture affords China. These uncertainties may justify the costs for a defensive system, particularly if damage-denial capability can be bought by equivalent reductions elsewhere in the budget. If the existence of a U.S. AICBM system could spell the difference between no or virtually no American deaths[6] and, say, twenty-five million deaths, a fairly sizeable investment ($3-4 billions, according to DOD estimates) might seem worthwhile insurance.

Experts agree that ABM deployments against China's first-generation ICBM's would make a difference both in damage denial and certainty of deterrence that is no longer possible with respect to the Soviet threat. Yet the purely military case for an AICBM may not prove persuasive to defense policymakers, for, despite the added uncertainty, the credibility of a Chinese attack would nonetheless be low. Although on purely military grounds a Chinese ICBM force might seem an unrewarding device in the face of the huge U.S. preponderance of nuclear force, such a limited capability could be useful in persuading Asian states that the United States was no longer willing to risk defending them.[7] Chinese acquisition of the capability to strike the United States with ICBM's, even though she would not be likely to exercise it, would tend to depress the morale of Asian states. They would be increasingly concerned as to American willingness to defend them at risk of an attack on the U.S. homeland. Thus China could gain far-reaching political and psychological advantage so long as the United States was open to ICBM attack. Not only would Asian

[6]Assuming, that is, that damage denial approaches rather than equals a perfect defense.

[7]See, for example, Morton Halperin, *China and the Bomb* (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 155.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

states doubt U.S. willingness to defend them in a variety of circumstances, but Washington would in fact be compelled to act with some caution in its dealings with Peking, and to accord China a stronger voice in the resolution of important international problems.

Moreover, segments of American opinion might not be willing to believe that the risk of attack is low, and even U.S. leaders, in crisis situations, might hedge their actions against the possibility of a Chinese attack.[8] It will probably become necessary for psychological and political reasons, therefore, to demonstrate U.S. impregnability by deploying an anti-Chinese ICBM defense.[9]

The technical utility of an anti-Chinese AICBM is generally accepted by experts. One argument to the contrary deserves comment: the argument that defense against a first-generation system is fruitless because the second-generation offensive system could not be coped with.[10] This argument has serious limitations. It apparently reasons from the false analogy of the race of U.S. defensive technology to keep abreast of Soviet offensive nuclear-delivery potentialities. U.S. defensive missile and detection capabilities are years in advance of Chinese offensive technology. By the time Communist China could produce a second-generation offensive capability—probably not before 1980-1985—the fifteen years or so of intervening U.S. research and development may well have permitted solution of the problem of intercepting such an attack. This is a fundamental consideration, for the capacity of U.S. AICBM system development to remain technically ahead of Chinese offensive capabilities is crucial to the decision to commit large sums of money to the deployment of such a system. An unwarrantedly pessimistic judgment in this matter could have profound consequences for our future power in Asia. That we can now seriously consider sea-based alternatives to Nike is one evidence of the fact that we need not be pessimistic—that we have good prospects for maintaining an anti-Chinese damage-denial capability for many years, perhaps twenty or more.

[8]This is, of course, highly debatable. As J. I. Coffey has pointed out, *loc. cit.*, President Kennedy did not hesitate to risk millions of U.S. lives in his Cuban missile crisis decisions. But one wonders whether the smaller stakes of various crises which might occur in Asia would not permit the President to hedge against the risk of huge losses in American lives and treasure.

[9]The Defense Department believes that a thin Nike-X defense would provide damage denial against the CPR (*DOD Appropriations for FY 1967, Hearings, op. cit.*, p. 129).

[10]Advanced by Coffey, *loc. cit.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Pros and Cons of a Sea-Based AICBM System

Assuming that an anti-Chinese ICBM system should prove desirable for the above reasons, are there important advantages to be gained from the development of a sea-based ICBM system, even though a competing system (Nike-X) already exists just short of the procurement stage? There appear to be several advantages.

A sea-based system, as an alternative to a system based in the continental United States (CONUS), if suitably deployed, would minimize the tremendous difficulties of blast, radiation or fallout over U.S. cities. It is generally agreed that a CONUS-based defense program must include a large civil defense program. Against the USSR, even a combined mid-course area and terminal local defense (at a cost of more than $23 billion) could not protect the United States against detonations outside the limits of the defended areas, which would result in heavy fallout. The civil defense system must therefore include fallout shelters. To be sure, a CONUS-based damage-denial AICBM system arrayed against a first-generation Chinese system might not need to be complemented by a fallout shelter system, for it requires perhaps 50-100 megatons per offensive missile to make fallout shelters essential. But the second-generation Chinese system might be capable of producing such fallout effects even though it could not achieve effective penetration.

A sea-based system may have an additional advantage in the area of thermal radiation and blast effects, depending on its kill-ratio effects as a forward-deployed system. The so-called damage-denial (as contrasted to "damage-limiting") systems deployable against Communist China, though highly effective, cannot be expected to bring down all incoming missiles. Therefore thermal and blast protection, at least of the high priority target areas, would be essential. To the extent that earlier detection and possible multiple intercept resulted from a forward-deployed sea-based system, the intercept rate might be marginally improved and the costs of civil defense therefore might be reduced. Moreover, the earlier warning would improve the chances of the population taking cover and thus reduce casualties.

A land-based system located in Alaska or northern Canada would partly overcome the civil defense problem, but this deployment raises other problems. Political difficulties, particularly those arising from the danger of fallout over Canada and Alaska and the difficulties of reducing its effects, would develop. Personnel

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

operating efficiency might be lower than aboard ship, and construction and maintenance problems in a subarctic environment would be formidable—though, to be sure, operations in this area have proven possible. In addition, the relative permanence of commitment to such locations would entail costs, as changing Chinese threat capabilities caused the defenses to become obsolete. In sum, though both a CONUS-based and a sea-based AICBM system would have to be complemented by civil defense measures, a sea-based system gives promise of requiring a less costly civil defense program for an equivalent level of casualties.

The problem of obsolescence suggests a second advantage of a sea-based system—flexibility. As Chinese range capabilities improve, a sea-based system can be relocated for optimal detection and intercept; and as quantities of missiles grow, a defense-in-depth can be provided by stationing separate but similar sea-based systems at various distances from the launch area. Initial deployment, for example, might be southwest of Alaska and Greenland,[11] later to be supplemented by a system in the Norwegian or Barents Sea.[12]

Third, there are technical advantages in a sea-based system. Forward deployment may well permit earlier detection and successive engagements of the same ICBM. It may also strengthen other warning systems. A system based near Greenland could deepen the warning system of Western Europe (which could be reached from China by a 5,000-mile missile). Relying as it does on mid-course intercept, it may permit economies in CONUS-based systems, allowing them to be stronger on terminal intercept. Alternatively, it can provide depth to a CONUS-based area system. Among the gains from such depth is the complication it introduces for the adversary in optimizing second-generation weapon designs for penetration or evasion at various and shifting ranges of intercept.

A fourth and not insignificant advantage is the opportunity to conduct intercepts in an operational environment with maximum safety. This would facilitate development of better offensive and defensive systems, valuable experience data and realistic training.

[11]Targeting may show that the system in Greenland alone could defend all significant U.S. targets except California, but full damage denial almost certainly would require both.

[12]Possible sensitivity of the Soviet Union to such a deployment might make it impracticable. However, the lack of sophistication of the system would make clear to Moscow that it was deployed against China, and Soviet leaders might deem such a defense complementary to their own equivalent system. There are already indications that the USSR is considering similar anti-China defenses.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Finally, there may be cost advantages to a sea-based system. It could probably be deployed at less cost than the thinned-out Nike-X system, since the latter was designed to cope with a more sophisticated attack. There are no real estate costs such as those required for land-based system sites. Moreover, by withholding deployment of the Nike-X system, we would ease the task of refining the latter system for possible anti-Soviet deployment without the costs and design compromises involved in having to build on a prematurely committed system.

A sea-based system is not without disadvantages. Once Communist China acquires a submarine-based missile capability, an attack could be launched from behind the sea-based system—the ease of doing so increasing the farther forward the sea-based system was deployed. A strong anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability would, therefore, have to go hand-in-hand with a sea-based AICBM system. There would be difficulties in maintaining around-the-clock and around-the-year operational readiness peculiar to stationing at sea. Weather could degrade the efficiency of the system in the absence of highly sophisticated means of navigation, platform stability or guidance. This is the most serious weakness of a surface sea-based system. It could be compensated for by relying on retaliation alone during periods of bad weather, or by repositioning to avoid local bad weather. However, the difficulty is probably not insurmountable, as improvements in platform stabilization and navigation are likely to prove equal to all but the severest storms. At worst, the system would be reduced from damage denial to damage limiting during such storms. Finally, both a Pacific- and an Atlantic-based system, probably necessary for full defense of the United States anyhow, would permit one system to cover in good part for the other when it was inoperative.

At first glance, the vulnerability of the system to attack may seem to invalidate it. In reality, however, vulnerability would not be a problem prior to an all-out attack, since strategic and political factors would make it foolish for an enemy to tip his hand to the attack. The enemy would also be foolish if he attacked the system as part of a lesser politico-military action, for this would be viewed as preliminary to an all-out attack on the United States, and invite pre-emption. To eliminate the possibility of an irrational attack one could also publicly guarantee ICBM reprisal, though this hardly seems necessary. Vulnerability during an ICBM attack

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

on the United States would arise mainly from a simultaneous submarine attack, and would require reliance on active ASW defense. Vulnerability from missile attack would be minimal against a first-generation force of forty weapons or less, for presumably the AICBM system could approach 100 per cent effectiveness.

The IRBM and MRBM Threats

We can expect that after deploying a token force of ICBM's, Communist China is likely to give priority to IRBM and MRBM systems. She cannot compete with the United States and the USSR in producing hundreds of ICBM's without seriously impeding her economic development. Moreover, her politico-strategic aims in Asia would be best served by an arsenal of shorter-range missiles.

With IRBM's and MRBM's, Communist China would be able to practice the intimidation of states throughout Asia. These weapons would appear especially threatening to countries against which the Chinese communists are known to harbor animosities, such as Taiwan and India. Despite China's efforts to woo Japan, and the strong pressures within Japan for cooperation with China, these weapons would be considered a direct threat by Japanese leaders as well. Shorter-range systems would permit China to threaten neighboring states without seeming to threaten the United States, and Peking could exploit the target nations' reluctance to have U.S. counter-systems based on their soil. As AIRBM, and even more so AMRBM, systems require a special sophistication to cope with the short time-of-flight, target states might be discouraged from finding a military solution and turn instead to neutralism or acceptance of Chinese dominance.[13] In the absence of U.S. ballistic missile defenses, the Chinese could publicly raise doubt among Asians about U.S. willingness to retaliate with ICBM's against such attacks. Furthermore, there would be military risks in deploying U.S. conventional forces to Asia if they were not protected by suitable missile forces. Asian perception of this risk, in turn, would tend to weaken credibility in American willingness to come to the defense of Asian states.

Communist China may well be capable of building a sizeable

[13]Japan could be an exception. The sophistication of her present missile technology suggests that she could probably design an effective AIRBM system by 1975. Indeed, she may opt to do this in order to decrease her dependence on the United States. See Harrison Salisbury, *New York Times,* August 19, 1966.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

force of IRBM's and MRBM's by 1975-1985. In this she will be helped by the fact that sophisticated guidance systems are not needed to strike undefended targets—especially if the weapons are intended primarily for blackmail. A relatively inaccurate system for area attack—all that would be necessary to intimidate the non-nuclear Asian states—could prove difficult to defend against. The number of offensive weapons the Chinese could build to strike specific targets, such as surface naval vessels or the depots of deployed military forces, would, on the other hand, be quite small.

There are, of course, practical limits to the number of anti-ballistic missile systems one can provide. While the CPR could threaten a large number of Asian states with nuclear blackmail, there are probably only two which are of such strategic importance that the United States would seriously consider providing them with an active defense. The Asian countries most likely to be militarily endangered by China's IRBM's are India and Japan—if we exclude the USSR from consideration here—for these are the only ones with sufficient power to challenge China's aspiration for hegemony in the area.

India stands threatened because of the dangers in her rival ideological approach to economic development, her resistance to expansion of China's Himalayan borders, and her competition for leadership of the underdeveloped states. Her main cities and governmental centers could be attacked by IRBM's (but not MRBM's), located logically in central China, convenient for transport purposes to the nuclear production facilities around Lanchow.[14]

Although present Chinese policy is to woo rather than threaten Japan, the latter is a natural rival. To advance their interests, the Chinese will seek to limit Japan's growing influence, probably by employing a carrot and stick method of diplomatic blandishments and military threats, a combination of efforts to gain her cooperation and to isolate her. By 1975-1985 Japan is likely to be the economic leader in Asia and may pose a more formidable obstacle to CPR goals than India. Whether or not Japan decides to develop nuclear weapons, Communist China will almost certainly deploy IRBM's capable of attacking her. This is not to say that a missile attack on Japan, under present circumstances, can easily be fitted into a logical political or military strategy. But

[14]By 1975 there might be several other launching sites including areas such as Western Sinkiang and Tibet. Any Chinese submarine-based ballistic missile threat probably lies beyond 1985, and is therefore excluded from the present analysis.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

should the Chinese greatly strengthen their naval forces or patch up their dispute with the Soviets, or should relations between the communist and noncommunist worlds deteriorate, such an attack on Japan might make strategic sense.

Because India and Japan are strategically important, China will have to act with great caution and calculation before deciding to risk an IRBM attack on them. For she can expect the United States to retaliate by missile or aircraft attack on China's war-making capabilities (e.g., missile sites, command and control centers), and perhaps even with an attack designed to eliminate her as a major Asian power. Yet in an age of Chinese ICBM's, the credibility of U.S. retaliation because of an attack on India or Japan will be somewhat weakened in the eyes of the prospective target country if the United States does not have an AICBM system. To deter a Chinese communist attack on Japan or India probably does not, in purely military terms, require an intermediate-range ABM system, *provided* there is a U.S. AICBM system.

To say that an anti-CPR AICBM system deployed in the United States is essential to maintaining the credibility of the U.S. guarantee is not to say that this would be enough. Though the issue admits of no certainty, Japan and India probably will not be satisfied with deterrence through a combination of U.S. retaliation and AICBM defense, especially when they know that an even higher degree of deterrence can be assured through intermediate-range anti-ballistic missile systems. Their dissatisfaction will be heightened by their fear of the escalation implied in a U.S. retaliatory strike, and by their uncertainty as to how Soviet leaders might act if China and the United States go to war. Japan, in particular, would welcome the increased independence from the United States which a ballistic-missile defense of her homeland could provide, especially if it were under her control. She may have the capability to develop an AIRBM system herself, and has already shown interest in buying a U.S. Nike-X system. Faced with this prospect, the U.S. government may try to discourage the Japanese from building or purchasing an AIRBM system, in order to head off this very independence. Or we may be compelled to deploy a U.S.-controlled AIRBM system as the politically least undesirable alternative.

One may ask how effective an instrument of blackmail the Chinese IRBM threat will be, when one reflects on the failures of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Soviet missile blackmail against European states. But the situations are not analogous. West European states, with their strong, stable governments, are upheld in their resolve by the NATO alliance —despite its weaknesses—and by the knowledge that the United States considers preservation of Western Europe fundamental to its survival. Although Washington has broadened U.S. security commitments in Asia, there is not the same stark clarity that Asia's freedom is indispensable to U.S. survival. Consequently, European and Asian leaders hold differing views of the credibility of U.S. retaliatory guarantees.

One may also ask why, if Asian states fear the impending CPR missile threat, they do not fear the existing Soviet threat. The answer lies in China's nearness to the South Asian states, her age-old expansionist policies toward South and Southeast Asia, cultural animosities between the Chinese and other Asians, and recent evidence, such as the 1962 attack on India, that China seems more aggressive than the USSR.

A decision to deploy U.S. anti-ballistic missile systems is likely, therefore, to hinge on the need to reassure Asian states that they will be protected against a CPR attack or blackmail, rather than simply on their military utility for defense of the United States.

What combination of AICBM, AIRBM and Asia-located retaliatory forces will provide that reassurance, and best serve as a credible deterrent, permitting stabilization of the 1975-1980 balance of power in Asia? This question must be examined in the Asian political and strategic context. But first we should investigate the political and strategic utility of Asia-deployed AIRBM systems, so that we will be in a better position to compare the merits of alternative ABM combinations.

Utility of a Mobile AIRBM System

The primary objective to be sought by adding an AIRBM system to the other defense and deterrence systems in Asia would be to neutralize Chinese communist efforts at nuclear blackmail. By undermining the credibility of the Chinese threat, this system, which would probably have to be damage-denying,[15] would help to create a psychological climate in which the states on China's periphery could pursue constructive policies contributing to the

[15]A "damage-limiting" system may be meaningless in the case of Japan, whose industry and population could be devastated with very few weapons. While India's industry would not be so sensitive to marginal attacks, she might not be able to endure a single weapon psychologically, and might cease to exist as a viable state.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

general stability of the area. It would help to still the fears of nuclear proliferation among Asian states. And the most economical means of calming such fears would be to strengthen those key countries whose fortunes greatly affect the future of the weaker states.

As an alternative to a joint U.S.-Soviet guarantee to India of nuclear retaliation, which she prefers, an AIRBM system might well be a second-best means of forestalling the costly and destabilizing creation of Indian strategic nuclear forces. The cost of producing an Indian retaliatory force would undermine U.S. efforts to aid Indian economic development and India's general capacity to act as a strategic counterweight to China. The effect of deploying AIRBM systems might indeed be to reverse the general trend among nonnuclear states to aspire to membership in the nuclear club, for it would encourage them to believe that the nuclear powers would employ their nuclear superiority, not just on their own behalf, but to safeguard the nonnuclear nations.

The question of whether a U.S. AIRBM system to protect Japan ought to be developed must take into account the political consequences of a Japanese decision to develop or buy their own system. A Japanese-controlled system would increase Japan's political and military independence of the United States; for example, it would increase her freedom to set conditions for continued American use of bases on Japanese soil. But Japan would still have to rely on the United States for deterrence through retaliation, and sufficient harmony of strategic and economic interests exists to minimize the likelihood of a major change in the U.S.-Japanese security relationship. Therefore, deployment of a U.S.-controlled AIRBM system simply to forestall an independent Japanese system hardly seems worthwhile. In contrast to the Indian case, therefore, whether to build an AIRBM system may not turn out to be a problem for U.S. strategists and taxpayers. Nevertheless, it might prove to be sound economics and strategy to have one system or set of systems under U.S. control, so that we would possess the flexibility to defend more than one Asian country by deploying AIRBM's differently under various international circumstances.

An Asia-based AIRBM system would also have the strategic value of imposing costs on China for devising systems to neutralize our defenses. Even by 1975-1980, China will be too poor to bear these costs without severe strains on her economy, yet she might

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

find herself compelled to maintain her IRBM (and MRBM) striking systems to supplement her ICBM's as the best deterrence she can muster against a U.S. or Soviet first strike.

Against these advantages, one must weigh the important consideration that the deployment of AIRBM systems would tend to decrease the dependence of the major Asian states on U.S. retaliatory deterrence, and thus might increase their independence in adopting policies that run counter to U.S. policies.

Pros and Cons of a Sea-Based Form of AIRBM System

So far, our discussion in favor of an Asia-deployed U.S. ABM system applies equally to air-, ground-, or sea-based systems. What special advantages and disadvantages of a political or strategic nature does a sea-based system offer?

A sea-based system avoids the political difficulties encountered in acquiring and retaining base rights associated with ground-based systems. Pride of sovereignty, fear of retaliation by adversaries, and exploitation by dissident domestic groups in the host country make such rights an unreliable and wasting asset, if not a real political liability. This is a particularly important consideration with respect to Japan and India. Retention of present base rights in Japan is already a sore political issue, and could lead to their termination should the Japanese Socialist Party come to power. Japan, which has so far banned the basing of U.S. nuclear weapons on her territory, would then be faced with the choice of building a retaliatory missile striking force, relying on a U.S. sea-based ABM system (though she might opt for both), or building her own ABM systems. While she might decide to develop her own AIRBM system, the advantages of a sea-based system might prove persuasive, since it is especially valuable to a small, heavily populated state in terms of protecting the population, reducing real estate costs, and providing long-range detection. Even so, she would probably insist on controlling her own system, whether U.S.-designed or not, rather than risk being drawn into wider security commitments through reliance on U.S. naval forces.

An important advantage to the United States of a sea-based system is the extra security gained by not having to expose the system to espionage or sabotage, or to make disclosures to a host country. This would be especially important in defending India, whose leaders might otherwise feel obligated for political reasons to accept a system using both Soviet and American elements.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Besides the political advantages of a sea-based system, there are advantages in its mobility. This feature would enable it to take account of changes in the target-orientation and launch-location of Chinese missile systems. Such changes can be expected, as the number and family of missiles grow, and as China alters her blackmail targets in accordance with changing political issues and national strategic priorities. Furthermore, because it can be positioned close to possible launch areas, this system may be able to serve as an early warning element of an AICBM system.

A sea-based system does have one significant disadvantage compared to a ground-, air- or space-based system. Limitations in technology may make it relatively ineffective in defending nations not separated by water from China. Yet even this disadvantage can be partly overcome: India could be defended from the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea,[16] though at the risk of heavy casualties from fallout. Southeast Asian countries could be defended from the South China Sea and the Bay of Bengal, sharing in part systems able to defend India. It is difficult to see how anything *other than* a sea-based system could provide Japan with appropriate acquisition radar or launch locations, while it would almost certainly be politically infeasible to defend Indonesia from locations on the Asian mainland.

Other disadvantages of a sea-based system are those usually associated with the special problems of precision of fire, logistics, and manpower efficiency after long periods at sea, problems which Polaris has shown can be overcome.

The preceding arguments tend to support the desirability of sea-based AIRBM systems compared to land-based systems and to sole reliance on limited retaliation (i.e., IRBM's and MRBM's) for deterrence in Asia. However, we have not evaluated the relative merits of an AICBM vs. an AIRBM system or the desirability of some combination of ABM systems or ABM and limited retaliatory systems. What seems to be the best alternative? Is a combination of systems desirable?

On balance, it appears that deterring Chinese missile attacks in Asia will be accomplished better by improving the credibility of U.S. retaliation than by providing an impregnable defense against actual attacks. It happens also to be less costly. To be sure, neither an AICBM system without AIRBM systems nor the reverse will completely remove Asian doubts about U.S. determina-

[16]From the Bay of Bengal alone, if Chinese missiles are located in central China rather than, say, western Tibet.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion and intent. The deployment of both systems would, however, probably reassure Asian leaders to the point where they will have the fortitude to remain outside the communist bloc and to strengthen themselves against Chinese encroachments.

The AIRBM alternative would be more costly; and, even if systems were provided to defend Japan, India and perhaps Indonesia, there would still be other Asian states living in fear of a Chinese strike. Furthermore, since a defense against MRBM's seems impracticable, deterrence of this form of threat must be based on retaliation, and retaliation, to be convincing to Asians, must be premised on a secure America. Thus, damage denial to CONUS is the surest basis for credible deterrence against MRBM attacks.[17] At some distant time, a combination of AICBM and AIRBM systems may become necessary, as improved Chinese ICBM's degrade the CONUS defense. But that time lies beyond 1980. The requirement now is for building an AICBM system to strengthen Asian confidence in our will to retaliate, rather than deploying AIRBM systems to defend various countries. The former is also probably in a technical sense an easier problem to solve.

To be effective, an Asian deterrence posture based on AICBM's depends also on having retaliatory means appropriate to meet lesser attacks. Should aircraft become obsolescent due to SAM developments during the period to 1975, we could not dispense with AIRBM's unless we deployed offensive nuclear weapons systems capable of delivering selective graduated retaliatory attacks distinguishable in their effects and flight patterns from the all-out targeting of counterforce and city-attacking ICBM's appropriate to general war. Such systems should be tailored to punish CPR missile attacks in ways which keep escalation under control and avoid provoking either a desperation Chinese ICBM attack or a Soviet ICBM attack based on misinterpretation of U.S. intent. They must, in other words, be system-target combinations which can selectively punish Communist China without threatening her survival. For this purpose, fleet ballistic missile submarines (FBMS) might prove suitable, provided the targeting of some missiles was planned for missions other than those included in the present national strategic targeting system, which presumably is premised on general nuclear war and the need to destroy Com-

[17] A perhaps not insignificant dividend would be the marginally strengthened warning provided to Western Europe against Chinese ICBM's by a sea-based North Atlantic defense.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

munist China's full war-making capacity. Systems such as FBMS would not only avoid overflight of the USSR in attacks on China, but would permit the delivery of less powerful and costly weapons than would ICBM's.[18]

In summary, a system based on a combination of a sea-based AICBM system and sea-based IRBM retaliatory weapons merits investigation as a high priority matter, with the objective of operational readiness by 1975. Sea-based AIRBM systems should be investigated as a lower priority alternative, pointing toward a possible need after 1980.

The MRBM-AMRBM Problem

Defense against MRBM's is, for the most part, a separate technical problem, because normally it depends on terminal rather than mid-range intercept, and therefore on ground-based rather than sea-based means. Nevertheless, in examining the Chinese nuclear threat we must take into account the strategic context of the MRBM threat as well. Many of China's potential adversaries are contiguous or nearby neighbors, her technical limitations suggest that the MRBM option is a plausible one, and the psychology of blackmail and credible deterrence in Asia inescapably links the full range of offensive nuclear delivery options.

Taiwan as an MRBM Target. The chief likely target for Chinese communist MRBM deployments is Taiwan. Since Taiwan has a defense treaty with the United States obligating Washington to act in event of attack, this guarantee will probably deter a Chinese MRBM attack. The United States will seek to retain its bases in Taiwan indefinitely, particularly since it must face the prospect that its base rights in Japan will eventually be curtailed or terminated. The U.S. presence on Taiwan will act as a deterrent. Therefore, although the intervening water technically facilitates solution of the AMRBM problem, there appears to be no need for such a system.

U.S. action to honor the commitment to Taiwan in event of an MRBM strike would be easier to take if an anti-China AICBM system were in existence. Even without it, the U.S. government would probably take some form of retaliatory action. We would be faced with the alternatives of an all-out pre-emptive first strike against China's ICBM complex or a limited retaliatory action so

[18]For example, FBMS's could carry both missiles included in the strategic targeting system and missiles armed and targeted for a lower level of retaliation.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

as not to threaten the survival of Communist China. Most probably, the United States would choose the latter course. In doing so, Washington would have to calculate carefully the threshold at which Peking might launch a last-gasp ICBM strike. Chinese leaders, in turn, would have to weigh the alternatives facing the U.S. President before deciding to make the MRBM strike in the first place. Even assuming the possibility of an attack with impunity, it is difficult to see what Communist China could gain by the strike if Chinese forces cannot cross the Formosa Strait—an impossibility so long as the Seventh Fleet remains there. On balance, the improbability of Peking developing a rationale for an MRBM attack on Taiwan and the high risk of U.S. retaliation both argue against the need for an AMRBM system to defend Taiwan.

Other Target Countries. There are a number of other countries which Communist China may seek to blackmail through MRBM threats. CPR blackmail could pressure such states into a variety of costly actions, such as withdrawal from SEATO, admitting communist groups into the government, or denial of base rights to the United States. Execution of a Chinese threat seems far less likely. To defeat or control these states, Peking would probably prefer to use other military means, such as guerrilla or limited warfare.

The United States is prepared to deter such attacks by means of a variety of conventional and tactical nuclear measures. Should the U.S. government come to believe that the strengthening of the morale of these states requires a forward anti-ballistic missile defense, it could deploy AIRBM systems in the Bay of Bengal and the South China Sea as partial protection for the Southeast Asian countries. However, the technical problems and costs of providing a system effective against an MRBM family of various ranges and in defense of a multitude of possible targets are likely to militate against such a system for a long time, and perhaps forever.

The utility of an AMRBM system becomes particularly questionable when one thinks of certain technical difficulties. With ranges of less than 700 or 800 miles, these MRBM's have flight durations of under a minute. Nothing less than a completely automatic response using terminal-type missiles (actually, missiles with the speed of terminal types such as Sprint but intercepting in mid-course) would seem to suffice. Because of the low altitude

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of intercept, neutralization of the warhead would be essential. A sea-based system would in many cases have to violate national waters to be positioned along the line of projection of expected trajectories, and certainly cannot be located at the target for terminal intercept. The need for terminal intercept militates against a sea-based system. Indeed, until such time as the state-of-the-art for ground-to-air, close-in intercept has advanced considerably, it would seem difficult to justify efforts to develop even a ground-based system, except perhaps for the high priority battlefield anti-missile systems needed to provide security for combat-deployed U.S. ground forces.

Summary

The best we can hope for in terms of state-of-the-art over the next decade is either an AICBM system, AIRBM systems (perhaps in combination with an appropriate system for limited strategic retaliation), or a combination of these.

The only state in addition to the USSR from which a plausible threat could come in the 1975-1985 period, possibly requiring U.S.-controlled anti-ballistic missile defenses, is Communist China. During that period she will probably have a small number of nuclear-tipped ICBM's which could reach most parts of the United States. Communist China could also threaten Japan or India with IRBM attack, though the circumstances which could make an attack on Japan politically or strategically advantageous are difficult to envisage. The greatest danger is that she could threaten a large number of weaker Asian states for purposes of blackmail.

The likelihood that Communist China would attack the United States with first-generation ICBM's is very low, given the overwhelming U.S. capacity to destroy her in a retaliatory attack without significantly degrading our anti-Soviet retaliatory capabilities. However, this argument may not be persuasive to a number of Asian governments. They will at least fear that the United States may fail to retaliate against Chinese missile strikes in Asia, or against a Chinese military attack backed by a missile threat, because of the possibility of an ICBM attack on the United States. This fear could be reinforced by China's attempt to use her growing ICBM capability to inhibit future U.S. policies in Asia and to convince Asians that the United States is an undependable ally.

The diminution of Asian confidence in America in the 1970's

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

could have far more serious consequences than did the similar phenomenon in Europe during the late 1950's. At the worst, the political orientation of important states could change, nations could become inviable, and internal and limited warfare could become endemic.

A U.S. anti-ICBM system is one means of assuring these states that U.S. retaliation would follow Chinese missile or other military attacks in Asia. Another method would be to provide AIRBM systems to protect the Asian countries likely to be targets of CPR missiles. This has certain advantages: it would be locally "visible" and would confirm in the minds of Chinese leaders our commitment to the defense of Asian states. But it may not improve the credibility of U.S. intentions among the many Asian countries which such a system could not directly defend, notably those open to MRBM attack. It would also be relatively costly, as multiple systems would be required.

A combined AICBM-AIRBM system would give credibility and protection beyond that of either system alone, and may become essential as the diversity and quantity of Chinese missiles grow. However, against the expected modest CPR capabilities of 1975-1980 the extra cost seems out of proportion to the added security provided, in comparison to a system combining an AICBM defense of CONUS and local (probably IRBM) means of selective retaliation.

Since it does not appear worthwhile to design one system for both an AICBM and an AIRBM role (the necessary trajectories being quite different),[19] a choice between the two systems seems essential. Asian states defensible by AIRBM's will put about as much credibility in the deployment of an AICBM system as in AIRBM systems defending their homeland, while the other Asian states will place far more reliance on the AICBM deployment. The latter would also provide a more credible defense against MRBM's than would AIRBM systems, since it would insure U.S. impunity in taking any and all forms of retaliatory action.

A sea-based AICBM system has distinct, and in some cases enormous, advantages over a CONUS-based system: earlier detection, more safety for the homeland, reduced costs for civil defense, greater flexibility of deployment, relative invulnerability to pene-

[19]A sea-based detection system would be optimal for both in the Western Pacific close to the launch area, but missile intercept of ICBM's from there would be impossible. A dual system is technically feasible, but could not function concurrently in both modes.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tration, and increase in defense depth and in sophistication from one missile generation to the next. Overall system costs are likely to be lower as well.

AMRBM systems pose as yet unsolved technical problems for battlefield use, and especially difficult ones for a sea-based system. From the standpoint of the likely political environment of the next decade, a large number of countries could be open to MRBM attacks. It would be impracticable to deploy enough systems to defend all, and perhaps politically unwise to protect only a selected few. In this time-period, the safety of these countries against nuclear attack will have to rest largely upon the deterrence combination of U.S. retaliatory and AICBM forces.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ABM AND NONPROLIFERATION: RELATED ISSUES

by Lewis A. Frank

THERE has been a good deal of recent discussion concerning two issues of direct importance to the security of the United States: whether the risks of nuclear war can be minimized by deploying an anti-ballistic missile system (ABM) to protect major U.S. cities and military installations; and how best to discourage nonnuclear powers from developing their own independent nuclear forces which might increase the likelihood of involving the United States in a nuclear war—intentionally or inadvertently. Since the United States would be committed to limiting the damage to itself in both situations, the two issues are related.

Extensive Administration testimony and Congressional hearings on both subjects in 1966 and 1967 make it clear that these issues are of immediate concern to national defense policymakers, the Congress, and the public. The recent Middle East war, the continuing Viet Nam conflict, the Chinese test of an H-bomb, and the Soviet buildup of its offensive missiles and initial deployment of an ABM system are only a few prominent examples of the complex and related elements that make up the wide-ranging discussion of nuclear defenses and proliferation.

President Johnson, in his budget message of January 1967, proposed initiating discussions with the Soviet Union regarding a bilateral limitation on ABM deployment. The Administration's FY 1968 budget requested a contingency appropriation of $375 million for initial production of the Nike-X ABM system should such an approach prove unrewarding.[1] In his address of March 2 and in his statements after the June 1967 Glassboro summit meeting with Chairman Kosygin, the President reaffirmed the U.S. desire for further exploration of the ABM question with the Soviet Union, beginning with the Rusk-Gromyko conversations in New York.[2]

[1] *The Budget of the U.S. Government for the Fiscal Year ending June 30, 1968,* Part I, "The Budget Message of the President" (Washington: GPO, 1967), p. 19.

[2] See transcript of the "President's News Conference of March 2, 1967" in *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents,* March 6, 1967, p. 353; also the "President's Remarks at the White House reporting on his meeting with Chairman Kosygin," in *ibid.,* July 3, 1967, p. 930.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In anticipation of such discussions on the ABM issue, the Disarmament Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee conducted hearings on the ABM and related arms questions during February and March of 1967 involving both State and Defense Department witnesses.[3] On June 9, 1967, nine days prior to the Chinese H-bomb test, the House Appropriations Committee reported out a $70.3 billion appropriations bill for the Department of Defense in FY 1968. This figure includes $298 million for initial production, if necessary, of an area-defense variant of the Nike-X system, conceivably effective against a light Chinese nuclear threat and capable of being expanded further to ward off a larger Soviet threat.[4] This appropriation provided $29 million more in contingency funding for this purpose than previously authorized by the Senate on March 20, 1967.[5] Consistent with earlier appropriations bills, the House provided $442 million for further development, test and evaluation of Nike-X, an increase of $18.7 million over the Senate appropriation.[6] The House Committee's report states:

> There seems to be a reluctance to begin deploying the system as long as the possibility of reaching an agreement for limiting the deployment of ABM systems is being explored with the Soviet Union. The funds made available provide the necessary flexibility to allow the President to act promptly whenever he is ready to make that decision.[7]

Both the Appropriations and Armed Services Committees of the Congress have differed with the Administration over the pace and timing of such a program. In the spring of 1966, the House Armed Services Committee recommended that the White House speed up its decision regarding deployment of Nike-X—a decision which Secretary of Defense McNamara preferred to defer for the time being.[8]

[3]U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *United States Armament and Disarmament Problems, Hearings,* before the Subcommittee on Disarmament, 90th Congress, 1st Session, February 3, 6-7, 28 and March 1 and 23, 1967 (Washington: GPO, 1967).

[4]U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, *Department of Defense Appropriation Bill, 1968,* Committee Report No. 349, 90th Congress, 1st Session (Washington: GPO, June 9, 1967), pp. 11, 55; hereafter cited as *DOD Appropriation Bill FY 1968.*

[5]U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, *Authorizing Appropriations during Fiscal Year 1968 for Procurement of Aircraft, Missiles, Naval Vessels, and Tracked Combat Vehicles and Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation for the Armed Forces,* Committee Report No. 76, 90th Congress, 1st Session (Washington: GPO, March 20, 1967), pp. 4-5.

[6]*DOD Appropriation Bill FY 1968, op. cit.,* p. 11.

[7]*Loc. cit.*

[8]U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ABM AND NONPROLIFERATION: RELATED ISSUES

The Administration and the Congress have been in closer agreement regarding the U.S. approach to the nuclear proliferation question. The Joint Atomic Energy Committee conducted hearings in early 1966 on nonproliferation problems, at the conclusion of which it endorsed a Senate resolution offered by its co-chairman, Senator John Pastore (D., R.I.) which concludes:

Resolved: That the Senate commends the President's serious and urgent efforts to negotiate international agreements limiting the spread of nuclear weapons and supports the principle of additional efforts by the President which are appropriate and necessary in the interest of peace for the solution of the nuclear proliferation problem.[9]

Testimony in these hearings revealed many significant problems to be faced in dealing with these distinct but related questions. However, there remains the hard question of whether the United States can strengthen its national security more through an ABM program, a nonproliferation treaty, or perhaps a mix of the two. The following discussion is concerned with the range of ABM/nonproliferation options possible in the coming decade.

The United States can pursue two main paths of defense preparedness against nuclear attack. We can utilize our technological capability to develop and deploy ABM systems, or we can rely chiefly on our diplomatic resources to achieve security through the operation of conflict control measures such as the proposed nonproliferation treaty, based on the U.S. and Soviet drafts tabled in 1965 at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC).[10]

Damage-Limitation Options

Defensive system deployment options will be discussed here in the context of the "damage-limiting" capability of U.S. forces described by Secretary McNamara in the FY 1968 defense budget

Authorizing Defense Procurement and Research and Development, and Military Pay, Committee Report No. 1536, 89th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington: GPO, 1966), pp. 16-17, 19.

[9]U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, *Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Hearings on Senate Resolution 179,* 89th Congress, 2nd Session, February 23 and March 1-7, 1966 (Washington: GPO, 1966), Appendix 13, p. 179; hereafter cited as *Hearings on SR 179.*

[10]*Ibid.,* Appendix I, pp. 107-110, for full text of U.S. draft treaty submitted to ENDC on August 17, 1965, and Appendix III, pp. 117-118, for the revised U.S. draft, submitted to ENDC on March 22, 1966. The full text of the Soviet draft treaty, submitted to ENDC on September 24, 1965, is found in Appendix II, pp. 111-112.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

hearings.[11] The cost of one option, a full-scale ABM system, deployed in a Nike-X type configuration, ranges between $19.4 billion and $32.5 billion depending on the extent of population coverage and the nature of the expected Soviet threat, all calculated over the FY 1966-1975 period.[12] These costs include increments to U.S. strategic missile capability which would quantitatively and qualitatively improve the "assured-destruction" capability of U.S. forces.[13]

Passive defenses, such as fallout shelters, can also contribute to the damage-limitation objective at a lower level of cost (and protection), ranging from an estimated $1.5 billion to about $3.4 billion over the FY 1966-1975 period. These would be part of the full ABM posture; or they could be coupled, in a second option, with a scaled-down ABM system, deployed sufficiently to offset the Chinese nuclear missile threat expected during the 1970's. The latter configuration of Nike-X would involve an estimated five-year systems cost of $8.0 to $10.6 billion depending on the desired level of protection.[14] The limited ABM system, for use mainly against China or an aggressive third party, could, if necessary, be deployed within three years of a go-ahead from the Department of Defense. It would involve a level of effort of between 25 and 50 per cent of that required to deploy a full-scale—but possibly unnecessary—ABM system. Presently available is the full fallout shelter inventory, which, according to Secretary of the Army Stanley Resor, will cover 80 per cent of the population by 1970, with additional shelter spaces identified "for a substantial part of the remaining population."[15]

A final damage-limiting capability for the 1970's would resemble the U.S. defense posture currently in force, consisting of

[11]A damage-limiting capability is generally that which affords the least loss of life and industrial capacity in the event of a nuclear attack. For an extended discussion see *Statement of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara before a Joint Session of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Subcommittee on Department of Defense Appropriations on the FY 1968-72 Defense Program and 1968 Defense Budget,* January 23, 1967 (mimeo.), pp. 38-39; hereafter cited as *Statement on FY 1968-72 Defense Program.*

[12]*Ibid.;* see Table on p. 49.

[13]"Assured-destruction" capability is the capability to "deter deliberate nuclear attack upon the United States and its allies by maintaining, continuously, a highly reliable ability to inflict an unacceptable degree of damage upon any single aggressor, or combination of aggressors, at any time during the course of a strategic nuclear exchange, even after absorbing a surprise first strike." See *ibid.,* p. 38.

[14]In U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1967, Hearings,* before a subcommittee, 89th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington: GPO, 1966), Part I, p. 47.

[15]Figures as of January 25, 1966 in *ibid.,* Part I, p. 357.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

over 141 million fallout shelter spaces[16] complemented by assured-destruction forces comprising B-52G/H and FB-111/SRAM airborne weapons systems and Minuteman ICBM, Polaris A-2 and A-3, and Poseidon SLBM's.[17] This posture, projected into the next decade, would not be responsive to any future shift in the world balance of power due to Soviet and Chinese capabilities or nuclear proliferation to other countries.

The Elements of Nonproliferation

The most likely nonproliferation measures to be enacted in the near future would take the form of either the U.S. or the Soviet draft treaties tabled at ENDC during 1965-1966. Although each differs in some detail on the question of defining what "access" to nuclear weapons means,[18] the essential elements of the two proposals are: (1) Parties to the treaty which are nuclear states will agree not to transfer nuclear weapons into the control of nonnuclear states. (2) The nuclear states will not provide information or inducements that would assist nonnuclear states in achieving any control, direct or indirect, over nuclear weapons. (3) Parties to the treaty which are nonnuclear states will agree not to possess or develop nuclear weapons, either singly or in concert with other states. (4) The nonnuclear states will not seek assistance in nuclear weapons development from other states.

Alternative Strategies

In order to define the relationship between damage-limiting and nonproliferation measures, Table I shows six of the most likely combinations, taking three damage-limiting postures interfaced with a nonproliferation agreement, and the same three postures without a nonproliferation agreement. The Table suggests six ways in which the eventual U.S. commitment to nonproliferation and its own continental defense could evolve in the coming decade. These alternatives are most conveniently expressed in terms of three different modes: passive defense, limited active

[16] *Ibid.*, Part I, p. 358. Estimates of total fatalities from a nuclear attack on the U.S. during the coming decade range from less than two million in a Chinese attack to upwards of 130 million resulting from a Soviet first strike. *Ibid.*, Part I, pp. 47, 51.

[17] The SRAM is a short-range air-to-ground missile; the SLBM is a submarine-launched ballistic missile.

[18] This delicate semantic problem, affecting NATO and other nuclear-sharing arrangements, is discussed in the testimony of William C. Foster, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, in *Hearings on SR 179, op. cit.*, p. 42.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE I

DAMAGE-LIMITING AND NONPROLIFERATION COMBINATIONS
1966-1975

Damage-Limiting Posture	*Diplomatic Posture*	*Cost (FY 1966-1975)*
1. Passive Defense (Civil Defense/Full Fallout Shelter Program)	Nonproliferation Agreement	$3-6 billion
2. Passive Defense (Civil Defense/Full Fallout Shelter Program)	No Agreement	$1.5-$3.4 billion
3. Limited Active Defense (Partial ABM Deployment with Full Shelter Program)	Nonproliferation Agreement	$8.0-$10.6 billion
4. Limited Active Defense (Partial ABM Deployment with Full Shelter Program)	No Agreement	About $10 billion
5. Full Active Defense (Full ABM Deployment with Full Shelter Program)	Nonproliferation Agreement	$19.4-$32.5 billion
6. Full Active Defense (Full ABM Deployment with Full Shelter Program)	No Agreement	Over $40 billion

defense, and full active defense. ABM deployments designed for the last two modes were publicly disclosed by Secretary McNamara in February 1967. A limited active "thin" type area-defense system covering twenty-five U.S. cities with long-range Spartan interceptor missiles and associated systems would cost $9.9 billion to build and $330 million annually to operate. A full active and extensive fifty-city deployment comprising both the Spartan and the short-range Sprint point-defense interceptor missiles and associated systems would cost $19.4 billion to build and $720 million annually to operate.[19]

PASSIVE DEFENSE AND NONPROLIFERATION

It is possible that the United States may decide not to add active missile defenses to its damage-limiting capability. It may, instead,

[19]See data on two ABM postures in *Statement on FY 1968-72 Defense Program, op. cit.*, Table I, p. 49; cited also in *Washington Post*, February 16, 1967, p. A 11.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

allocate its resources to the purchase of more strategic offensive systems to offset further increases in Soviet or Chinese nuclear capabilities. If a nonproliferation agreement were in effect, this type of offensive buildup could be made politically palatable to the nonnuclear signers only by setting up for their protection a system of bilateral or multilateral security guarantees or "nuclear umbrellas." Such a system would be likely to increase the U.S. defense budget by several billions over the next five years by adding to our present costs of damage-limitation. The recent U.S. reaction to the Soviets' initial deployment of their ABM system indicated a preference for responding by means of qualitative improvements to the U.S. strategic forces, such as Minuteman "penaids" (penetration aids) and the replacement of the Polaris family of SLBM's by the more accurate Poseidon SLBM by the early 1970's.[20]

The tone of the Johnson-Kosygin talks at Glassboro indicated U.S.-Soviet willingness to continue talks on the question of an ABM limitation. However, the Soviets have traditionally been defense-oriented and are likely to improve air and missile defenses in an attempt to offset anticipated improvements in U.S., British, French and Chinese capabilities to launch a nuclear attack against the USSR.

It is unlikely that powers other than the United States and the Soviet Union could acquire their own anti-missile defenses in view of the tremendous cost of developing such systems. Thus, a nonproliferation treaty as presently envisioned would not address itself to the problem of protecting third countries by means of active defense against nuclear attack.

The arms procurement policies of the major nonnuclear powers—India, Israel and Japan—are determined by their access to a major weapons supplier. India is finding that purchase and license-production of Soviet aircraft, such as the MIG-21, or outright purchase of Soviet surface-to-air (SAM) missiles, is proving more reliable than trying to secure similar weapons from the United States or Britain, particularly in view of the Anglo-U.S. arms embargo following the 1965 Kashmir war. Israel looks to France as the major supplier of combat aircraft, while Japan structures its Self-Defense Force on the basis of what can be

[20]The U.S. reaction was crystallized in the Texas press conference with President Johnson, Secretary of Defense McNamara, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Earle Wheeler; partial text reprinted in *Washington Post*, November 11, 1966, p. A 18.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

bought or license-produced from the United States. All of these countries have the capability to develop nuclear weapons within a short time.

In the event that both the United States and the Soviet Union give emphasis to strengthening their own defenses vis-à-vis each other, there is a strong likelihood that with the rapid spread of nuclear weapons technology the nonnuclear powers will be afforded less opportunity to acquire first-line equipment from them and will be tempted to develop their own nuclear-capable aircraft and missile systems. If, on the other hand, the United States chooses to retain a passive damage-limiting posture into the 1970's (i.e., no ABM), such a decision would be likely to reduce the acceptability of a nonproliferation agreement to the major nonnuclear powers.

The avoidance of a damage-limiting strategy by the United States is not a cheap way to avoid nuclear proliferation. It is likely that Washington would have to pay a higher price, politically and economically, to prevent proliferation of nuclear weaponry: it would be necessary for the United States to "bribe" the nonnuclear powers to abstain from acquiring nuclear weapons, either by augmenting foreign aid with increased military assistance (an increasingly unpopular program in the United States) or by making greater outlays on its own strategic forces in order to maintain the credibility of its deterrent against the Soviet Union and Communist China and to strengthen U.S. security commitments. The absence of active defenses does not imply any leveling off in the great-power arms race: other means of filling this gap could be much more provocative in touching off a renewed nuclear buildup.

Limited Active Missile Defense and Nonproliferation

The answer to the question whether the United States should deploy a limited ABM system depends mainly on how the nature and rate of increase of Communist China's nuclear strike capability is interpreted—a matter of increased attention since the test-firing of a Chinese missile in October 1966 and the explosion of a prototype H-bomb on June 18, 1967.[21] Secretary McNamara believed that there was sufficient lead-time to defer deployment of an ABM system against China until the early 1970's, at which time

[21] See *Washington Post,* October 28, 1966 and June 18, 1967, pp. A 1, A 8.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

China might possess a number of missiles capable of hitting the western part of the continental United States. According to McNamara, "It is not clear that we need an ABM defense against China. In any event, the lead time for deployment of a significant Chinese offensive force is longer than that required for U.S. ABM. deployment; therefore the decision for the latter need not be made now."[22]

It may be well to consider whether a limited ABM deployment could be useful now in checking China's nuclear aims and thus contributing to nonproliferation by easing the fears of her nonnuclear, but potentially nuclear, neighbors, India and Japan. They may feel that if the United States is not capable of protecting itself against an attack by China, it cannot deter a nuclear attack by China against them and other weaker neighbors. The timing of the Chinese H-bomb test indicates that China is making faster progress in nuclear weaponry than expected, thus cutting down the lead-time available to the United States for ABM deployment. It is unlikely that India or Japan will be comforted in the long run by the massive retaliatory capability of the United State to punish China, if at the same time these countries face the prospect of suffering heavily from a Chinese nuclear attack. A corpse has no need to be liberated.

Insecure or anxious nonnuclear powers are not likely to have their fears eased by nuclear guarantees or nuclear "umbrellas" if they must withstand a hostile nuclear onslaught against their cities. Active defenses, unlike guarantees, assume immediately recognizable form. It may be worthwhile, not only by way of direct protection, but also for hardheaded considerations of the power balance in Asia, for the United States to deploy such a system—even to the extent of providing it, under suitable conditions, to India and Japan.

For these countries, and other nonnuclear states which may later find themselves in similar dilemmas, such anti-missile defenses would be more desirable than any other kind of protection the United States could provide—both economically and politically. Development of their own ABM systems would be infeasible due to the high cost associated with the necessary radar and hardware components required to intercept missiles. Possession of some anti-missile systems by the major nonnuclear

[22]*Statement on FY 1968-72 Defense Program, op. cit.*, p. 54.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

third powers, coupled with a nonproliferation agreement permitting them to have qualified control over their nuclear components, would considerably dampen their tendency to acquire their own nuclear offensive systems. In contrast, a nonproliferation agreement that prohibited the transfer of ABM systems would, in effect, favor the security of those countries which were fortunate enough to have their own nuclear weapons prior to the signing of the agreement, and weaken the security of those which did not have nuclear weapons. It is for this reason that India at present is balking at the draft nonproliferation treaty which would leave her at a significant strategic disadvantage vis-à-vis Communist China.

Congressional reaction regarding the chances for a nonproliferation agreement differed greatly in the wake of the recent Chinese H-bomb test. Senator Henry M. Jackson (D., Wash.) commented that the treaty would have little credibility to powers such as India as long as China did not sign the treaty. Representative Chet Holifield (D., Cal.), former Chairman of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee, was of the opinion that a treaty is more necessary now that China has the H-bomb.[23] Little mention has been made of excepting ABM systems from the provisions of the treaty—a step which might increase its acceptance by the nonnuclear countries, and thus possibly encourage anti-proliferation tendencies in the world.

For the United States, the acquisition of a limited ABM system in the $10 billion range would provide a hedge against unexpected Chinese and Soviet offensive buildups as well as a building block on which a full-scale system can be set up. Military experts believe that the same area-defense which could be arrayed against a Chinese missile attack could be expanded, with the addition of more sophisticated radars, to form the basis of an anti-Soviet missile defense, including ICBM silo protection.[24] In the absence of a nonproliferation agreement, a decision to acquire a limited ABM system will probably also make it necessary to acquire additional strategic offensive capability to fill the gap during the eighteen months to two years minimum time estimated for its deployment.[25]

[23] *Washington Post,* June 18, 1967, p. A 8.

[24] *Aviation Week and Space Technology,* November 7, 1966, p. 27; *Technology Week,* November 7, 1966, p. 14.

[25] *Technology Week,* November 7, 1966, p. 13.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ABM AND NONPROLIFERATION: RELATED ISSUES

Full Active Missile Defense and Nonproliferation

The likelihood that a multibillion dollar anti-missile defense can be coupled with a nonproliferation treaty by the 1970's is quite remote. The effort needed for such a massive program would be inconsistent with the period of relaxed tensions that would have to precede the signing of a nonproliferation treaty. Even assuming that such an agreement was in effect *before* a two-sided ABM buildup, it could not prevent the two superpowers from establishing ABM defenses. The treaty in its present draft form is not concerned with the acquisition of nuclear defensive systems by the nuclear powers. This has been treated as a separate matter. There is, however, room for arguing that the ABM question is vital to the discussion of nuclear proliferation.

The extensive power and prestige gap between the nuclear "haves" and nonnuclear "have-nots" is likely to widen by 1975, analogous to the widening economic gap between the developed and developing nations. Greater experience with nuclear weapons production means increased productivity and rapid innovation and improvements in the state-of-the-art of weaponry. These activities can be afforded by the United States and the Soviets, but it will be some time before other nuclear powers are able to keep pace with the technological leaders.

If the United States or the Soviet Union, by means of ABM's, protected themselves from third-party nuclear blackmail, this development would probably conflict with the aspirations of the emerging nuclear states or those which are capable of building a nuclear force. A great deal of leverage can be gained by threatening to "go nuclear." Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union feels comfortable with the recurring thought of catalytic war between them brought about through the nuclear machinations of the Chinese or other zealous third powers. Neither would the news of full-scale deployment of nuclear defenses be received sympathetically by the Warsaw Pact allies of the Soviets or by the NATO allies of the United States. The possession of these systems would give both powers the opportunity to disengage themselves from prior commitments during a local or regional crisis in Central Europe. Thus, such a deployment, while increasing for the two great powers the credibility of each other's deterrent forces, would simultaneously serve to reduce the credibility of their commitment to wage nuclear (but not conventional) war on behalf of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

their alliance partners, since neither power could hope to punish the other sufficiently by means of general nuclear war. Within NATO, at least, this could result in a greater role for the British nuclear deterrent force or a renewed campaign for a NATO nuclear force. This development would also reduce the political value of the French nuclear *force de dissuasion,* unless France decided to realign its defense policy toward closer cooperation with the other West European nations.

This last, "full" ABM/nonproliferation option is perhaps much less costly to Washington and Moscow than it appears at first glance: it gives them more political flexibility vis-à-vis other powers. Should the United States and the Soviets build large ABM defenses in the 1970's, it would decrease the ability of other powers to exact a high price, through bargaining for security guarantees, for staying out of the nuclear club. Thus their present advantage from *not* signing a nonproliferation treaty would be lost. The United States and the Soviet Union could reap some further benefits by openly threatening to go "full ABM," conditioning their abstinence on the adherence of the major nonnuclear powers to a nonproliferation treaty. Thus, possession of ABM systems by the great powers could deter nonnuclear countries from obtaining nuclear weapons while at the same time increasing the deterrent value of the great powers' nuclear forces.

Conclusion

It is evident that what the United States does concerning its defenses in the next decade will affect and in turn be affected by the defense plans of the Soviet Union, the other nuclear powers, and those of the major nonnuclear powers, in that order. An ever-present factor in the planning of the latter group is the question of whether or not to "go nuclear." The nature, degree and timing of the arms interaction between the United States and the Soviet Union will influence their eventual answer to this question, politically, militarily and economically.

The full ABM posture seems highly beneficial politically in the long run, and tremendously expensive in the short run, particularly if the only result is to gain more adherents to a nonproliferation treaty. On balance, the "middle way," a limited "thin" ABM defense, seems to be the best policy at present for optimizing damage-limitation and constraining proliferation.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Potentially the most costly and eroding alternative would be to do nothing to strengthen defenses, to have an "assured destruction only" defense posture in the hope of deterring Soviet or Chinese offensive buildups while committing ourselves to "nuclear umbrellas" to deter proliferation. If the Soviets and the Chinese fail to be impressed by the effectiveness of the U.S. deterrent in the 1970's the security of India, Israel, Sweden, West Germany or Japan may be threatened—thus tempting them to acquire nuclear weapons and increasing the risks of nuclear war to all concerned.

Finally, future discussions concerning proliferation should include the question of ABM development and deployment. This subject has been discussed at ENDC only in connection with controlling the numbers and characteristics of strategic delivery vehicles.[26] A further look at the proliferation issue, however, indicates that its future course and the methods of controlling it may be significantly influenced by the introduction and deployment of ABM systems in the United States and the Soviet Union. Viewed from the standpoint of the United States, introduction of antiballistic missiles could decrease the prospective utility of nuclear weapons to the major nonnuclear powers.

[26]See the statement by the U.S. representative to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee, "Freeze on Strategic Delivery Vehicles," presented by Adrian S. Fisher, April 16, 1964, in U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Documents on Disarmament, 1964* (Washington: GPO, 1965), p. 159.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE WORLD THROUGH DE GAULLE'S LOOKING GLASS

by Elliot R. Goodman

UNTIL Charles de Gaulle's return to power, it was widely assumed that the nations of the West were caught up in an exciting and relentless movement toward some form of integration. Hopefully, an expanded European Community would proceed toward constructing supranational institutions culminating in a European federation, while the nations on both sides of the Atlantic were fashioning various bonds that would eventually create a strengthened Atlantic Community. If the persistent and emphatic "no" of General de Gaulle has been responsible, in large measure, for drastically slowing the momentum of these movements, one is entitled to ask precisely what de Gaulle proposes to put in the place of these shattered hopes. And once Gaullist concepts and goals have been identified, it is also necessary to determine to what extent they are susceptible of rational analysis.

I

Two recurrent themes in Gaullist thought directly affect his policy toward the Atlantic Community. One consists of de Gaulle's image of a small continental West European bloc of states maneuvering its way between the United States and Britain on the one hand, and the Soviet empire on the other. The second is the longer-range Gaullist vision of the organization of a greater European bloc extending across Eastern Europe into the heart of Russia, which presumably will become possible with the withering away of communist rule. America and Britain are excluded from this grand design. In effect, there is no image of an emergent Atlantic Community reaching from the Continent across the English Channel and across the Atlantic Ocean. Whatever collaboration France has undertaken in this direction, in the Gaullist view, has been forced upon it because of the temporary military threat arising from the East. De Gaulle has consistently aimed to release France from its Atlantic ties and turn it toward his concept of Europe, both small and large, at the earliest moment he judged expedient.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

De Gaulle's striving to formulate an independent continental European bloc was evident from the moment Hitler invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941. Even though France was languishing in defeat and occupation, de Gaulle recorded his hopes for the future. He acknowledged that "a victory in which the Soviets would have taken a major share might well, ipso facto, face the world with other perils later. . . . At the same time her presence in the allied camp brought Fighting France a balancing element over against the Anglo-Saxons of which I was determined to make use."[1] Here in capsule form was de Gaulle's frank statement of intentions, which he hoped to implement once France had regained the power to play a prime role in world politics: France was to lead a grouping of European states that could pursue independent policies by playing off the Soviets against what he called "the Anglo-Saxons."

Following the liberation of France, de Gaulle used the occasion of Churchill's visit to Paris in November 1944 to propose a Western grouping of nations built around an Anglo-French core. De Gaulle acknowledged that France would "not regain her former power all at once" and therefore was in need of allies; at the same time British power would be diminished because of war losses "and, particularly the rise of America and Russia, not to mention China!" If France and Britain could act together they could establish "the equilibrium of Europe" and guarantee peace along the Rhine as well as uphold the independence of the Vistula, Danube and Balkan states. This would be "an organization of nations which will be something more than an arena for disputes between America and Russia." De Gaulle implored Churchill to "come to an agreement in order to uphold these interests. . . . If you are willing to do so, I am ready. Our two nations will follow us. America and Russia, hobbled by their rivalry, will not . . . raise any objection." But Churchill refused to abandon the British connection with America, and so de Gaulle's project did not materialize. "In politics as in strategy," Churchill replied, "it is better to persuade the stronger than to pit yourself against him. That is what I am trying to do. . . . I have formed a close personal tie with Roosevelt. With him, I proceed by suggestion in order to influence matters in the right direction."[2]

[1]Charles de Gaulle, *The Call to Honour, 1940-1942* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1955), p. 228.

[2]Charles de Gaulle, *Salvation, 1944-1946* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960), p. 59.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Rebuffed in his effort to separate Britain from America, de Gaulle immediately sought to find a counterweight against what he imagined were the pretensions of "Anglo-American hegemony." In December 1944 he flew to Moscow to conclude a Franco-Soviet treaty. "Perhaps it would be possible," de Gaulle speculated, "to renew old Franco-Russian solidarity which, though repeatedly betrayed and repudiated, remained no less a part of the natural order of things, as much in relation to the German menace as to endeavors of Anglo-American hegemony." It was his hope that "the signing of a Franco-Russian treaty could help us to participate at once in the elaboration of European settlements."[3]

Immediately following the Allied military victory in 1945, de Gaulle considered that "the hour for settling accounts had come." Now "it seemed likely that the new period would allow me to achieve the great plans I had conceived for my country. . . . I intended," de Gaulle explained with explicit candor, "to cooperate with the East and West and if need be contract the necessary alliances on one side or the other without ever accepting any kind of dependence." He further intended to

> persuade the states along the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees to form a political, economic, and strategic bloc; to establish this organization as one of the three world powers and, should it become necessary, as the arbiter between the Soviet and Anglo-American camps. Since 1940, my every word and act had been dedicated to establishing these possibilities; now that France was on her feet again, I would try to realize them.[4]

This justly famous statement of intentions represents perhaps the sharpest formulation of the Gaullist ambition: to lead a continental European bloc that could become the arbiter between the Soviet and the Anglo-American camps. There is no hint of any interest in the concept of the Atlantic Community.

II

Even after France had joined NATO, and de Gaulle periodically affirmed the need for Allied solidarity against Soviet military threats, he nevertheless maintained his vision of a separate continental European bloc whose existence might be endangered by the rivalry between the Soviet and Anglo-American camps. Following his return to power, at a press conference on November 10, 1959, de Gaulle conjured up the specter of a sinister interplay between the "Anglo-Saxons and the Soviets" that could obliterate

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 61.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 205.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Europe. Even though France was legally a member of the Western alliance, de Gaulle found it possible to dissociate himself equally from both camps.

In his view, Europe had to be alert to two possible threats. First, the present equilibrium "between the atomic power of the two camps" might be upset by a rapid technological advance by one side or the other, and tempt one camp to unleash a nuclear attack. In setting forth the second possibility de Gaulle gave free play to his imagination:

> Who can say whether, in the future, if basic political facts should change completely, as has already occurred on the earth, the two powers that would have a monopoly on nuclear weapons might not make a deal with each other to divide the world between them. Who can say whether, should the occasion arise, while each side might follow a policy of not hurling its devices at the principal adversary, so as not to be threatened by them itself—who can say whether the two rivals might not crush the others. One can well imagine, for example, that on such a terrible occasion, Western Europe might be destroyed from Moscow, and Central Europe from Washington. And who even can say whether the two rivals, as a result of some unforeseeable political and social upheaval, will not come to the point of uniting?[5]

The specter of this unholy alliance was raised again in a radio and television address de Gaulle delivered three and a half years later. No one knows, he said, whether "in the event of a conflict, the atomic bombs would or would not be used at the start by the two principal champions; whether, if they did use them, they would use them in Central and Western Europe only, without striking each other directly and immediately."[6]

Such a prospect not only envisaged the complete faithlessness of America to its European allies, but also conceivably implied that the United States would abandon several hundred thousand American soldiers deployed along forward positions of the Central European front in Germany. One could argue that de Gaulle had assumed that, because of America's disinterest in its European allies, the U.S. government would have removed its troops from the Continent and thus would be guilty only of betraying its partners in NATO Europe. However these Gaullist prophecies might be deciphered, one idea stands forth: in de Gaulle's view

[5]President de Gaulle's Second Press Conference, November 10, 1959, Ambassade de France, New York, Speeches and Press Conferences, No. 145, pp. 4-5. All the speeches and press conferences of de Gaulle and other French officials, cited below, are available in this series published by the French Embassy, unless otherwise noted.

[6]Speech by President de Gaulle, April 19, 1963, Ambassade de France, New York, French Affairs, No. 154, p. 4.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

there is no firm and unbreakable bond holding Europe and America together; or conversely, Europe must always be prepared to maneuver on its own between two hostile camps and seek to insure its own survival by dint of its own independent means.

The extent to which official French pronouncements have equated American and Soviet behavior and ambitions is quite startling. Gaullist Premier Michel Debré drew such a comparison before the National Assembly in October 1960. "It will undoubtedly be said that the destiny of the world is in the hands of the greatest powers—the United States and Russia. But what is notable is their inability to impose their will universally. In the East as in the West, we are witnessing the development of the phase in which the greatest empires see their power confronted by limitations." In this view both the United States and the Soviet Union were equally guilty of seeking great empires. However, their failure to attain their goals "is what gives the second-ranking powers—to which we belong, but which are aware of their past role and of their future responsibilities—the opportunity to exercise their influence in the direction of progress and of peace."[7] De Gaulle reiterated this theme in his press conference of July 23, 1964 when he held that "the division of the world into two camps led by Washington and Moscow respectively corresponds less and less to the real situation. . . . It appears that Europe, provided that it wishes it, is henceforth called upon to play a role, which is its own." For France "it is a question of Europe's being made in order for it to be European. A European Europe means that it exists by itself for itself."[8]

The impact of de Gaulle's "European Europe" is not to be confined to Europe. By dissociating France from what he calls "the two hegemonies" of the United States and the Soviet Union, de Gaulle hopes to appeal to the widespread neutralist sentiment in the "third world." He has repeatedly held up France as the model showing the way to a new global balance of power that is especially applicable to the countries of Latin America, Asia and Africa. Specifically, in a country like Viet Nam, where communist and American power meet head-on, de Gaulle has offered himself, to use his own words, as "a free arbiter."[9]

De Gaulle has provided a clear indication of how he conceives of this role. Taking advantage of the hospitality of the Cambodian

[7]Speech by Premier Michel Debré, October 13, 1960, No. 156, p. 8.
[8]President de Gaulle's Tenth Press Conference, July 23, 1964, No. 208, p. 5.
[9]Speech by President de Gaulle, *New York Times*, September 29, 1963.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

leader, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, whose neutralism has been distinguished by a persistent dislike of the United States, de Gaulle in September 1966 offered his own stark solution for the Viet Nam conflict. Meaningful negotiations to end the war could only be undertaken, de Gaulle insisted, if the United States would "repatriate its forces within a suitable and determined period of time."[10] This call for the unilateral withdrawal of American forces, which conspicuously omitted any reference to the presence of North Vietnamese troops in South Viet Nam, was quickly seized upon by the leaders in Hanoi, who rejoiced: "French President Charles de Gaulle recently condemned the U.S. aggressive war in Vietnam and demanded that the U.S. withdraw its troops from South Vietnam."[11]

The blatant anti-American tenor of de Gaulle's proposal was underscored by his pointed refusal to take into account the letter transmitted to Paris, with President Johnson's approval, before de Gaulle's departure for Cambodia. In this communication the United States sought to enlist de Gaulle's help in bringing peace to Viet Nam by having him assure Hanoi that the United States really did intend to withdraw its bases and military forces from South Viet Nam as soon as a just peace had been negotiated. Washington not only reaffirmed its willingness to abide by the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Agreements on the neutrality of Viet Nam and Laos, but also suggested phased troop withdrawals by both sides that could be subject to international verification, or if this were rejected, phased withdrawals whose terms could be arranged through any one of several secret diplomatic channels.[12] Instead, de Gaulle compared the position of the United States in South Viet Nam to the former French colonial position in Algeria. He ignored the important differences in these situations, as well as the basic fact that the United States had been drawn into Viet Nam in the first instance as a result of disastrous French policies there, which permitted a major segment of the Vietnamese nationalist movement to fall under communist control. In playing

[10]Speech by President de Gaulle at Pnompenh, Cambodia, September 1, 1966, No. 250, p. 3.

[11]"Text of North Vietnamese Rejection of U.S. Offer," *New York Times,* September 11, 1966.

[12]James Reston, *ibid.,* September 9, 1966. The authenticity of this report is supported by references that President Johnson made in a speech on September 5 and in his press conference of September 8 to the prospect of phased withdrawals from Viet Nam. In effect, Johnson was seeking to convey in public the message which he had hoped de Gaulle would have conveyed while in Southeast Asia to the leaders of North Viet Nam, either publicly or in private.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the role of "a free arbiter" de Gaulle cast the United States purely as a foreign conqueror. He told his Asian audience of the hopeless nature of the American venture, since there is "no chance that the peoples of Asia will subject themselves to the law of the foreigner who comes from the other shores of the Pacific."[13]

The idea of acting as an arbiter in the global struggle between "the two hegemonies," in which Europe would exist "by itself for itself," implicitly rejects the concept of a strengthened Atlantic Community or an Atlantic federation. This might appear to belabor the obvious, were it not for the quaint interpretations of Gaullist thought offered by Clarence Streit, who has persistently seen de Gaulle as a potential supporter of Atlantic Union. Such wishful thinking is based on reported private expressions of support for Atlantic Union from several anonymous but highly placed Gaullists, as well as on one passage in de Gaulle's press conference of May 15, 1962.[14] On that occasion de Gaulle rejected the proposal to transform the Six of the European Community into a supranational entity. "Such an entity cannot be found without there being in Europe today a federator with sufficient power, authority and skill." Such an integrated Europe would drain the national will of each state so that there would be "no France and no Europe," since in his view such a Europe would be incapable of "making any policies at all. But then, perhaps, this world would follow the lead of some outsider who did have a policy. There would perhaps be a federator, but the federator would not be European. And it would not be an integrated Europe, it would be something quite different, much broader and much more extensive with, I repeat, a federator."[15]

This Delphic pronouncement, to be sure, is open to various interpretations. From it Streit concluded that de Gaulle "considered Atlantic federation more realistic than a European one," if only the United States, as the outside "federator" would take the initiative in proposing an Atlantic Union.[16] A more likely interpretation is that, to an ardent nationalist like de Gaulle, the idea of federation is totally abhorrent, and an outside "federator" is synonymous with an external conqueror. Such a suspicion was

[13]Speech by de Gaulle at Pnompenh, September 1, 1966, pp. 2-3.
[14]See the articles by Clarence K. Streit in the following issues of *Freedom and Union:* April 1960, pp. 1-5; February 1963, pp. 3-4; March 1963, pp. 7-12; July-August 1963, pp. 22-23; June 1965, p. 5; September 1965, pp. 2-6; April 1966, pp. 11-12, 16.
[15]President de Gaulle's Sixth Press Conference, May 15, 1962, No. 175, pp. 5-6.
[16]Streit, in *Freedom and Union,* July-August 1963, pp. 22-23.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

confirmed in a subsequent press conference when de Gaulle returned to this theme. He decried the

> concept of a European federation in which, according to the dreams of those who conceived it, the countries would lose their national personalities, and in which, furthermore, for want of a federator—such as in the West, Caesar and his successors, Charlemagne, Otto I, Charles V, Napoleon and Hitler tried to be, each in his fashion, and such as, in the East, Stalin tried to be—would be ruled by some technocratic, stateless and irresponsible Areopagus. We also know that France is opposing this project.[17]

That is, de Gaulle rejected rule by the "stateless technocrats" in Brussels, while he equated intervention by an outside "federator," such as Streit urged upon the United States, to the role of a Hitler or Stalin.

De Gaulle, in fact, has given us ample explicit evidence concerning his views on the Atlantic Community. One of his reasons for rejecting the British application for Common Market membership was that British entry would open the way for the accession of other states in the Atlantic Community.

> We would then have to envisage the construction of another Common Market. But the 11-member, then 13-member, then perhaps 18-member Common Market that would be built would, without any doubt, hardly resemble the one the Six have built. Moreover, this Community, growing in that way, would be confronted with all the problems of its economic relations with a crowd of other states, and first of all with the United States. It is foreseeable that the cohesion of all its members, who would be very numerous and very diverse, would not hold for long and that in the end there would appear a colossal Atlantic Community under American dependence and leadership which would soon completely swallow up the European Community.

Such an outcome, de Gaulle concluded, "is not at all what France wanted," which was to build "a strictly European construction."[18]

III

If de Gaulle's long-range goal is not an Atlantic Community but a totally independent Europe, what are the prospects for achieving this end? The French President early recognized the formidable obstacles to the creation of a lasting and cohesive grouping of sovereign states. Writing in 1932, he depicted states in a condition of perpetual conflict. "Is it really likely that the present

[17]President de Gaulle's Twelfth Press Conference, September 9, 1965, No. 228, p. 4.

[18]President de Gaulle's Seventh Press Conference, January 14, 1963, No. 185, p. 7.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

balance of power will remain unchanged so long as the small want to become great, the strong to dominate the weak, the old to live on?" To him "the root cause of armed conflict in men and in nations" is "passion and self-interest," and who could imagine that "human nature will ever become something other than it is?" There could be temporary truces and solemn pledges to abide by a common code, but such arrangements would be built on foundations of sand. "Even supposing that nations should agree, for a time, to conduct their mutual relations in accordance with a sovereign code, how effective could such a code be?," he asked. " 'Laws unsupported by force soon fall into contempt,' said Cardinal de Retz. International agreements will be of little value unless there are troops to prevent their infringement."[19]

Such a Machiavellian assessment of man's nature and the behavior of states might give excessive weight to the role of force, but there is at least a clear recognition of the difficulties standing in the way of forming an enduring and effective organization among sovereign states. Logically, one might conclude that the only way to escape from this basic condition of anarchy is to create a new and larger community of nations based upon enforceable law, capable of transcending the old parochial sovereignties. But this has not been de Gaulle's answer.

From his earliest days de Gaulle has imbibed the assumptions of nationalism as if they were tenets of religious dogma. It is precisely here that de Gaulle contradicts himself. On the one hand he declares: "To build Europe, that is to say, to unite it, is evidently something essential." On the other hand he asks:

> Now what are the realities of Europe? What are the pillars on which it can be built? The States are, in truth, certainly very different from one another, each of which has its own spirit, its own history, its own language, its misfortunes, glories and ambitions; but these states are the only entities that have a right to order and the authority to act. To imagine that something can be built that would be effective for action and that would be approved by the peoples outside and above the States —this is a dream.[20]

Ridiculing those who would erect some sort of supranational or federal Europe, de Gaulle has asserted that "there cannot be any other Europe than a Europe of States, apart, of course, from myths, stories and parades."[21]

[19]Charles de Gaulle, *The Edge of the Sword* (translated from the French edition, 1932; London, 1960), p. 13.
[20]President de Gaulle's Third Press Conference, September 5, 1960, No. 152, p. 8.
[21]De Gaulle's Sixth Press Conference, May 15, 1962, p. 5.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

One is entitled to ask: Who is immersed in dreams and myths? How can a "Europe" be built that would assume full responsibility for its own destiny and play the role of arbiter between the "two hegemonies," when the only real political entities in Europe are the separate national states? What in fact would this "Europe" accomplish, except to perpetuate the classic nationalist strivings in which "the small want to become great, the strong to dominate the weak, the old to live on?" What magic, automatic harmony of interests would bind together a conglomeration of separate states that were caught up in their traditional power rivalries and squabbles? As a strident nationalist, de Gaulle has activated nationalist ambitions that have disrupted efforts to build broader communities of nations both in Europe and the Atlantic area. By the same token, this strident nationalist has demonstrated his total inability to construct a "European Europe," or, indeed, any kind of Europe.

Within France de Gaulle's authoritarian nationalism found fertile ground upon which it could blossom. From its position as a first-rate power in 1939, France suffered a series of unmitigated disasters: defeat, occupation, humiliation and widespread destruction in World War II, followed by years of frustration and loss of an empire in Southeast Asia and Africa, which debilitated the country and pushed it to the brink of civil war. It was not difficult to grasp the nature of de Gaulle's appeal when he returned to power in 1958. The mystique of his nationalism, emphasizing the traditional sources of French prestige, made the retreat from empire seem like a triumph of French grandeur and the restoration of national glory. His claim to be the incarnation and symbol of the French nation brought a welcome feeling of unity and relief from the bickering politicians of the Fourth Republic. His high-handed, arbitrary style of rule was overlooked or forgiven.

It was, however, precisely this "style" that added another impediment to his effort to build "Europe." How could de Gaulle inspire confidence in and develop intimate ties with other European leaders, given his blatantly Machiavellian concept of rulership?

These principles of personal style and rulership were set forth as early as 1932, and he has faithfully demonstrated his adherence to them ever since. A true leader must remain aloof and be self-reliant, he recorded. "This passion for self-reliance is obviously accompanied by some roughness in method." He complained of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

those who do not realize "that asperity is, more often than not, the reverse side of a strong character."[22] The essence of "the plan on which the leader has concentrated all his faculties," he said, is that it "shall bear the mark of grandeur." In this enterprise, "the question of virtue does not arise. The perfection preached in the Gospels never yet built an empire. Every man of action has a strong dose of egotism, pride, hardness and cunning. All these things will be forgiven him, indeed they will be regarded as high qualities, if he can make them the means to achieve great ends."[23] The true statesman must be able to captivate men's minds.

> He must know how to dissemble, when to be frank. He must pose as the servant of the public in order to become its master. He must outbid his rivals in self-confidence and only after a thousand intrigues and solemn undertakings will he find himself entrusted with full power. Even when he has it in his grasp, he can never be completely open in his dealings.

The statesman knows that realities are complex, and he "sets himself to master them by trickery and calculation."[24]

IV

President de Gaulle's personal brand of statesmanship has had tragic consequences for the European Community. For the moment, the only nucleus for a future "Europe," which de Gaulle professes to desire, is the Europe of the Six. Yet France would never have accepted the Treaty of Rome had de Gaulle been in power at the time of its ratification. (The Gaullist members of the National Assembly voted against it.) However, from 1958 through 1962 de Gaulle was so preoccupied with the Algerian problem and domestic considerations that the Six could proceed with their own unique experiments.

It was generally recognized among those working in the Community institutions that only by progressively transferring national loyalties to supranational bodies could a new entity called "Europe" ever come into existence. These new forms of association were necessarily delicate and tenuous, and had to be nurtured with care if they were to bear fruit. As the institutions of the Six increasingly became the center of joint expectations and rewards, it became possible to speak of "the Community spirit." National negotiators were inclined to take account of the long-term common good and promote the common interest, even if it meant

[22] De Gaulle, *The Edge of the Sword,* pp. 41-42.
[23] *Ibid.,* pp. 60-61.
[24] *Ibid.,* pp. 96, 98.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

making short-term national concessions that were not strictly on a *quid pro quo* basis. This novel and exciting experiment among European states held out the promise that the selfish national concerns of the past might recede as the various peoples became caught up in their concern for a common European future.

When the parliamentary election of November 1962 gave de Gaulle an absolute majority in the National Assembly, he felt that there were no longer any effective domestic restraints on his policies and that he could safely turn his attention to foreign affairs. In January 1963 came de Gaulle's abrupt and unilateral veto of Britain's attempt to enter the Common Market, and then a series of threats, ultimatums and boycotts of the Community institutions, all designed to restructure them along the lines of traditional intergovernmental organizations that would be compatible with Gaullist nationalist concepts. The first casualty of these assaults was the fragile Community spirit, which for the time being has been totally destroyed. Only the future will tell if it can be revived, but without it there is no prospect for building a European union that will transcend the tragic, historic divisions among the separate nations of Europe.

De Gaulle has occasionally acknowledged that the institutions of the Six have made a positive contribution to Europe. "Of course it is true," he noted, "that while waiting to come to grips with Europe's problems and tackle it as a whole, it has been possible to institute certain organs that are more or less extranational." Their role must be strictly limited, however. "These organs have their technical value, but they do not have, they cannot have authority and, consequently, political effectiveness."[25]

In the eyes of the "good Europeans" of the Monnet school, such institutions embodied a philosophy that made them highly political in nature. There was the novel concept of an independent Commission, detached from separate national interests, entrusted with the responsibility of transcending them by consciously seeking out the common interests of the Community, endowed with considerable powers of initiative, and capable of carrying on a dialogue with the Council of Ministers, who represented the constituent countries. There was the European Parliament, at first given limited powers and elected only indirectly; but provisions existed for the direct election of its members and the intention was gradually to augment its scope of authority. These beginnings were viewed as the nucleus for the future political transformation

[25]De Gaulle's Third Press Conference, September 5, 1960, p. 8.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the separate states into a United States of Europe. The essence of this community approach was to replace the old patterns of national rivalries with a new concept which accorded all partners legal equality and equal respect and which arrived at solutions that would benefit the broader community of nations.

De Gaulle, however, condemns the idea of European "integration as not being able to lead to anything other than an American protectorate."[26] This rather curious conclusion stems from his commitment to nationalism, which precludes the possibility that any entity other than the national state could have political significance. To him, the Community institutions constitute an arid technocracy that has no chance of developing political roots; hence they would be susceptible to easy manipulation by far-reaching schemes drawn up in Washington. De Gaulle castigated those who, "instead of participating, as is normal, in organized cooperation among the free nations of the Old Continent," want "to be literally dissolved in a Europe described as integrated which, lacking the incentives of sovereignty of the peoples and responsibility of the States, would automatically be subordinate to the protector across the ocean."[27]

There is genuine irony in the Gaullist position. The French President rejects any hegemony over Europe except his own. Yet his own arrogance and imperious, high-handed methods make the Gaullist image of Europe unattractive to all his prospective partners. Short of conquest, a Gaullist "European Europe" cannot be organized. The only possible basis for creating a powerful Europe, truly independent of the United States, fully capable of pursuing independent action, is by renouncing the nationalist and imperialist molds of the past and integrating the separate states in a new supranational community. The Monnet school, which he openly scorns, provides the only answer for the kind of institutional strength that would make a truly independent Europe possible. Monnet contends, of course, that he would prefer to form a partnership with the United States to tackle the great problems facing the West. Precisely how far Monnet's "Europe" might go in cooperation with the United States cannot be predicted, since such a Europe does not exist. But the fact remains that the *capacity* for implementing independent, Gaullist-type policy would most likely exist in the very kind of Europe de Gaulle totally rejects.

[26]De Gaulle's Tenth Press Conference, July 23, 1964, p. 6.

[27]Speech by President de Gaulle, April 27, 1965, Ambassade de France, New York, French Affairs, No. 175, p. 2.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Max Kohnstamm, Vice-President of Monnet's Action Committee for the United States of Europe, places the issue of U.S. "hegemony" in a different perspective. After World War II, the United States realized that it could return to its prewar isolation only at the price of accepting Soviet domination over Europe. Reluctantly the United States concluded that it had no choice but to remain in Europe.

> From 1945 on, the United States consented to be, and was, Europe's protector. Economically it made European reconstruction possible through generously given aid; militarily it took care of Europe's defense through NATO. . . . Such an alliance, whereby one very strong nation protects and leads others is usually called a hegemony, but from the beginning there was something very unusual about this relationship. In the first place, the United States was in Europe without really wanting to be there. . . . But secondly—and this is even more unusual in history—from the beginning the United States spurred Europe to unite. I do not know any example in history of a hegemonial power urging its clients to unite.[28]

As Europe regained its strength, gradually "political leaders in America and Europe stopped thinking in terms of protector and protégé and began thinking in terms of partnership. But such a partnership, to be effective and real, could only be a partnership with the Community as a whole, not a partnership with any of the relatively small European powers separately, not even with America's old ally, the United Kingdom."[29] De Gaulle, however, continued to complain of American "hegemony" at a time when the United States was seeking ways of creating a more equal relationship between the two sides of the Atlantic. He rejected the partnership offer, vetoed Britain's entry into the European Community, and attempted to undermine the Community institutions which might permit a strong European partner to emerge. In short, de Gaulle has raised the loudest protests against American "hegemony," and yet has done everything possible to perpetuate the conditions that would make this unequal relationship inevitable. In a very real sense de Gaulle has a vested interest in perpetuating the image of American "hegemony," since without it he would lose his own role as the "liberator" of Europe.

V

Since de Gaulle's principles for organizing a "Europe of States" were totally incompatible with the aims of the Community insti-

[28]Max Kohnstamm, *The European Community and Its Role in the World* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1964), pp. 37-38.
[29]*Ibid.*, p. 41.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tutions of the Six, he was forced to try another tack. The Germans seemed particularly vulnerable to Gaullist manipulation, since their recent Nazi past made them anxious for international rehabilitation and political respectability. Following de Gaulle's sedulous campaign of wooing German public opinion, especially calculated to flatter the aging Chancellor Adenauer, the two leaders signed a Franco-German Friendship Treaty in January 1963. This came, significantly, only a fortnight after de Gaulle's rebuff of Britain's Common Market bid. The formal reconciliation of France and Germany was, of course, wholly praiseworthy. But de Gaulle's motives went beyond that. As he explained in July 1963, "the French-German Treaty provides an example which may be followed and a framework which may be enlarged." The treaty was to provide a model for the nations of Europe "to organize themselves in order to conduct together a policy which is European." Referring to the negotiations for a partial nuclear test ban then under way, he warned that "the direct contacts which are being re-established between the Anglo-Saxons and the Soviets and which once again may commit Europe's fate, should convince it that it is time for it to be itself, or that it run the risk of never being it."[30]

What came of the Franco-German Treaty which, in de Gaulle's mind, was to be the opening wedge for organizing a "European Europe" that could be directed equally against the "Anglo-Saxons and the Soviets?" In 1964, almost exactly one year after the above pronouncement, de Gaulle complained of German behavior: "One could not say that Germany and France have yet agreed to make together a policy and one could not dispute that this results from the fact that Bonn has not believed, up to now, that this policy should be European and independent." De Gaulle was thus reduced to the position of claiming that France alone represented Europe, and would be forced to chart a "European" course, even if no other Europeans went along. "In waiting for the sky to clear, France is pursuing, by her own means, that which a European and independent policy can and should be."[31]

De Gaulle's failure to organize any kind of Europe, even one restricted to a Franco-German core area, turned on the question of Europe's transatlantic relations. In the negotiations for the Franco-German Treaty, the Germans originally proposed a clause

[30]President de Gaulle's Eighth Press Conference, July 29, 1963, No. 192, pp. 12-13.

[31]De Gaulle's Tenth Press Conference, July 23, 1964, p. 7.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

stipulating that the treaty would be consonant with the parties' NATO obligations. This provision was deleted at de Gaulle's insistence.[32] However, the Bundestag inserted a preamble to the treaty before ratification which stated that the treaty was also intended to preserve "a close partnership between Europe and the United States of America" and to insure "collective defense within the framework of the North Atlantic Alliance, and the integration of the armed forces of the States bound together in that Alliance."[33] The extraordinary act of inserting such a preamble amounted to a German rejection of de Gaulle's concept of a European defense and foreign policy.

Nor did de Gaulle fare any better with his other partners in the Six. As France was completing its withdrawal from the NATO command structure in 1966, Foreign Minister Couve de Murville complained of the repeated failure of French efforts "to give our countries all together the means for better affirming their personality and independence" by formulating their positions on a variety of issues in a purely European rather than an Atlantic context.

> This means that those European countries must strive to build in common their economy, their foreign policy and their defense. If this is indeed what is involved, then I am obliged to note that none of our partners shares our views. Shall I give corroboration of this? Every time for the past six years, that we have together discussed measures to take toward what is generally called the political Europe, everyone has always taken the stand that defense was a taboo subject: that is NATO's business. As for international policy, doubtless one could be bold enough to discuss it a little, but the really appropriate forum was, nevertheless, that of NATO.[34]

There could scarcely be a clearer statement of the total bankruptcy of de Gaulle's effort to create a "political Europe."

His European partners, and especially the Germans, were quick to realize that if de Gaulle's formula of a "European Europe" existing "by itself for itself" were taken seriously, this would lead "the Anglo-Saxons" to withdraw from Western Europe. Europe's future existence would then be dependent on the sufferance of Soviet power. With such a disequilibrium of power arising on the Continent, it would be difficult to imagine any "European

[32]Conversation of May 30, 1963 between the author and Arthur J. Olsen, then Bonn correspondent for the *New York Times*.

[33]*The Bulletin*, Press and Information Office of the German Federal Government, May 21, 1963, p. 2.

[34]Speech by Foreign Minister Couve de Murville, April 14, 1966, No. 244A, p. 7.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Europe" other than a Soviet-dominated Europe. These fears were confirmed when de Gaulle publicly declared in February 1965 that the settlement of the German problem is purely a matter of concern for the European states, thereby simultaneously excluding U.S. participation and reserving a prominent role for the Soviet Union.[35]

The Soviet and other European communist leaders were delighted by de Gaulle's statement. A gradual *rapprochement* of Gaullist and communist positions had been under way for some time. When de Gaulle discovered that he could not organize Western Europe on his own terms he had nowhere to turn except to the East. Beginning in late 1963 there was a marked expansion of French diplomatic contacts with the Soviet Union and the East European communist states that has continued ever since. In March 1965 Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov promptly endorsed de Gaulle's concept of an exclusively continental European settlement of the German problem by listing the European states he thought should be involved; the United States and Britain were not among his invitees.[36] Subsequent American and British protests brought a reluctant French admission that the United States and the United Kingdom also had a stake in Germany's future, by virtue of their positions as original occupying powers.

When de Gaulle visited Moscow in the summer of 1966, the notion of a European settlement was revived in a jointly sponsored declaration: "Both governments agree that the problems of Europe should be first of all discussed within European limits. They believe that the states of the continent should exert efforts to create conditions necessary for the establishment of an atmosphere of detente between all countries of the West and East."[37] This declaration, which was in line with past Gaullist policy as well as Soviet aims, significantly omitted mention of the United States, as though these grand objectives could be reached without the participation of one of the two superpowers. The role of the United States was not ignored, however, since French spokesmen accompanying the General revealed that in his talks with Brezhnev, de Gaulle "welcomed the fact that the existence of the Soviet Union counterbalanced the United States' tendencies

[35]President de Gaulle's Eleventh Press Conference, February 4, 1965, No. 216, p. 12. See also Drew Middleton, "U.S. Refuses to Abandon German Unity Settlement to France and Soviet," *New York Times,* May 11, 1965.

[36]*New York Times,* March 12, 1965.

[37]Text of Franco-Soviet Declaration of June 30, 1966, *ibid.,* July 1, 1966.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

toward hegemony," while he equally welcomed "the fact that the existence of the United States counterbalances similar Soviet tendencies."[38] The Soviet leaders had received an authoritative, firsthand statement of de Gaulle's self-created role as the balance wheel in world politics.

What important, long-range consequences have resulted from this free-wheeling Gaullist diplomacy, in which de Gaulle imagines that he has become a global arbiter playing off "the Anglo-Saxons" against the Soviets? The example of unabashed French nationalism, manifested in such grand style, has unquestionably stimulated nationalism everywhere in the Atlantic Community. No doubt the most ominous revival has taken place in the Federal Republic of Germany, since the Germans, after all, are the only members of the West with unsatisfied territorial demands. Professor Brzezinski has correctly observed that "the German Gaullists, who initially welcomed the Bonn-Paris axis, mistakenly, as a source of collective pressure against the Soviet Union, and now are repelled by the Gaullist opening to the East, do not return to the Atlantic orientation but increasingly move in the direction of intensified nationalism in Germany."[39]

There could hardly be any more dangerous, destabilizing influence in the heart of Europe than a headstrong German nationalist movement that would launch a reckless adventure in the name of German reunification. The best way to head off such a movement is to keep West Germany firmly tied to the larger Western community of nations. In the long run this can only be done if the other Western powers identify themselves with Bonn's legitimate needs and ambitions and arrive at common policies which take account of the pressures bubbling up in German society. But such an effective political forum could exist only as the instrument of a cohesive West, and it is precisely this that de Gaulle has so tenaciously prevented.

De Gaulle's continuing disruption of the West, which must also be scored among Soviet successes, may well be a short-lived victory because it is based upon shortsighted policies. The Gaullist expectation that a European settlement, including the settlement of the German problem, could be accomplished in the absence of American power on the European continent is especially myopic. Nothing could be more desirable from the American

[38] *Ibid.*, June 23, 1966.

[39] Zbigniew Brzezinski, "New Approach to Eastern Europe," *European Review*, Autumn 1965, p. 19.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

point of view than to be relieved of the burdens of stationing nearly 300,000 American troops in and around Europe. Were the Soviet army withdrawn behind Soviet borders, and the East Europeans, including the East Germans, permitted a free expression of their wills, the American "hegemony" could be radically revised. But how can the West get the Soviets to renounce the dominating military position they now occupy in the center of Europe? Will the Kremlin be enticed to retreat by a unilateral U.S. withdrawal from the Continent? Surely the present standoff of forces in Europe is the result of a transatlantic NATO effort, in which the combined pressure of West European, American and Canadian forces has been brought to bear on communist power. Both the immediate security of Western Europe and the prospect for the ultimate reunification of Germany depend upon maintaining Western political and military cohesion, until a substantial alteration in communist policy makes possible a safe withdrawal from Europe of both Soviet and American forces and a means for achieving German reunification. If anything approaching a "European Europe" is ever to be realized, it cannot be done by driving U.S. troops from Europe, weakening NATO and destroying Western political cohesion.

VI

What aspects of de Gaulle's dreamworld make him believe that he can deal successfully with Soviet leaders and arrive at a satisfactory rearrangement of European affairs without American power? What causes de Gaulle to believe that a West in disarray will provide incentive for the communists to arrive at an accommodation with Paris, and with the French concept of Europe? Why can he not perceive that a divided West will only confirm Moscow's belief in the validity of its ideological tenets about the inevitability of conflict among capitalist states, and will invite not accommodation with the West but increased communist exploitation of these conflicts, intensification of its political warfare, and a return to hard-line, intransigent policies that seek to restructure Europe according to the Soviet concept? The answers would seem to lie in de Gaulle's understanding of communism and his vision of a greater Europe.

It is significant that de Gaulle always refers to the Soviet Union as "Russia." Seen from the perspective of this nineteenth-century nationalist, the Russian empire was never really transformed into

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Soviet Union. There are two reasons for his outlook. First, the basic and determining fact about this huge political entity, he believes, is the continued existence of the Russian nation and Russian national interests, not the transitory and rather insubstantial aberration of communist ideology which appears to overlay these fundamental national concerns. Second, "Russia" remains part of Europe, and is destined to rejoin the other Continental states in a grand all-European political construction. De Gaulle has viewed such an all-European arrangement as the ultimate goal lying beyond the attainment of his "European Europe." Its achievement would, in fact, mean the latter's demise, since a "European Europe" was intended to maneuver as an independent force between "the Anglo-Saxons" and the Soviets. The long-run Gaullist vision of a greater Europe assumes the dissolution of the Soviet camp, and the incorporation of the nations of Eastern Europe and a reborn, traditional Russia into an all-European concert of nations.

As with the rest of de Gaulle's concepts, these views can be traced back long before he came to power in France. Following Hitler's attack of June 1941, which brought the Soviet Union into the war on the side of the Allies, de Gaulle considered what role the French communists might play in the resistance. His answer clearly illustrates the relative weight he assigned to communist ideology and French nationalism. "In the ceaseless movement of the world," he recorded, "all doctrines, all schools, all rebellions have one moment only. Communism will pass. But France will not pass."[40]

Then in 1944 de Gaulle outlined his ultimate goal for a postwar European settlement. "After the terrible lacerations she had undergone in the last thirty years, and the vast changes which had occurred the world over, Europe could find equilibrium and peace only by an association among Slavs, Germans, Gauls, and Latins." It is significant that de Gaulle specifically did not include "the Anglo-Saxons," who were, at the time, otherwise constantly on his mind. He expressed the hope that "the unity of Europe could be established in the form of an association including its peoples from Iceland to Istanbul, from Gibraltar to the Urals." Here the future position of Britain was open to question, although there was no doubt about the exclusion of America from his scheme. The thrust of de Gaulle's grand design was clearly east-

[40]De Gaulle, *The Call to Honour*, p. 271.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ward "to the Urals" and the Slavs, not westward across the Atlantic.

He acknowledged that the Slavs would be difficult to accommodate in this greater Europe while they were ruled by an aggressive communism. Europe "must take into account what was momentarily tyrannical and aggrandizing in the Russian regime." The "momentary" nature of communist rule was underscored when he said that "communism was apparently trying to gain control of the Vistula, the Danube and the Balkans" by employing totalitarian oppression and invoking the solidarity of the peoples of East Central Europe against the German peril. "But once Germany ceased to be a threat, this subjection, for lack of a *raison d'être,* would sooner or later appear unacceptable to the vassal states, while the Russians themselves would lose all desire to exceed their own boundaries." The mainspring of Soviet expansionism was thus explained in terms of traditional balance of power considerations and conflicting national interests, instead of the commitment by a regime to a universal revolutionary ideology which did not aim to perpetuate the nineteenth-century nation-state system. Even "if the Kremlin persisted in its enterprise of domination," de Gaulle speculated, "it would be against the will of the nations subject to its government." Such a regime could not last, since "in the long run there is no regime that can hold out against the will of nations."[41]

Following his return to power, de Gaulle at his first press conference in March 1959 revived the image of a greater Europe, which was now defined as lying "between the Atlantic and the Urals."[42] It was this terminology which de Gaulle continued to employ. He also continued to make the emergence of this greater Europe dependent upon the breakup of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe and the mellowing if not the disappearance of communism. Just how much of a transformation in the communist regimes would, in fact, be required or how soon this might be expected was not clear. In part this imprecision stemmed from de Gaulle's persistent refusal to take communist ideology seriously.

As de Gaulle intensified his wooing of the East in 1965, ideology seemed to disappear entirely as a consideration. In September, de Gaulle could report: "Our contacts and our exchanges are

[41]De Gaulle, *Salvation,* p. 53.

[42]President de Gaulle's First Press Conference, March 25, 1959, No. 128, p. 4.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

multiplying with the countries of the East, each of them, of course, being treated only in consideration of its *national* personality." "In this respect," de Gaulle continued, "we attach great importance to the new trend of our relations with Russia." He also looked forward to the visit of the Polish Premier in the hope that "his presence here will serve the practical rapprochement of the French and Polish peoples, friends and allies at all times in their history." Again, it was only the historic association among nations that counted. Then, without pausing, de Gaulle projected the culmination of these renewed ties between East and West.

> We do not hesitate to envisage that the day will come when, in order to achieve a constructive entente to the Urals, all of Europe will wish to settle its own problems and, above all, that of Germany, by the only means that will make it possible to do so—that of a general agreement. On that day, our continent could once again assume in the world, for the good of all men, the role that is worthy of its resources and its capacities.[43]

It is difficult to speculate with any assurance about de Gaulle's intentions and attitudes toward the communist bloc. If substantial transformations in the communist regimes must precede the construction of this entente to the Urals, then surely the task must be viewed in terms of generations. If, however, de Gaulle is seeking to make a deal with the East, or is simply an old man in a hurry who wishes to see the entente created in his own lifetime, then the matter becomes of immediate concern. This approach can be rationalized by reference only to national interests, to the total neglect of the stubborn ideological considerations.

Let us suppose that sooner or later an attempt is made to form this association of nations from the Atlantic to the Urals. Upon what principles is it to be organized? The model is found in the "Europe of States" which de Gaulle has sought to create in Western Europe, beginning with the Franco-German ties. Even before the conclusion of the Franco-German Treaty, de Gaulle explained:

> There is a solidarity between Germany and France. On this solidarity depends the immediate security of the two peoples. . . . On this solidarity depend all hopes of uniting Europe on the political and defense levels as on the economic level. On this solidarity depends, in consequence, the destiny of the whole of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Ural Mountains.[44]

[43]De Gaulle's Twelfth Press Conference, September 9, 1965, p. 9. (Italics added.)
[44]De Gaulle's Sixth Press Conference, May 15, 1962, p. 8.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

De Gaulle has explicitly reiterated this three-step sequence on several occasions: First, a political entente with West Germany, then with the Europe of the Six, and then with all of Europe. "We must," de Gaulle entreated in 1965,

> behave like the Europeans we are and, in that capacity, attempt to re-establish, from one end of our continent to the other, an equilibrium based on understanding and cooperation among all the peoples who live on it as we do. This is exactly what we are doing by reconciling ourselves with Germany; by proposing a real solidarity of the Six to our neighbors on both sides of the Rhine and the Alps; by resuming with the Eastern countries, as they emerge from their crushing constraint, the relations of active understanding which formerly linked us to them.[45]

There would emerge from such an active understanding "a Europe in a state of equilibrium, peace and cooperation from one end to the other of the territory which nature has given it."[46]

Step three, the achievement of an idyllic state of equilibrium, peace and cooperation from the Atlantic to the Urals, is to follow the achievement of these conditions in Western Europe. What are the prospects for realizing this grandiose goal? Here one must recall all of the Gaullist illusions about the possibility of organizing a grouping of sovereign nation-states which somehow would be able to shed their traditional power rivalries and antagonisms so as to live with each other in peace and harmony. What, in fact, would result from an attempt to organize Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals on the Gaullist pattern? As former Under Secretary of State George Ball has noted, one would find "a Europe in which each of the middle-sized states would seek to make its own deal with one or the other of the 'great hegemonies' in the hope of establishing for itself a first-class power position while keeping the others in an inferior role. Such a Europe—a continent of shifting coalitions and changing alliances—is not the hope of the future." Rather it would mean "a reversion to the tragic and discredited pattern of the past—a return to 1914, as though that were not good enough, and with the same guarantee of instability—yet made more dangerous, not less, by the ideological drive of the Soviet Union and the existence of nuclear weapons."[47]

We already know that de Gaulle has failed to establish consistently harmonious, cooperative relations between the Two of the Franco-German Treaty, and has been even less successful in

[45]Speech by de Gaulle, April 27, 1965, p. 2.
[46]De Gaulle's Eleventh Press Conference, February 4, 1965, p. 12.
[47]Address by Under Secretary of State George Ball at Washington, April 29, 1966, *Department of State Bulletin*, May 16, 1966, p. 767.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

reorganizing the Six along Gaullist lines. Within the Six, indeed, de Gaulle has most often found himself arrayed against the other five. If Gaullist principles cannot be made to work between the Two or among the Six, then how can they ever be expected to work among the twenty or more nations lying between the Atlantic and the Urals? It would be necessary to accommodate all the revived sovereignties of Eastern Europe and their long-standing animosities which never produced peace or an equilibrium in the past, as well as the divergent ideological heritages of these states. Simply to list the ingredients that would go into making this entente is to reveal that the Gaullist conception of a Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals is pure fantasy.

But the fantasy does not stop here. The very phrase of Europe "to the Urals" implies drastic alterations in the easternmost partner of the entente. The Urals, in de Gaulle's scheme, are not only a geographical expression marking the end of Europe, but a political boundary marking the end of Russian power. He believes Russia will be partitioned as a result of the growing intensity of the Sino-Soviet rivalry. "Russia," de Gaulle predicted in 1959, is "a white European nation which has conquered part of Asia," and "nothing can happen to prevent her from having to reckon with the yellow multitude which is China—numberless and wretchedly poor, indestructible and ambitious, building by dint of violent efforts a power which cannot be kept within limits and looking around her at the expanses over which she must one day spread."[48]

That the reckoning with China would, in fact, mean the partition of Russia was confirmed by de Gaulle's Minister of Information, Alain Peyrefitte. In an interview he was asked: "What of General de Gaulle's mention of the Urals? Does he look forward to the division of Russia in two, or has it escaped his attention that nearly half the Russian nation is now to be found beyond the Urals, in Siberia?" Peyrefitte retorted that "in Siberia, after all, the Russians are occupying what is Chinese soil. Will the Chinese forever tolerate this intrusion?"[49]

[48]De Gaulle's Second Press Conference, November 10, 1959, p. 2.

[49]Joseph Alsop, *New York Herald Tribune*, European edition, March 29, 1963. See also C. L. Sulzberger, *New York Times*, August 22, 1965: "The General does not loosely use this conventional geographical definition of 'Europe.' He is quite aware that such a 'Europe,' terminating in the heart of the Soviet Union, politically implies some future partition of the USSR. This inference is deliberate. De Gaulle conjectures that the mighty China whose rise he foresees will some day pre-empt Russia's Siberian and Central Asian territories, which he considers artificially administered by Moscow, since they result from 'colonial' conquests. The fact that this displeases Russia does not bother de Gaulle. He holds 'that is their affair, not mine.' "

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

De Gaulle, in effect, is advising the Kremlin: Join with me in rediscovering your European vocation, and together we can lead the nations of Europe in building a Continental equilibrium. Perhaps this vision is rooted in the Treaty of Tilsit, whereby Napoleon and Alexander I divided Europe, for a time, between them. Clearly, de Gaulle views cooperation with Russia essential so as to keep a future unified Germany within bounds. This is evident from de Gaulle's conspicuous lack of enthusiasm for German reunification,[50] except as a consequence of having first created Europe "to the Urals." De Gaulle fully shares with Moscow the desire to keep West Germany in a permanently inferior military position, by preventing Bonn from participating in any plans for multilateral nuclear sharing through NATO, or indeed from having access to the *force de frappe,* even though Bonn has a special treaty relationship with Paris.[51]

Though de Gaulle shares certain limited objectives with Moscow, what incentives do Soviet leaders have to enter seriously into the Gaullist framework of a Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals? Is the USSR going to allow de Gaulle to demote it from its position as a world power to that of a merely European one, and one that de Gaulle has gratuitously consented should be dissected at the Urals? Could this maimed Russia then be expected to extend a friendly hand to France? Moreover, how receptive is the Kremlin likely to be to the Gaullist gambit of wooing China, which in part has been undertaken so as to give the Russians a feeling of being outflanked and encircled, and hence driven toward rejoining Europe? Is this likely to encourage a Franco-Russian entente, or will it excite Russian suspicions of Gaullist motives?

Even assuming that these obstacles could somehow be surmounted and a Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals had come into existence, what assurance would there be that this Europe could be run from Paris and Moscow? Is it not still more fantasy

[50]De Gaulle's Sixth Press Conference, May 15, 1962, p. 7. "In light of the extremely precarious balance that exists between the East and the West, our view on Germany is that it is not opportune, at the present time, to alter the facts that have already been accomplished there. We believe that these facts must be taken as they are and lived with."

[51]C. L. Sulzberger, *New York Times,* November 21, 1964, reported: "As the Fourth Republic waned, Jacques Chaban-Delmas, Defense Minister in the Gaillard Cabinet, made a verbal deal with [Defense Minister] Strauss granting Germany access to French nuclear weapons in exchange for financial and technical aid. . . . After de Gaulle regained power, Herr Strauss asked the General's Defense Minister to honor the arrangement. He was rebuffed and the accord was ultimately denegotiated."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to suppose that a reunified Germany of more than 75 million people could be contained by a weaker France on the West and a truncated Russia on the East? West Germany is already the world's third greatest industrial power and the second-ranking state in world trade. This enormous economic potential could, in the future, be joined to an active political policy which would enable a unified Germany to emerge as the dominant power in Europe. Moreover, much of the energy which the parts of a divided Germany have been dissipating on each other could then be turned against the outside world. To date, the Federal Republic has been restrained in its diplomacy because of its Nazi heritage and the shattering of the continuity of its national traditions and leadership groups. Should a reunified Germany emerge in a Gaullist Europe, it would be stimulated by the toxin of Gaullist nationalism and freed of the restraints that weigh upon the present generation. A new generation of leaders would by then have come of age, no longer feeling the stigma of the Nazi past and eager to reassert German power on the stage of world politics by emulating the egoistic, nationalist behavior of de Gaulle. When viewed from this perspective, the Gaullist dream becomes a nightmare.

Taken together, all of the dangers and difficulties of de Gaulle's concept of a Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals amount, as Professor Brzezinski has put it, to a vision but not a policy. In terms of its practical effect, "his insistence on a Europe detached from America disunited the West without causing any substantial change in the East. Indeed, his attitude could have the effect of driving America out of West Europe . . . without driving Russia out of East Europe."[52] If such a Europe ever comes to pass, it would leave either a divided Germany or a Germany that would be reunited on Soviet terms. This version of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals would surely not be dominated by Paris, or even by Paris and Moscow, but by Moscow alone. And such a Europe, of course, would mean the end of NATO, both as an instrument of Western defense and as an invaluable political forum in which the West could hammer out common positions so as to move in unity toward a settlement with the East.[53]

[52]Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Alternative to Partition* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), p. 115.

[53]For an examination of de Gaulle's views on NATO, see Elliot R. Goodman, "De Gaulle's NATO Policy in Perspective," ORBIS, Fall 1966.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC "INTERNATIONAL"

by Charles R. Dechert

AS an international movement Christian Democracy is a many-faceted association of national political parties and *équipes,* regional and continental party organizations, youth and women's groups. Although present-day Christian Democracy is nonconfessional, its origins lie in Catholic social thought. It is supported by organizations of Christian social inspiration, working at various levels from local community to worldwide, in labor and business, management and the professions, among farmers, artisans and students.

The European Catholic political movement of democratic orientation had its origins early in the nineteenth century, not on an international scale, but primarily as a series of local and national responses to the challenge of political and economic liberalism and the rise of the modern centralized state. By the beginning of the twentieth century the validity of political Catholicism in Western Europe had been implicitly recognized by Pope Leo XIII, and mass-based party organizations accepting the reality of the national state and parliamentary institutions had affirmed themselves in the Low Countries, Germany and Switzerland. The interwar period saw the rise (and fall) of strong Catholic parties in Italy and Austria, and the inception of Christian Democratic movements in France, Spain, and a number of East European and Latin American countries. After World War II, Christian Democracy became the dominant political force in Western Europe, not least because it had succeeded in overcoming its exclusively Catholic orientation. It found support among the broad strata of Europe's population through an aconfessional appeal based on a concrete political program. European union, for example, is inextricably linked to the names of such Christian Democratic leaders as Adenauer, De Gasperi and Schuman. Alone or in coalition, Christian Democracy has dominated or strongly conditioned the postwar governments of Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Switzerland. The same is true of Luxembourg and San Marino.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC "INTERNATIONAL"

In recent years, Christian Democracy has become an increasingly important force in Latin America. The Christian Democrat, Eduardo Frei, was elected President of Chile in 1964, running under the slogan "Revolution in Freedom." His victory was confirmed the following year when the Chilean party gained 82 of the 147 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. The Peruvian Christian Democrats form part of the government and hold the vice-presidency and two ministries. In Venezuela the Social Christian Party (COPEI), which has moved to the opposition, hopes to replace Acción Democratica (the Social Democrats) as that country's leading party. Prior to the constitutional crises of recent years, the Christian Democratic parties of Argentina and Brazil were growing rapidly and had won between 5 and 10 per cent of the popular vote in national elections. In Central America, the party is strongest in El Salvador, where it received 26 per cent of the popular vote in the 1964 elections.

Unlike the international movements of Marxist inspiration, with their mass syndical organizations and appeals to mass action, the Christian social movement found its first support in the countryside and among the free workers and professions. It directed its earliest organizational efforts to the formation of banks and credit unions, cooperatives and associations of artisans. From its beginnings, the movement eschewed violence and emphasized the values of personal freedom, mutually supportive interpersonal relations, interclass cooperation, and the desirability of a pluralistic society. As a result of this lack of the spectacular, of "newsworthy" conflict, the growth of Christian Democracy as a worldwide political force has gone largely unrecognized by broad sectors of the public.

The terms "Christian Democracy" and "Christian social movement" can create some confusion in the mind of the unwary reader, and, indeed, are not infrequently used interchangeably by recognized scholars. Michael P. Fogarty, for example, concludes his volume *Christian Democracy in Western Europe* with this statement:

> In short: Christian Democracy can be re-defined as *that aspect of the ecumenical or catholic movement in modern Christianity* which is concerned with the application of Christian principles in the areas of political, economic, and social life for which the Christian laity has independent responsibility.[1]

Maurice Vaussard, in his *Histoire de la Démocratie Chrétienne,*

[1](Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1957), p. 435.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

accepts the definition of Toniolo, the authorized commentator on the thought of Pope Leo XIII:

> . . . that ordering of civil society in which all the social, juridical, and economic forces, in the fullness of their hierarchical development, cooperate proportionally for the common good, producing ultimately a series of advantages for the lower classes.[2]

Toniolo's definition refers to Christian Democracy as a state of society; Fogarty's to the process of laymen applying Christian principles to the entirety of social life. Christian Democracy as a concrete political phenomenon is much more restricted than either of these definitions. Fogarty's definition might well be applied to the Christian social movement as a whole.

In this paper "Christian Democracy" will be used to refer to the organized national political parties and movements of Christian social inspiration, their associated organizations such as trade unions and employers' groups insofar as these serve a strictly political function, and to the World Union of Christian Democrats (UMDC). The Christian social movement, and in ultimate analysis Christian Democracy as an organized political current, are based on the fact that ethical and religious institutions and values are inextricably interwoven with the political and economic life of man.

Basically the Christian demands that the social order and the political process (which is essentially a process of values allocation) conform with those criteria of justice that assign an inalienable prescriptive right to the personal integrity of the individual, the formation, conservation and education of the family, and the development of personality through the use and disposal of material goods, access to cultural goods, free association for communal objectives, and the performance of religious acts. The Christian Democrats maintain that in the contemporary world the requirements of justice are most adequately met by democratic governments and representative institutions in a political system that provides meaningful guarantees of civil liberties.

Development of the Christian Democratic "International"

The various European political parties and movements of Christian inspiration arose independent of one another. Each has its own history and national character. The sole unifying element in these parallel developments throughout the nineteenth century

[2](Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1956), p. 21.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and the first two decades of the twentieth was the voice of the papacy addressing itself to problems of contemporary society in essentially religious and moral terms. Perhaps the most important single papal document providing policy guidelines in the crystallization of modern Catholic social and political thought was the *Rerum Novarum* of Pope Leo XIII. This papal denunciation of the moral and social defects of both liberalism and socialism still provides a basic element in the platform of Christian Democracy, which represents itself as a middle way between irresponsible individualism and dehumanizing collectivism.

The initiative for an international organization of Christian Democratic parties came from Don Luigi Sturzo shortly after the founding of the Italian People's Party (Partito Popolare Italiano) in 1919. In 1921, Sturzo and four associates, including Alcide De Gasperi, visited key members of the German Zentrum at Munich, Berlin and Cologne, while other members of the Italian party initiated discussions at Paris and Vienna. Subsequent informal meetings of European party leaders were held at Rome, Venice and Genoa. Sturzo's exile in 1924, and the formation of the French Parti Démocrate Populaire in November 1924, provided the personal impulse and the organizational conditions for the formation of the new "International."

The First International Congress of Peoples Parties was held at Paris in December 1925, with the participation of party officials and parliamentarians from France, Italy, Germany, Belgium, Poland and Lithuania. Subsequently, the parties of the Netherlands, Switzerland, Austria, Bavaria, Luxembourg and Czechoslovakia adhered to the Paris-headquartered Sécretariat International des Partis Démocratiques d'Inspiration Chrétienne.[3] Although this first "International" held annual congresses in the latter 1920's and early 1930's, it never became an effective international organization. The rise of fascism and nazism destroyed the Italian and German parties which were the natural leaders of the movement. The Austrian Catholic experiment with an authoritarian corporative state created an internal split among the parties that could not be healed. The Paris Secretariat increasingly lay in French hands and ceased to exist in 1939.

In 1936 Don Sturzo formed the People and Freedom Group in London with the support of the American, Miss Barbara Bar-

[3]The term "Christian Democrat" was avoided in this title because of its association, especially in France and Italy, with the Modernist Movement condemned by Pope Pius X.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

clay Carter, who, in 1940, became General Secretary of a newly formed International Christian Democratic Union presided over by Professor Veraart of the University of Delft. This Union published the review *People and Freedom (for Christian Democrats of All Countries)*. It brought together representatives of all Christian Democratic groups of the European governments-in-exile plus representatives of the Italian *popolari* and the Basque and Catalan Christian Democrats. Vaussard notes that in 1938 there were formed the Nouvelles Équipes Françaises. These played an heroic role in the resistance to nazism and together with other national groups of Christian inspiration helped to lay the groundwork for the resurgence of Christian Democracy in Europe after World War II.

The Resistance forged militant Christian Democratic cadres within the occupied countries. This was especially true of Italy and France, where they worked closely with the communists and socialists in the clandestine struggle for liberation, and later in governing the newly liberated nations. Even in Germany surviving leaders of the old Zentrum, most notably Adenauer, came rapidly to the fore during the Allied occupation. In 1945 Sturzo promoted the formation of an International Christian Democratic Information Service at London, while in the same year the Swiss Christian Conservative Party sponsored informal meetings of representatives from the re-emerging European Christian Democratic parties at Geneva. These culminated in the formal meeting at Montreux in the autumn of 1946 which established the Nouvelles Équipes Internationales (NEI). At the first international congress, held at Chaudfontaine, Belgium, in May 1947, the NEI (Union Internationale des Démocrates Chrétiens) was approved by representatives of the European parties as a permanent international coordinative and consultative institution.

The NEI explicitly rejected the role of a "black international" or "third force" on the international political scene, although in its publications and those of member parties Christian Democracy is always presented as an ideology and political orientation providing an alternative both to Marxism, in its communist and socialist versions, and to the nineteenth-century conception of the liberal state. The NEI viewed European political integration as its first major objective, and European union as the first step toward world unity. It sought to lend encouragement to leaders and groups of Christian inspiration within the British Common-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

wealth, the French Union and Latin America as part of its contribution toward attaining the broader goal of a viable international political order.

Membership in the NEI has been on the basis of national "teams" or *équipes*. In countries which have a single party of Christian inspiration, the *équipe* represents that party, while in countries where there are several such parties, like the Netherlands, the national *équipe* is named by the participating parties. France, Belgium and Great Britain were initially represented by *équipes* whose members were active either in a political party or the labor movement, or were notable in some extrapolitical activity.

In 1948 the NEI established a Cultural Commission and an Economic and Social Commission. A Youth Commission was set up in 1947 when the NEI was founded. It was later renamed the Youth Section. In accordance with a decision taken at a meeting in Hofgastein in 1950, it acquired autonomy in July 1951 at Berlin as the Union Internationale des Jeunes Démocrates Chrétiens (UIJDC). The UIJDC immediately undertook a large-scale effort to create young party activists in Western Europe, especially among university youth, and is beginning to show fruit as a major channel for the recruitment of a third generation of party leaders. The Christian Democratic Parliamentary Group of the European Parliament at Strasbourg is closely tied to the NEI.

Owing to grave limitations of funds and personnel, neither the Economic and Social Commission nor the Cultural Commission became effective in the postwar period as an influential and continuing element of the NEI. The NEI's principal function has been to provide a multilateral device for the transfer of information among and between European Christian Democratic parties and their key members. This has occurred principally at its annual congresses, which serve as meeting places for Christian Democratic parliamentarians and members of the parties' secretariats. They are also a point of encounter for observers from other national and international parties; representatives of emerging Christian Democratic parties and movements; and observers from peripheral groups such as Christian workers, Christian employers, and university students, and from interested Free World governments such as the United States. The NEI has published a quarterly review *L'Eveil de l'Europe,* the bimonthly *Le Bulletin de Presse du Centre International d'Information,* and *Les Cahiers*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

des N.E.I. The latter publication, issued irregularly, carries depth analyses of major political, economic and social issues by notable Christian Democratic political leaders and intellectuals. Since 1959, the Christian Democratic Group of the European Parliament has published a mimeographed quarterly in French, German and Italian. This is largely concerned with developing and enunciating a common line on European unity, and is sympathetic to the efforts of Jean Monnet's Action Committee for a United States of Europe.

The East European Christian Democratic parties, for most of the period following World War II, have been parties-in-exile. Yet the Czechoslovak Peoples Party, for example, was one of the founders of the NEI. Its representative at Chaudfontaine in 1947, Ivo Duchacek, was named a Vice-President of the "International." After the communist coup of February 1948, the Board of Representatives of the Czechoslovak Peoples Party decided to cease activity and the greater part of the leadership went into exile. Similarly the Democratic Peoples Party of Hungary ceased activity in February 1949, with the condemnation of Cardinal Mindzenty, and survived in the exile organization of Hungarian Christian Democrats that initially arose in 1948 at Paris around the figure of Monsignor Horvath.

The Latvian, Lithuanian, Polish and Slovenian Christian Democratic parties had an even briefer existence in their homelands after World War II, and organized parties-in-exile in the immediate postwar period. Nonetheless, the Christian Labor Party of Poland was represented at the first congress of the NEI in 1947. In the following years, the other exile groups joined the NEI and have continued their participation to the present time.

Because of the specific problems faced by the exiles and their distinct policy objectives, the Christian Democratic Union of Central Europe (UCDEC) was founded at New York in July 1950, under the leadership of Adolf Prochazka (Czechoslovakia) and Karol Popiel (Poland). The principal concern of UCDEC was to contribute to liberating the peoples of Central Europe from communist oppression and integrating the central European area into a united and democratic Europe. UCDEC pursued these objectives through its publishing activities (the monthlies *Nouvel Horizon* and *Christian Democratic Review,* and the bimonthly *Informacion Democratica Cristiana* directed at Latin America), personal contacts with European and Latin American Christian

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Democrats at the United Nations, cooperation with the Assembly of Captive European Nations and the Free Europe Committee, and participation in the annual congresses of the NEI, where UCDEC positions frequently appeared as resolutions. It has also sent representatives and observers to the congresses and meetings of the Pax Romana (the international Catholic students' and intellectuals' movement), the French Semaines Sociales and the German Katholikentage, the International Committee for the Defense of Christian Culture, the Union of Malines, and similar groups.

Within the international movement as a whole, the UCDEC has functioned as a liaison between the mature European Christian Democratic parties making up the NEI and the rising parties of Christian inspiration in Latin America. UCDEC initiated contacts with the Latin American parties in April 1951, by an exchange of letters with Senator Dardo Regules of the Partido Union Civica (Uruguay) in his capacity as the first Secretary General of the Christian Democratic Organization of America (ODCA). The latter organization had been formed at the second of two meetings of the leaders of Christian Democracy in Latin America held at Montevideo, Uruguay in 1947 and 1949. The UCDEC leadership began a close working relationship with leaders of the Latin American group early in 1952 on the occasion of an international meeting on freedom of information sponsored by the United Nations in New York. By the end of 1952, firm ties linked it with the Christian Democratic parties of Chile, Uruguay, Venezuela and Brazil.

In 1953 UCDEC entered into relations with the Partido de Acción Nacional of Mexico, the Christian Democratic groups of Peru, Bolivia, Paraguay and Argentina, and the Christian social movements in Colombia and Cuba. The First International Congress of ODCA was held in Santiago, Chile in December 1955. This was organized in close cooperation with UCDEC, whose Executive Committee Chairman, Adolf Prochazka, was elected Vice-President of the Congress. Relations between the Central European Union and ODCA have remained close.

Once working relations had been established between key personalities of the NEI, UCDEC and ODCA, the next step was to call a world meeting.[4] The First World Conference of Christian

[4]This had been asked for by a motion approved at the First International Congress of ODCA in December 1955.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Democratic Movements, held in Paris on November 9-10, 1956, provided the first opportunity for extensive meetings and the development of personal acquaintances between the leaders of the European and the Latin American parties. It was a meeting ground for representatives of thirty-three political groups of Christian inspiration coming from twenty-eight countries.

In addition to the plenary sessions, the conference was divided into five commissions: political, social, economic, ideological, organizational. The final report of the Commission on Organization, approved as a resolution of the conference, took the first steps toward a world organization of Christian Democrats. It recommended the creation of two committees: an Inter-Continental Committee, composed of the leaders of all Christian Democratic parties in the world; and a Permanent Committee of Liaison and Organization, composed of the General Secretaries of the three existing international groupings, NEI, UCDEC and ODCA. The first part of the recommendation proved premature, for the Inter-Continental Committee never met. On the other hand, cooperation among the secretariats of the three regional organizations proved entirely feasible, and a second world congress was held at Brussels in 1958.

In 1960 the Centre International Démocrate-Chrétien d'Études et de Documentation (CIDCED) was established at Rome—with the financial support of the various national Christian Democratic parties—to serve as a permanent focus for the national parties and the three regional groups. Karl Josef Hahn, former Assistant Secretary General of the Catholic Peoples Party of the Netherlands, was named General Secretary.

A World Committee, proposed in a report of the Third International Conference of Christian Democrats (Santiago, 1961) and shortly thereafter established on a provisional basis, was formally confirmed and its membership extended at the Fourth International Conference (Strasbourg, 1963). Between 1961 and 1963, the World Committee consisted of the General Secretaries of the three regional organizations (NEI, ODCA, UCDEC) and the General Secretary of the Study Center (CIDCED). At Strasbourg it was extended to include three representatives from the European and Latin American regional organizations (NEI, ODCA), one representative of the youth organization (UIJDC), and one representative of the Central European group (UCDEC), as well as the General Secretaries previously serving. The reformed World

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Committee, meeting at Caracas in May 1964, formally created the World Union of Christian Democrats (UMDC), approved its statute, and fixed the headquarters at Rome.

The second meeting of the expanded World Committee, at Rome in September 1964, was largely concerned with defining the scope and purpose of the World Union of Christian Democrats. Though limited by its lack of substantial resources, human or financial, the World Committee adopted, by unanimous vote on September 17, a Plan of World Activity. This plan emphasized those activities that neither national nor regional Christian Democratic organizations can undertake alone. Within the framework of the Christian social movement the World Committee saw the need for interregional exchanges of information, methods and personnel, greater coordination of national party programs, and increased cooperation at the international level with Christian trade unions (CISC) and Christian employers and managers (UNIAPAC). Christian Democracy has been noticeably weak in communicating its ideals and principles outside Europe. A special effort was thought necessary to make the movement better known and to develop practical policies for working with non-Christian political currents on other continents. It was foreseen that such relations must be based on democratic and progressive programs and ideologically on the ethical and spiritual principles that Christians hold in common with other, non-Western cultures.

Among the key issues of policy that the World Committee felt must be resolved at the international level were (1) unified orientation and common action with regard to nondemocratic regimes and movements; (2) common counterstrategies to meet the tactics and appeal of world communism; and (3) elaboration of strategies of economic and political development for the emerging nations.

At Munich, in June 1965, the World Committee laid plans for the Fifth World Conference of Christian Democrats to be held at Lima, Peru in the spring of 1966. The arrangements were completed at Taormina on December 8, 1965, immediately prior to the seventeenth meeting of the NEI, which was now renamed the European Union of Christian Democrats (UEDC).

Fifth World Conference of Christian Democrats

The 1966 World Conference at Lima concentrated on the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

general theme "Development and Solidarity," although of equal importance to the World Committee were the still unresolved organizational problems attendant on creating an effective international movement. It was organized into five commissions, three dealing with the substantive theme, while Commissions IV and V worked in the area of international party policy and organization. The specific topic of each commission was based on the proposals of various national parties: I, Development and Social Justice (Peru); II, International Solidarity (Germany); III, The Community of Nations (Chile); IV, Christian Democracy and International Problems (Venezuela); V, Structure, Relations, and International Possibilities of the Christian Democratic Parties (Italy).

Organization of the conference rested in the hands of the Peruvian Christian Democratic Party which set up a Conference Committee consisting of a General Secretary, and subcommittees on finance, installations, press and publicity, and reports. The Credentials Committee was made up of the Chairman of the Organizing Committee and the general secretaries of the three regional sponsoring organizations (ODCA, UEDC, UCDEC) and the Study Center (CIDCED). Regular Delegations and Delegates represented several categories of conference participants: (1) parties and *équipes* formally associated with the regional organizations; (2) the three regional organizations (ODCA, UCDEC, UEDC); (3) CIDCED as an organ of the international organization; (4) other international Christian Democratic groupings, namely, the youth movement (UIJDC), the Association of Latin American Christian Democrats in Europe (ADCLE), and the Christian Democratic Group of the European Parliament. Adherent Delegations and Delegates were sent by invited Christian Democratic parties or movements not officially members of the regional organizations; Observing Delegations and Delegates represented "interested parties, movements, or institutions" sponsored by a regional organization. Each Regular Delegation had a single vote on resolutions and the Head of Delegation might name up to two representatives on each commission.[5]

[5]Prior to the first plenary session held on the afternoon of April 23, a preparatory meeting attended by the Heads of Regular Delegations agreed to a final schedule, named the officers and rapporteur of each commission, and elected the Chairman and Regional Vice-Chairmen of the Conference. In passing, it is perhaps significant to note that although no English-speaking countries were regular participants at the conference, English, together with Spanish and French, was an official language.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A total of some 350 delegates and observers attended, with a regular representation from the parties, groups and institutions listed in Table I.

The situation of the British and Spanish representatives to the conference was somewhat ambiguous. The British *équipe* to the NEI began as an informal group of British notables drawn from the three major parties. It was held together largely by the personal influence of Patrick McLaughlin. In 1961, when McLaugh-

TABLE I

REPRESENTATION AT THE FIFTH WORLD CONFERENCE OF CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS

International Christian Democratic Organizations

European Union of Christian Democrats (UEDC-NEI)
Christian Democratic Organization of America (ODCA)
Christian Democratic Union of Central Europe (UCDEC)
International Union of Young Christian Democrats (UIJDC)
International Christian Democratic Center for Research and Documentation (CIDCED)
Association of Latin American Christian Democrats in Europe (ADCLE)
Christian Democratic Group of the European Parliament

National Parties and Movements

ODCA

Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guatemala
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay (movement)
Peru
Puerto Rico
Uruguay
Venezuela

UEDC

Austria
Belgium
France (MRP)
Germany (CDU-CSU)
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands (*équipe*)
San Marino
Spain (observer)
Switzerland
Great Britain (observer)

Exile Parties and Movements

ODCA

Cuba (movement, Miami)

UEDC

Basque (*équipe*, France)

UCDEC

Hungary (New York)
Lithuania (New York)
Poland (Rome)
Czechoslovakia (New York)
Slovenia (Cleveland)
Latvia (Ottawa)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lin left England, coordination of the group devolved on Lady Emmett, head of the Overseas Bureau of the Conservative Party. By this time, however, such Liberals as John McCallum-Scott and such Labour Party personalities as Michael P. Fogarty had ceased active participation in the *équipe*.

After a number of informal initiatives, the Conservative Party formally sought admission to the World Union of Christian Democrats in mid-1965. In a press conference on January 21, 1966 at Rome, Edward Heath publicly announced his party's desire to join the Christian Democratic "International." In all probability, British entry would be followed by applications from Scandinavian conservatives. But because a number of parties in the European Union object to the essentially secular nature of Britain's Conservative Party, its basic orientation and a number of its policies, the party's application has been left in abeyance. Significantly, the UIJDC guide to international and national Christian Democratic organizations of March 1966 omits the British *équipe* and assigns observer status in the youth movement to the Young Conservative and Unionist Organization. The Conservative Party did not send anyone to the Lima Conference.

The Spanish situation is much more complex. Although political movements, with the exception of the Falange, are technically outlawed, there have been several incipient Christian Democratic groupings. These include a moderate right-wing group centered at Madrid, La Democracia Social Cristiana, headed by José Maria Gil Robles; a left-wing group, La Izquierda Demócrata Cristiana, inspired and led by Professor Jiménez Fernández of Seville; the Spanish *équipe* of the UIJDC; and L'Unión Española Democratica, which consists of university students and is supported by a number of professors, most notably Aquilar Navarro. The clandestine Federacion Sindical de Trabajadores is linked to the Conféderation Internationale des Syndacats Chrétiens (CISC), and the overt workers' section of Acción Católica is also active. Many sympathetic professionals and intellectuals are grouped around such cultural and political reviews as *Aun, Mundo Social, Cuadernos para el Dialogo, El Ciervo* and *Siembra*. The picture is further complicated by the presence of a UEDC-recognized Basque *équipe* in exile and by the Catalan Christian Democrats.

Efforts at unifying these diverse groups culminated in the formation of the Unión Española Demócrata Cristiana in January 1965 at Los Molinos outside Madrid. Although Professor Jiménez

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Fernández was named President of the federally structured Unión, divergent policy orientations and basic conflicts of personality continue to divide the Spanish groups. The Organizing Committee at Lima recognized the Madrid group represented by José Gil Robles, son of José Maria Gil Robles, but the Credentials Committee did not wish to take sides in disputes among the Spaniards. It recognized the representatives of any known Spanish group, and restricted all but the Basque exiles to the status of observers.

At the Third World Conference of Christian Democrats held at Santiago in 1961, only a handful of West European delegates had appeared and the commission reports reflected the strong left-wing orientation of many of the rising Latin American parties. Fortunately for the solidarity of the international movement, the extreme positions of the Santiago meeting were not adopted as resolutions binding the "International." This avoided the possibility of policy ruptures between the members of the Latin American movement and the more mature European parties.

At the Fifth World Conference, over fifty European delegates were present, including four Christian Democrats of ministerial rank: Emilio Colombo and Giovanni Battista Scaglia from Italy, Bruno Heck from Germany, and Theodore Bot from the Netherlands. The Italians were especially prominent with eighteen delegates, followed by the German Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union with six. Mariano Rumor, head of the Italian delegation, in his role as Political Secretary of Democrazia Christiana (he is also President of the UEDC) denied, on a number of occasions, that any party could be considered as, or assert the role of, a *partito guida*—a party of leadership. On the other hand, the Italians did not fail to point out the affinities between their Latin-Mediterranean tradition and the civilization of Latin America, or the relevance of the Italian party's alliance with democratic socialism and the political exigencies of Latin American Christian Democracy.

Overall, the deliberations of the five commissions and the resolutions of the Fifth Conference were remarkable for their moderation and pursuit of an intercontinental consensus on matters of ideology, policy and organization.

The First Commission (Development and Social Justice) refused to consider underdevelopment solely in economic terms,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

but also emphasized the "social, cultural, political, psychological and moral" dimensions of the problem. Although the developmental process is associated with an increase in per capita income, it consists essentially in weaving an organic institutional web that continuously enhances the participation and influence of hitherto marginal social elements in decisions that affect their lives, and in the corresponding diffusion of social satisfactions and benefits. Underdevelopment prevails when "large sectors of population find themselves in material and spiritual conditions of life that imply the negation of the dignity of the human person." As might be expected, the Christian Democratic response is personalist, but not individualist. At the level of the individual and small group, the Commission Report emphasizes the role of cultural and moral factors: the dignity of productive labor, the moral as well as social value of savings, the need for a sense of responsibility to family and community. The part intermediate organizations play in development is also stressed. A decentralization of operative social control in business corporations, cooperatives, credit unions, democratic communal and regional political units is considered necessary if social decisions are to be made effectively. The report insists on the necessity of personal private property both as a guarantee of personal independence and of entrepreneurial initiative. Nonetheless, it discusses other types of property and asserts the legitimacy of "community property" in the form of cooperatives and "communities of free workers" or, in exceptional cases, property controlled by national or intermediate-level public authorities where the pursuit of private or parochial interests would be dangerous to the common welfare.

For the first time, the Christian Democratic "International" has taken cognizance of postwar experiments in economic planning. The First Commission Report accepts the necessity of "imperative," publicly sanctioned norms for public enterprise, while the overall economy (largely the private sector) would be governed by an indicative plan put into effect by indirect controls exercised through monetary and fiscal policy. The report notes that indicative planning is relevant not only at regional and national levels but, in view of international economic disequilibria, might well be established through consultative institutions at the continental and global levels.

The Second Commission (International Solidarity) emphasized the necessity of taking all human communities into account when

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

considering the developmental process. This implies raising the cultural and economic level of underdeveloped countries so that they may participate in decisions and receive their share of the ever-increasing flow of economic and cultural goods among nations. To assure the effective decision-making power and autonomy of single communities in the family of nations requires the repudiation of any form of economic hegemony or "neo-colonialism." Hence, the Commission Report recommends that foreign aid programs be multilateral. This element of international Christian Democratic policy tends to follow the German line that development assistance programs are probably best handled on a consortium basis through nongovernmental agencies.

The Third Commission (The Community of Nations) began its deliberations by noting that the problem of development is distinct for each community and people. Christian Democrats must recognize the fact of cultural differences and that these indicate diverse routes of development, even within the framework of a common ideology. The acceptance and encouragement of cultural pluralism, however, should not be construed as an endorsement of efforts to achieve autarchy. The development process demands increasingly open national economies and the stimulation of freer trade. Furthermore, the extraordinary weight of economic power in the hands of the superpowers requires the development of continental-size economic units to avoid a situation in which all significant decisions are imposed from without. For this reason, Christian Democracy encourages the creation of Common Markets and customs unions in South and Central America, Africa and the East.

In concluding its report, the Third Commission pointed out that fruitful collaboration among peoples involves far more than economic exchanges and intergovernmental relations. Opportunities for increased international cooperation should be extended to the intermediary groups of society so that a horizontal pluralism may develop. It encouraged the formation of international professional, cultural, political and economic associations of all kinds.

The reports of the first three commissions were accepted in plenary session as resolutions of the conference.

The Fourth Commission (Christian Democracy and International Problems) confronted the potentially explosive issues of contemporary international politics. Its report required some re-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

drafting during the last session and could be presented for approval at that time only orally. In this form, it gained the consensus of the delegates.

Latin American participation in the Fourth Commission was strongly conditioned by two factors: the success of the Tri-Continental Conference of Havana in defining a worldwide communist strategy of revolutionary warfare directed at "national liberation,"[6] and the decision of the ODCA Council at Merida, in August 1965, to condemn the U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic. Repeatedly, delegates referred to Christian Democracy as an alternative to communism on a world scale. They also recognized that the political base of the party is founded on mass political participation under democratic institutions, and, hence, up to now has been effective only in nations having substantial Christian and especially Roman Catholic populations. To be effective in Africa and the East, Christian Democracy must broaden its ideological base and develop practical nonconfessional party institutions that can prove attractive in nations where Christian communities are minuscule.

Christian Democracy conceives of its world mission as the establishment of peace, that is, an international order founded on justice and the self-determination of peoples. The Report of the Fourth Commission condemns the Tri-Continental Conference for encouraging the use of violence, and asserts "the will of Christian Democracy to maintain democratic freedoms and to re-establish them in lands where they have been abolished." This will to re-establish freedom, however, repudiates violence and looks toward the gradual internal liberalization of the communist regimes. Specifically, the report recommends: (1) a movement from *détente* between East and West to positive cooperation in peaceful activities; (2) a negotiated settlement in Viet Nam; (3) admission of Communist China to the United Nations

[6]The Tri-Continental Conference, held at Havana on January 3-15, 1966, was attended by 500 delegates from 82 countries. Organized by the African and Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization, it provided for a "comradely confrontation of independent views" on imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism. A considerable level of programmatic unity was achieved, although there were clear *divisions between the Soviet and Chinese viewpoints.* A Latin-American Solidarity Organization was set up with "specific and important functions," and three other bodies were formed: (1) an Afro-Asian-Latin-American Solidarity Organization, with headquarters at Havana; (2) a Committee to Aid the National Liberation Movements and the Struggle against Neo-Colonialism, and (3) a Tri-Continental Committee of Solidarity with the Vietnamese People. (See *World Marxist Review,* March 1966, pp. 21-24.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

under the obligations of the Charter; and (4) German reunification and the eventual unification of all Europe.

During the Santiago Conference of 1961, a large number of Latin American Christian Democrats expressed their irritation with many of the economic and political activities of the United States in the Americas. At Lima in 1966, the Fourth Commission asked for increasingly close economic and political cooperation between Europe and Latin America, and the establishment of new relations between the Latin American states and the United States "based on equality and mutual respect." Such ticklish issues as Panamanian claims on the Canal, although raised in debate, were covered by this blanket statement on which a general consensus could be achieved. Even the extremely sensitive problem of U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic was muted in a formula recommending the establishment of democratic institutions and the departure of foreign troops—without indicating a priority.

The Fifth Commission (Structure, Relations, and International Possibilities of the Christian Democratic Parties) treated the heart of the problems confronting Christian Democracy as an international movement. The basic paper was given by the Italian, Angelo Bernassola, President of the UIJDC. Bernassola pointed out the need to spread Christian Democratic ideas and ideals beyond Europe and Latin America. After describing the truly international character of communism, he expressed the view that Christian Democracy provides a unique ideological and practical alternative. The crux of his argument was that a permanent coordinating and executive agency is required at the global level in order to increase the international effectiveness of Christian Democracy. Such an agency is not provided by the existing instrumentalities of the World Union, namely, the collegial World Committee that meets only occasionally and for short periods, or its organ CIDCED. Hence, a permanent central organization is needed: (1) to take speedy and effective action under changing circumstances; (2) to provide an effective Christian Democratic presence in international organizations; (3) to coordinate doctrinal development; (4) to provide for cadre development; and (5) to monitor and assist the development of new parties and movements. Bernassola noted that ODCA, at the Merida meeting of August 1965, had reinforced its structure by giving the Executive Committee a series of continent-wide

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tasks, and that an analogous development had taken place for the European group during the UEDC meeting at Taormina in December 1965.

Organizationally, the Bernassola paper recommended:

I. A World General Secretary to be elected triennially by the World Committee, and to report to it annually, with Adjunct General Secretaries named by the World Committee on the proposal of the World General Secretary. CIDCED would be a technical organ of the World Union of Christian Democrats (UMDC) and its Director would be named by the World Secretary General. The permanent organs of the World Union would:

   A. Develop closer relations among the parties through
      1. Document exchanges, exchanges of information on studies, training, electoral organization, press and propaganda methods.
      2. Exchanges of information and experience in central and local government, organization and activities of the national parliaments.
      3. Demonstrating solidarity, especially on the political plane, with parties in difficulty or working under repressive conditions.
      4. Cooperating in developing cadres for the party, government and public administration.

   B. Undertake cadre training and formation through
      1. Coordinated training programs, and the development of international specialized schools and activities.
      2. Exchange of party militants.
      3. Providing information on public and private international educational exchange programs, and facilitating student adjustment abroad.

   C. Increase the research facilities of CIDCED, publish a bulletin in several languages, and provide a publishing facility for exile parties.

   D. Develop personal contacts in Asia and Africa.

   E. Provide a permanent representative to the United Nations to follow its activities and establish liaison relations with delegates who are active in or sympathize with Christian Democracy. Establish a "consultative status" at UNESCO, especially for the UIJDC.

   F. Set up a World Conference on Development for 1967, and a Conference of Christian Democratic Parliamentarians on the subject of International Cooperation.

II. A reorganization of the World Committee to include the Presidents and General Secretaries of the three regional organizations and UIJDC, the World General Secretary and his Adjunct General

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Secretaries. The World Committee would meet annually and be responsible for the financing and budget of the World Union's permanent organs.

III. A World Conference or Congress to meet triennially and be responsible for:

A. General policy and guidelines for future work.

B. Discussion of problems of general interest.

C. Admission of new members on the recommendation of the World Committee.

The proposed reorganization was so fundamental that it aroused immediate opposition. Many European delegates (apart from the Italians) felt that such far-reaching proposals should have been discussed earlier within the regional organizations. Because the World Union had been a loose confederation of national parties and regional groupings, the suggested new structure seemed to be monolithic and bureaucratic. It was questioned whether Christian Democracy is really that type of political movement. Does its genius lie in disciplined obedience to a unitary center or in an organic polycentrism capable of adjusting a common view of man and society to the multiplicity of concrete national and historical situations?

In the end the conception that prevailed looked upon the World Union of Christian Democrats as a confederation of regional organizations whose power lies in the resources and political success of its member parties. The Report of the Fifth Commission, as approved by the conference, concluded: "It is understood that the positions agreed upon by the Commission, insofar as they require a revision of the statute of the UMDC, constitute only a recommendation that will be settled in final form by the World Committee."

The Italian position on the need for a stronger central executive and coordinative agency was accepted at Lima. It was agreed in principle that the activities of the World Union should be expanded. But both the Fifth Commission Report and the Conference Resolution put the decision as to future structure and the selection of a World Secretary General and his staff into the hands of the World Committee. It seems clear that any permanent secretariat will be an agency of the World Committee and the regional interests it represents.

A number of Latin American delegates felt that the existing and proposed membership of the World Committee gives undue

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

weight to the Europeans, and asked for a reorganization of the UEDC into Eastern and Western zonal groupings paralleling the ODCA's Atlantic, Pacific, Caribbean and Central American zones. In effect, this would reduce the weight of the East European exile groups (UCDEC) and reincorporate them into the European Union from which they had partially emerged in 1950.

The delegates to the Fifth Commission were less than enthusiastic about the conference schedule proposed in Bernassola's basic paper (I-F), and limited this to: "Assist other initiatives for a World Conference on Peace." In a later revision this became: "Seek the convocation of a World Christian Democratic Conference on Peace."

In some areas, the Commission Report, approved in plenary session, went well beyond the basic proposals. It recommended the creation of a World Feminine Section to parallel the youth activities of the UIJDC, and the formation of a Permanent Committee on Ideological Studies, both to develop party doctrine and to examine the ways and means of broadening Christian Democracy's worldwide appeal. The final version of the Fifth Commission's Proposal for a Resolution called for creation of a permanent group to study the specific issues involved in realizing greater international solidarity.

Conclusions

At the Lima Conference of Christian Democracy and in the post-conference clarifications of policy, including statements made at a meeting of the European leadership at Salzburg in mid-July 1966, it became clear that Christian Democrats do not favor a centralized and monolithic international movement.

In principle, the World Union of Christian Democrats accepts the desirability of two permanent agencies working under the control of the World Committee: one for ideological development and long-range planning, and another, executive agency, responsible for training and propaganda, exchanges of party experience and cadres, and assistance to parties and groups in their formative stages or operating under adverse political conditions. Clearly, however, an international executive needs more precise policy guidelines than currently exist and must confront serious problems of personnel, finance and internal organization.

It seems not unlikely that Christian Democracy can develop a worldwide appeal—although perhaps not under that name—in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

view of the inherent attractiveness of its program. It provides a reasoned alternative to communism and communist-inspired "wars of national liberation." It accepts and legitimates national and ethnic aspirations to independence without mortgaging their future. It substitutes for a doctrine of violence and class hatred an aspiration to social solidarity, encouraging class and functional cooperation in economic and social development. It proposes popular participation in decision-making as opposed to authoritarian or totalitarian controls. It recognizes private ownership as a means to personal liberty and individual responsibility while condemning the social abuse of wealth that provides a breeding ground of mass discontent and revolutionary subversion. Such principles may well have an appeal for many non-Western peoples since they reflect at least some of the aspirations of surviving traditional cultures and communitarian institutions.

At Lima, Christian Democracy grew in stature and self-awareness as an international movement. It avoided the more obvious threats to its solidarity and moved to improve its international machinery and hence its potential effectiveness. Only time will reveal whether it is adequate to the political challenges of our century. Can the World Union of Christian Democrats convert a political doctrine whose popular support has hitherto been largely based on Christian religious foundations into a universal force? Can this "international" create effective mechanisms for the acquisition and exercise of political power through representative institutions in those parts of the world where democratic rules are alien or ignored? Can it respond effectively to military dictatorship or to movements that speak from the rifle's mouth? And, not least, do there exist possibilities for its eventual affirmation, or reaffirmation, within the communist bloc itself?

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE COMMUNIST PARTIES OF THE "THIRD WORLD" IN SOVIET STRATEGY

by Edward Taborsky

FROM Lenin's time to the present, communist party leadership has been considered indispensable for the victory of socialism. Current Soviet ideological pronouncements not only make this thesis fully applicable to the developing nations, but go so far as to claim that even the success of the national-liberation struggle is "unthinkable in any country" without active communist participation.[1]

While stressing the importance of the proletariat and the peasantry, Soviet dicta, past and present, assert clearly that neither can accomplish the tasks assigned them by Soviet strategy-makers unless they are guided by the communist party as the enlightened revolutionary vanguard of the working class. "Only a political party of the working class, i.e., a Communist Party," said Lenin,

> is capable of uniting, educating and organising such a vanguard of the proletariat and the whole mass of the working people, a vanguard which is alone able to resist the inevitable petty-bourgeois vacillations of this mass, the inevitable traditions and relapses of trade-union narrowness or trade-unionist prejudices amidst the proletariat, and to lead the proletariat politically and through it to lead all the masses of the working people.[2]

Although Lenin was willing, if need be, to concede the leadership temporarily to nonproletarian elements during the initial phase of the national-democratic revolution, he insisted that the bourgeois-democratic movement be aided "only on the condition that the elements of future proletariat parties existing in all backward countries, which are not merely communist in name, shall be grouped together."[3] And the 1961 Program of the Soviet Communist Party proclaims "the leadership of the Marxist-Leninist party" to be an "indispensable condition" for "the triumph of the socialist revolution and the building of socialism."[4]

[1] *Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism* (Moscow, 1963), p. 425.
[2] *Collected Works,* 4th Russian edition, Vol. 32, p. 222.
[3] Preliminary Draft, *Selected Works,* 10, p. 231.
[4] English text in Herbert Ritvo, *The New Soviet Society* (New York: The New Leader, 1962), p. 29.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Hence, efforts to establish viable communist parties in developing countries where none existed before, and to strengthen those already in operation, figure among the most pressing tasks of Soviet strategy at the present stage of the Cold War. How successful have Soviet strategy-makers been in these efforts? How well prepared are the communist parties of developing nations for the crucial role they are supposed to play in communist revolutionary strategy in the Middle East, Asia, Africa and Latin America? Since the situation varies considerably from one region to another and from country to country, no full-fledged generalization is possible. Nonetheless, certain prevailing common characteristics can be traced, though all of them do not apply to each and every communist party of the "third world." These traits have been duly noted by Soviet analysts and some of the flaws they have uncovered cause them no small concern.

Small Party Membership

A major problem for Soviet strategists is the woefully small party membership throughout the "third world." In his speech at the Twenty-third Congress of the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU), General Secretary Brezhnev claimed almost fifty million members organized in eighty-eight parties.[5] However, the bulk of this impressive total consists of the ruling parties of the "world socialist system." With respect to the "third world," the latest Soviet release on the numerical strength of the "communist and workers' parties" published in *Pravda* claims, as of 1966, an aggregation of 4,203,000 members in all of noncommunist Asia, Africa and America.[6] But this total also includes communist and "workers'" parties that do not fall in the category of less-developed nations, such as those of Japan, South Africa, Israel, Canada and the United States. Moreover, there is little doubt that the *Pravda* article, designed as it is to stress "the dynamics of the development" of world communism, errs on the optimistic side. A more realistic calculation attempted in Table I indicates that the communist parties of the less-developed countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America total less than 2.5 to 3.5 million. Furthermore, two to three million of these, depending on what figure one accepts, are, or were, concentrated in a single country,

[5] *Pravda*, March 30, 1966.

[6] F. Burlatskii and E. Kuskov, "V borbie za splochennost' kommunisticheskiskh sil," in *ibid.*, January 20, 1967.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE I
THE COMMUNIST PARTIES OF THE "THIRD WORLD"

Country	*Membership*	*Status*		*Stand on the Sino-Soviet Rift*		
		Legal	*Illegal*	*Pro-Soviet*	*Split*	*Pro-Chinese*
AFRICA	10,900-34,300	1	11	5	1	1
Algeria	1,000-8,000		×	×		
Congo (Leopoldville)	very small		×			
Egypt	1,000-8,000		×		×	
Lesotho (Basutoland)	100-800	×		×		
Libya	very small		×			
Malagasy Republic	100-2,000		×			
Morocco	500-2,000		×	×		
Nigeria	less than 500		×			
Senegal	very small		×			
Sudan	8,000-11,000		×	×		
Tunisia	200-2,000		×	×		
Zanzibar (Tanzania)	very small		×			×
MIDDLE EAST	10,500-27,500	1	6	3	1	1
Iran	1,000-2,000		×			
Iraq	2,000-15,000		×	×		
Jordan	500		×	×		
Kuwait	very small		×			×
Lebanon	4,000-6,000		×		×	
Syria	3,000-4,000	×		×		
Yemen	very small		×			
NONCOMMUNIST ASIA	2,177,350-3,177,850	4	9	0	6	4
Burma	5,000		×		×	
Cambodia	100	×			×	
Ceylon	2,600	×			×	
India	125,000	×			×	
Indonesia	2-3 million[a]		×			×
Laos	very small[b]	×				×
Malaysia	2,700		×		×	
Nepal	6,000		×		×	
Pakistan	3,250		×			
Philippines	1,500-2,000		×			
Singapore	200		×			
South Viet Nam	31,000		×			×
Thailand	very small		×			×
LATIN AMERICA	180,900-202,500	8	12	10	7	0
Argentina	60,000-70,000	×[c]		×		
Bolivia	6,500-7,000		×	×		
Brazil	20,000-30,000		×		×	
Chile	30,000	×		×		
Colombia	12,000	×[c]			×	
Costa Rica	300		×	×		
Dominican Republic	1,700	×[c]			×	
Ecuador	2,000-3,000		×		×	

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE I (continued)
THE COMMUNIST PARTIES OF THE "THIRD WORLD"

Country	Membership	Status		Stand on the Sino-Soviet Rift		
		Legal	Illegal	Pro-Soviet	Split	Pro-Chinese
El Salvador	200		×	×		
Guatemala	1,000		×	×		
Haiti	very small		×			
Honduras	1,300		×	×		
Mexico	5,200-5,300	×[c]			×	
Nicaragua	200		×	×		
Panama	500		×	×		
Paraguay	5,000		×		×	
Peru	5,000	×[c]			×	
Trinidad and Tobago	very small	×				
Uruguay	10,000	×		×		
Venezuela	20,000		×			

Notes: (a) As estimated prior to its outlawing in the wake of its abortive coup.
(b) The pro-communist Pathet Lao and Neo Lao Hak Sat are not included.
(c) Restricted in various ways.

Sources: *World Strength of the Communist Party Organization,* an annual report of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U.S. Department of State; supplemented by information gleaned from various other sources, communist and Western.

Indonesia, where the reprisals taken against the Communist Party after its abortive attempt to seize power have undoubtedly resulted in a substantial reduction of its membership. Without Indonesia, there are a mere 380-440 thousand party members scattered over all of Africa, the Middle East, Latin America and the neutral belt of mainland Asia, a thin spread indeed.

By far the least encouraging situation for the communists has been Africa. Prior to World War II communist parties existed only in the Northern Arab belt, and were inadequate even there. While new communist parties have begun to appear in other parts of the continent since the late fifties, their membership is extremely small and, worse still, it seems to be in a state of stagnation. Not even Soviet sources claim more than 60,000 party members in all of Africa; and, modest as this claim is, it is contested by Western analysts whose estimates run from a low of around 10,000 to a high of less than 35,000.[7]

[7]See Table I.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

On the other hand, this state of affairs is eased somewhat by the presence in Africa of a number of pro-communist leftist parties, such as the Sudanese Union Party of Mali, the Democratic Party of Guinea, the National Revolutionary Movement Party of the (Brazzaville) Congo, the Socialist Workers' and Peasants' Party of Nigeria, the African Party of Independence of Senegal, the Afro-Shirazi Party of Tanzania, the People's Union Party of Cameroons, and the Arab Socialist Union of the United Arab Republic. These, labeled as "workers' national-democratic and left-wing socialist parties" in official Soviet terminology, sent delegations to attend the Twenty-third Congress of the CPSU in March 1966.[8] Their leaders are referred to in Soviet and East European communist quarters as "comrades," and some of them have already committed themselves publicly to "scientific socialism," the well-known Soviet alias for Marxism-Leninism.[9] Since they pursue policies that are in most instances favorable to the Soviet Union and unfavorable to the West, and ordinarily cooperate with the Soviet Communist Party in the arena of international relations, they are considered by Soviet strategists, not without justification, as the next best thing to full-fledged communist parties.

As explained in a recent *Izvestia* article, "unlike the bourgeois-nationalist parties which represent the interests of the national bourgeoisie and feudal circles" and "press for conciliation with the imperialists," the African national-democratic parties "are closely linked with the laboring strata."[10] Although their conception of the ways of transition to socialism is said to differ from Marxism-Leninism, the "growing anti-imperialist alliance of Communist and national-democratic parties" rests presumably "not on temporary and transitory political situations or factors, but on the profound share of vital interests of the peoples of socialist

[8] *Pravda,* March 30, 1966.

[9] However, the term "scientific socialism" as employed by the leaders of some of the left-wing parties of the "third world" cannot be fully equated with Marxism-Leninism. For instance, Nasser's understanding of "scientific socialism" is certainly far removed from Marxism-Leninism. ". . . if we want true socialism, pure and successful, it must follow scientific lines," stated Nasser in 1964. "The opposite of the scientific method is anarchy. Therefore, our socialism is scientific socialism. . . . It is [however] not at all a materialistic socialism. We have not said that our socialism is Marxist, we have not said that we are atheistic. . . ." *Al-Ahram,* November 13, 1964, cited in Jaan Pennar, "Moscow and Socialism in Egypt," *Problems of Communism,* September-October 1966, p. 47.

[10] V. Midtsev, "You Wanted to Know: Alliance of Fighters Against Imperialism," *Izvestia,* May 17, 1966, p. 5. English text in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* June 8, 1966, p. 20.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

countries and of peoples fighting for national independence."[11] Nonetheless, despite *Izvestia's* optimism, such a loose relationship is inherently unstable. This was documented by the abrupt about-face performed after Nkrumah's ouster by the Ghanaian Convention People's Party, which had sent a delegation to the Twenty-second Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in 1961 but failed to appear at the Twenty-third Congress in 1966.

Nor can Soviet strategy-makers feel satisfied about the size of communist party membership throughout the rest of the "third world," although the situation is somewhat better there than in black Africa. The 25,000 party members in the Middle East represent a considerably higher party/population ratio than is the case in Africa. Yet it still amounts to an infinitesimal ratio of a little over .33:1,000. In the rest of noncommunist Asia the ratio would rise above 3:1,000, provided one accepts the communist peak claim of three million members for the Communist Party of Indonesia. However, because of the disarray in which this largest communist party of the noncommunist world finds itself after its abortive uprising, even the lower estimate of two million would certainly be excessive. If Indonesia were left out of the Asian computations, the party/population ratio would plummet to a mere .25:1,000, i.e., even below the ratio obtained in the Middle East. As for Latin America, the corresponding party/population ratio, which now appears to be the highest in the "third world," is still only about 1.5:1,000.

These meager results in party recruitment can be explained and excused in Africa, especially below the Sahara, where national independence is a recent phenomenon and the industrial proletariat, the class presumed to be the most rewarding hunting ground for communist recruiters, rather small. But they can hardly be dismissed without painful soul-searching in regard to mainland Asia and Latin America, where the collapse of colonialism (especially in Latin America) occurred much earlier, communist parties have existed since the twenties, and progressive industrialization has given birth to a sizable working class in a number of countries and areas. Indeed, somber views of this situation have at times broken through the crust of official communist optimism and found their way into Soviet-controlled publications. Analyzing current conditions in Latin America in a recent article in *Problems of Peace and Socialism,* a communist

[11] *Ibid.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

writer has regretfully concluded that "the revolutionary parties of the working class" have been "lagging behind," and that "even though the Communists have sound programs and are waging a valiant struggle on behalf of the working class and the entire people, most of the Communist parties of Latin America evidently still do not exert a *constant and effective* political influence on the basic sections of the working people."[12]

Legal Status

Matters are further complicated by the status of illegality or semi-legality in which communist parties find themselves in all but a few countries of the "third world." Following the outlawing in 1965 of the Sudanese Communist Party, the only African communist party that had thus far managed to secure Cabinet seats and thereby gain admission to the highest level of government, there was, as of 1966, no communist party enjoying legal status in all of Africa, except perhaps the minuscule, recently established and utterly insignificant Communist Party of Lesotho (Basutoland). Similar conditions prevail in the developing countries of the Middle East, where all communist parties were gradually proscribed. However, this trend was broken when the ban in Syria was tacitly lifted in 1966 by the new regime of the left wing of the Ba'ath Socialist Party: the Syrian Communist Party thus became the only Arab communist group freed from the onus of illegality. Moreover, one of the party's members, Samih Attiyeh, was named Minister of Communications in the new Syrian Cabinet.

The situation has been somewhat better, though only slightly so, in noncommunist Asia and Latin America. After the Communist Party of Indonesia was outlawed, only four communist parties of the developing Asian nations continued to cling to a rather shaky status of legality by the end of 1966, namely, those of India, Ceylon, Cambodia and Laos. The first three are subject to recurrent molestations on the part of governmental authorities, especially the Indian. The communist party of Laos is in a different position: the Neo Lao Hak Sat, controlled from North Viet Nam, has been in rebellion against the Souvanna Phouma coalition government, set up under the 1962 Geneva agreements. It remains a legal party, and Cabinet seats are still retained for

[12]José Manuel Fortuny, "Has the Revolution Become More Difficult in Latin America?," *Problems of Peace and Socialism,* August 1965, pp. 38 ff.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NLHS members; meanwhile, acting ministers carry on current affairs. As for Latin America, only the communist parties of Chile and Uruguay could be said to be enjoying genuine legality as of 1966. A few additional parties appear to be operating in a sort of twilight zone of quasi- or semi-legality circumscribed by various restrictions, such as denial of the right to participate in elections. This seems to be the position of the communist parties of Argentina, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Peru, and one of the communist parties of Mexico.

While the prevailing status of illegality or semi-legality does not preclude communist parties of the developing nations from existing and operating, it certainly renders the pursuit of their objectives more difficult. Denied access to authorized communications media, deprived of the right of assembly and organization, barred from legitimate participation in public life, often cut off from their leaders who have been forced into hiding or exile, and subject to arrest if and when the ruling regimes choose, the native communists must operate under many restraints which hamper recruitment of new members and gravely impair the parties' effectiveness.

Faulty Social Composition

Another matter of concern to Soviet observers is the faulty social composition of "third world" communist parties. Being by definition "the vanguard of the working class, i.e., its advanced, class-conscious part capable of leading the masses in the struggle for the overthrow of capitalism and the building of socialism,"[13] a communist party should ideally have a membership consisting predominantly of industrial workers. Communist parties in the developing nations generally fall far short of this proletarian ideal. In most instances their membership is a social hodgepodge with a strong middle-class admixture, a sampling of proletarian and semi-proletarian rural strata, a sizable dose of "angry young men" recruited mainly from radical elements of the native student body, a smattering of professional revolutionaries, but with no genuine working-class majority.[14]

[13] *Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism, op. cit.*, p. 335.

[14] See, for instance, Lucian W. Pye, *Guerrilla Communism in Malaya* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956), and Walter Laqueur, *Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East* (New York: Praeger, 1956). These authors show that most Asian parties originated as study groups set up mainly by intellectuals without political experience, and that Arab communist parties consist essentially of intelligentsia and middle-class groups.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

This defective class composition of parties in the Middle East, Asia, Africa and Latin America has inconvenienced communist leaders for a long time. Analyzing the situation in the colonies and semi-colonies in 1928, the Sixth World Congress of the Comintern drew attention to the problem "that party membership in the first stage of the movement is recruited from petty-bourgeoisie, especially revolutionarily inclined intelligentsia and frequently students."[15] Feeling that such elements find it difficult to "free themselves from their petty-bourgeois attitudes," the congress directed the communist parties in the colonies to become "genuinely proletarian also in their social composition." Evidently, the results attained in the ensuing four decades have not been good enough, for calls for improvements in class structure are no less urgent today than they were forty years ago.

However, the official emphasis on making communist parties of developing nations genuinely proletarian by concentrating primarily upon the recruitment of industrial workers has not gone unchallenged. The communist parties of Latin America were criticized by pro-Soviet José Manuel Fortuny in his article in *Problems of Peace and Socialism* for having been oriented "solely on the urban working class," for neglecting agricultural laborers and not paying sufficient attention to "the middle sections which grew in numbers and importance" and "to the radical circles of the petty-bourgeoisie and the student body. . . ."[16] A similar exhortation to the communist parties of Asia to concern themselves more with the "political organization of the rural proletarians and semi-proletarians" was contained in another article in the same magazine prepared by "a group of staff members of the Institute of Asian Peoples under the USSR Academy of Sciences."[17]

Low Ideological Level

The unsatisfactory class composition of the communist parties of developing nations is held responsible, at least in part, for their relatively low ideological level. While their leading figures, who are frequent contributors to *Problems of Peace and Socialism* and other communist publications, are evidently well versed in

[15] *The Thesis on the Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies and Semi-Colonies* (London, 1929), p. 42.

[16] Fortuny, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

[17] "The Agrarian Question in the Developing Countries of Asia," *Problems of Peace and Socialism,* September 1965, pp. 38 ff.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Marxist-Leninist theory and strategy, most of the parties' rank-and-file members appear to have at best only a rudimentary notion of the doctrine and its implications. They have been drawn into the party fold more by emotional anti-Westernism, dislike of colonial-style capitalism, and the lure of Marxism-Leninism's revolutionary slogans and promises, than by a cool-headed acceptance of the overall Marxist-Leninist "world outlook" and a thorough understanding of the doctrine's fundamental tenets. For a good many of them the adoption of Marxism-Leninism results from a search for a new authoritarian creed to replace faith in the old ways and values shattered by the break-up of traditional society.[18] Even the more sophisticated among this new species of converts hardly qualify as genuine Marxist-Leninists, for theirs is an eclectic philosophy combining certain aspects of Marxism with selected elements of non-Marxian socialism, cooperativism, communalism, nationalism, and even religious spiritualism.

Lacking thus in "ideological steadfastness"—one of the most important qualities of a good communist—the communists of developing nations are all the more vulnerable to various "petty-bourgeois," "reformist," nationalist and other undesirable influences. To overcome this grave danger by raising substantially the ideological level of the Middle Eastern, Asian, African and Latin American communists has therefore become a major aspect of Soviet operations in the "third world." As stated in *Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism,* the current official Soviet manual of ideology and strategy, "the struggle for the purity of the Marxist-Leninist world outlook is an immutable law of the existence and development of the Communist Parties."[19]

Loose Discipline

The penetration of adverse influences has been facilitated by the loose discipline characteristic of most of the communist parties of the "third world." Problems of discipline plague every political movement in its initial years, of course, and are inevitably bound to afflict even more a movement emphasizing absolute subordination and obedience as does Marxism-Leninism. But

[18]See, for instance, Pye, *op. cit.;* Walter Laqueur, "Communism and Nationalism in Tropical Africa," *Foreign Affairs,* July 1961, p. 611; and Walter Kolarz, "The West African Scene," *Problems of Communism,* November-December 1961, p. 23.

[19]P. 351.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in most parts of Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Latin America temperament imposes a further difficulty. The peoples of these areas seem to possess a highly excitable mentality oriented toward emotionalism, inclined more toward anarchism than strict discipline, lacking in balance and consistency, and prone to abrupt changes of mood and direction. Their behavioral pattern tends to be unstable, subject to vacillations and sudden jolts, wanting in persistence and abounding in factionalism, based on personalism rather than institutionalism and on caudillism rather than collective guidance. Such behavior is ill-suited for the kind of iron discipline and centralized collective leadership the Soviet strategists insist upon. It is hardly conducive to the "absolute centralization and strictest discipline" demanded by Lenin,[20] and it makes well-nigh impossible the creation of "stable groups of experienced authoritative and influential leaders" deemed indispensable for communist success. As pointed out by various studies of Asian, African and Latin American communism, major psychological hurdles lie in the way of fashioning the communist parties of developing nations into disciplined cohorts obediently following the orders of their collective leadership organs.[21]

Sino-Soviet Split

The difficulties encountered by Soviet strategists in developing native communist parties and guiding them along the tortuous path toward fulfillment of their vanguard mission are further aggravated by the Sino-Soviet split. Insofar as communist parties of the "third world" are concerned, the quarrel of the two communist giants has had at least two far-reaching consequences:

First, it has destroyed the unity of the communist movement by cleaving it into two mutually hostile camps looking either to Moscow or Peking for inspiration and guidance. Hardly a communist party in the Middle East, Africa, Latin America and noncommunist Asia has managed to steer clear of the dispute. In a number of instances the pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese wings have parted company and established their own pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese parties. By the latest count, such separate parties exist in Brazil, Burma, Ceylon, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, India, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mexico, Nepal, Para-

[20] *Selected Works,* 1952, II, 2, p. 344.

[21] See, for instance, Ernst Halperin, *Communism in Mexico* (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1963) and Lufti El-Kohli, "Current phase of the anti-imperialist struggle in Africa," *Problems of Peace and Socialism,* January 1967, pp. 13 ff.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

guay and Peru.[22] In a few countries—notably Burma, India and Mexico—there is a three-way split, without considering the various Trotskyite factions operating in many parts of the "third world," especially in Latin America. Elsewhere, the pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese wings have avoided a formal rupture, but are locked in a bitter struggle that has reduced unity to a sham. If the pro-Chinese wings continue to carry out the latest Peking directives asking them to "discard these decaying old revisionist groups and build new revolutionary parties" and "draw a clear line of demarcation both politically and organizationally between themselves and the revisionists,"[23] even more splits may occur.

Moreover, the Sino-Soviet tug-of-war has been instrumental in encouraging a trend toward self-assertion among "third world" communists. Weak and scarcely able to stand on their own feet, the communist parties of the developing nations could hardly afford to insist on their right to independence as the communist parties of Western Europe have done. However, some of them have begun recently to flirt with similar ideas.

Foremost among the parties bitten by the polycentrist bug is the Communist Party of Sudan. In interviews with the Cairo paper *Al-Jumhuriyya,* the Italian Communist Party daily *L'unità,* and the Yugoslav Press Agency, Tanjug, the Sudanese party's Secretary General, Abdel Khalig Mahgoub, rejected "the transference or results arrived at by sections of the socialist movement to another country," declared himself against "the imposition of a single political line on the Communist movement," and called for communists "to take up an independent position in applying the general concepts of Marxism in accordance with their countries' circumstances."[24] A somewhat similar polycentrist stand, though spelled out more cautiously, was taken by Syria's Khaled Bakdash, a leading Arab communist, in his speech at the Thirtieth Anniversary of the Seventh Congress of the Comintern in October 1965.[25] While disagreeing with those who "would subordinate the tactics of the Soviet Union and its entire foreign policy to the tactical requirements of the other Communist parties," Bakdash reproved those holding the "erroneous" and "dangerous" view that "all the Communist parties should take exactly the same attitude as the Soviet Union."

[22]See Table I.
[23]*People's Daily* and *Red Flag,* November 10, 1965.
[24]*Al-Jumhuriyya,* February 3, 1965; *L'unità,* January 11, 1965; Tanjug release, March 4, 1965—all cited in a Radio Free Europe release, April 27, 1965.
[25]*Problems of Peace and Socialism,* December 1965, pp. 16 ff.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Thus the unity which communists were directed by the 1960 *Declaration of Eighty-one Communist Parties* to cherish "like the apple of their eyes," is gone. So is "the internationalist solidarity of all Marxist-Leninist parties" without which "the success of the working class cause in any country is unthinkable."[26] And with unity lacking, the greater goal is in abeyance; the Soviet Communist Party can no longer perform the role of "the universally recognized vanguard of the world Communist movement" assigned to it officially by the 1960 *Declaration.*

Second, the Sino-Soviet conflict interferes with Soviet strategy and tactics for cooperation with nonproletarian groups preliminary to communist assumption of leadership. Soviet strategists envisage a comparatively long period of cooperation between native communists and noncommunist segments of the national-liberation movement. Aware of the many weaknesses plaguing communist parties in most parts of the "third world," they counsel against premature attempts to seize the leadership and countenance rather a cautious, gradualist approach in that respect. Meanwhile, Chinese communist leaders, bent on encouraging revolutions at all cost and scornful of Soviet procrastination, urge the communists of developing nations to wrest the leadership of the national-liberation movement from the unworthy hands of the vacillating bourgeois nationalists, even if it means resorting to armed struggle and risking defeat. These contrary guidelines make it difficult for native disciples to avoid the two notorious communist vices of *khvostism* and sectarianism identified earlier by Lenin and subsequently noted by the 1928 Comintern *Thesis* on the colonies and semi-colonies:[27] Should communists be too dilatory, too deferential toward the national bourgeoisie and their other temporary allies, too slow in stepping into their rightful position of the vanguard, they commit the heresy of *khvostism.* If they act too hastily, seek to assume the leadership prematurely and thereby alienate their partners and become isolated from the masses, they are guilty of sectarianism.[28]

Sailing safely through the narrow straits between the Scylla of *khvostism* and the Charybdis of sectarianism—none too easy un-

[26]English text in Dan H. Jacobs, *The New Communist Manifesto and Related Documents* (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1961), p. 43.

[27]*The Thesis on the Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies and Semi-Colonies, op. cit.,* p. 26.

[28]See, for instance, Tad Szulc, "Latin America's Divided Left Wing Keeps Functioning Amid Air of Crisis," *New York Times,* December 16, 1963.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

der any circumstances—has become almost impossible as a result of the Sino-Soviet quarrel. Whatever the native communists may do, their chances of satisfying both Moscow and Peking are slim. Moreover, the understandable desire of Soviet and pro-Soviet communists to disprove the Chinese charge that they lack revolutionary zeal involves a grave risk, for rash and premature *tours de force* are likely to harm the communist cause throughout the "third world" even when they may occasionally lead to momentary local gains.

The dilemma was brought into sharp focus by the proceedings and resolutions of the Tri-Continental Solidarity Conference held at Havana in January 1966. Convened with obvious Soviet blessing and despite equally obvious Chinese displeasure, the Havana gathering of leading representatives of Asian, African and Latin American communist and "revolutionary" parties was evidently expected by its Soviet backers to confirm the correctness of the Soviet version of the strategy of "peaceful coexistence" and to administer a rebuff to impetuous, saber-rattling Chinese sectarianism. However, the conference, whose insignia symbolically depicted a hand clasping a machine gun, turned out to be much more belligerent than the Soviets had bargained for.[29] Worse still, the beleaguered Soviet delegate, Sharaf Rashidov, alternate member of the Soviet party's powerful Politburo, felt obligated to "howl with the wolves." Eager not to appear less resolutely anti-imperialist than other delegates, he signed the conference's fiery and militant resolutions calling for armed revolutions and assailing as agents of neo-colonialism a number of governments with which the Soviet Union was striving to maintain friendly relations. Thus, in order to score against the Chinese (and also against the Castroites), the Soviet Union found itself maneuvered into the embarrassing position of offending the very regimes it seeks to entice. Illustrative of Russia's chagrin was Soviet handling of the protest against Rashidov's conduct at Havana reportedly made by the Uruguayan government. As revealed by Uruguayan sources, the Soviet Ambassador to Uruguay, when pressed for an explanation, had to fall back on the typical Soviet tongue-in-cheek statement that Rashidov spoke "privately" and not at all for the Soviet government.[30]

[29]For a discussion of the conference and its background, see D. Bruce Jackson, "Whose Men in Havana?," *Problems of Communism*, May-June 1966, pp. 1 ff.
[30]Richard Eder, "Russians Clarify Statement on Latin American Revolts," a *New York Times* News Service release, February 18, 1966.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Competitive Native Socialist and Other Leftist Parties

Finally, one of the most delicate issues confronting communist parties in the developing areas and their Soviet mentors is the competition of native socialist and other leftist parties and groupings. With conservative and other right-of-center parties there is no difficulty; since they oppose socialism in any form and seek essentially to preserve the economic and social status quo, the issues between them and the communists are clear-cut and they can be treated as enemies without causing any confusion. With bourgeois parties of the center matters are somewhat more complicated, as some of their objectives are similar to the interim goals pursued by communists at the initial national-liberation stage.

The real dilemma arises when communists are confronted with active parties of the left. Such parties in developing countries stand for radical social and economic changes, including sweeping land reform and a struggle against the vested interests of the native aristocracy and upper classes; they are generally in favor of socialism (albeit not of the Marxist-Leninist variety), and critical of capitalism; many of them are anti-Western, and the remainder neutralist. Since they are for socialism and pursue certain major goals similar to those sponsored by communist propaganda, they cannot very well be denounced as reactionary. At the same time they pose a more serious long-term menace to the communist cause than do bourgeois parties for two reasons: (1) Unlike the bourgeois parties, they are in a position to recruit followers from the same social groups that serve as the communists' main reservoir, namely, the workers, poorer peasants and the radically inclined intelligentsia. (2) Unlike the parties guided by Marxism-Leninism, they view their political, economic and social objectives as ends in themselves. They strive for their native type of "socialism-in-one-state" for its own sake rather than as an interim step meant to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat and advance the ultimate global victory of communism.

Hence, in fulfilling their crucial task of determining "the *chief enemy* against which the shock forces of the masses have to be concentrated,"[31] communist parties of the developing countries should really point their finger at parties of the democratic and socialist left wherever these parties are active and have some

[31] *Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism, op. cit.*, p. 482.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

measure of success.[32] However, to do this would bare communist insincerity and thus undermine their own propaganda. It would offend the ordinary rank-and-file members of the criticized leftist parties and impair chances of enticing them to switch to communism. And it would undermine the stratagem of the "National Democratic Front" conceived specifically as a communist device of cooperation with parties of the noncommunist left and other "progressive" groupings.

Soviet strategists have thus far attempted to handle this thorny dilemma with considerable caution and flexibility. In essence, they have fallen back on the tactics employed over many years vis-à-vis the socialist parties of the West, namely, drawing a distinction between the leaders and the led.[33] While only kind words are said publicly about the latter, the treatment reserved for leaders varies widely, depending on the specific conditions and developmental stage in each country and the tactical needs thereby created. Wherever leaders of native leftist parties are anti-Western and side mostly or frequently with the communist camp on important political issues, they are treated with correctness and even kindness commensurate with the merit earned and the degree of cooperation the communists would like to secure from them. At times kindness is even proffered, in advance, as an inducement to adopt a pro-Soviet stance on a certain issue. But when such leaders shed the pro-Soviet bias or fail to live up to Soviet expectations, and when hope is abandoned that they can be brought back to the desired course, friendly treatment is replaced by rebuke apportioned to the magnitude of the sins committed and the measure of Soviet disillusionment.

The best known examples of leftist noncommunist and socialist leaders exposed to the "soft" treatment have been Egypt's Nasser, Algeria's Ben Bella, Ghana's Nkhrumah and Mali's Keita. Khrushchev went so far as to refer to Ben Bella and Nasser as "comrades";[34] and, as mentioned earlier, the heads of "third

[32]See, for instance, Rollie E. Poppino, *Communism in Latin America* (New York: The Free Press, 1964); also, Robert Alexander on communism and indigenous social reform parties in Latin America, in Jane Kirkpatrick, editor, *The Strategy of Deception: A Study in World-wide Communist Tactics* (New York: Farrar, Straus, 1963).

[33]For an explanation of these tactics, see *Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism, op. cit.*, pp. 358 ff.

[34]*Pravda*, May 2, 1964, and Associated Press release from Aswan, May 14, 1964. Cited in Uri Ra'anan, "Moscow and the Third World," *Problems of Communism*, January-February 1965, pp. 22 ff.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

world" delegations of "workers', national-democratic and left-wing socialist parties" in attendance at the Twenty-third Congress of the CPSU in March 1966 were invariably spoken of as "comrades." Representative samples of the opposite treatment are supplied by former Venezuelan President Betancourt and the leader of the Peruvian Aprista Party, Haya de la Torre, who were hailed initially as progressive leaders, but subsequently condemned as reactionaries, abettors of imperialism, subverters of Marxism-Leninism, "docile tools directed against the interests of the people," and worse.[35]

In some instances, however, communist strategy-makers are faced with a veritable Hobson's choice, offering no prospect of gain regardless of the attitude they may take. This is especially true in countries where their leftist competitors are in control of the government and are in the process of carrying out social and economic reforms appealing to the broad masses. A good illustration of this sort of a communist cul-de-sac has been provided by Eduardo Frei's Christian Democratic regime in Chile. Since Frei adamantly refuses to invite communists to cooperate in his program, they are duty-bound to criticize him. Unable to pin on him the customary label of a reactionary, they complain that reactionary forces are taking advantage of "the inertia, blunders and the inconsistencies of the Christian Democratic government."[36] On the other hand, they cannot very well repudiate completely a government that has re-established diplomatic relations with the USSR, is pushing through a law aimed at breaking up large landholdings for a more equitable land redistribution, and proceeding with the "Chileanization" of the copper industry. Hence, they have taken refuge in obscure equivocations, such as the following cryptic sentence from a recent authoritative communist statement: "To the reformist policy of the government, the vanguard of the proletariat must respond by acting flexibly without

[35]Cf. the speech of the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Peruvian Communist Party at the Twenty-second Congress of the CPSU in Moscow, TASS release of October 28, 1961; V. Andrianov, "Venezuela: the Lesson of Recent Events," *International Affairs,* June 1960, pp. 83-84, and *Krasnaya Zvezda,* June 22, 1962, both quoted in Cyril E. Black and Thomas P. Thornton, editors, *Communism and Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964); and A. Shulgovskii, "Imperializm i ideologyiya natsional-reformizma v. Latinskoi Amerike," *Mirovaya Ekonomika,* No. 8, 1961, pp. 45-59, English text in Thomas P. Thornton, *The Third World in Soviet Perspective* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 305 ff.

[36]Orlando Millar, "Christian Democratic Reformism," *Problems of Peace and Socialism,* November 1965, pp. 65 ff.; "The Revolutionary Line of the Chilean Communists," *ibid.,* December 1965, pp. 104 ff.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the slightest manifestation of sectarianism, displaying broadmindedness, and at the same time firmly upholding the revolutionary position in debates and mass actions."[37] As for Frei himself, a high-ranking Chilean communist, José Gonzales, speaking at the Thirteenth Congress of the Chilean Communist Party in October 1965, went so far as to praise the Chilean President as "a manly and honorable fellow, able to respect the ideas of opponents and look truth in the eyes." This flattering description evidently met with Soviet approval, as Gonzales' statement was also printed in Moscow's *Pravda*.[38]

Summary

In sum, the frantic Soviet endeavors to develop and strengthen the right kind of "revolutionary workers' parties" in the "third world" and preserve communism's unity have thus far yielded only mediocre results. Numerically, organizationally, structurally and ideologically, the communist parties of noncommunist Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America remain, as a whole, rather weak and ill-prepared for the exacting role assigned them in Soviet strategic plans. "Unfortunately we very often forget," laments José Manuel Fortuny, "that the role which the Party is called upon to play as the vanguard of the revolution is one thing in theory and quite another in practice. . . ."[39] Although Fortuny refers specifically to the communist parties of Latin America, his remark holds true of Africa and, with the exception of South Viet Nam and Laos, noncommunist Asia. A prominent Egyptian communist likens some of Africa's "revolutionary parties" to "a magnificent revolutionary edifice minus, however, substance and effectiveness, out of touch with reality and isolated from the masses, so that it collapses when put to the test."[40]

Despairing of building effective communist parties in various portions of the "third world," some of the communist spokesmen, among them the well-known Soviet theoretician A. Sobolyev, have suggested that in countries where Marxist-Leninist parties do not yet exist, "the role of revolutionary vanguard may to some extent be played by the trade unions."[41] A few have even gone so far as to express doubts concerning the feasibility of preserving the

[37] *Ibid.*, November 1965, p. 69, quoted from the periodical *Principios*.
[38] October 19, 1965.
[39] Fortuny, *op. cit.*
[40] El-Kohli, *op. cit.*, p. 19.
[41] "National Democracy—the Way to Social Progress," *Problems of Peace and Socialism*, February 1963, pp. 39 ff.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

organizational independence of native communist parties in certain emerging nations.

This perplexity has arisen mainly with the establishment of anti-Western, one-party states in Africa where, as one communist writer put it, "the working class and its Marxist-Leninist vanguard" are confronted with the problem "whether to join the mass party or to build an independent working class party."[42] His suggestion seemed to be that in countries "where the state directed by a single mass party represents the revolutionary dictatorship of the people and seeks to suppress anti-national elements," the communists should join this "new type of mass revolutionary party." But they must retain their "ideological independence," for the main rationale for their membership in such parties is to "spread ideas of Marxism-Leninism in these parties, gradually bringing their ideological platform closer to scientific socialism."[43] A similar view maintaining that in one-party states of Africa, such as Ghana, Algeria and the United Arab Republic, "it is not necessary to found purely Marxist-Leninist parties," was expressed by a Nigerian communist at a conference on the Centenary of the First International held in Moscow in September 1964.[44] Although the above-mentioned statements were made by non-Soviet communists, they were allowed to appear in the materials of the Soviet-sponsored and Soviet-edited *World Marxist Review,* indicating that if the Soviets do not agree with such theses, they at least tolerate them.

The vague and ambivalent Soviet attitude on such a fundamental issue of communist strategy is borne out also by actual Soviet behavior. After Ben Bella banned the Algerian Communist Party in 1962, Moscow swallowed the affront and began to act as if the party had ceased to exist. Larbi Bouhali, the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Algerian Communist Party, began to be referred to simply as "Algerian."[45] The outlawed Egyptian Communist Party became virtually a non-party after Khrushchev elevated Nasser to the status of a meritorious "comrade." As noted by the monitoring service of Radio Free Europe, a program produced on May 11, 1964 by the "Voice of Iraqi People" (a clandestine communist station operating from East

[42]W. Sheppard, "The One-Party System and Democracy in Africa," *ibid.,* March 1964, pp. 86 ff.
[43]*Idem.*
[44]Cited by Philip E. Mosely, "Communist Policy and the Third World," *Review of Politics,* April 1966, pp. 210 ff.
[45]*Pravda,* June 2, 1964.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Germany), to commemorate Khrushchev's seventieth birthday, broadcast greetings to the Soviet ruler from every Middle Eastern communist party *except* the Egyptian party.[46] Nor were the Algerian and Egyptian parties, the two largest communist parties in the Northern Arab tier of Africa, represented by a formal official delegation at the Twenty-third Congress of the CPSU. A few "representatives of the Algerian Communists and other comrades" were said to be present as individuals, but the mere mention of this fact by Brezhnev in his opening speech caused the delegation of the Algerian National Liberation Front to walk out in protest. And the largest communist party of the "third world," the Communist Party of Indonesia, sent neither a delegation nor was it mentioned among the "fraternal parties" whose representatives were in attendance at the congress.[47]

Such a stand betraying a willingness to sacrifice the sacrosanct principle of communist party independence in certain one-party states flagrantly contradicts not only Lenin's teaching on the subject, but also the long-standing directives of the international communist movement. While permitting temporary cooperation and "in certain circumstances even a temporary union between the Communist Party and the national revolutionary movement," the *Thesis on the Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies and Semi-Colonies* (1928) cautioned that such a union must by no means "degenerate into a fusion of the Communist movement with the bourgeois-revolutionary movement."[48] Rather, the *Thesis* prescribed that the communist parties must "from the very beginning *demarcate themselves in the most clear-cut fashion,* both politically and organizationally, from all the petty-bourgeois groups and parties" and that the "Communist movement in all circumstances must unconditionally preserve the independence of the proletarian movement and its own independence in agitation, in organization and in demonstrations."[49]

Hence, it is hardly surprising that recurring hints of a possible abandonment of communist organizational independence have dismayed and alarmed some of the "third world" communists. A most forceful objection to such defeatist behavior was voiced by Khaled Bakdash in his above-mentioned speech on the thirtieth

[46]Radio Free Europe release of June 24, 1964: "Communists in Egypt: The Lost Tribe."
[47]*Pravda,* March 30, 1966.
[48]*Op. cit.,* p. 26.
[49]*Ibid.,* p. 35. See also Kermit McKenzie, *Comintern and World Revolution, 1928-1943* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), p. 135.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

anniversary of the Comintern. While conceding that communists should recognize the role of other revolutionary groups, the veteran Arab communist leader cautioned that "the unity cannot be based on the disbandment of the Communist parties or their being dissolved in other parties."[50] "Is there anyone today," he asked indignantly, "who would venture to claim that proletarian parties have no place in the conditions prevailing in the newly-free African and Asian countries?" Similarly, while conceding that Egypt's "communist and other progressive and national organizations have voluntarily relinquished independent existence," Bakdash's Egyptian colleague, Lufti El-Kohli, member of the Secretariat on matters of ideology of the Arab Socialist Union, cautioned that "the Egyptian revolutionary experience cannot be extended to the other Arab countries."[51]

It seems that the ghost that has periodically haunted communist consciences ever since the fiasco of the Kuomintang experiment of the twenties, when a similar nationalist-communist merger was tried out, has returned to plague them once again.

[50] *Problems of Peace and Socialism*, December 1965, pp. 16 ff.

[51] "Perspectives of Cooperation and Unity of the Progressive Forces in the Arab Countries," *ibid.*, October 1966, pp. 49 ff.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

MAO'S STRATEGIC INITIATIVE OF 1965 AND THE U.S. RESPONSE

by Stefan T. Possony

TWENTY years ago U.S. Far Eastern policy was based in large part on the hypothesis that the Chinese communists were nothing but "agrarian reformers." Today, despite the Cultural Revolution and other indicators of instability, the follow-on hypothesis has been, and still is, that the Chinese communist regime is stable and durable, and since it is here to stay, we must accommodate to it.

The fact is that the Chinese communist regime has been unstable for nearly ten years and has proved itself to be one of the most inefficient and unsuccessful, and at the same time "destabilizing," regimes on record. If it had not been for the private peasant plots producing the vegetables, dairy products and meat exported to Hong Kong; if capitalist Hong Kong did not import its food from mainland China at a cost of over $400 million per year; if the Chinese in Malaysia did not annually import $100 million worth of Chinese communist products; and if the overseas relatives of mainland families did not remit to Peking's coffers some $50 million each year—Mao's great communist experiment might have collapsed some time ago. This fact is not a secret within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) or among its subjects. As a result, there are strong pressures in China for modifications in the experiment. The accusation hurled by the Maoists against their party opponents, that they are taking the "capitalist road," is exaggerated and certainly premature, but it does not lack substance.

Mao is not a man to tolerate leaps backward. Nor is he predisposed to settle down to the prosaic construction of socialism by means of economic plans and doctored statistics. In addition to his passion for building power, Mao is devoted to the concept of the "uninterrupted revolution," not only abroad to spur world revolution, but also within the socialist homeland for the sake of continuously arousing enthusiasm and raising the "level of consciousness." Mao believes that man must be reconstructed and his

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

personality recast before society can be built anew. The way to create the new man is to launch one mass movement after another—large-scale agitational orgies to remold consciousness, to struggle against the hydra-headed class enemy, to sharpen the threat-awareness of party members and the masses, to increase production, and whenever such efforts seem expedient, to exterminate the "four pests" (flies, mosquitoes, sparrows and rats) or overcome the "four olds" (thoughts, culture, custom and the traditional way of life). All of this is the well-known *kai chao* or "correction" technique which involves sloganizing, brainwashing, mass meetings, demonstrations, self-criticism, mock courts, confessions, purges, forced labor, punishment, terror and death.

The idea that there is such a thing as brainwashing has occasionally been ridiculed and even denied in the United States. Yet the history of Chinese communism is replete with such operations. The so-called land reform was carried out by means of such a mass movement. Another campaign preached "increase production and practice austerity." Revisionism, opportunism and rightism have been the targets of enormous *kai chao* efforts. There was an "anti-ancient, love-modern" movement and a "surrender your heart to the party" movement. As time went on, the titles of these movements became cabalistic and numerological, e.g., the "four-firsts" and "three-eights." Mao has always been able to find new topics for his mass movements, new excuses for psychological and physical terror and for tightening party discipline. The whole thing gradually has come to resemble a permanent circus rather than a permanent revolution, and the cherished Marxist goal of a progressive industrial society seems to have been forgotten. Howling dervishes have replaced the concept of an effective labor party. Hence, to continue regarding Mao as a "Marxist," or even as a Leninist or Stalinist, borders on the ridiculous. Despite Mao's infallibility, *kai chao* did not work.

II

In retrospect, it is reasonably clear that for several years—at least since 1959—Mao has been running into increasing opposition within the party and the state bureaucracy. The pragmatists among the communists considered Mao's policy of tirelessly stirring up the pot a terrible nuisance and an intolerable interference with the systematic accomplishment of essential tasks, such as feeding the people and building armament factories. Soviet ad-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

visers and technicians apparently held similar views and suggested a return to orthodox methods. It was painfully obvious, some eight years ago, that Mao had been a good guerrilla leader and still was a good writer, perhaps even a serious theoretician, but that he was temperamentally unable to run the government efficiently.

This criticism remained muted because those who opposed Mao's policies realized that the regime—all factions and groups —would be in serious trouble if Mao, the nonpareil of the Chinese communist revolution, were eliminated. There was no choice except to keep him, even to suffer the worship of his personality. He was, and still may be, irreplaceable as the symbol of party legitimacy. Since he had to stay in power *pro forma,* there was no way of preventing his bellicose statements and his irrational *kai chao* campaigns. Only low-keyed, almost imperceptible noncompliance with his orders on all levels of the state, party and military bureaucracies was practical. But this resistance proved effective enough: Mao lost the substance of power. He reigned, but he no longer governed.

In one way or another the split between Mao and the party must have had its inception during the early phase of CCP rule. One conflict broke into the open during 1955 when it became apparent, at least to CCP inner circles, that the regime's program for modernizing China was in trouble. Mao decided, some time in 1957, to reactivate the revolution. In November 1957, stimulated by initial Soviet missile and space successes, he confidently proclaimed that the East wind prevails over the West wind. Looking for an instant strategic success and hoping to demonstrate the hollowness of U.S. defense guarantees, he put the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to work on the conquest of Quemoy. The objective was to set in motion the revolution on Taiwan. Yet Quemoy did not fall, the barrels of the Chinese artillery wore out, the United States lived up to its commitment, and the USSR failed to support Mao's adventure. Soviet inactivity came as a traumatic shock.

To silence insistent warnings that China was too weak to embark on an aggressive foreign policy by itself, Mao argued that it would be possible to overcome paralyzing material weakness by means of a Great Leap Forward. All that was necessary, according to his dream, was for the entire population to put its full energies into the leap: build blast furnaces in every little village; work twice as hard in every factory; discover all the mineral resources

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

still hidden on the Chinese mainland; increase the production of arms; and solve outstanding agricultural problems. Chinese workers were to remold themselves overnight into paragons of efficiency and unceasing diligence. Revolutionary idealism was to win over anti-revolutionary materialism, the will was to triumph over matter, and the superstructure was to be the demiurge of the infrastructure. But the "great leap" was not "forward"; neither was Marx stood on his head; instead, the infrastructure proved dominant and immotile.

The Soviet Union, unable to ensure the success of this first experimental quantum jump in social engineering, did not bestir itself to protect comrade Mao's reputation. The Chinese Minister of Defense, Marshal P'eng Te-huai, and the Chief of Staff of the PLA, General Huang K'o-ch'eng, concerted with Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders. Together with a vice-minister of foreign affairs, they stated their objections, cautiously but firmly, at the Eighth Plenum of the Central Committee held at Lushan in August 1959.

This crisis at Lushan was one of the milestones in the developing double conflict—between Mao and Moscow, and between Mao and his party. Mao succeeded in routing the opposition. His opponents were purged and Marshal Lin Piao, presently described as Mao's "closest comrade-in-arms," became head of the Defense Ministry.[1] About 15 per cent of the party and military cadres were reassigned (and many critics apparently were eliminated). But Mao had won merely a Pyrrhic victory. He was forced to give up the state presidency, although he retained the party chairmanship. The Great Leap Forward, which had resulted in an extraordinary economic decline, was canceled.

The stage was set for Mao's gradual eclipse and a takeover by those elements within the party which would be able to steer a more conventional course and deliver massive Soviet support. The party majority was arrayed against the chairman; while they were unable to depose him, they thought they could safely ignore him.

[1]Lin is a successful military leader with considerable experience extending over more than forty years and numerous battles and campaigns. While recuperating from wounds suffered in battle, he served as an observer during the siege of Leningrad and became familiar with modern war. He won his most outstanding laurels during the battles of 1948-1949 in which the Kuomintang forces were routed. He subsequently served as commander of the Chinese "volunteers" in Korea, where he employed his favorite tactic of launching "human-sea attacks"—assaults in which he used untrained or poorly trained reserves, mostly of "upper" peasant origin. This tactic did not work against U.S. firepower and resulted in mass defections. Within the PLA, Lin has always functioned as Mao's mouthpiece.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

But Mao was not yet ready for the shelf. He had enough power left to engage in a lusty dispute with the Soviet Union. Published documents indicate a sharp divergence of views concerning overall strategic concepts, notably with respect to nuclear weapons and people's wars. We do not know whether this dispute was restricted to theory or whether it was related—as it now appears—to concrete proposals and strategic decisions. For example, it is possible and even probable that Mao insisted on support for his operations against the offshore islands and perhaps against Taiwan and Southeast Asia.

Whatever the precise points at issue, Mao's policies apparently frightened the Soviets, who were anxious to gain time.[2] By mid-1959 they were recalling many of their technical and economic advisers, and by 1960 they had halted assistance to China's nuclear program and to various arms projects, such as the delivery of modern fighter aircraft like the MIG-21. This withholding of aid may also have been prompted by open Maoist suggestions that the Soviet Union, in order to equalize economic conditions within the bloc, should redirect virtually all investments and much existing industrial capacity from Eastern Europe and the USSR to China. Even if the Soviets had wished to oblige the Chinese, such a policy would have been infeasible, for it would have put a speedy end to communist control of Eastern Europe. The Soviets did not take these suggestions seriously, but they could not fail to be concerned about their strongest ally.

The Soviets had not been successful in making friends and gaining influence in China. Hence, Mao's dispute with Moscow gained for him some sympathy among strongly nationalistic and xenophobic members of the CCP and strengthened his internal position. In addition, Lin Piao was placing Mao's followers in key jobs throughout the PLA. He also started several military mass movements in order to implant "The Thought of Mao Tse-tung" in the minds of his soldiers. But the cautious communist leaders against whom these quasi-subversive techniques were directed stayed in control.

For the remainder of 1960 and throughout 1961 Mao remained relatively quiet (if we disregard his running debate with Moscow). He may have been in poor health, perhaps the victim of

[2]We now have been told by Khrushchev, speaking from his retirement, that Mao wanted the USSR to provoke a war with the United States, for which adventure he would make available hundreds of Chinese divisions. Of course, there are not that many Chinese divisions of armed, trained and reliable troops.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a stroke. In this period of relative calm, Mao's opponents succeeded in repairing the damage done to the Chinese economy.

III

By mid-1962 Mao returned to the offensive. The Vietnamese war had been stepped up during the period of the Great Leap Forward—whether as a result of an agreement between Hanoi and Peking or as an independent decision by Hanoi is not known—and was developing favorably for the communists.[3] U.S. efforts to help South Viet Nam were no match for the unceasing guerrilla strikes, the systematic terror attacks in the villages, and the effective political warfare campaign waged against the Saigon regime. The protracted conflict in Viet Nam was following the classic Maoist strategy.

At the Tenth Plenum of the Central Committee, held during September 1962, Mao explained that the failure of the Great Leap Forward had been due to the inability of the cadres to understand and manipulate concrete conditions. He rammed through a program epitomized by the slogan "never forget the class struggle." This admonition meant that the party should no longer occupy itself unduly with economic problems but return to what is really important to communists, namely, the world revolution. A "mass movement" was promptly started to familiarize the entire nation with the inescapable need to fight all hostile "classes."

On October 20, 1962 the PLA invaded India. There is documentary evidence that Peking had tried to enlist Moscow's support for an offensive against India. Moscow rejected this request.[4] Since it is difficult to see how the seizure of large parts of India could have helped Mao, except in stirring up international conflict, the strategic purpose of this Chinese offensive remains a mystery. We now know that Mao was aware of Khrushchev's plan to place MRBM's in Cuba. Thus, he may have anticipated a

[3]The Vietnamese communists had stepped up their attack in South Viet Nam and had established a so-called National Liberation Front on March 10, 1961. By November of that year the U.S. government had decided to bolster the military strength of South Viet Nam with additional advisory personnel and matériel. On June 2, 1962 the International Control Commission found North Viet Nam guilty of subversion and hostile activities against South Viet Nam. The Polish delegation to the Commission, naturally, dissented from these findings. (U.S. *Department of State Bulletin,* July 16, 1962, p. 109.)

[4]See the CPSU letter of January 1963 which was sent confidentially to all the parties in the "socialist camp" in answer to the charges made in the Chinese letter of December 1962. The letters are reprinted in David Floyd, *Mao Against Khrushchev* (New York: Praeger, 1964); the above-mentioned letter appears on pp. 362-367.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

severe crisis in Soviet-American relations and tried to escalate it into a major war between the two superpowers. Mao may have expected that the Indian communists, taking advantage of the deployment of the Indian armed forces against China, would initiate large-scale guerrilla warfare. But most of the Indian communists supported the Indian government. Despite the dangerous tension with the United States, the Soviet Union strongly opposed the attack against India and promised help to Nehru. Another Maoist strategic gambit had misfired. The party probably forced its chairman to desist from the futile adventure, and the conflict was liquidated within a few short weeks.

In 1963, when the Sino-Soviet conflict broke into the open, Mao let it be known that he took a very pessimistic view of the future. He envisaged the possibility that "China will change its color." The fact was that China's agricultural recovery was predicated on a heavy downgrading, indeed the concealed liquidation, of the communes, and a reintroduction of some "capitalist" practices. Mao ordered a social education movement and a rectification campaign (his fifth). Lin appointed military commanders to concurrent party and government positions and launched a campaign to familiarize the PLA with more of "Mao's thoughts," which was later applied to the entire population. Yet Mao did not expect much improvement because, as he said, the departments of government were being run by "dead men."

On June 15 the CCP wrote a letter to the Kremlin suggesting that a new "general line" be adopted for the communist world movement. It called for the intensification of revolutionary activities everywhere as an "urgent task"; asserted that substantial risks should be taken, because "revolutionary people's wars" would *not* lead to world war; and warned that it would be " 'right' opportunism if the proletarian party should not dare to lead a revolution. . . when the objective conditions are ripe." Nuclear weapons do not and cannot "resolve the fundamental contradictions in the modern world," nor can they "alter the law of class struggle." The Soviets were accused of being "opposed to revolutions by the oppressed peoples" and also "opposed to others supporting such revolutions." "Can peaceful transition be made into a new world-wide strategic principle for the international communist movement? Absolutely not. . . .there is no historical precedent for peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism." Hence the new general line should be "one of the resolute revolu-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tionary struggle by the people of all countries and of carrying the proletarian world revolution forward to the end."

Moscow was not about to agree to this proposal. Whether the USSR is biding its time until it possesses nuclear superiority, or has become "revisionist" as Mao and Lin assert, the Kremlin does not intend to squander its resources in indecisive battles and it will not take risks to gain inconclusive successes. The victory of the world revolution presupposes the defeat and possibly the destruction of the United States. Although a series of simultaneous and successive people's wars could weaken the United States, such a strategy will not lead to its defeat. It might even result in undesirable U.S. reactions. Moscow saw no reason to change the general line—or, at least, the Kremlin's version of it—agreed upon between 1956 and 1960. The general line did not prevent Moscow from supporting the war against South Viet Nam. On the contrary, it called for such support.

In Viet Nam, the death of President Ngo Dinh Diem early in November 1963 threatened to destroy the residual political and social cohesion of the Republic. The United States, rather furtively, began to carry out a partial withdrawal.[5] Secretary of Defense McNamara stated that the United States should not take the responsibility for the outcome of the conflict which, in his opinion, could "only be won by Vietnamese themselves." Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia quarreled with Washington and secured China's pledge to protect his country against aggression by South Viet Nam and Thailand. This arrangement strengthened the military position of the Vietnamese communists. Meanwhile, Chinese Prime Minister Chou En-lai went to Africa in search of potential people's wars. Despite Moscow's caution, China was laying the groundwork for revolutionary explosions across the globe.

It may be that Mao and Ho Chi Minh knew enough about American politics not to accelerate the timetable of aggression during an election year. If Hanoi had mounted a strong offensive after the deaths of Presidents Diem and Kennedy, South Viet Nam might have been overrun by early 1964. But such an event might have had repercussions in U.S. domestic politics which would have been undesirable from the communist point of view—perhaps leading to a strengthening of U.S. strategic and nuclear power and

[5]See White House Declaration of October 2, 1963; *Facts on File*, December 19-25, 1963, Vol. XXIII, No. 1208, p. 447; also, *ibid.*, February 13-19, 1964, Vol. XXIV, No. 1216, p. 53.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

greater U.S. involvement in the Far East. So Mao and Ho refrained from pressing their advantages.

The task for 1964 was to prepare for the conflicts that would follow the U.S. election, regardless of its outcome. Lin established "political departments" in various party and state agencies, and covered important offices with a net of commissars, most of whom were military officers deemed loyal to him. By other organizational maneuvers he won significant influence within the policymaking State Council. In September Mao set in motion the "fourth clean-up movement," designed to expose party members who had gotten into the habit of talking about Mao by making sly references to "amnesia" and to a "blind man crossing the bridge." He was determined to prevent the emergence of a Chinese replica of the Petöfi Circle which he claimed had brought about the Hungarian Revolution of 1956.

On October 14, 1964, Khrushchev fell from power. Mao was pleased and no doubt hoped that henceforth his strategic concepts and other schemes would find greater receptivity within the Kremlin. Two days later the first Chinese atomic device was exploded. On November 1 the Thai independence movement was founded in China, the first operational step toward activating guerrilla war in Thailand.

The rhetoric of the American election seemed to augur an early U.S. disengagement from Southeast Asia. It is true that in the fall of 1964, after the naval incident in the Bay of Tonkin, Congress authorized stepped-up U.S. defense preparations, and that immediately after the election Washington deployed F-105 fighter-bombers to Viet Nam. But Mao and Ho were apparently unimpressed by these moves.

IV

With the advantage of hindsight, it becomes clear that 1965 was the target date for the outbreak of a series of people's wars embracing many and vast theaters of conflict. The Ho-Mao plan, as it can now be reconstructed, envisaged operations in Southeast Asia, Indonesia-Malaysia, South Asia, Latin America, Africa and mainland China.

Mainland Southeast Asia. In Viet Nam the task was to consummate the victory which seemed to be within easy reach and which was confidently predicted for the end of 1965. Victory was crucial, for it would bring psychological, political and economic

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(food) benefits, humiliate the American "paper tiger," and make available North Vietnamese, Viet Cong, and some South Vietnamese forces for further military action, for example, in Thailand. The takeover of South Viet Nam would be followed quickly by the fall of the remaining noncommunist areas of Laos and the complete subservience of Cambodia. In early 1965 Hanoi dispatched a large number of its army units into the South to deliver the *coup de grâce*. On January 11 communist-controlled "Buddhists" called a general strike throughout South Viet Nam. On January 24 about one-half of the aircraft of the loyal Laotian air force was destroyed by sabotage. On May 3 Cambodia severed diplomatic relations with the United States.

The war also was to be carried into Thailand, to the isolated northeast where about 40,000 North Vietnamese loyal to Hanoi had settled years earlier, and to the southern area bordering Malaysia, where guerrillas had sustained themselves since the British had suppressed the communist operations against Malaya. Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi forecast in January 1965 that a people's war would be raging throughout Thailand within the year. On January 23 the Thai Patriotic Front was formed.

Indonesia-Malaysia. By 1965 there was considerable evidence that Mao had gained for his secret projects the support of Sukarno, President of Indonesia, or at least that of Subandrio, Sukarno's foreign minister and intelligence chief. The Indonesian communists, who had been on close terms with Peking for many years, and their fellow travelers were expected to carry out two tasks: prepare a full-fledged war against Malaysia and seize power in Indonesia. The maneuvers began in 1964 when Peking formed a Malaysian National Liberation League and Indonesia initiated guerrilla warfare in Sarawak during October. In January 1965 Indonesia withdrew from the United Nations. By mid-1965, guerrilla operations had become widespread, if not very successful. The communist attempt to seize power in Indonesia came suddenly on September 30-October 1, when six Indonesian army generals were murdered and a revolutionary government with communist support was formed.

South Asia, Latin America and Africa. In April 1965 Pakistan, with its own interests in mind, but apparently with the assurance of Chinese diplomatic if not military support, began sending guerrilla teams into Indian Kashmir. Previously, Pakistan President Ayub Khan had visited Peking and Moscow and had signed an

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

agreement with Peking. Following a short truce in June, the sporadic Pakistani-Indian engagements developed into a brief limited war in late summer. In support of Pakistan, China on September 17 addressed an ultimatum to India, and sought by means of various threats to bring about an Indian defeat.[6] In the end, the Chinese were unsuccessful, and the conflict was liquidated through Soviet mediation.

During 1966 China-oriented Indian communists stirred up riots in Bengal, notably in Calcutta. Many Indian observers are convinced that as part of its protracted struggle against India, China had used Pakistan as its proxy and had ordered the Bengal riots.

Communist guerrilla activity in the Philippines, which had been dormant for several years, was resumed on a significant scale in 1965. In Korea, the first signs that the North Koreans were preparing for guerrilla warfare in the South appeared in 1965.

In Latin America, the Dominican Republic crisis, which began on April 25, 1965, pitted U.S. military power directly against communism. This second confrontation, although it took place in a theater far removed from East Asia, occurred simultaneously with the U.S. deployment to Viet Nam. The U.S. decision to send major combat units to Viet Nam is dated April 2, 1965; the decision to send paratroops and Marines to Santo Domingo was taken on or about April 27.[7]

In addition to the violence in the Dominican Republic, various communist-supported incidents, including city riots, were reported in Bolivia, Colombia and Ecuador, and a communist insurgency was gaining strength in Guatemala.

The Tri-Continental Conference held at Havana during January 1966 was called to coordinate the various guerrilla movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Originally, China had called for an Afro-Asian conference to open on June 29, 1965 in Algiers. After Ben Bella's ouster, the conference was postponed until November, then canceled. The Havana Conference in which the Soviets participated as "Asians"—they were represented by an Uzbek—had been in preparation for more than a year,[8] which

[6]It is worth noting that on October 5, 1965 Pakistan severed diplomatic relations with Malaysia, target of the Indonesian communists. This was rather belated, for by then the Indonesian communists were hard pressed.

[7]There is no reason to assume that communist operations in the Dominican Republic had been planned beforehand. The attempted seizure of San Domingo therefore was not part of the Ho-Mao operation.

[8]Nicolas Land in *Est & Ouest*, December 1-15, 1965, pp. 1-8. A preparatory committee met on September 1-2 in Cairo. An Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference in Accra, Ghana, May 9-16, 1965, also belongs to this sequence of activities.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

means that a decision to implement the tri-continental people's war strategy against the United States was made before January 1965.

There was "anti-colonialist" unrest in parts of Africa, such as Mozambique, and a series of assassinations of African statesmen: some of these events and murders appear to have been related to communist strategy. A major effort was made to support the communist rebellion in the Congo from Burundi, Uganda and Tanzania in the east (to some extent also from Kenya), and from the Congo Republic (Brazzaville) in the west. It would appear that this operation was directed primarily from Tanzania. However, the rebel leaders in the Congo split, and the political situation in Burundi proved unstable. Despite many attempts to keep the rebellion alive during January 1965 and again in the summer, the Congo operation gradually disintegrated. Other preparations for instigating people's wars were made through Algeria and Ghana. The objectives and activities of Algeria are unclear, but Ghana's primary mission apparently was to initiate actions throughout the French-speaking countries of West Africa. In December 1965 Ghana broke relations with Britain.

In summary, people's wars were to engulf the mainland of Southeast Asia, Indonesia, parts of India, the Philippines, the Caribbean area, the northwestern part and the inaccessible center of South America, Central and West Africa. In addition, two "orthodox" wars were being promoted between Indonesia and Malaysia (plus Britain), and between Pakistan and India. Moreover, a war was in progress in Yemen, and there were the exploitable trouble spots of Cyprus and Israel. On February 23, 1966, a pro-Soviet left-wing coup took place in Syria—an event pregnant with consequences for 1967. The *envergure* of this strategy was indeed formidable.

China. On the Chinese mainland itself strategic preparations were going forward. Chinese leaders decided during May 1964 to establish a food reserve of about fifty million tons of grain. By mid-1965, possibly half of that reserve had been procured through wheat imports from the West.

Despite its enormous impact on the economy, the nuclear program was achieving rapid and impressive progress. The nuclear budget was raised substantially. On May 14, 1965, the second atomic device was detonated, a full-fledged bomb dropped from

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a TU-4 bomber. Special "machine-building" ministries were established to manage the Chinese atomic, electronic, missile, aircraft and ship industries, as well as agricultural machinery plants. The defense budget was increased substantially to about seven billion JMP. Precisely how much of an increase this represented is uncertain, since the budget figures of the preceding years are disputed, but the "leap" probably was by one-third or more.

On May 22, 1965, military ranks in the PLA were abolished and the Chinese armed forces were given an extreme egalitarian and revolutionary veneer. A new mass propaganda campaign was launched to stress that politics are pre-eminent ("politics to the fore"): Mao and Lin wanted to convey the thought that technology, weapons and up-to-date military capabilities are not as important as flaming revolutionary enthusiasm and energetic leadership, singlemindedly devoted to revolutionary victory. The campaign was aimed at the military professionals, who knew—as USSR leaders knew—that China was not ready for major military adventures. Whether Mao expected to commit Chinese forces abroad is highly doubtful, but the multiregional people's wars involved commitments and risks.

During May 1965 the Viet Cong attempted to thwart the U.S. deployment. Heavy reinforcements streamed in from the North. On August 7, Peking announced that it would send volunteers to Viet Nam if they were requested. Two days later Hanoi indicated, in ambiguous terms, that it wanted to respond to this offer. On September 3, Lin Piao published a long doctrinal statement on people's war which clearly spelled out that China wanted a maximum number of conflicts on three continents and was ready to support revolutionary operations. Lin expected all genuine revolutionaries to strike soon and in force.

By the end of September, Foreign Minister Chen Yi hinted broadly that war was imminent. On October 1, the *People's Daily* stated that *war with the United States* was inevitable and that the United States must and would be defeated by means of people's wars. The communists staged their coup in Indonesia on this very day. If this plan had been successful, the Vietnamese conflict would have been pushed into the background by a far larger conflict—a conflict which, even without Soviet intervention, might have expanded into a third world war.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

V

Was this a concerted, world-embracing strategy, as it appears from the record of events, or simply an incredible series of coincidences? Whenever strategic events, functionally related and caused by forces that are allied or are pursuing similar goals, occur simultaneously or within short intervals, it is wise to adopt the working hypothesis that they are linked and part of a general plan of action. Naturally, such a working hypothesis does not exclude the possibility that some of the events were purely coincidental. Nor should one overlook the fact that even without consultations and agreements imitation plays an historically significant role: Coup B that follows coup A may be simply the result of emulation and not a pre-planned second step within a serial operation. Precisely because such imitation exists, success or failure may cause an "amplifier effect"—one of the main factors that distinguishes a minor from a major event. But if there is a strategic doctrine calling for a whole series of simultaneous and successive operations, and if such a series does occur, it is only logical to assume that the doctrine was implemented through joint planning and coordination among the parties involved.

Agreements on joint operations remain ultra-secret. They may be disclosed after the event at the option of the participants or, especially if the attempt resulted in failure, they may be kept secret forever. There is no confession while the deed is still in progress; but there is a strong presumptive case.

The coordination of joint strategic undertakings may assume different forms, ranging from a carefully detailed secret treaty to merely a verbal understanding. Whether oral or written, the understanding may bear on the types and timing of operations, or it may be only general in nature. For reasons of security and lack of mutual trust, the partners may disclose to one another only the bare minimum of their intentions. Sometimes there is no agreement at all, but the initiator of the action communicates his intent in the expectation that the government he has tipped off, for reasons of its own, will take some sort of parallel action. In some instances, such communications can be effected through intelligence rather than diplomatic channels, i.e., the information is planted.

In other words, a highly integrated strategic operation that is undertaken by many different and geographically dispersed forces does not presuppose a prior "war council" in which all

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

participants lay their cards on the table and concert their respective tasks. Such war councils are extremely rare and they are not necessary.

The historian who suspects mutual understandings should make a diligent search for documentary evidence. In the absence of documentary proof, he must examine the circumstantial evidence and decide whether the hypothesis of coordination is more plausible than the hypothesis of a sheer accident of parallelism. If documentary proof is missing, historians cannot conclude, as they often do, that no coordination took place. The matter is merely unresolved. It should be added that the historian, even with full access to the relevant documents, must guard against fraudulent and alibi records and be alert to documentary gaps. He must evaluate the written evidence on the basis of what actually happened and the requisite operational mechanisms involved. Primary source materials do not "speak for themselves" but contain secrets that must be uncovered by reasoning.

I know of no significant historical event about which we have full and entirely conclusive evidence. Consequently, circumstantial evidence must be considered a strong rather than a weak form of proof. This is entirely in line with legal practice, although the point escapes many social scientists who vainly try to imitate the methodology of the natural sciences. It is self-evident that the communist strategy of 1965 cannot yet be elucidated from its documentary record. Nevertheless, since we must orient ourselves in the real world, we cannot suspend judgment until all the data become available. Fortunately, the pattern of operations can be inferred from the events themselves.

The global situation in 1965 must be analyzed with respect to the coordination between Hanoi and the Viet Cong; between Ho Chi Minh and Mao Tse-tung; between Hanoi, Peking and Moscow; between the main communist states and Latin American and African communists; and between communists and non-communists.

Hanoi-Viet Cong. During March 1967 U.S. forces in South Viet Nam launched operation "Junction City" to flush out the Viet Cong command post near the Cambodian border. Large numbers of documents and photographs were secured which at last permitted identification of the Viet Cong high command. It turned out that the leader of all communist forces in South Viet Nam is a regular North Vietnamese officer, General Nguyen Chi

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Thanh.* A member of the North Vietnamese Politburo, ranking eighth in the hierarchy of the North Vietnamese Communist Party, and reported to be a fervent Maoist, General Thanh is believed to have taken command by early or mid-1965. The deputy commander of the "liberation army" operating in South Viet Nam is General Tran Van Trah, also a North Vietnamese officer and a pro-Maoist. Major General Tran Do, the third ranking officer, a North Vietnamese expert in guerrilla warfare and also a Maoist, is the chief political commissar. Thus, the Viet Cong is essentially a Maoist-oriented politico-military organ of Hanoi (which, of course, does not imply that some Viet Cong elements do not desire some independence of action).

Ho-Mao. As the chief of an independent state, Ho Chi Minh would refuse to take direct orders from Peking. For that matter, the communists are highly punctilious about matters of rank, precedence and ceremony. Hence it would scarcely have occurred to Mao to send instructions to Hanoi. Ho may have informed Mao about his intentions and timetables, and he may have invited comment; or Mao may have requested information from Ho for the purpose of his own planning; or Mao may have found out about Ho's intentions in one way or another and may have adjusted his operations accordingly. Both men are agreed on the need to fight people's wars against the United States. Hence it is most probable that the two coordinated their actions in a systematic way, even though Mao presumably did not indicate his plans with respect to Indonesia and India. The chances are that Ho decided the timing of his big push, but that this decision was preceded by consultations with Mao.

The suggestion that Mao and Ho must have concerted their strategy is resisted on the grounds that the Vietnamese do not want to have anything to do with the Chinese and would oppose any move which, directly or indirectly, might put their country under Chinese overlordship. The rulers at Hanoi certainly do not desire to be ruled by Peking. The Vietnamese seek to avoid Chinese domination and a large-scale influx of Chinese soldiers. However, because of the intimate historical ties between the Chinese and Vietnamese communist parties, and the close cultural relationships between the two countries, such "nationalistic arguments" should not be pressed too far. Whatever the current

*Editor's Note: As this article went to press, General Thanh was reported by Hanoi to have died of a heart attack.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mutual feelings may be between Vietnamese and Chinese, the basic question is this: What are the relations between Ho and Mao? There is no evidence whatever that a split existed during 1965. In any event, national divergencies do not preclude strategic agreement.

To illustrate this point, let us consider the main rail line connecting the Chinese provinces of Kwangtung and Kwangsi with Yunnan. It runs through North Viet Nam and carries supplies to the Vietnamese, but it is owned and partially operated by China and defended by Chinese troops and weapons. Chinese forces —about nine divisions at less than full strength—now are stationed in North Viet Nam to guard the railroad. Their deployment in Ho's realm has proved entirely feasible in a political sense, despite the fact that as long as these forces remain in North Viet Nam, Ho is unlikely to oppose Mao. If Ho agreed to the Chinese presence, he presumably does not intend to depart from Mao's line; or, if he had no choice but to accept those troops, he cannot effectively oppose Peking. It does not matter which of the two versions is accepted. In any case, the press reported that during the abortive "peace negotiation" of early 1967, in the course of which Moscow allegedly appealed to Hanoi to compromise with the United States, Ho sent a delegation to Peking to coordinate his reply.

Hanoi-Peking and Moscow. Hanoi enjoys Moscow's support; without it Ho could not continue the war. But Mao, whose support is likewise necessary for Hanoi, is split from Moscow. The main disagreement between the Soviets and the Maoists centers on strategy. Logically, one would therefore assume that the Mao-Moscow split would place Hanoi in a quandary, or induce one of the two feuding parties to withhold help from the other's protégé. Yet the triangle operates on the basis of "the enemy of my friend is my friend." This unusual arrangement is precisely that which is prescribed by communist operational doctrine.

Despite major disputes, feuding communist groups are bound to cooperate within the context of the "general line." The rule that applies to communism as a world movement is that the several parties, irrespective of splits, must maintain full collaboration within the precisely agreed-upon sphere of the general line which they all adopted. The Chinese attempted in 1963 to have the line changed, but failed: hence, the old line is still binding on them. In his speech of March 29, 1966 to the Twenty-third Party Congress

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the CPSU, Brezhnev underscored this continuing obligation. Regardless of "differences of opinion," Brezhnev explained, there still was "unity of action between the communists of all countries." He called for the observance of the general line as formulated between 1956 and 1960.

Consequently, during 1964-1965 the Soviets and Mao could have concerted plans with respect to those tasks which, as good communists, they both acknowledged. The fact is that in early February 1965 Kosygin was in Hanoi and promised "assistance and support" to North Viet Nam. The date suggests that Kosygin ratified previous agreements between Ho and Mao: Kosygin arrived on February 6; on February 7, the Viet Cong escalated the war by attacking the U.S. base at Pleiku; and on February 10, there was a giant pro-Viet Cong rally at Peking, with Mao Tse-tung prominently in attendance.

The meaning and purpose of the general line is poorly understood in the Free World, where disputes and splits between communists are naïvely interpreted as ruptures of fundamental solidarity and as insuperable obstacles to "unity of action." How this doctrine of the general line works in practice can be deduced from the debate on "people's war." Lin Piao's lengthy treatise on people's war, though dressed up as an anniversary speech, was designed to provide the overall theoretical framework for the operations planned during 1965 and 1966. The timing of the release of this document lends credence to the thesis that in 1965 the strategic initiative came from Peking; more specifically, from Mao.

Lin's treatise is more than a restatement of Mao's views on guerrilla war. It deals with global strategy, sets forth a concept of how to defeat the United States, and offers full Chinese support to those who prosecute the right kind of people's wars. U.S. defeat in Viet Nam "will lead to a chain reaction," Lin stated. The more the war expands, "the greater will be the chain reaction." The struggle in Viet Nam "is now the focus of the struggle of the people of the world against U.S. aggression." The "colossus of U.S. imperialism," Lin added, "can be split up," "defeated," and "destroyed" "piece by piece" by the "peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America and other regions."

Hanoi neither modified nor rejected Lin's concept, or at least did not do so openly. By contrast, the Soviets did not agree with the thesis that the United States can be defeated by means of a tri-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

continental people's war, and that "people's war is the most effective weapon against U.S. imperialism"; nor did they accept the corollary idea that the great assault should be mounted in 1965. Moscow was not interested in premature high-risk operations.

Soviet leaders disagree with Lin's assertion that the "principal contradiction in the contemporary world" lies "between the revolutionary peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America and the imperialists headed by the United States." Instead, Moscow finds this principal contradiction in the relationship between "socialism" and "capitalism," i.e., between the USSR and the United States.

Lin, quoting Lenin, says that war, though destructive, "is a great school" which shakes up the masses and accelerates "social development to an unheard-of degree." War pushes "history forward" and is the main method of adding to one's strength. "Whether one dares to fight a people's war. . .means whether one dares to embark on revolution. This is the most effective touchstone for distinguishing genuine from fake revolutionaries." "It is opportunism if one won't fight when one can win." "Marxist-Leninists and revolutionary people never take a gloomy view of war."

Brezhnev hardly takes a gloomy view of war. But at that time in history, he presumably found himself in closer agreement with another sentence in Lin's treatise: "It is adventurism if one insists on fighting when one can't win." In his speech to the Twenty-third Party Congress, which contained a reply to Lin, Brezhnev offered all kinds of support to revolutionary movements. Yet he did not associate himself with Lin's key point: "The spiritual atom bomb which the revolutionary people possess is a far more powerful and useful weapon than the physical atom bomb." The Kremlin's attitude to this sort of bombast had been expressed on January 16, 1963 by Khrushchev: "The Albanian leaders talk a lot about rocket and nuclear war but nobody is worried by their talk. Everyone knows that they have nothing to their name but idle talk. . . . Our responsibilities are different."[9]

The continuous general line has been that armed struggle must be used only when such a struggle can be won. The general line calls for both violent and nonviolent operations but does not, contrary to Lin's view, consider "fighting" to be "the first of all our

[9]Address to the Sixth Congress of the East German Communist Party in Berlin; reprinted in Floyd, *op. cit.*, p. 354.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

strategies and tactics." Nor does it call for a tri-continental revolutionary people's war. It does call for support to "national liberation wars," which is a quite different concept. In his report to the Twenty-third Congress of the CPSU, delivered on March 29, 1966, Brezhnev specifically stated: "The principle of peaceful coexistence is not applicable to the relations between . . . colonialists and the victims of colonial oppression." However, the Kremlin's advice to the countries that had recently won their independence did not include the suggestion that they should organize people's wars; instead, Brezhnev stressed the importance of economic development.

Soviet leaders fear that the USSR could bleed itself white if it were compelled to organize people's wars on a global scale. Whether or not Soviet leaders really believe—as Lin alleges they do—that "a nation without nuclear weapons is incapable of defeating an enemy with nuclear weapons" and that "nuclear weapons decide everything," it is reasonably clear that in 1965 the Kremlin did not want, and was unwilling to waste scarce resources on, a global people's war strategy. People's wars that are in progress, or that should arise because of compelling circumstances, must be supported as a matter of communist duty, but otherwise the priority strategic task is to achieve strategic-technological superiority over the United States.[10]

There are three reasons for Moscow to support the Vietnamese war: (1) It is unfinished business and a communist defeat cannot be tolerated. (2) Aid to Ho and the Viet Cong is an obligation of

[10]In 1961 I testified before a Senate Subcommittee on the Soviet strategic doctrine as expressed in Khrushchev's speech of January 6, 1961. Analyzing the text, sentence by sentence, I concluded that the USSR would support limited and national liberation wars, but that, since a nonnuclear strategy cannot possibly defeat the United States, their chief strategic objective was to achieve nuclear superiority and to prepare themselves for nuclear war. Preferably, the Soviets would try to utilize nuclear superiority to impose their writ by psycho-political means, i.e., wage nuclear war psychologically. The implication was not that nuclear war is inevitable but that preservation of U.S. strategic and nuclear superiority would preclude nuclear blackmail or war; moreover, because the risks and costs of offensive nuclear strategy by the weaker side are excessive, such U.S. superiority might induce the Soviet Union eventually to abandon the pursuit of its world revolutionary objective.

This evaluation of Kremlin strategy collided with the judgments of the new Secretary of Defense. McNamara's analysis found that the Soviets would proceed by means of national liberation wars and that the underdeveloped world would be the main theater of conflict. By now it should be clear that this assessment confused Moscow with Mao. Many illuminating details of the Moscow-Mao debate about nuclear versus people's wars, and about the difference between national liberation and revolutionary people's war have been in the open since 1963, but there is no public evidence that McNamara's estimate of Moscow's strategic intentions has changed.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

communist solidarity. (3) The Viet Nam war cuts deeply into the U.S. military budget, mostly at the expense of strategic weapons systems, and thereby facilitates Soviet nuclear strategy. But even in the case of Viet Nam, Moscow was assisting only one specific national liberation war, whereas Mao promises to support local people's wars anywhere in order to bring about far-flung conflagrations. (How much Mao can help is debatable. His own concept of "support" is largely organizational and tactical. But it is believed that he offered Sukarno an atomic test device to be exploded at the initiation of the Malaysian war.) For Moscow, Viet Nam is a limited task in itself; for Mao it is a subsidiary operation within a larger scheme. The conflicting interests of Mao and Moscow coincide in the Vietnamese theater and, within this limited context, have been coordinated. But there was not much coordination outside this theater. Mao did not need it for his plans in Thailand and Indonesia, and the Soviet Union sabotaged Mao's plans with respect to India and opposed Chinese machinations in Latin America and Africa.

The Communist World Movement. At the beginning of 1965, Che Guevara traveled to China, Egypt, Algeria, Ghana and the (Brazzaville) Congo, places of contemporary key importance to international communism. (I have ignored in this discussion the role of Egypt and Syria.) After his return to Cuba, Guevara disappeared and was rumored to have fallen victim to a purge. It is far more probable that he has been sent out to line up guerrilla forces for people's wars in the Caribbean or in South America. In view of Guevara's military skill and experience, he may also have drawn up operational plans for African would-be participants in the tri-continental people's war. There is little doubt that Guevara is a good Maoist and therefore a suitable coordinator.

The avowed purpose of the Havana Tri-Continental Conference was to coordinate the activities of communist guerrilla forces in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Guerrilla warfare leaders and experts of some eighty "liberation movements" reportedly attended the sessions. Although it is often asserted that this conference was carefully prepared by the Soviet Union, its underlying concept, namely, the instigation of a tri-continental revolutionary people's war, was formulated by Mao and Lin and is contrary to Moscow's strategy. If Moscow did in fact organize the conference, instead of capitalizing on China's labors, the purpose must have been to establish control over the various guerrilla

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

movements. The Chinese failed to make much of an impact, and the Soviet delegates, together with Castro, prevailed. The resolutions were militant enough and called for revolutionary violence, but the conference took place at a time when it was already apparent that the great offensive scheme of 1965 had failed. Aid was offered to all the people on the three continents "engaged in a struggle for national liberation," but a deft editorial hand buried the more militant Mao-Lin line.

Latin American communism is fragmented into groups oriented toward the Soviet Union, Castro, Mao, and the Trotskyites. It is impossible to distinguish these feuding groups by examining their positions on the Moscow-Mao dispute. Many elements, including the Castroites, need the support of the Soviet Union but otherwise would prefer to adopt the people's war strategy. The Soviet Union appears particularly sensitive to the risk of a new confrontation in Latin America. Whether or not it managed to suppress "adventurism" throughout Latin America, Moscow made special efforts to control the Venezuelan communist movement. Moscow recognized that the communist guerrillas have not found much support in the rural areas of Latin America and have been forced to remain in outlying districts from where they are unable to exercise much influence; or else they have played at city uprisings, thereby departing from a fundamental precept of Maoist tactics. Under the circumstances, and despite the popularity of the Viet Cong among some Latin Americans, Mao has not obtained much help from the Western Hemisphere.

Dominican Republic. The Dominican Republic crisis has a history of several years, but since the incident itself came almost as a complete surprise, it is most unlikely that operational coordination took place between Mao (or any of his proxies) and the Dominican communists. Undoubtedly, the possibilities of a people's war in the Dominican Republic were considered along with other opportunities. But the concrete events of April 1965 occurred unexpectedly and rapidly. If a people's war had begun and spread to Haiti, it would have facilitated the Mao-Ho strategy. As it was, the swift U.S. intervention disclosed a change in U.S. policy and had a most damaging effect on the tri-continental scheme.

Africa. The methods used to stimulate operations in Africa included two visits by Chinese Prime Minister Chou En-lai, trips by several cooperative African statesmen to China, pacts by China

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with Tanzania and Algeria, the supply and distribution of Chinese weapons, and selection by Peking of a Congo guerrilla leader. Chou En-lai masterminded the series of Afro-Asian conferences but desisted from this effort after the communist debacle in Indonesia.

Coordination with Noncommunists. In Indonesia Mao was apparently able to operate in part through cabinet members and military officers who were clandestine communists, or had been prevailed upon to join the communist side. Though not a communist, President Sukarno was willing to throw in his lot with Mao and Ho, because he wanted to preserve his own internal position. He had become increasingly more pro-communist, apparently because he did not expect the United States to take forceful action in Asia.

The coordination between Mao and Pakistan probably was achieved during President Ayub Khan's visit to Peking, although on his subsequent visit to Moscow he may have been warned about the dangers of allying his country too closely to China. Presumably, China offered Pakistan diplomatic assistance and promised to tie up Indian forces along the Chinese border. The Pakistanis saw a chance to promote their national interest. The arrangement was strictly what the communists call a "temporary alliance" and did not involve a Pakistani commitment to revolutionary people's war.

In summary, some of the coordination mechanisms can be traced and others can be inferred. Not all of the 1965 communist actions were coordinated, and there is evidence that with respect to some plans Moscow and Peking were working at cross-purposes. But enough evidence is at hand to permit one to state with considerable confidence that the pattern of communist operations during 1965 was not the result of pure coincidence, of various communist and pro-communist groups taking independent and entirely unrelated actions. There was a concerted effort to bring about a tri-continental people's war.

VI

Mao's strategy might have succeeded—except that, as in the case of Korea, the United States again did the unpredicted. Whether the election rhetoric of 1964 concealed awareness by the U.S. government of the impending threat is questionable. The chances are that the full danger was not perceived and the customary

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

illusions about communist intentions prevailed. After all, the Cold War conflict with the communists was supposed to have been tacitly called off after the Cuban missile crisis. In any event, United States policy was not very realistic: Washington fully understood that it could not abandon South Viet Nam, but it did not want to fight there. Instead, Washington desired to extend the alleged Cold War truce to Asia. Washington frantically signaled Hanoi and Peking that the United States harbored no aggressive designs, but on the contrary was willing to pay a substantial price for peace. This type of message meant little to Mao Tse-tung or Ho Chi Minh, who desired the war—indeed, urgently needed it.

Shortly before the election campaign began in earnest, a naval incident led to a substantial modification of U.S. policy. At the end of July 1964 Hanoi complained that U.S. warships were violating North Vietnamese coastal waters. On August 2, three North Vietnamese torpedo boats attacked a U.S. destroyer on the open seas. On August 4, a new torpedo attack was directed against two U.S. destroyers. Thereupon U.S. carrier planes bombed shore installations and naval bases. On August 5, a third torpedo attack led to another retaliatory air strike and the deployment of F-102 fighters to South Viet Nam. President Johnson declared that "peace is the only purpose of the course we pursue." On August 7, Congress adopted a Joint Resolution authorizing the President to take all steps necessary to maintain peace and security in Southeast Asia.[11]

By the end of 1964 the United States had stationed in Viet Nam about 23,000 men, of whom 10,000 were combat soldiers acting as advisers. The official line still was that this war would have to be won by the South Vietnamese themselves. Yet Washington was not unaware of the rather massive deployment of North Vietnamese troops into the South which commenced after the U.S. election. Simultaneously, Viet Cong terrorism was stepped up dramatically, also against Americans in the Saigon area. Evidently, the war was entering a new phase. On February 7, 1965, the Viet Cong successfully and brutally attacked a U.S. camp at Pleiku and soon thereafter struck U.S. Army installations at Tuy Hoa and Qui Nhon. Retaliatory air raids were undertaken against the North to warn Hanoi against the repetition of such attacks. But North Viet-

[11]The purpose of the North Vietnamese torpedo attacks is by no means clear. Perhaps the strikes were intended to intimidate the United States or cause it to lose face. It is most unlikely that Hanoi sought to bring about a stronger U.S. military commitment to South Viet Nam.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

namese units continued to infiltrate, as Secretary McNamara disclosed on April 26.

Washington decided to send in 3,500 Marines to protect the air base at Da Nang and block the coastal invasion route. On March 12, the Marines were committed to battle for the first time. It was hoped that these "signals" would be understood, but the communists, by means of demonstrations of Asian students before the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, a belligerent statement from Peking, and a series of communist-demanded expropriations in Indonesia, threw up "signals" of their own. On March 30, the U.S. Embassy at Saigon was subjected to a terror bomb attack.

Thereupon, on April 2, the United States decided to deploy appreciable strength into Viet Nam, to bomb the logistics and communication lines of the North Vietnamese invaders, and to employ U.S. forces to defeat the North Vietnamese military units operating in South Viet Nam. The decision was communicated to our allies and accompanied by an offer of one billion dollars for the development of Mekong River resources. The buildup was started with the prompt dispatch of 14,000 men and was accelerated during May and June. B-52 attacks against Viet Cong strongholds were mounted. U.S. ground forces won their first battle on June 13. The tide was turned by mid-August. Counteroffensive operations started in October.

This is not the place to recount the course of the Viet Nam war. Suffice it to say that during the next two years U.S. troop strength was increased twentyfold; in a prolonged series of ground engagements the large communist units operating in South Viet Nam were defeated; the hard core of the Viet Cong was severely attrited; and the U.S. armed forces demonstrated that, in a tactical sense, people's war held no secrets with which we were unfamiliar and posed no military threats with which we were unable to cope, provided we fielded sufficient numbers.

These U.S. successes were achieved under conditions especially favorable to the guerrillas. At the beginning of 1965, the communists controlled a substantial portion of the country. The terrain was prepared thoroughly with thousands of tunnels, hideaways, munitions caches, communications facilities, training installations, and the like; some of these preparations had been started in 1941 (against the Japanese). The Viet Cong displayed superior knowledge of the countryside. They are still quite numerous and their first-line cadres have received thorough

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

training. Two or even three generations of guerrillas have been trained successively, and experiences have been handed down from father to son and from elder to younger brother. In addition, the communists possess ample logistics resources, short and defensible supply lines, and sanctuaries in Cambodia and Laos where their troops are able to relax, regroup and recover. Yet, while the Viet Cong are superb fighters, they have proved no match in battle against U.S. troops; the North Vietnamese units quickly demonstrated that they were qualitatively not the equal of the battle-seasoned and more highly motivated hard-core Viet Cong. Thus, by August-September 1965, there no longer was a chance of a conclusive communist victory. Not surprisingly, the people's war in Thailand failed to materialize by the scheduled date, August 1965.

The great strategic maneuver which Mao had conceived, and in which Ho was playing the chief operational role, had been blocked in its initial and decisive phase. The American defeat would not occur in 1965, not even in 1966. According to documents captured early in 1967, U.S. defeat is now forecast for 1970 but Hanoi is holding open the option of a fifty-year war. Lin takes pride in the fact that the "people's war led by the Chinese Communist Party," which resulted in the capture of China, "lasted for 22 years." But even the most faithful and hardened Viet Cong, as we know from captured documents, balk at this timetable. Although Mao's concept of a "protracted conflict" may be a realistic approach to world revolution, his recent interpretation of the "uninterrupted revolution" as an incessant multiple war lasting several generations lacks appeal and is infeasible.

U.S. "signals" were understood for the first time when the communists received them on the battlefield. To be sure, Ho himself remained unimpressed by U.S. successes, and we cannot be certain about Mao's reactions. But after the situation in the Dominican Republic had been stabilized, Ben Bella was ousted in Algeria (June 19) and U.S. firepower "signals" were comprehended by the more cautious "professional" elements within the Chinese Communist Party. In September 1965 the CCP Central Committee held a conference to prepare the propaganda operations that were to accompany the impending battles. But the conference was marred by fundamental disagreements and unmistakably derogatory references to Stalin (read Mao) : the anti-Maoist opposition wanted no part of the chairman's strategy.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

On October 1, the communist coup in Indonesia was suppressed. The Indonesian Communist Party, generally considered to be the strongest outside the bloc, was destroyed in bloody massacres. Whether the coup was bungled; whether anti-communist Indonesian generals, including graduates of U.S. military schools, had been encouraged by the U.S. resistance in Viet Nam; or whether opponents of Mao within his party had contrived the defeat, remains uncertain. But few intelligent observers of the psychological climate in Asia could disagree with Australian Prime Minister Harold Holt when he said on January 12, 1967: "If communist expansion in South-East Asia had been allowed to proceed unchecked, I personally question whether the overthrow of communism in Indonesia would have occurred."

A desperate attempt was made to save the military situation in Viet Nam through a change in battle tactics. As in Korea, the communists tried a "human sea" attack near the Cambodian border on November 14, 1965. When they were defeated, they were forced to de-escalate from "mobile warfare" (as Lin calls operations with large units) to guerrilla tactics.

As a result of fortunes on the battlefield the "psychological climate" was transformed. On December 18, Laos authorized U.S. air strikes against Vietnamese forces operating in its territory. Following a coup in Dahomey, the Chinese communists were evicted. In half a dozen additional coups, mostly in West Africa, and culminating on February 24, 1966 in the overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah who was visiting Peking, the Maoist position in Africa crumbled. The insurgency in the Congo was defeated, and the people's war in the Caribbean miscarried.[12]

The unfavorable turn of events in Viet Nam stimulated renewed disagreement within the PLA. Peking disclosed in May 1966 that a "professional military viewpoint" had "come to the fore," in opposition to the line laid down by Lin that military thinking should be controlled by "politics." In other words, the leading professional soldiers called for caution.

VII

By November 15, 1965, Mao found it prudent to leave Peking.

[12]In addition to this turn of events, the Associated Press reported that the United States was not losing the battle for public opinion even behind the Iron Curtain: a poll in Czechoslovakia showed that while 41.5 per cent of those asked blamed the United States for the Vietnamese war, "18 per cent said they did not know and 25.5 per cent did not answer." Reported in the *San José Mercury* (California), May 6, 1967, p. 19.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

He went to Hangchow to "recuperate," where, aided by Lin Piao and protected by loyal units of the PLA, he began to plot for an early comeback. World strategy was now less important than political survival at home.

Four targets were to be smashed: (1) the propaganda department of the CCP; (2) the professional military leaders headed by Chief-of-Staff, General Lo Jui-ch'ing (who formerly had bossed the CCP terror apparatus and enjoyed Soviet support); (3) the anti-Maoist forces within the party, the state and the trade unions, headed by Liu Shao-chi; and (4) the anti-Maoist base at Peking run by Politburo member P'eng Chen, Liu's main assistant and mayor of Peking. The fall of P'eng in May 1966 was expected to result in Liu's elimination but, despite recent reports of his ouster, Liu at this writing still seems to be China's President.

Mao's initial attack through PLA newspapers at Shanghai and Peking on November 10, 1965 was directed against the military opposition, representative writers of drama, opera librettos and fiction, and party members allegedly advocating counter-revolution and the return to capitalism. It is a fact that plays were written and performed calling for the rehabilitation of innocent people and for the return of land to the peasants. Artists painted pictures which seemed to support Mao and were widely reproduced, but closer scrutiny later revealed that they contained counterrevolutionary slogans. One widespread slogan which seems to have been particularly vexing, read: "Everybody is equal before the truth." In short, the public opinion media were undermining Mao's authority and reputation. This could not have been accomplished, certainly not on such a large scale, without protection afforded by high party functionaries, such as Liu and P'eng.

The military opposition realized the infeasibility of Mao's strategic plans. Frightened by the prospect of military obligations that China could not meet and eager to receive Soviet supplies again, it stressed the importance of military technology and capabilities against the overemphasis on "mere politics." Between January and April 1966, the *Liberation Army Daily*, one of Lin's mouthpieces, published a series of articles severely criticizing the military opposition. The articles intimated that some PLA cadres were not interested in fighting "unnecessary" people's wars.

In April 1966 Mao and Lin launched the Socialist Cultural Revolution, later renamed the Proletarian Cultural Revolution. As the *Liberation Army Daily* stated on May 4, 1966, this revolu-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion was to be "an extremely sharp class-struggle" designed to remold the thinking of the entire party. Lin issued the slogan that all factories should be run as schools of Mao's thoughts. Another slogan to which Chou En-lai paid lip service was that the "old must be demolished" and that it was the duty of the party to "foster the new": this was a broad attack on traditional Chinese culture. The sloganizing was capped by the admonition that "struggle is life."

In May 1966 Mao returned to Peking, and about this time General Lo appears to have been dismissed. By early June P'eng Chen had been purged, and propaganda chief, Vice Premier Lu Ting-yi, was ousted soon thereafter. On June 6, Mao expressed his fear that the state and party will perish. On the same day, the *Liberation Army Daily* summed up the basic meaning of the struggle: "Guns have no mind, but when those who hold the gun change their minds, the target of the gun will also change."

In August Mao felt strong enough to call a Plenum of the Central Committee.[13] It is believed that he warned the party that it had lost touch with the masses, but he apparently ran into heavy opposition when he tried to orient the meeting against his opponents. On August 6, Foreign Minister Chen Yi told Japanese parliamentarians that China did not desire to fight the United States and hinted that Peking might be willing to talk about Viet Nam. On August 9, the anti-Maoists spread the word that the "leftist deviation of the Cultural Revolution has been rectified." But in the end, Mao succeeded in purging about one-third of the Central Committee, in weakening the position of Teng Hsiao-p'ing, the party Secretary-General, and in reshuffling the ranks of the leading party officials. Liu was demoted from second to eighth in rank, while Lin, dubbed Mao's "dearest comrade," moved into second place. But it was again a Pyrrhic victory and Mao knew it. None of the important "social forces" was ready to support him in the event of a showdown. Even the PLA was not fully dependable and could be used only cautiously and sparingly.

In a desperate search for new support, Mao and Lin were inspired to create the so-called Red Guards from school pupils eager for an exciting change from their boring routine. By

[13]On July 16, the story on Mao's celebrated swim in the Yangtze River was released. This fantastic tale seemingly was designed to tell the country that Mao was in excellent physical condition, but the story seems to have been edited to make Mao look ridiculous. The photograph showing Mao in the water was an obvious fabrication. Perhaps the story was a warning to the outside world that the Chinese political situation was deteriorating.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

granting them a protracted school vacation, free meals and free travel (most of these teen-agers had never traveled beyond their county), and also allowing them the run of the streets, Mao set up the Red Guards as a new "mass movement" and used them to intimidate, harass and even eliminate otherwise untouchable enemies. Mao's invention was a master stroke, yet it uncovered another weakness: he was forced to go to the unorganized *pubescentes* because the party's regular youth organization was not on his side.

The Red Guards were established during June 1966, through the instrumentality of the PLA. Officially, only the sons of poor peasants and genuine proletarians were recruited; actually the Guard was soon flooded by all sorts of activists, including not a few anti-Maoists. Later, many of the Guards were recruited from slightly older age groups. Lin took operational command and Mao was named "supreme commander." On August 18, the Red Guard was "unveiled" in an enormous mass demonstration held in Peking's largest square. Mao attended in his uniform.

The demonstration underscored Mao's victory in the Central Committee and portended a clear threat to his opponents. But during the ensuing months it seemed that the party organization was operating at cross-purposes and maneuvered the howling youngsters into ineffectual and self-defeating posturing. The anti-Maoists, in turn, mobilized "guards" of their own. In due time, different groups were struggling for possession of office buildings, factories, cities and entire provinces.

By the end of November, no less than eight Red Guard meetings had been held at Peking. Altogether about thirteen million youngsters were assigned to the Guard, of whom eleven million at one time or another were transported to Peking. The rest journeyed to other big cities and were later joined by the Peking demonstrators. This operation could not have failed to overload the inefficient Chinese railroad system, upset the precarious food situation in large municipalities, and interfere with the logistics support to North Viet Nam. Yet Red Guard regulations listed support for the struggle in Viet Nam as one of their most solemn obligations.

Soon chaos spread all over China, despite the army's attempt to keep a semblance of order. There is not much evidence that the anti-Maoists were uprooted, or that Mao succeeded in infusing genuine revolutionary enthusiasm into the party or the masses.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Nor did the experience strengthen the PLA, which was pressed into service to supervise, and even help in, the spring planting, and which suddenly was confronted by reborn warlordism and separatism in the outlying areas. When the Red Guard demonstrations were finally halted (or at least drastically reduced in scale), and the schools reopened in March 1967, many Guards were reluctant to return to school. It remains to be seen how these Chinese youngsters, uprooted and now widely-traveled, will be reintegrated into society. Chinese leaders also face the possibility of an acute food shortage in 1967-1968.

The chaos does not seem to have affected the Chinese nuclear program. During 1966, in May, October and December, three nuclear tests were held. The May and December tests showed that progress had been made toward the development of fusion weapons. The May shot involved U-235 and lithium-6 as a "fortifying" fusionable material. The December shot tested a three-stage (fission-fusion-fission) device and yielded 300 KT, without the operation of the fusion stage. The most important shot, in the short-term military sense, occurred on October 27, when the Chinese fired a domestically produced missile carrying a warhead with a yield of about 120 kilotons. The missile attained a range of at least 400 miles, and some reports suggest that the range was closer to 600 miles. The potential range of the weapon is believed to be about 1,000 miles, and its accuracy is reported to be good. The development and testing of a complete delivery system at so early a date came as a general surprise. These nuclear missiles could be operational late in 1968 and thus available for use in the Viet Nam war. In May 1967, the Chinese communists tested their first H-bomb, a three-megaton weapon weighing less than five tons which was dropped from an airplane. This acceleration of the Chinese nuclear effort came as still another surprise.

It is noteworthy that at the eight mass rallies, Mao spoke only once publicly, by radio, and altogether uttered but three words. It is reported, however, that at one other time he spoke one sentence to persons who had joined him on the platform. The films and pictures that have been released try to convey the impression of a man in robust health, but closer scrutiny of available information and of the films seems to indicate that he is in ill health, perhaps partially paralyzed.

Lin was in eclipse for several months, possibly also because of failing health, and we do not know whether he has strengthened

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

his hold on the PLA. During April 1967, when Mao, Lin and Chou received the newly appointed ambassador from North Viet Nam, Lin was again described as Mao's "closest comrade-in-arms." Nevertheless, his status is uncertain. The dynamism of events may yet cause a falling-out between Lin and Mao. In his isolation, Mao has few powerful friends left: he needs Lin, not only because he has been demonstratively loyal, but also because he is a clever manipulator and has kept one-half or more of the army in Mao's camp. Lin, in turn, is dependent on Mao, because without Mao's support he would never have attained his high position and could hardly retain it now: he still needs Mao's protection if he wants to step into the master's shoes. But at the same time, Lin must avoid being ruined by Mao's destructive policies. Thus, if Mao is not receptive to moderating influences, and if he should live too long and do too much damage, it may be to Lin's personal advantage to execute the *coup de grâce*. Because of this possibility, Mao, at one point or the other, may be looking for a surrogate heir. Lin's frail health is still another reason why the Lin-Mao alliance should be regarded as unstable.

Prime Minister Chou En-lai has emerged as the relatively most durable element of the quasi-triumvirate, but this appearance may be deceptive. Chou more or less "controls" the state apparatus and has been performing a balancing act between Mao and Lin, as well as between the Maoists and the anti-Maoists. He has a good chance to win out over Lin, but his opportunities, too, are predicated on his success in keeping Mao's "adventurism" under control. Thus, we have Mao who wants the "locomotive of history" to plunge forward at breakneck speed, and we have two brakemen who are desperately trying to reduce the train's speed. Both brakemen realize that their own political survival depends on their ability to retain the confidence of the party's majority. This means that, behind the scenes and sometimes openly, they must extend a protecting hand to the leaders of the anti-Mao opposition. Hence, only a few anti-Maoist party officials seem to be menaced by permanent elimination.

Mao still sits on his throne and possesses great power. Presumably, the anti-Maoists would be content to permit Mao to play a ceremonial role, provided he does not provoke new adventures. He is unable to remake the party, but the party cannot keep him quiet and seems incapable of removing him.

There is little use in speculating about the next phases of the in-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

traparty struggle except to state that the Communist Party of China appears to be split down the middle, and this rupture is most unlikely to be healed in the foreseeable future. The bloom has come off the Chinese revolution and the Mao regime has been revealed as a disastrous failure. The political consequences of this discovery will be enormous.

VIII

The U.S. intervention in Viet Nam (and the Dominican Republic) during 1965 prevented the outbreak of a gigantic tri-continental people's war. The notion that Viet Nam is unimportant and of no strategic significance to the United States is not confirmed by recent events. The domino theory proved to be an optimistic, not a pessimistic, interpretation of reality: operations to topple numerous additional dominoes were already being put in motion, even while the Vietnamese domino had not yet fallen. The Vietnamese war is of worldwide significance, and U.S. intervention has had worldwide consequences. Its impact has been felt in the destruction of Indonesian communism and the disruption of Chinese communism and its global strategy. Rarely in history has the mere assertion of will and power been so successful. Whether, and how, the United States will exploit its success of 1965 is another matter.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE: KEY TO SUCCESS IN VIET NAM

by Reuben S. Nathan

IT should be interesting to explore the bearing of the platitudes and miscalculations of the 1930's on the course of recent history. Whether the findings would greatly affect the fallacies which obscure the nature of the struggle in Viet Nam and delay its resolution is another question and may be doubted. The critics of the war are too enamored with their confusions and its advocates too enmeshed in dated processes of thought. When history starts moving fast as it does in eras of transition, it is hard to catch up with it.

Nor do precedents seem to be of much use. Forty million people need not have died before their time had those in positions of power grasped that Adolf Hitler was not merely another ambitious politician but an apocalyptic phenomenon. One did not have to be a genius to understand this fact, for there had never been a book quite as revealing as Hitler's *Mein Kampf*. Few bothered to read it, and most of those who did just shook their heads over its vulgar absurdities and consoled themselves with the thought that, should he come to office, the responsibility of power would transform the author as it had allegedly, with reassuring regularity, been in the habit of doing to demagogues. The pacifist Left tried to rationalize the man and his movement into an understandable reaction to the stupidities of the Treaty of Versailles, which had long before ceased to be realities, and to depression and unemployment. The argument so satisfied its proponents as to sweep thoughts of action under the rug. The Right, of course, saw Hitler as a highly desirable bulwark against communism, an illusion which survived the Nazi-Soviet pact; his policies instead transformed communism from the doctrine of a second-rate nation into a power which, in one form or another, controls a third of the world. It was a cultural lag with a vengeance—this reluctance to comprehend that comfortable certainties were yielding to revolutionary times.

It has become the fashion of conformist intellectuals to ridicule any suggestion that Munich proves the essential validity of Wash-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ington's determination to stop the Viet Cong. There are great differences, of course, between the situation Chamberlain and Daladier faced at Munich, or rather refused to face, and that confronting the United States in Asia. But these differences do not negate the valid points of comparison. People accustomed to democracy's cynical practice of winking at programmatic political statements and election promises cannot make themselves accept today, as they could not then, that totalitarians tend to be committed to objectives ordained by doctrine. Moreover, Munich confirmed to Hitler that his views on the decadence of the West were justified. It convinced him that there were no significant obstacles on his road to conquest. Peking and Hanoi are similarly persuaded that public opinion in the United States will force Washington to withdraw from Viet Nam and that they need, therefore, do little more than hang on, if necessary for years. They could probably do so even if we succeeded meantime in reducing their strength to the near-invisible nucleus they fielded seven years ago. Therefore, we have little chance of achieving a settlement at the conference table.

The essential difference with Munich is the fact that China does not dream of attaining its objectives by a direct confrontation with the West, nor even by traditional conquest. To Peking, thinking in such terms is as archaic as are conventional military tactics to North Viet Nam's General Giap. The men planning world revolution in the 1960's live in the 1960's. We have hardly outgrown the thirties.

I

For instance, we still fail to understand the nature of that revolutionary warfare by which Peking expects to achieve orthodox communism's ultimate goals. It certainly is not revolution. The ideological theses the Viet Cong purvey have never caught fire. There has never been a popular movement in support of the Viet Cong as there was of the Viet Minh, no communist *levée en masse*. Any demonstrations in South Viet Nam have been carefully contrived by individuals concerned with their own little games and ambiguous ambitions, and form a part of the natural turmoil of a people groping for self-rule after decades of stultifying colonialism. It is not easy to understand why some of these demonstrations should have so misled the American public, because television, different from the press, presented it with the incontrovertible truth: What the press blithely insisted on

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

calling "the" Buddhists—rarely, if ever, mentioning that Ky is a Buddhist himself—the screen clearly exposed as screaming gangs of teen-agers and "beatniks," together with children out for a lark, following two or three rather sinister monks who demonstrate their reverence of life by imperiling the confused and the innocent. Few of the alleged parties which make up the Lao Dong's (North Vietnamese Communist Party) front organization, the so-called National Liberation Front, ever existed; those which are more than fiction add up to nothing.

The absence of a genuine communist movement conforms to the general pattern. The communists discovered long ago that communist doctrine holds little attraction for people. All communist advances have been accomplished by force, threat of force, conspiracies, coups and terror. No nation, with the exception of the Republic of San Marino, ever freely elected a communist government, and that government did not last long. In North Viet Nam more than one million people fled from communism twelve years ago; in South Viet Nam another million, having escaped from Viet Cong-dominated areas, prefer the unenviable life of refugees to life under communist rule. All mass migrations since 1945 have been away from communism.

Instead of propagating communism, therefore, the communists, being realists, long ago switched to a substitute: they identify themselves with the aspirations of the people whatever they are, even though these may be in conflict with fundamental communist tenets. Ho Chi Minh, for instance, promised land reform with private ownership before he gained control of the North and started collectivizing. This may be smart politics but it sometimes presents problems. I remember a young fisherman in Rach Gia. That morning he had defected from the Viet Cong, and he had death in his eyes. He was fifteen years old. "How long have you been with the Viet Cong?" I asked him. "One year and a half." "Why did you join them?" "My parents are very poor," he answered, "and the VC told me that by joining them I would help to ease their lot. I wanted to help my parents." "And why did you defect?" "It was worse for my parents after I left them; they need me to fish. The VC did not keep their promise." I reminded him that his parents' village was in a contested area: "What if the VC catch you?" "Then I may have to die," he said. "It will be my fate. But I must help my parents."

Some object that today there might be a genuine communist revolution in Viet Nam were it not for the brutal methods of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

oppression employed by government and police. The plain fact is that none of the governments succeeding Ngo Dinh Diem's ever had that much power or were that efficient. Viet Nam may not be a democracy by our standards—standards it took two centuries to develop—but it is a curiously free country. Not only is criticism of the government its favorite sport, but the hamlets rule themselves. Rural chiefs who do not enjoy the confidence of the people will not be chiefs for long; and if thousands of them were murdered by the Viet Cong it was because they reflected, as they must, the views of their constituents.

II

Revolutionary warfare is the most highly organized type of warfare. Though it can be and usually is conducted by a small minority, it is total war in its truest sense—political, psychological, social, economic, and only secondarily military. It does not aim at such conventional military objectives as defeating armies or taking ground per se; it aims at *the creation of a political and psychological vacuum* that only the insurgents can fill. A Viet Cong detachment does not normally cut a road to hamper troop movements or the flow of military supplies. If it cuts the road from Dalat to Saigon, it aims at increasing the price of vegetables in Saigon, at contributing to inflation, at proving that the government cannot protect the people against rising prices; if it cuts the road from the coast, the purpose may be taxation, for trucks carrying sea food will go through at a price. Yet even the toll charge, no matter how important the funds derived may be to financing the insurgency, is primarily designed to demonstrate the government's inability to keep the road open. The physical act of throwing up a roadblock aims at making a psychological point.

Similarly, terrorism, the Viet Cong's main weapon, is less concerned with its immediate victims than with inspiring fear in the survivors, paralyzing people, stifling resistance to Viet Cong policies. It follows that the Viet Cong want maximum publicity for their acts of terrorism. As long as they achieve their objective of fear and paralysis, they are perfectly willing to pay the price in terms of popular and international revulsion—it is the old story of Caligula's *oderint dum metuant*. And it is the measure of our inability to grasp the nature of revolutionary warfare that we tend to advance this objective by widely publicizing incidents of terror. Each outrage unfailingly produces American pamphlets

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

featuring photographs of Viet Cong victims, usually women and children. These are supposed to demonstrate, as, of course, they do, the contempt in which the Viet Cong hold Vietnamese lives. Yet North Vietnamese publications celebrate these massacres as "victories" and often prove the victory's extent by featuring the same photographs on which we rested our case. Take an incident which happened late in 1965. The government was building a canal south of Saigon. The workers slept at night in a Buddhist pagoda. One night the Viet Cong entered the pagoda and murdered all of them. It seemed to be a perfect illustration of communist disregard of life and sacred buildings. U.S. official publications disseminated the story widely, the photographs showing long rows of corpses—the bodies of men who had been working on a project benefiting the people. I do not know how many laborers volunteered to complete the canal. There may have been recruiting difficulties. If so, we helped to do the enemy's work.

Not all the targets of revolutionary warfare are in Viet Nam. One of the most important is American public opinion, which, Hanoi hopes, will ultimately compel Washington to withdraw from the war. Many attacks on U.S. units have not only been in contradiction to General Giap's basic concept (which is never to engage the enemy unless he is relatively weak and/or demoralized) but had no conceivable strategic or tactical purpose other than to inflict casualties—not in order to diminish our strength, for the Viet Cong know we can replace losses, but in order to persuade the American public that its leaders pointlessly sacrifice American youth. Some of these attacks, timed to coincide with tides of anti-war criticism, proved to be analytically predictable. At other times the Viet Cong try to goad U.S. troops into actions likely to repel a public which does not look at the facts behind the facts; for instance, they may infiltrate a village whose inhabitants are hostile to them and snipe from it in order to draw return fire. That fire does not, because it cannot, differentiate between friend and foe, and so it often produces unfortunate results that furnish ammunition to the critics.

The communists tend to overrate the significance of this domestic criticism just as Hitler overrated the influence of the America First Committee and Fritz Kuhn's German-American Bund. "A great revolutionary storm is gathering in the United States," said Liao Ch'eng Chih at a "pro-American people rally" in Peking on March 27, 1966. "With admiration, the Chinese people firmly support the just struggle of the American people."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It is one of the tragic paradoxes of history that there might no longer be a war in Viet Nam if it were not for those at home who oppose the American role.

III

If much of the confusion to which the critics admit is caused by the complex nature of revolutionary warfare, not all of it is. I have, for instance, never been able to understand why so many people would accept the enemy's word if he agreed to a truce but refuse to believe him otherwise. China and North Viet Nam have stated their objectives as clearly as did Hitler in *Mein Kampf;* they have done so time and again, and they began to do so long before the United States introduced combat troops into South Viet Nam. One of the first of these statements appeared five years ago in *Jen-min Jih-pao* (Peking's *People's Daily*), the official voice of the Chinese Communist Party: "Defeats of the tactics used by the U.S. advisors in South Viet Nam prove that revolutionary forces can overcome the superior military strength of the United States. The reverses sustained by the U.S. in Viet Nam will encourage revolutionary action in other countries of Asia, in Africa, and in Latin America."

From this we can draw several conclusions. The war in Viet Nam is a test case. Its primary objective is to demonstrate the superiority of revolutionary warfare techniques over the conventional power of the United States. The reduction of South Viet Nam is secondary. Success is meant to serve as a message to hard-line communists all over the world that the United States is a "paper tiger," unable to protect its friends, and that revolutionary planning may safely disregard U.S. policies. The objective is not so much the immediate expansion of China's zone of influence as the gradual isolation of its most powerful antagonist. How anyone can seriously expect that the Soviets, vying with Peking for the allegiance of all communist factions, can afford to help in settling the conflict (no matter how much they might like to do so), and thereby go on record as opposing an ideologically common objective, is hard to understand. Communist leaders lending their hand to so treacherous an undertaking would risk being replaced by more militant men. At stake in Viet Nam is not merely the right of fifteen million people to live as they please, but the security of the United States, the ultimate target.

The Chinese communist concept of revolutionary war appears

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to draw inspiration from Sir Halford Mackinder's theories[1] which formed the basis of Professor Haushofer's geopolitical theses. If we have forgotten these theories, the communist world has not. To reduce them to their essence, we must first remember that 74.5 per cent of the globe's surface is water. Four-fifths of the land constitutes what Mackinder called the World Island: Asia with its European appendix and Africa. The powers dominating Asia (including European Russia to the Volga) are, if allied, assumed to have an excellent chance of controlling the rest of Europe and Africa as well. While technological, political and economic developments since World War II make this assumption appear somewhat tenuous, it regains a measure of credibility if we look at the Asian heartland as the source of communist power and consider the possibilities inherent in ideological and revolutionary warfare.

The "Satellite Islands," the Americas and Australia, make up a mere 5 per cent of the world's surface. Classic geopolitics assumed that a power dominating the World Island could quarantine the United States by cutting off its markets and that, as the result, the United States would inevitably succumb to depression, unemployment and civil strife.

Whether this assumption is realistic or not, it does seem to form the basis of Chinese strategy. Lin Piao, Mao's heir presumptive, in his doctrinal statement on people's wars, puts it this way:

> Taking the entire globe, if North America and Western Europe can be called "the cities of the world," then Asia, Africa, and Latin America constitute "the rural areas of the world." . . . In a sense, the contemporary world revolution also presents a picture of the encirclement of cities by the rural areas. In the final analysis, the whole cause of world revolution hinges on the revolutionary struggles of the Asian, African, and Latin American peoples. . . .[2]

If the Viet Cong succeed in proving the case of revolutionary warfare versus U.S. power, the already tenuous situation in Laos will in all likelihood deteriorate and Thailand will face serious problems; neither the Pathet Lao nor the insurgents in Northeast Thailand need much encouragement to intensify their operations. The psychological effect of these developments on the rest of Southeast Asia and underdeveloped nations elsewhere would certainly be considerable. The image of American power is a major

[1]See his "The Geographical Pivot of History," *The Geographical Journal,* April 1904; and *Democratic Ideals and Realities* (London, 1919) (New York: Henry Holt, 1942).

[2]Samuel B. Griffith, II, *Peking and People's War* (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 95. This book contains the full statement by Lin Piao.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

factor in world affairs. What if this power would seem to have lost its cutting edge? What if a Viet Cong victory, by arms or negotiation—the victory of a small "revolutionary" minority over fifteen million South Vietnamese and 200 million Americans—were to unleash simultaneous communist action in several Latin American countries or other areas of the globe? China would not have to push buttons (there are very few buttons Peking can push today) for scores of little red fuehrers to get the point that the American giant has an Achilles heel. Should these "revolutions" prove successful and the global influence of the great communist powers increase, Mackinder's thesis might prove to have been correct.

On August 30, 1966, in an editorial in *Jen-min Jih-pao,* Peking's leaders updated Lin Piao's doctrinal statement on "people's wars." The key sentence reads: "The day when the main military forces of the United States are wiped out will mark the outbreak of revolution in all countries of the world, and that means the utter collapse of U.S. imperialism." The balance of the editorial deals with the means by which to accomplish this objective.

> The tying down of large numbers of U.S. troops by the Asian people creates a favorable condition for the further growth of the anti-U.S. struggle of the people in other parts of the world. With all the people rising to attack it, one hitting at its head and the other at its feet, U.S. imperialism can be nibbled up bit by bit. . . . The more forces U.S. imperialism throws into Asia, the more it will be bogged down there and the deeper will be the grave it digs for itself.

Thus, not only is the success of revolutionary warfare over the conventional power of the United States seen as a signal to communist leaders and movements urging them to rise and to begin the "encirclement," it is also meant increasingly to suck American power into the Vietnamese conflict in order to paralyze the United States elsewhere and, of course, eventually to destroy it.

IV

The wise course is to prevent "people's wars" from breaking out across the globe. The first step is to stop the Viet Cong. This cannot be accomplished solely by conventional means. While military strength is indispensable, our conservative approaches to military strategy and the primacy granted to purely military considerations reveal that we still lack the modest sophistication which, in 1945, would have suggested the wisdom of taking Prague and Berlin. Nor do essentially traditional aid, information and pacification programs promise much by themselves. The answer to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

revolutionary warfare lies in the *integration of all means of struggle within the framework of a single and single-minded psychological operations plan designed to deprive the Viet Cong of the one factor on which the success of revolutionary warfare depends: popular support.*

The emphasis is on integration and the primacy of psychological considerations. We have a measure of coordination among our major instrumentalities, but coordination is merely a euphemism for consultation among the leaders of "empires" which rarely affects actual operations on lower levels. And we recognize that psychological operations have some usefulness—everybody talks, at least, of the need to "win the hearts and minds of the people"—but they play only a subsidiary role. Yet unless we subordinate all conventional instruments of warfare and statecraft, and the thinking that goes into the employment of each of them, to psychological planning, we have little chance to prevail over enemies who think, live and fight in terms of psychological warfare. We cannot do so while our faith in hardware exceeds our belief in ideas.

Considering the nature of the problem we must resolve, our strategy is, to say the least, curious. The position in which the forces of South Viet Nam and the United States find themselves is not unlike that of the police in New York City. There are some 28,000 police officers in New York City and only a handful of murderers. But the police cannot prevent murders; they can sometimes catch murderers. To prevent murders, the city would have to station officers in each dwelling and on each side of every block, twenty-four hours a day, so that they would be present when potential killers (and who might not be one?) get ready to commit their crime. That is obviously unrealistic.

It is equally unrealistic to try guarding every square foot of the jungles and mountains of Viet Nam. Millions of men would be needed to defend every one of the thousands of hamlets against attacks by concentrated forces which can choose at will their targets for the day. It takes only three men to lug a fairly heavy mortar from its hiding place up a wooded hill in the dark of night and lob a dozen rounds at the most heavily guarded base, but it would take an army to prevent those three from causing a great deal of damage, for it is not easy to police vast areas of jungle and keep them policed. There are thousands of miles of vital roads which can be cut by a handful of guerrillas. How many men it would require to keep the roads open is impossible to know, but it is safe to say that we do not have enough.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The only thing that can prevent small, highly trained units from carrying out ambushes successfully is intelligence: information on where they are and what they plan to do. Intelligence comes primarily from informers. But anyone who remembers the Chicago of the twenties will also recall how difficult it is to find witnesses ready to testify against terrorists. Al Capone is said to have been responsible for more than forty murders. He was convicted of tax evasion.

Normal people do not like to take chances with their lives. To the extent, therefore, that checkmating the Viet Cong depends on information, it is necessary to persuade the people that it is in their interest to act as informers. The Vietnamese peasant is an extremely sophisticated species, sophisticated in the sense of the Good Soldier Schweik—he has to be to stay alive in a country that has been torn by war for twenty-five years. As any realist, he prefers to be on the side of the stronger battalions. He knows that the Viet Cong in his midst represent an immediate threat to his survival and so he has tried to accommodate them. But he has begun to sense that the American buildup has turned the tide against the insurgents. If he can be made to believe that the Republic, supported by the resources of the United States, will inevitably prevail, he may conclude that it is wiser not to take a chance of being identified with the ultimate loser. He is shrewd enough to realize that he and his family are fairly safe unless the Viet Cong use his village as a hideout or a strong point. When he is told of instances where information from villagers on the whereabouts of Viet Cong in their vicinity led to the destruction of these units before they managed to infiltrate the villages, he sees the point quickly. Enlisting the people's help, even though it has been done neither systematically nor consistently, has begun to produce results. The results could be much greater if we understood and exploited the full potential of psychological operations.

V

The prevention of terrorism, assassination and ambushes cannot by itself win the war, although the increasing sense of security following from it would be of incalculable value. U.S. military strategy, therefore, apart from the essential routine of securing the perimeters of our bases, aims at searching out and destroying the enemy's main strength units and logistic centers. The trouble is that Viet Cong and North Vietnamese regulars, except when Giap's conditions are met—i.e., when they have a chance to hit

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

at numerically inferior or demoralized units—do all they can to avoid contact. Their purpose is not to stand and fight and take the heavy losses which superior firepower can inflict; it is to remain "in being," capable of hitting at will with locally superior numbers, and so to tie down many times their strength all over the country. Seeking them out to engage them is a tough, laborious and bloody business. Slugging through the jungle in quest of an elusive enemy who is waiting for a chance to ambush temporarily isolated forces takes incredible heroism. It may also take a long time before the job can successfully be completed.

The question is whether it might be possible to break the enemy's will to fight at a smaller price in terms of manpower, time, sweat and blood. Ever since the U.S. buildup began in the summer of 1965, the presence of U.S. combat troops, the constant threat of their mobility and firepower, and our domination of the skies have kept the Viet Cong on the move. They are getting tired. The more tired they get, the easier they—especially the great numbers of conscripts they are now forced to employ—succumb to psychological operations. They are probably more vulnerable to propaganda than they are to bullets.

How do we know? We know from thousands of interrogations of prisoners and defectors, many of them in depth. We know that defections, compared with 1965, quadrupled in January 1966 to almost 1,700 and that this steep increase followed the climax of a major psychological campaign, the first, as far as I know, ever systematically planned and conducted in Viet Nam. It focused on TET, the lunar New Year holidays which, in 1966, fell in the period of January 20 to 24. The campaign, which utilized both U.S. and Vietnamese capabilities and all available media (e.g., leaflets, posters, radio, movies), began on January 9 with the theme that the Viet Cong were losing the war, that its leaders knew it, and that the rank and file were being sacrificed to prolong a hopeless struggle in the interest of a foreign power, China. It switched on January 13 to assurances that the Republic of Viet Nam extended a welcome to returnees (defectors); started on the 16th to disseminate specific advice on how to surrender safely; and concentrated on dropping safe conduct passes from the 17th to the 19th.

There was a time when the Viet Cong felt fairly safe staying in villages, indoctrinating the villagers (which is not a hard job if one carries automatic weapons), growing rice with them and taking their share. Since the U.S. buildup, they can no longer

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

afford to stay put. They must grab what they need, They extort four times the amount of taxes the government imposes. They seize rice they did not help to grow. And in lieu of recruiting volunteers, they must draft every likely young man. The draft, more often than not, takes the form of kidnapping at the point of a gun. I once talked with seventy-two young men who had been shanghaied near My Tho, marched to Ben Cat (not too far away but the march took more than a month), and then had managed to escape in the confusion caused by an artillery barrage. These were typical teen-agers whom one hardly could call defectors because they never wanted to be Viet Cong in the first place. The reports of boys whose corpses were found chained to machine guns and mortars are not fiction.

The reason why the Viet Cong have trouble enlisting volunteers is in part universally human and in part peculiarly Vietnamese. As long as the insurgents seemed to have a chance of winning, many Vietnamese thought it prudent to have one son serve with the Viet Cong and another with the Vietnamese armed forces. Today most of them no longer consider it necessary to play both sides. The other reason stems from the belief that the dead who are not ritually buried in marked graves will turn into errant souls—a fate worse than death. Now that the Viet Cong are hard pressed, they must often leave the bodies of the dead on the battlefield to rot, uncared for, in the jungle. It is hard enough to lose a son but it is harder to know that his soul may never find rest. This is why few parents today want their children to become Viet Cong. And Viet Nam is one country where children tend to do what their parents tell them.

No peasant likes people who take his money, his harvest and his sons. If these same people endanger the rest of his family simply by infiltrating his village and exposing it to hostile fire, he likes them less. There have been instances of resistance, rare because it is dangerous; but grudging reluctance to part with money, food and sons has become quite general. The Viet Cong know it; captured documents, prisoners and defectors reveal it. They ascribe the situation not only to military pressure but to a miscalculation. They had thought in the summer of 1965 they were winning. Therefore, they emphasized military over psychological considerations—the unforgivable sin. Now, they admit, it is hard to revert to fundamentals.

To overcome the peasants' resistance under the pressure of time, the Viet Cong had little alternative but to increase terror.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In doing so they took on another formidable enemy: the Vietnamese commitment to *nhan doa,* which means not only dignity and humanity but absence of oppression. The inescapable result was a process of ever-widening alienation of the people from the Viet Cong.

Alienation of the people, to the highly indoctrinated hard-core Viet Cong, spells defeat. All communist doctrine unequivocally states that successful revolutionary warfare depends on securing voluntary popular support. The insurgent must be able to trust the people on whom he must rely for shelter, food and information. If popular support is no longer voluntary, the trained communist knows that his efforts are doomed. He need not be told. But we can tell the rank and file, the soft-core Viet Cong, that their leaders know that they have lost because their own book tells them so. We can tell them: If you die, you will die in vain. You are cannon fodder. You are being sacrificed for the ulterior purposes of men who operate in the interest and under the orders of an alien imperialism, of that same Chinese imperialism which once held your country enslaved for a thousand years. As the Soviet Communist Party phrased it in a letter to other communist parties regarding the split with China: ". . . the Chinese leaders need a lengthy Vietnamese war to maintain international tensions, to represent China as a 'besieged fortress'. . . . New facts constantly prove the readiness of the Chinese leaders to sacrifice the interests of the national liberation movement to their chauvinist big-power plans. . . ."[3] This is powerful medicine, produced by communists, and it is effective.

The U.S. Army announced on January 3, 1967 that the number of Viet Cong who had defected in 1966—i.e., who had voluntarily come over to the government's side, registering in *Chieu Hoi* (Open Arms) centers—totaled 20,242. The figure for 1965 had been only 11,124; that for the preceding two years combined less than 9,000. It is generally believed that the elimination of four Viet Cong costs the life of one Vietnamese, American, Korean, Filipino, or Australian. This means that 5,000 allied soldiers were spared in 1966. That is about ten battalions, and it is not the whole story: many defectors join the Vietnamese army. Instead of losing men, we are gaining men.

The psychological outlook favors us. The American military buildup and U.S. policy as stated by President Johnson—"as much as it takes for as long as it takes"—project power and determina-

[3]Quoted in the *New York Times,* March 23, 1966.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion sufficient to demonstrate that free Viet Nam must inevitably prevail, and this encourages the people to hasten the arrival of peace and security by supporting the ultimate victor. The communists' own doctrine proves that they have lost.

Increasing emphasis on the revolutionary nature of developments in free Viet Nam suggests that the country may be on its way to finding its true identity, and that Vietnamese solutions to Vietnamese problems offer greater hope than the stifling, reactionary, alien teachings which the Viet Cong import and try to impose. For what Americans are apt to consider Viet Nam's chronic instability is in fact merely the normal social, ideological and political ferment of a new nation in the process of trying to find itself, of a society seeking to fill the emptiness created by the death of an old order.

VI

These, then, are the basic themes of the psychological answer to revolutionary warfare in Viet Nam: we must project hope and focus that hope on our side. History proves that hope can sustain even the desperately hungry and inspire them to join forces with those committed to turning hope into reality. If commitment and determination are made clear enough, they need not be adorned with specific promises that cannot be easily or quickly realized. We must instill faith in the certainty of victory and peace and the emergence of a just society. The objective is not the mere creation of good will, the goal of so many of our aid and information programs, nor is it the appeasement of expediency. It is identification: our identification with the people's aspirations and theirs with our purpose. We should make it clear that we continue to represent that permanent revolution of mankind which the American Revolution advanced; that only the principles of that revolution can ultimately produce the results for which man longs; and, most importantly, that we *will* produce them.

This general objective must, of course, be translated into terms which are directly meaningful to the Vietnamese. It must not be confused with selling the American way of life, so meaningless to people whose history and environment differ from ours. But the basic values of the *human* revolution—freedom, the inalienable rights and the dignity of man, the rule of law—and the material benefits which appear to flow from these values are applicable everywhere, particularly in a country which has never ceased to dream of *nhan doa*. Kipling's commonplace, that East is East and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

West is West and never the twain shall meet, has not served us very well. Communism is, after all, a Western idea, conceived by Germans, adopted by white-skinned Russians, and the twain did meet: large parts of Asia are living with the result. There is no conceivable reason why the only true revolution of mankind should not be able to prevail over the pseudo-science of communism. On the contrary, as John F. Kennedy said in 1959 to James MacGregor Burns: "It is because I believe our system is more in keeping with the fundamentals of human nature that I believe we are ultimately going to be successful."[4]

There are, however, conditions. One is that effective psychological operations projecting our message must not only be planned and carried out systematically but radiate burning, passionate faith. They cannot be left to either amateurs or bureaucrats; they require professionals and they require believers.

Second, the propagandists must be permitted to saturate the atmosphere with the smallest possible number of the simplest possible themes, taking the offensive and forcing the opponent on the defensive—for defensive propaganda is ineffective. This requires strict central control and unity of command so as to make certain that the same themes are used everywhere and at all times, without departures that would weaken their thrust. It requires, furthermore, that we rid ourselves of all intellectual prejudices against repetition. There are many ways to make the same point without boring and ultimately antagonizing one's audience.

The third condition is a drastic change in our political and military thinking and planning. It is time we recognized that conventional warfare may be as obsolescent as traditional diplomacy and that, barring nuclear disaster, international confrontations are likely to pit our spiritual values and material resources—*in that order*—against the techniques of revolutionary warfare. To be ready for this probability, we must reverse our present order of priorities; we must recognize that propaganda and psychological warfare are the primary weapons systems of our era and that the function of military operations is in substance limited to supporting them, principally by providing them with that indispensable ingredient, the image of physical power.

Political and psychological warfare have been the stepchild of American statecraft for too many years. This country has yet to realize that information is at best a weak substitute for them. The information policy on which our strategic propaganda effort is founded is based on a plethora of trite fallacies and disregards

[4]Arthur Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 508.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the fact that the meaning of news depends on the perspective in which one views it. The people of the United States have access to, more or less, the same news. But that same news suggests to some that the country would be better off if it were run by Republicans, to others that a Democratic administration is by far preferable. The objective of propaganda is to commit people to *one* side—one's own. The U.S. armed forces still tend to consider psychological operations a mere appendix to action, an auxiliary, supplementary service which may at times be helpful in facilitating conventional operations.

Senator Robert F. Kennedy, referring to discontented elements in South Viet Nam, mentioned that "There are three things you can do with such groups: kill or repress them, turn the country over to them, or admit them to a share of power and responsibility."[5] But there are four. They can be persuaded to lay down their arms.

Fortunately, our effort in Viet Nam demonstrates that we are changing our attitude. This is not a reference to the bombing of North Viet Nam which clearly had first been conceived as a psychological operation, a message advising Hanoi that the price of directing and reinforcing the Viet Cong was increasing and might in the end be prohibitively high. It disregarded a large number of pertinent facts and lessons: that bombing tends to raise morale and unite people behind their governments as it did in England, Germany and Japan; that Asian stoicism and communist fanaticism combine to reverse the message's intent; and that people get used to almost anything that lasts long enough—one fears *un*certainties. The intended "message" turned into a conventional military operation. I simply refer to the fact that we have, in Viet Nam, at last begun to appreciate the usefulness of tactical psychological operations. We have not as yet recognized their correct place in the scheme of things and their true potential.

Psychological warfare is not just a matter of broadcasting and of dropping leaflets, of "brainstorms" and "gimmicks." It is the systematic pursuit of psychological objectives to achieve political ends. Even though words are still the most powerful instrument in the human arsenal, it does not rely on words alone. Correctly employed to exhaust its full potential, "psywar" bends all action —military, political, economic, social—to its purpose. This requires recognition on the part of all authorities that the goal of all action is the achievement of a psychological objective. Every action must be planned and conducted with the psychological

[5] *Washington Post,* February 20, 1966.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

objective in mind. In other words, instead of looking at war merely as an encounter between two parties intent on destroying each other, we must learn to view it as an effort to make people switch allegiance from one set of opinions and values to another. We must begin to grasp the full meaning of the fact that our primary target in Viet Nam is not the death of the enemy but the trust of the people, without whose acquiescence, voluntary or involuntary, revolutionary warfare cannot be sustained.

To suggest specific changes in our strategic approaches to winning the war in Viet Nam without having access to the kind of information on which all military planning must be based would be foolish. It is possible, however, to raise a number of questions. Can the negative effect of increases in U.S. forces—negative in terms of inflation, destruction, morals and foreign impact on the conduct of indigenous Vietnamese affairs—truly be balanced by numbers of Viet Cong killed? Is it really preferable to seek out and engage enemy main strength units instead of concentrating on the guerrilla forces which represent a more direct threat to the Vietnamese peasants' security? Might the latter course not make a greater contribution to the pacification of the countryside, with all that such progress would imply psychologically, *and* force the main strength units to deviate from General Giap's precepts and come out into the open to fight on our terms? With the mobility at our command, strategically placed reserves should be able to reinforce any troops under attack in time to prevent major assaults from achieving their objective.

If all operations were coordinated by a psychological warfare design, our reaction might not be to retaliate against a village simply because somebody sniped from it; we would weigh the impact of casualties against whatever immediate advantage might be gained by eliminating the sniper. Nor would we build roads, bridges and wells simply to gain the good will of the few who benefit from them directly; we would use our aid as an instrument of statecraft to further the war effort as a whole, in a program geared to impress significant numbers of people with our willingness and ability to improve the human condition.

Psychological warfare must cease to be an appendix to action, and become the *reason* for our action. We must prove that our values are closer to the hopes of man than are those of the enemy. Our values are the ultimate weapon—the only weapon capable of paralyzing revolutionary warfare.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

HISTORY AND THE AMERICAN ROLE

by Lionel Gelber

IT was a prewar British historian, H.A.L. Fisher, who, in the preface to his *History of Europe,* told us that the play of the contingent and unforeseen is the only safe rule for the historian to observe. But his timing was poor. There was nothing unforeseen about the dread consequences of the appeasement line then being pursued by his own country—with the blessing, be it noted, of British historians as renowned as Arnold Toynbee and E. H. Carr. History may be studied for a number of reasons. Its value is academic, or even antiquarian, if, among current perplexities, it does not help us to find the way ahead.

Skepticism about its utility on this score has recently been expressed by an outstanding American historian, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. To depend on history for guidance in the short run at least may, he feels, do more harm than good. But one is puzzled when Schlesinger points to the Nazi-Soviet pact as a pivotal event which could not be foreseen.[1] We now know that this event had been foreseen, though to no avail, within the confines of the British Foreign Office by Lord Vansittart. Even the writer of these lines may possibly add a minor item to the record from his own prewar days in London. His warning against a Russo-German alignment appeared in the old *Fortnightly Review* (merged afterward with *The Contemporary Review*) of March 1938—two weeks before the fall of Austria, six months before Munich, a year and a half before the signing of the Nazi-Soviet pact. The prewar record also shows that an Anglo-American combination had been predicted on the eve of Munich—long before Churchill, on taking office in 1940, formed his "special relationship" with F.D.R.: it could be foreseen that, in any final crisis, the English-speaking peoples were bound to unite.

War recurred in 1939 because lessons taught by the war of 1914-1918 had been ignored. Why did this happen? Wishfulness had much to do with appeasement in Britain between the wars and with its transatlantic counterpart, the isolationism into which the

[1]Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Bitter Heritage* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967), p. 93.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

United States relapsed after 1918. But there were also those who made it their business to capitalize on such folly. Distorting the supreme issues of the age, they shook the faith of free societies in the moral validity of their own cause.

After World War II, however, it was in the light of prewar errors that the West resolved, under the American lead, to do better. On some fronts that reading of history has paid off. Would it do so on others?

I

This is a vital question at a juncture when U.S. intervention in Viet Nam has stirred up another great debate on the character of American commitments abroad. In this debate, the hearings held in 1966 and again in 1967 by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations have been a forum for responsible criticism of U.S. policy. Senator J. William Fulbright, Chairman of the Committee, set the tone of the hearings, and on both occasions former Ambassador George F. Kennan appeared as a witness. His testimony coincided with opinions expressed by the Senator.

In 1966 these two prominent Americans emerged as the chief dissenters from the course taken by the Johnson Administration in East Asia. In 1967, however, both supported measures submitted by the President for the approval of the Senate that pointed to an improvement in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Some might have hoped that this development, together with turmoil in China, would soon make the American involvement in Eastern Asia less hazardous. But in a new book, published early in 1967, Senator Fulbright[2] reaffirmed the position he took in 1966, and in 1967 Kennan did nothing to retract views he had previously enunciated before the Committee. Both men have urged the American people to adopt a less wide-ranging concept of the U.S. role, and to drive their point home they have armed themselves with the evidence of history. Though Senator Fulbright is not a professional historian, he has made his mark as an intellectual; George Kennan's writings on Russian history have brought him considerable acclaim. Yet history is a two-edged sword. As a weapon in America's great debate, it should be handled with care.

President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk have suggested that, were the West to accept a Chinese bid for domination, it

[2]J. William Fulbright, *The Arrogance of Power* (New York: Random House, 1967).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

would be doing in Eastern, Southeastern and Southern Asia what it did before World War II to the Czechoslovak democracy at Munich. At the Senate hearings of 1966, Fulbright and Kennan retorted that, as the circumstances were not the same, the comparison was inapt. Similarly, at the Senate hearings in 1967, Fulbright tended to demur at the theory that China could do in Eastern Asia what the Soviet Union had done during the late 1940's in Eastern Europe. These are not the only historical topics that Fulbright and Kennan have touched upon as students of world politics in general and as critics of the American role in particular. Wrong analogies, they have insisted, can be misleading. But how sound has been their own use of history?

From the start, a strange paradox lurked in Fulbright's main thesis. Many have agreed with him and with Kennan that there may be no need to withstand Communist China at an early date —as Nazi Germany could have been withstood, say in 1935-1936. In 1966, nevertheless, when he presented this argument, the Senator glossed over the Chinese subjugation of Tibet. When he did that, he himself conjured up a parallel with the 1930's. For here were echoes of the excuses offered during the appeasement period for the rebirth of Pan-German aspirations. World War II might never have occurred if Germans yesterday, like Chinese today, had not revived claims to territories that had long since vanished from their control. In the eyes of appeasers, the mere reassertion of those claims sufficed to justify them.

Apologetics for the irredentism of the strong were a prescription for European anarchy between the wars. Those apologetics cannot be renewed in an Asian context without making the weaker neighbors of China feel less secure. It is true that no exact comparison can be made between the 1930's in Europe and the 1960's in Asia. But those who reject historical analogies should be the last and not the first to bring them to mind.

At the Senate hearings of 1966, moreover, no spirit of extenuation applied to the Great Powers of nineteenth-century Europe. Fulbright laid stress on their misdeeds in the Far East during and after the Opium Wars. Unmentioned was the fact that an Asian power, Imperial Japan, did most, after whipping Tsarist Russia, to carve up China. Nowadays Peking tries to spread the notion that the white race is the only one that has exploited colored races. Senator Fulbright might have combatted that notion but did not.

It was, however, in his University lectures which admonished

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the United States against "the arrogance of power" that the Senator from Arkansas created a furore. In 1967, with the publication of his new book on the same subject, he gave those chidings fresh currency. But here also his references to history have been surprisingly ambiguous. For one thing, the Senator coupled "arrogance of power" with an idea of "special responsibility for other nations." Yet it has been the idea of "special responsibility for other nations" that has redeemed arrogance of power in the United States. Without that saving idea she might have done as little after World War II to defend and reconstruct the Free World as she did after World War I. And that would have been a sin of omission infinitely worse than any sin of commission with which she might now be charged.

It was astonishing, too, that Fulbright should have deemed pertinent Woodrow Wilson's phrase about "being too proud to fight."[3] Of all the Senator's references to historical precedent, this was one of the least apropos. For fight Wilson did. The phrase was idiotic when the President first uttered it. The United States turned the scales when she entered the struggle in 1917. By then Europe had been at war for almost three years. Civilization never recovered from the shock of that ruinous struggle, and a better world order is still remote.

On the chief Asian problem of his own time, the position of the Senator is still somewhat obscure. At the hearings of the Senate Committee in 1966 and 1967, Fulbright and Kennan should have been asked whether "Munich" and "appeasement" would be inapposite as historical analogies if the United States today acquiesced in a semi-continental takeover by China. Such a takeover may loom less large when China herself is in the throes of another domestic upheaval. But the USSR, too, has gone through that sort of thing. China's huge potential has not diminished. That potential may, according to some observers, have been exaggerated. It must be formidable, nevertheless, when it can put even the Soviet titan on the alert.

Critics may say that the United States commits fresh errors when she strives to avoid a repetition of past errors. But the nature of past errors must be recollected before the tragic American quandary in Viet Nam can be understood.

Britain's failure to preserve British interests made "appeasement" and "Munich" bywords for betrayal and self-betrayal in

[3]In a speech delivered in Philadelphia on May 10, 1915.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the 1930's. Historically, the balance of power in Europe had been the safeguard of British national independence. Whenever Britain maintained or restored the European balance, she also maintained or restored the liberties of lesser European countries. She flouted her own history when she neglected that time-honored axiom in the 1930's, and, when World War II erupted as a result, the European balance had been demolished irretrievably.

There is now a global rather than European balance of power —one which the United States does most to underpin, with assistance from allies, in order to uphold the freedom of all countries beyond the Soviet and Chinese spheres. The West has kept the Soviet sphere of influence within bounds on the European sector of that new global balance. Upon the outbreak of the Korean War the United States discovered that an effort would also have to be made (even though there was so much less to work with in the Asian sector) to keep the resurgent Chinese within bounds. In the latter effort, the Soviets themselves might ultimately have to join. There may have been unanticipated side effects when the United States, by coming to the rescue of South Viet Nam, demonstrated that Asia would not be left in the lurch. In 1965, when India and Pakistan locked horns, China moved against India and then halted as the prospect of Anglo-American support for India developed. So also U.S. intervention in Viet Nam may have emboldened Indonesian generals—with British forces blocking Sukarno's campaign to seize Malaysian soil—to remove Indonesia from the Chinese camp. Asian countries can do little to organize for their own regional security unless American power remains in the background for them, as for Western Europe, to rely on.

American public servants who denounce "policy-making by analogy" should think through the analogies they themselves may cite. In Britain the Labour Party (together, it should be added, with a number of Conservatives and the remnants of the Liberal Party) had raised a storm in 1956 when Sir Anthony Eden and M. Guy Mollet tried to enforce the Suez Canal Treaty against Nasser's Egypt. This was behavior that Fulbright, with an eye on Congressional unrest, commended in criticizing the American intervention in Viet Nam. But his censure of the Anglo-French expedition against Egypt was in striking contrast to the steps he himself had sponsored in Southeast Asia. For in 1964, after the attack on U.S. destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin, it was Fulbright who introduced the Senate resolution endorsing the use of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"armed force" against the North Vietnamese. Moreover, when he later expressed regret over what had been done, it was not over the use of "armed force" in principle but over the extent to which the Senate had given President Johnson a "blank check."

Such being the case, why was Fulbright's indictment of the Suez venture so severe? The amount of "armed force" employed by the Anglo-French expedition was very much less than the United States has now employed in Viet Nam. To imply that it is right for the United States to defend her interests by limited means, but that not even limited means should be employed when the interests of allies are at stake is a stance likely to foster Gaullist tendencies among other members of the Western alliance.

For another reason, too, reference to Suez might have been ill-advised. Then, as now, there was a dispute over the use of historical analogy drawn from the 1930's; but a test of its relevance in the Suez case has since been furnished by the passage of time. Anthony Eden was derided in 1956 for having depicted Nasser as a latter-day Hitler. The Egyptian dictator has, nevertheless, been able, with backing from the Kremlin, to make more and more mischief over the years; in June 1967, when Israel broke another Pan-Arab stranglehold, she also saved the United States and the Soviet Union from a confrontation that might have been as grave as the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. Certainly if Eisenhower and Dulles had not protected Nasser, Israel would not have dwelt in such jeopardy, the rest of the world would have been less subject to blackmail by Egypt over transit through the Suez Canal, and the oil of the Middle East might have flowed to the West without interruption. Then, too, among the Arabs themselves, the Yemen might have been spared a cruel Egyptian occupation, Southern Arabia would be less susceptible to conquest by Egypt after the British withdraw from Aden, and the oil resources of the Persian Gulf would be less vulnerable than they are. Not that all of this could have been foreseen in detail. It did not have to be. The overall danger was clear from the outset.

Heed should have been paid to one further remark by Chairman Fulbright when the Senate hearings resumed in 1967. While aggression has never been precisely defined, the self-regarding manner in which his compatriots have construed that term earned Fulbright's scorn. "We know only," said the Senator, "that aggression is usually an action that Communist countries take and that the United States abjures. Equally, we therefore appear to know

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

instinctively that fighting in Lebanon or the Dominican Republic, for instance, somehow does not involve aggression."[4] But surely the postwar fate of East European countries—or the present fears of those who live more immediately under the shadow of the Chinese giant—should not be dismissed with a gibe. The action the Soviet Union or China has taken is distinguished from the action taken by other belligerents by its broader impact—the degree to which, if it went unchallenged, existing power balances might be affected and the defense of the Free World set back. To draw a distinction of that sort has not been casuistry. It was and is the quintessence of statecraft.

II

So much for the references to history with which Fulbright made his point in America's great debate. It was, however, with the Senator's concurrence that Kennan, at the 1966 hearings, submitted an "historical" solution of his own, namely, that countries such as the two Viet Nams should adapt themselves to the new China as Yugoslavia adapted herself to Soviet Russia in the postwar era.

But here, peculiarly enough, was the kind of historical analogy Fulbright and Kennan have condemned the Administration for invoking. Yugoslavia is, after all, within the strategic ambit of the West; between her land frontiers and those of the Soviet Union there is no contact. Geography does not permit the neighbors of China to cut themselves off from the Chinese imperium with the same ease should they, impelled by their own sense of nationhood, want to rebel. Perhaps in domestic affairs they could achieve some Titoist modifications. But in every other respect the domination of China would be consolidated inexorably over large tracts of Asia.

That may ensue anyway. An attempt to avert it might still be made, provided a number of Asian countries are not now abandoned to Chinese hegemony. It is extraordinary how a solution so utterly at variance with liberal tenets should have come to gain credit with liberals. It used to be a liberal aim to preserve the independence of small countries. Now official American endeavors in this respect are stigmatized by liberals as illiberal. And in such confusion there is also something reminiscent of

[4]U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Hearing, The Communist World in 1967,* with George F. Kennan, January 30, 1967, 90th Congress, 1st Session, p. 2.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

prewar trends. British intellectuals are apt to forget how much appeasement on the Right borrowed from the Center and the Left between the wars. American isolationists were drawn from the ranks of liberals as well as conservatives.

Be that as it may, Fulbright and Kennan themselves have not always been wholly in accord. The Senator has inveighed against overextension by the United States. Kennan wants to curtail the American role more drastically. Two passages from the testimony Kennan gave in 1966 shed light on this key point of curtailment. He began by quoting as pertinent a statement from John Quincy Adams, as though rhetoric suited to the world of 1821 had some bearing on global tasks which, *faute de mieux,* the United States has had to shoulder in the second half of the twentieth century. The United States, Adams had declared, "is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own." But has not so oversimplified a summary been out of date ever since the Pax Britannica broke down? The United States can be the champion and vindicator of her own freedom only by being the champion and vindicator of freedom on a much larger scale. It took two world wars to teach her this lesson, and their sequel, the East-West contest, made it no less cogent. These are the commonplaces of history in the modern era. They were, all the same, overlooked.

But others, too, have overlooked what Kennan was driving at. He did not warn, in the words of George Washington and Thomas Jefferson, against permanent and entangling alliances. But he confessed to having "more and more sympathy for the concepts of foreign policy that prevailed in this country at an earlier time, and I find myself, if you will, in many respects sort of a neo-isolationist."[5]

It is disconcerting that virtual silence should have greeted an admission of neo-isolationism from a public man so influential as George Kennan. One explanation for the immunity Kennan has enjoyed may be that with every backward step he also took a step forward. "We have," he hastened to add, "an enormous responsibility with regard to world peace." A preference for neo-isolationism, in other words, would not blind him to the realities

[5]This significant passage from Kennan's testimony did not appear in *The Vietnam Hearings* (New York: Random House, 1966), a report of the proceedings for which Senator Fulbright wrote an introduction. It will be found in U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Hearings, Supplemental Foreign Assistance FY 1966—Vietnam,* 89th Congress, 2nd Session, p. 386. For the quotation from John Quincy Adams, see p. 336.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of power. Yet how should we deal with those realities? Some Americans may be searching for a compromise between a parochialism discredited by history and a global leadership which in Kennan's opinion (and in Walter Lippmann's opinion) has been overdone. But has it, by and large, been overdone? There is no visible alternative to it, despite the imperfections that must attend so vast an enterprise.

Nobody will quarrel with Kennan's further contention that, in preserving peace, the United States can contribute most toward a peace among the Great Powers. How could they? In 1966, nevertheless, as he veered and tacked with his own historical analogies, the neo-isolationist vein persisted.

Neo-isolationism would be at odds with Maxim Litvinoff's famous postulate, that peace is indivisible. That must be why, when he testified before the Senate Committee in both 1966 and 1967, Kennan assailed with such vehemence the prewar dictum of the most pro-Western of Soviet statesmen.[6] But Kennan can scarcely rewrite the history of the twentieth century because of his dissent from what the United States has done or may do in one area, peripheral or decisive as the case may be.

Ever since Sarajevo in 1914 it has been through local conflicts that world conflicts, long in the making, have come to a head. Many millions were to die for Danzig. In some local conflicts, intervention from afar may be neither practicable nor necessary, and these can be permitted to take their course. Others, such as the invasion of South Korea in 1950, could be localized because the United States intervened at once. But the situation which constrains her to intervene is not always one of local conflict. During the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, the sinister accord between the Soviets and Cubans provoked an American response that, by preserving the global balance, had an impact that was more than local. The contingencies with which the United States must cope may vary. No prior curb can be put on her capacity to meet them, with or without the support of allies.

Litvinoff knew what he was talking about. When all is so explosively interconnected, peace is more indivisible than ever. The United States now has a global balance to maintain. It cannot be maintained if there is that narrowing of scope for which Kennan has hankered.

When Kennan testified before the Senate Committee in 1967, he seemed less disposed to turn the clock back than he had been

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 386; *Hearing*, 1967, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in 1966. He did not again dub himself a neo-isolationist when Senator Clifford P. Case brought up that point. But he did repeat the quotation he had culled from John Quincy Adams and again attributed to it the same curious, outmoded relevance.[7] Then, in a final display of concurrence with Senator Fulbright, Kennan argued that neither Moscow nor Peking had exerted a "guiding hand" in the struggle between the two Viet Nams—thus intimating that there had been no warrant for any counter-intervention by the United States. But ever since the Spanish Civil War we have seen how, when ideological factors come into play, "civil war" can be a misnomer; how indirect aggression, with aims that are more than local, might serve to upset existing power balances and cannot therefore be treated by the West with indifference. That being so, here was another lesson from modern history, a further clue to much that has occurred in the twentieth century. It, too, appears to have been overlooked.

This was a bewildering performance by one to whose expression of views a unique authority is apt to be attached. And yet there has long been something enigmatic about the counsel Kennan has tendered. "Containment" is the word he employed when, at the State Department, it was his job to clarify postwar U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union. Conditions in Asia are not the same. Resistance to China, if China is to be resisted, may have to take other forms. But did Kennan fully perceive all that containment entailed? There are grounds for doubt. The Truman Doctrine of 1947, with its offer of Greek-Turkish aid, was the classic exposition of containment—the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Alliance grew out of it. Yet among American officials, according to an "inside" account, George Kennan happened to be the one who, when the Truman Doctrine was being drafted, opposed it most strenuously. It is also reported that Kennan insisted upon restricting NATO to a political guarantee when the need for a military buildup first arose.[8]

Containment, as a matter of fact, was but another label for concepts of peace by power. A few political realists had been giving shape to these for nearly a decade before the U.S. government adopted them in 1947, when faced with the Soviet Union's postwar intransigence and Britain's recessional.

The new realists, as they exposed prewar errors and forecast

[7] *Hearing*, 1967, *op. cit.*, p. 57.
[8] See Joseph M. Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks* (New York: Viking Press, 1955), pp. 154-155, and James L. Richardson, *Germany and the Atlantic Alliance* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 18.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

postwar realities, might have paved the way for containment. What counted most, of course, was the direct experience of Churchill, Roosevelt and Truman. It will be for the historian of containment to depict its complex origins and to identify those upon whom President Truman leaned for advice. But when Kennan confesses that he is now a "sort of neo-isolationist," has he changed his mind or, while spelling out policies of another character, has he always been one? Perhaps he will tell us.

III

What conclusions may we derive from this phase of America's great debate? Hearings before a Committee of the Senate or a book by one of its more celebrated members are not the kind of data to which theologians or philosophers usually resort when they ponder the meaning of history. But proceedings such as these have affected policies on which the well-being of civilized society depends. They must therefore be taken seriously.

Those who invoke history would do well to remember how history, when misused, can itself be a source of misjudgment. It is the custom nowadays to affirm or controvert the relevance of a term like "Munich" when an accommodation between Washington and Hanoi or Peking is discussed. But for a more complete grasp of that term we must recall the moral and political atmosphere of the epoch to which it belonged.

Appeasement in Britain and isolationism in the United States nourished each other. Yet they owed a lot to some writers whose misinterpretations of recent history helped to demoralize free peoples at a moment when the West, by closing ranks, could have stopped Hitler in time. On both sides of the Atlantic there were those who gave preparedness a bad name by blaming munition-makers for stirring up threats to peace when their origin was so much more deep-seated. Then, too, there was a school of revisionist historians who, as apologists for the pre-1914 brand of German militarism, provided appeasement with its rationale and lent even to Hitler's culminating mania an air of plausibility.

Chamberlain, after all, was no innovator; he was an end product. And for activities of which "Munich" was the outcome, the intellectually culpable have never had to answer.

Men may differ over what history has to teach and over what its use might be. But it can provide wisdom by putting major issues in perspective. In America's great debate it has not always served that crucial purpose.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SOVIET DOMESTIC PROPAGANDA AND LIBERALIZATION

by Lorand B. Szalay

SINCE Stalin's death, and especially since Khrushchev's famous speech at the Twentieth Party Congress in Moscow in 1956, the Western world has become increasingly interested in new trends of Soviet development, frequently described as a process of liberalization.

In the area of Soviet political organization and power, the shift from one-man dictatorship toward group dictatorship exercised by a collective party leadership is often interpreted as liberalization. Even a move away from the dictatorship of the Communist Party toward a bureaucracy controlled by managers and technicians is regarded similarly. In economic life, the liberalizing trend is linked to eliminating rigid planning and highly centralized organization, as well as opening new avenues for economic growth by providing personal incentives, permitting limited operation of a market economy, and tolerating or even encouraging free enterprise. In the legal system these changes are expected to bring about increased reliance on normal legal processes and thereby to decrease the use of terror and overt suppression. This, it is hoped, may result in a growing recognition of the basic rights, freedom of speech, thought and religion.

Without elaborating further, we may conclude that Western observers generally perceive liberalization as a complex process embracing many—possibly all—important aspects of Soviet life. It is generally regarded as a shift away from the traditional, orthodox patterns of communism; a move toward "something," usually poorly identified but frequently assumed to be close to the Western way of life. While there is considerable agreement about the point of departure in the Soviet liberalization process, there is less agreement about the course it is on and how far it has gone.

Many uncertainties and ambiguities stand in the way of an understanding and realistic evaluation of liberalization. Its most critical and least known aspect probably is the human dimension. What is happening today to the Soviet man? Is he becoming less a Stalinist and more a Khruschevite or Titoist? Is he becoming

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

less a communist and more a democrat or a liberal? How do the changes come about? Is he effecting changes in his environment, or is his environment changing him? It has to be recognized that these intriguing questions relate to an historically little understood dimension of the Soviet system, namely, the Soviet man —his attitudes, opinions, beliefs, as well as the changes he has undergone under the influences of the Soviet socio-political environment.[1]

Our present discussion will attempt to analyze recent trends in Soviet propaganda in relationship to its target, the Soviet citizen. Three interrelated topics will be considered: First, the historic relevance of Soviet domestic propaganda and ideological indoctrination. Second, a few characteristics of the closed ideological belief system resulting from indoctrination. Third (with this belief system as a background), some recent trends in Soviet propaganda policies and strategies designed to strengthen ideological influences in the present period.[2]

I

The Soviet man is exposed to an experiment of mass persuasion on an historically unique scale. The experiment uses the most modern mass communication facilities without cessation, and complements propaganda dispensed by technical media with word-of-mouth agitation mobilized by a totalitarian organization. The propaganda machinery coordinates all channels of the system, while minimizing the effects of undesirable information sources. Its monopoly of communication is accentuated by social controls which effectively insulate the members of Soviet society from each other, prevent them by fear and distrust from exchanging nonconformist ideas, and keep the society atomized and cut off from

[1]As Alex Inkeles and Raymond Bauer point out in the context of their investigations for the Harvard study on Soviet refugees, "there are many excellent books describing the history of the Soviet Union and the formal structure and functioning of its institutions, but we know almost nothing about the attitudes, values, and experiences of its citizens." *The Soviet Citizen* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 3.

[2]Limitations of time and space do not allow elaboration here on the differential effects of official Soviet propaganda policy on various strata of the Soviet population. To solve this dilemma, general references are made to the Soviet man and the interest is shifted then toward the more thoroughly indoctrinated segments of the population, which are of primary concern to the engineers of Soviet information policies. It would be misleading, however, to forget the variety of types and belief systems of which the Soviet society consists and to view Soviet man as a single pervasive and uniform prototype.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the rest of the world. This massive domestic effort in propaganda and indoctrination has been carried on for half a century.

The Western world is intrigued and perplexed by this experiment. It has considerable difficulty in understanding its operational principles and rationale because they are so alien to Western experiences. Nevertheless, the outcome of this long-range experiment in political persuasion is of both theoretical and practical importance.

There are strong arguments suggesting that the future of communism depends primarily upon its capability to mold new generations according to its ideology. In the view of Klaus Mehnert, the German expert on communism,

> The amount of coal, steel, or atomic energy produced by the Soviet Union, the actual form of collectivization introduced in agriculture, and the number of airplanes in the Soviet Air Force are of secondary importance in the long range. Really decisive is the man who will control these in the future. The answer is less relevant for today than for tomorrow. Today the policy of the Kremlin is determined by men representing fathers and sons of the revolution. But one day the power will go to the grandchildren and their children—the new Soviet generations. What will they be like? How will they rule?[3]

The Soviet mass persuasion experiment is of special relevance in our age of communication explosion and the rise of modern, powerful totalitarian states which can use their monopolistic control over the mass media to establish a firm grip on the masses. As Hannah Arendt has demonstrated, this combination of revolutionary developments has led to a progressive dehumanization of man in the modern totalitarian system.[4] What is the relationship between totalitarian dehumanization and the monopoly of mass media? What are the effective limits of this communication potential when applied from a monopolistic position? The Soviet experiment may not necessarily give us final answers to these questions, but it may be expected to provide valuable clues and insights as to how the process works.

Unfortunately, we cannot use empirical research methods for measuring the impact of Soviet mass media, and for assessing the cumulative influences of indoctrination in the Soviet orbit. It is a more feasible task, however, to study the characteristics

[3]Klaus Mehnert, *Der Sovietmensch* (Stuttgart: Deutscher Verlag, 1958), pp. 13-14.

[4]Hannah Arendt, *The Origin of Totalitarianism* (New York: Meridian Books, 1950).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the indoctrinated mind, to learn more about its operation, and to seek a better understanding of the indoctrination process.

My personal experience with Soviet propaganda and indoctrination convinces me that they do not represent simple, conventional methods for influencing people but complex, large-scale operations requiring special analysis. Simplistic analogies related to Pavlov's dog experiments and the principles of commercial advertising are of little help. Ideological persuasion strives for more than a change of a single isolated attitude. Indoctrination is a systematic, long-range building process; it builds a new, all-inclusive world outlook based on the establishment of a tightly organized, closed system of beliefs. In view of our fundamentally pragmatic, utilitarian approach, it is especially difficult for us to understand people with an abstract-doctrinaire approach toward life. Political ideologies are alien to American thinking in any case, and it is hard for Americans to conceive the process of indoctrination which attempts to organize and control human life on the basis of a single abstract theory such as Marxism-Leninism. When this theory is applied to the environment, a new world is built. In this new world, things and events acquire new and different meanings. These meanings do not derive from natural experiences, but from strict definitions, by a "logical" formulation of their roles and places determined by the ideology.

Let us take a single example. The Soviet ideology defines communism, and it also defines world peace. These are abstract concepts, but for the indoctrinated person they have specific meanings. While defining the concepts, the ideology also establishes their relationship. It postulates that the victory of communism will bring about lasting world peace. The Red Army is urged to fight for communism, in order to attain world peace. To be a member of the Red Army, therefore, means to promote the cause of world peace; to refuse membership in the army means to undermine peace and to work for war. By this logic, Jehovah's Witnesses used to be sentenced to confinement for warmongering when they refused to serve in the Red Army. To a Western observer, this reasoning sounds ridiculous and cynical; he is inclined to believe that the Soviet judges may not have really meant what they said in justifying their decisions. However, if one's point of departure is a strong belief in the Marxist-Leninist meaning of communism, then the whole line of reasoning becomes logically precise and empirically irrefutable.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The ideological belief system fixes events and empirical phenomena in strict, seemingly logical interrelationships. Such a system of thought is hierarchically structured. The highly abstract concept (that is, communism) provides the keystone for logical sets of strictly defined new relationships (communism to peace; Red Army to peace; Jehovites to war; and the like). In this system, the empirical facts do not count: it does not matter that Jehovah's Witnesses are acknowledged pacifists, that their most sincere objective is peace, and that they believe wars would be impossible if nobody accepted arms. The interpretation of the Jehovites' behavior is the product of a series of theoretically posited relationships derived from the ideology.

Further, the ideological belief system is all-inclusive, totalistic. It explicitly claims to give appropriate explanations for all relevant events and social phenomena. There is a compulsion to explain and to compartmentalize everything in agreement with the hierarchically structured ideology.

Adopting this ideological framework means developing psychologically a closed, tightly organized belief system. It means seeing the world as consisting of elements of this system, thinking by using the logic of the system, and arriving at the logical conclusions offered by the system.

The system is closed in many ways. Its inner consistency is captivating. Once you are inside, it is extremely difficult to break out—to leave the deeply inculcated paths of thoughts. It provides strong defenses against the penetration of reality or extraneous ideas. Because the beliefs are closely intertwined and support each other, an attack on any one of them can be successfully resisted on the basis of another. Concrete arguments can be countered by making reference to one of the abstract theoretical premises.

Beyond its logical, cognitive qualities, the closed ideological system also offers subjective advantages. It is directive-oriented, relatively uncomplicated and reassuring. It gives a simple orientation in a complex world; it eliminates ambiguities; and it sets forth stark black-and-white alternatives. It offers protection against certain challenges of reality, and gives members the impression of being right, and the illusion of security.

II

Before analyzing some concrete instances of change in propaganda and indoctrination strategy, let us summarize briefly a few operational characteristics of the closed ideological belief system

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

which are at odds with prevailing preconceptions in the Western world. These may be of special relevance in determining the impact of the broad liberalization process on the thoroughly indoctrinated strata of Soviet society.

First, I believe there is substantially more resistance to reality and to empirical proofs built in closed, ideologized minds than we are generally ready to assume. Furthermore, while we are amazed by the rigidity of individual thinking, we are inclined to ignore the fact that this system lends itself surprisingly well to change if manipulated from the inside. We should realize that the Soviet people are accustomed to the idea that Marxism-Leninism is subject to interpretation by the authorities. Those who have the authority can with relative ease redefine issues, reformulate interrelationships and change priorities by exploiting the basically dialectic character of the system. They can do so without destroying the system, and without producing inconsistencies and contradictions. Certain shifts in propaganda lines which to us appear as contradictions or inconsistencies may, in the eyes of the indoctrinated person, pass unnoticed or be perceived as a matter of development in agreement with the general logic of the system.

Stalin's thesis on the inevitability of war with the capitalist world could easily be modified without giving up the Marxist definition of capitalism which emphasizes that wars derive from its very nature. The interpretation given by Khrushchev referred simply to a new development. It argued that the "peace-loving nations" headed by the Soviet Union have become so powerful that they may be able to put sufficient pressure on the leadership of the capitalist states to prevent them from risking war in our age of nuclear weapons.

Further, the system is altogether capable of absorbing popular, non-Marxist ideas and concepts by redefining them so that they can be integrated. This enables Soviet propaganda to win popular support and attract new groups of people without sacrificing ideological consistency. That is how, for instance, patriotism was revived as a popular topic and used as a powerful appeal. Officially it was labeled "Soviet patriotism" and received a new dialectic interpretation eliminating its apparent contradiction with the doctrine of "proletarian internationalism."

III

Any careful examination of recent trends and changes in Soviet

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

domestic propaganda will show that the Soviet leadership has emphatically maintained ideological indoctrination as a matter of highest priority. Attention given to indoctrination in the centrally-operated mass media and to the ideological saturation of articles, reports and news has not decreased. Party officials of all ranks reiterate the importance of ideological work. They repeatedly emphasize that peaceful coexistence in politics does not imply ideological coexistence. At the Twenty-second Party Congress Soviet leaders made a series of important decisions dealing with the improvement of "ideological work," and the recent Twenty-third Party Congress was characterized by deliberations on closely related ideological and practical questions. Even though the centrally-operated channels have not decreased their propaganda output, there are complaints by the authorities about the slackening of face-to-face agitation and the neglect of political education in factories, schools and other institutions.

In recent years Soviet leaders have expressed a strong concern about undesirable ideological influences emanating from certain sectors of art and literature. There are also clearly definable shifts in content and emphasis in anti-American propaganda to take advantage of timely and exploitable issues: the Viet Nam war, racial incidents in the United States, the war on poverty. These issues are presented as proof of the fundamentally imperialistic, exploitative nature of the capitalist system. While attacks on the U.S. system do not seem to have lost their central direction and intensity, direct attacks on individual representatives of the system have decreased in number and improved in tone. American scientific and technological achievements have received increased attention and recognition.

The Sino-Soviet split represents a new and undoubtedly sensitive issue in this period. Its impact at a subconscious level is incalculable. On the surface it receives a fairly routine propaganda treatment; the Kremlin can use tactics and arguments accumulated during various historic periods of infighting with Trotskyites, Bukharinists, Titoists, and others. On the level of overt and bombastic ideological attack, Soviet leaders probably gained more effective support by making references to Chinese chauvinism and territorial claims impinging on Soviet territory, thereby appealing to the patriotic feelings of the Soviet public.

A similarly complex and sensitive issue is de-Stalinization. Soviet propaganda in its latest form applies two different but

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

complementary approaches to this problem. It makes strong efforts to differentiate between Stalin and the Soviet system, arguing that Stalin's mistakes were conditioned by his personality and not by the characteristics of the system. People are told that in criticizing Stalin one has to be careful not to generalize and condemn the whole "historic period of building socialism." While these and similar arguments are used to dissociate Soviet history from Stalin, more recently there has also been a strong tendency to limit anti-Stalinist criticism and to restore a more favorable image of Stalin. Khrushchev is charged with using gross exaggerations in denouncing Stalin, of acting subjectively and for reasons of self-interest.

It is the present policy of the new Soviet leaders to endorse emphatically Lenin's principles of collective leadership. Intensive efforts are underway to present collective leadership as the sole Marxist-Leninist solution, as being wise, infallible and free of subjectivism—all the qualities Soviet citizens were taught at one time to attribute to Stalin. To bolster confidence in the Communist Party and in Soviet leadership, and to prove the superiority of the Soviet system, extensive attention is paid to Soviet achievements: space feats, events marking technological and scientific progress, increasing industrial production, and improvements in living conditions. Less attention is now paid to such subtle topics and long-range goals as world proletariat, internationalism and class struggle. Currently, propaganda capitalizes on issues with a more direct appeal: Soviet patriotism, world prestige, national security, national interest.

Undesirable new trends hostile to the system, such as critical trends in literature and demands for more freedom in thought and expression, are not identified as such, but rather as bourgeois influences, capitalistic immorality and anarchistic tendencies. Reports about the Sinyavsky-Daniel trial present the two authors as immoral and insane men hating and slandering the Russian people, conspiring with hostile foreigners and buying attention and popularity abroad by defaming their country. In this presentation, the critical issue—the authors' emphatic urge for freedom of literary self-expression—becomes irrelevant.

The extent to which Soviet domestic propaganda does indeed manage to maintain and promote the integrity of a closed Soviet world-outlook, eliminate inconsistencies, and argue away the contradictions of political reality is an open question. Nevertheless,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

we may conclude that it shows considerable flexibility in overcoming and taking advantage of the difficulties which emerge in the changing domestic political situation. Many tactical shifts in content and emphasis are performed within the framework of the Marxist-Leninist ideology without sacrificing fundamental doctrines. Although the logic and argumentation used in Soviet propaganda frequently appear from the outside to be artificial, inconsistent, or even an insult to intelligence, they seem to be well adapted to the indoctrinated strata of the population. In a political situation characterized by less reliance on open force and suppression, by a more effective penetration of ideas from the outside and by a heightened spirit of criticism from within, Soviet domestic propaganda makes extensive efforts to counter this challenge by exploiting such topics of general human appeal as patriotism, the moral order and national pride. Since these elements are redefined and used in clear subordination to ideological doctrines, it would be wrong to interpret their tactical use as a deviation from Marxism-Leninism. The changes do not signify a break with the Soviet past, and even less a transition to a bourgeois-nationalist way of life.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHINESE COMMUNIST POLICY TOWARD THE UNITED STATES, 1922-1933*

by Warren I. Cohen

IN recent years the formulation of U.S. policy toward Communist China has been one of the most pressing issues in this country's continuing debate over foreign policy. Inevitably, the debate follows a course backward through time to the days of the Chinese civil war, to U.S. policy toward China during and immediately after World War II. One argument that recurs frequently is the idea that a *détente* with the Chinese communists was possible at the close of World War II—that the implacable hostility of Communist China toward the United States today is the result of American blunders.

The historian generally shuns the hypothetical question: If the United States had acted differently, what might have happened? Such theorizing is on a par with an old Yiddish folk saying, in modern idiom: "*If* my grandmother had wheels, she might be a trolley-car." But one lesson the historian has learned is that relations between two powers can be understood and evaluated far more accurately by examining the record on both sides. Many years have passed since Samuel Flagg Bemis took the study of American diplomatic history out of the realm of domestic history and demonstrated the value of multiarchival research.

No one can say what would have happened had U.S. policy toward China differed, but the desire for a sounder basis from which to assess that policy requires an understanding of the limits imposed by Chinese communist policy toward the United States. Richard Leopold, writing in 1964, declared that "further study of the China scene is imperative, but it will be many years before scholars can hope for access to comparable materials setting forth the Russian, Nationalist, or Communist story. Indeed, that day may never come."[1]

*This article is derived from research for a book-length study of the development of American policy toward the Chinese communists, 1922-1949.

[1] *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* December 1964, p. 510.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

For the most part, Professor Leopold's pessimism amounts to understatement, but there is now available to American scholars one collection of materials that promises to be useful. This is the rich collection of Chinese communist documents and related government reports deposited in the library of the Bureau of Investigation (Ministry of Justice) of the Republic of China. Based primarily on these documents, this article reveals and analyzes early Chinese communist attitudes toward the United States.

I

A knowledge of attitudes is not, of course, equivalent to a knowledge of policy. In the years between the formation of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its retreat to Shensi in the Long March, the party was not in a position to make foreign policy. But the attitudes revealed in these years, the lines promulgated, filled the well from which policy was drawn when the day came for the CCP to formulate its policies toward the United States. The peculiar circumstances of 1945 and 1946 were undoubtedly decisive, but the preceding twenty-five years of party teachings could not but limit the range of alternatives.

Lest this focus on the United States prove misleading, two preliminary points should be noted. First, in the period 1922-1933, international relations were a lesser concern of the CCP; for approximately half of those years it was threatened with extinction. Second, when the party did consider foreign affairs, the United States was not the power of primary interest to it or to its members. Communist attacks on imperialism were often general, specifying no single country. When individual nations were singled out for abuse, the United States seems to have run a poor third, lagging behind Japan and England. But if the party line on the United States is merely a minor chapter in the history of Chinese communism in the 1920's and early 1930's, the importance of any and all Chinese communist thought about the United States and its policies and people becomes more and more apparent to students of international politics, as the United States and Communist China proceed along a collision course.

In these early years, the CCP concerned itself less with the United States than with England and Japan for the obvious reason that the latter countries were more deeply involved in China, politically, economically and militarily. When the United States *was* singled out as a target for Chinese communist attacks, it was

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

essentially for the innocuous role it played in China. Because all capitalist countries were presumably guilty of imperialism, and because U.S. actions or inaction often appeared to belie this theory, it was occasionally necessary for the party to warn the Chinese people that Americans were even more dangerous than the others—they were so shrewd as to seem to be opposing imperialism. This sort of legerdemain, long familiar to students of communism, was prompted by Moscow on at least one instance, and probably others, when the CCP limited itself to a realistic appraisal of the American role in China.

In July 1921, a small group of men met in Shanghai to hold the "First National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party." When the police disrupted the meeting, the delegates fled to Niehpu Lake in Chekiang where they boarded a rowboat to complete their work, including the formal establishment of the CCP. The records of that meeting were not preserved. Students of Chinese communism are generally agreed that for the next twelve years the Soviet Union dominated the CCP, dictating policy and action. Still, like any body of doctrine, that provided by the Comintern required interpretation. This task could be hazardous, as illustrated by the elusiveness of the Comintern line on the United States at the time of the CCP's Second National Congress, from May to July 1922. Months before it met, the Comintern convened, in Moscow, a "Congress of the Toilers of the Far East." Here, the principal theme was opposition to the Washington Conference on naval armaments and Far East questions, but it is significant to note that three different speakers, including Zinoviev, the prominent Soviet and Comintern official, criticized Sun Yat-sen's Kuomintang (KMT) for alleged pro-American sympathies. Coming not long after Trotsky had called American capitalism the stronghold of world imperialism, this was indeed a grave charge. Obviously, the CCP delegates had received a strong hint of the line desired by the Communist International.

But if this mandate seemed clear, an article by Vladmir Vilensky in the official journal of the Comintern, edited by Zinoviev, left considerable leeway. Vilensky's article contained a section in which he divided the Powers into China's enemies and friends, including among the friends "Soviet Russia, Germany, and with some reservations, America." He went on to predict that in the future China, Soviet Russia, Germany and the United States

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

would form an alliance for China's protection.[2] What, then, was the correct line on the United States?

The "Manifesto of the Second National Congress" contained a lengthy section on "China under the rule of international imperialism." The identity of the United States as an imperialist power was established with reference to the Philippines: "The United States keeps the Philippine Islands on a leash, on the one hand feigning a benevolent attitude, on the other continuing its economic penetration, not in the least able to loosen its grip."[3] There followed a capsule history of imperialist aggression against China, with England, France, Russia and Japan heading the cast of villains and with no mention of the United States until the World War. Thereafter, the United States became one of the principals. The Japanese had taken advantage of the war to seize German privileges in Shantung, and attempted to convert China into a Japanese colony. But this, the CCP reported, made the American imperialists envious, and a deep conflict between American and Japanese imperialism arose.[4]

Although the party contended that the Chinese political situation was determined by the rivalry between the United States and Japan, little antagonism toward Americans was evident as this point was elaborated. The Japanese were clearly allied with the Manchurian warlord Chang Tso-lin, and working with the Peking government. The British were in the south, consolidating their position along the Yangtze, but where were the Americans? What of American encroachments upon China? The Americans were found to be allying themselves with the new capitalist and intellectual classes, using their international trust or cartel policy. "But," the Manifesto admitted, "this is not entirely an aggressive method. After all, standing in conflict with Japanese interests, the United States cannot immediately develop its aggression."

If it is remembered that at this time the Comintern line on China required the development of capitalism before the revolution could proceed—the rise of a capitalist class in China was theoretically desirable—then the charge against the United States may be considered mild. Coupled with the admission that Amer-

[2]Allen S. Whiting, *Soviet Policies in China, 1917-1924* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954), pp. 79, 82-83, 112-114.

[3]"Ti erh-tzu ch'üan-kuo ta-hui hsüan-yen" (Manifesto of the Second National Congress), *Chung-kuo wen-ti chih-nan* (*Guidebook to Chinese Questions*), II (1937).

[4]The inevitability of war between Japan and the United States had become one of Lenin's themes in 1916. See Whiting, *op. cit.*, pp. 21, 104.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ican policy was not "entirely" aggressive, this view of the United States suggests that the CCP was very much aware of Vilensky's position.

Turning to the Washington Conference, the party adhered closely to Zinoviev's line, insisting that the conference had been called for the purpose of arranging a new division of markets in the Far East. The conflicts among the United States, Japan and England had been forestalled by taking the Far East, especially China with its rich lands and miserable people, and "placing it as an evening banquet before the diplomats and bankers of the various countries assembled in Washington, each equally desirous of cutting a slice." The matter of arms limitation at the conference was handled with the usual Marxist-Leninist approach: it was simply a deceit—military preparation is the pillar of capitalism, and for capitalist nations to reduce arms was therefore impossible. The "essential" question dealt with at Washington, the China question, was decided under U.S. pressure. As a result, the Powers recognized Japan's "sole occupation and plunder" of Manchuria, Mongolia and Eastern Siberia and agreed to keep China subject to the encroachments of their collective Open Door policy. This was the Chinese communist view of the Nine-Power Treaty.[5]

To many Americans, acceptance by the Great Powers of the Open Door policy in the Nine-Power Treaty was the fulfillment of a long-cherished dream of protecting China without the need to use force. To the Chinese communists, it was the first step toward U.S. aggression in China. And if American ultra-nationalists suspected the Four-Power Treaty (by which the United States, Great Britain, France and Japan guaranteed each other's rights in their Pacific insular possessions) of being a secret alliance, the CCP had no doubt: the Anglo-Japanese treaty had been replaced by a new "blood-sucking alliance." To the party, the future seemed more ominous than the past. Cooperation among the Powers in the Far East could only mean united aggression against China.[6]

When analyzing contemporary events in China, the writers of the Manifesto focused on recent fighting between the warlord cliques led by Chang Tso-lin and Wu P'ei-fu. Japan backed Chang, and Wu allegedly received support from the United

[5]Manifesto of the Second National Congress.
[6]*Ibid.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

States and England.[7] When Wu won, the Peking government "gradually fell into the hands of pro-American officials." This the CCP viewed as an incomparable opportunity for the United States, but the Americans were found unwilling to permit Wu, "a relatively progressive warlord,"[8] to form a unified government. They apparently feared that the steps Wu envisaged, while useful to the Chinese capitalists, were not good for foreign capitalists. Accordingly, the United States reversed its policy and shifted to cooperation with Japan in support of Chang Tso-lin—"in order to spare Japan and the United States from impeding each other and to create a puppet government that they can both use."[9]

And so, in its first official statement on foreign affairs, the CCP said little that had not already been said in Moscow. To the faithful and to those being proselytized, the United States was portrayed as one of the imperialist powers. Imperialism was the scourge of China; the United States, an imperialist power, was active in China; therefore the United States was pursuing an imperialistic policy in China and was an enemy of the people—that is to say, of the CCP. But the party seemed less fearful of American aggression than of Japanese or British, and less hostile to the United States than were Trotsky or the Comintern leaders. Assuming Soviet direction of the Chinese communist movement and given the range of positions taken by Moscow, the CCP line on the United States in 1922 appears to have been as "soft" as possible.

It need not, however, be inferred that the Chinese communists were friendly toward the United States. If it pleased the Chinese people to have the Americans oppose Japanese imperialism, the party strained to make it clear that the Americans acted not out of any desire to help China, but to supplant the Japanese as the leading imperialists in China. Friction between the United States and Japan was consistently explained in terms of contradictions within the imperialist camp. When the Americans appeared to be doing nothing, it was only because the Japanese had not yet given them a chance. If a warlord gained control of the government with the alleged support of the United States and the United

[7]For indications of American interest in Wu, see U.S. State Department Numerical File, 893.00/3549 and 893.00/3771.

[8]Wu's "relatively progressive" status probably derives from Soviet interest in him as a possible ally. See Benjamin Schwartz, *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958), p. 38.

[9]Manifesto of the Second National Congress.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

States took no spoils, it was because in victory the Americans had changed sides.

In 1923, when the party held its Third National Congress, its statements merely reflected shifts in Soviet policy toward China. Not only was the United States found to have resumed its support of Wu P'ei-fu, but that warlord had lost the "relatively progressive" label he had been awarded by the previous congress. Wu's loss of grace is perhaps most easily understood by noting that in February 1923 he suppressed a strike of railroad workers and virtually crushed the Chinese labor movement—although the Comintern seems to have taken little notice of this until much later. More important is the fact that between the second and third congresses of the CCP, the Comintern had called for an alliance between the CCP and Sun's Kuomintang. Anxious for allies in China, the Soviets had given up on Wu and had chosen to work with the KMT.

Thus two other sins attributed to the United States by the CCP are readily comprehensible. First, the United States was alleged to have been foremost among the nations urging the Chinese government to use force to prevent Sun's Canton government from acquiring the customs revenue surplus. Second, U.S. Secretary of State Hughes was alleged to have signed a secret treaty with England, the country that the party found behind the overthrow of Sun's government.[10] In short, these explanations of the apparent vacillations of U.S. policy and the decline of Wu's progressivism meant simply that Moscow had shifted its hopes from Wu to the KMT. "Progress," i.e., the Chinese revolution, was now best served by an increase in the power of Sun's forces, with whom the Soviet Union was actively cooperating.

Later, when the Fourth Congress examined the political situation, it found that a new phase had been reached in the imperialist plan to partition China. Severe conflict among the imperialist nations had ended the period of cooperation begun with the Washington Conference. The main American threat of 1924 appeared to be the Dawes Plan which was alleged to be an action against the people of Europe and Asia. The Manifesto of the Congress began: "The Chinese people should know that the world imperialists, with the United States leading, last fall in London devised a plan against the people of Europe and

[10]"Ti san-tzu tui-yü shih-chü te chu-chang" (View of the Third Congress on the Political Situation), *Guidebook,* II.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Asia." On the Chinese scene, the party re-emphasized its view of the United States as a country without a sphere of influence, without warlord puppets. Having entered the field too late to acquire these, the Americans sought desperately to arrange a conference to put into effect a "Dawes Plan" for China—thus to circumvent English- and Japanese-controlled warlords and to obtain economic control of China.[11]

II

Throughout this period, the CCP was busily exploiting its alliance with the KMT, attempting to build a mass base for the revolution and preparing for Chiang Kai-shek's Northern Expedition. On May 30, 1925, an incident arising out of a strike against Japanese-controlled textile mills led to the May 30th Movement, a spontaneous outburst of anti-imperialist, anti-foreign sentiment that spread from Shanghai through the cities of China and ultimately even to the countryside. In a short time the movement was infiltrated and controlled by the communists. Since the incident began with the strike against Japanese mills and was set off by a British order to fire on demonstrators, Japan and England were the primary targets for communist attacks. The United States did not escape, however. The CCP Central Committee declared that "with regard to aggression in China and the suppression of movements of the Chinese people, the imperialist powers are all alike. . . . During this massacre, the American imperalists stood as one with the English." Attacking the volunteer corps of the International Settlement (Shanghai), the party insisted that the American volunteers were equally as savage as the English.[12]

Obviously, in the first few years of its existence, the CCP seemed hard pressed to pinpoint the nature of U.S. aggression. The Comintern could conceive of contradictions among imperialists, but rarely tolerated the drawing of distinctions. The CCP had ample grounds for attacking Japanese actions, sufficient opportunities for going after the British, but the attack on the

[11]"Ti szu-tzu tui-yü shih-chü te chu-chang" (View of the Fourth Congress on the Political Situation), *Guidebook,* II; "Ti szu-tzu ch'üan-kuo ta-hui hsüan-yen" (Manifesto of the Fourth National Congress), *Kung-fei huo-kuo shih-liao hui-pien (Collection of Historical Documents Relating to the Communist Bandits and the National Calamity)*, I, p. 42. The latter was published by the Government of the Republic of China for restricted distribution (apparently restricted to foreign scholars and some members of the KMT).

[12]"Wei fan-k'ang ti-kuo chu-i yeh-man ts'an-pao te ta t'u-sha kao ch'üan-kuo min-chung" (Inform all of the people for the purpose of opposing imperialism's savage and cruel massacre), dated June 5, 1925, *Guidebook,* II.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

United States was more often than not an afterthought—a reminder that the Americans, despite their apparent inaction, were still imperialists, were still enemies of the people.

But in July 1925 the CCP caught the United States on a point on which American policy *was* vulnerable: the issue of the "unequal treaties" from which Americans had benefited since Caleb Cushing's Treaty of Wanghsia (1844). These treaties, and especially the extraterritoriality provisions, had long been symbols of imperialist oppression to Chinese patriots. Unlike the United States, the Soviet Union had early understood the potential of anti-imperialist sentiment: the Karakhan proposals, renouncing the privileges which Tsarist Russia had exacted from China, had created a tremendous sensation when they reached China in 1920. Although the Soviets were less generous in the treaty they signed subsequently, they had nonetheless taken the lead in satisfying the demands of Chinese nationalists, and for many noncommunist Chinese the USSR had replaced the United States as China's friend.[13]

In response to Chinese demands for treaty revision, the United States, while refusing to make any unilateral surrender of privileges in China, had expressed a willingness to participate in an international conference to discuss the problem. The U.S. position, as argued by J.V.A. MacMurray, Minister to China, was that Americans in China could not be expected to operate under conditions inferior to those of other foreign nationals. If other nations would agree simultaneously to treaty revision, the United States would be willing to go along.[14]

To the Chinese communists, this seemed a ruse. They contended that the Americans knew that their privileges in China were relatively slight and that England and Japan were not likely to second the American suggestion. The Americans were, therefore, using insincere methods "to deceive the Chinese people and to pursue their monopolistic lust in China." In a statement issued by the Central Committee, the CCP declared:

> In fact, if the United States really has deep sympathy with China's demand to correct the unequal treaties and to do away with extraterritoriality, then it should follow in the footsteps of the Soviet Union and by automatically discarding these treaty privileges, set a good example themselves so as to lead other countries. Why wait for an inter-

[13]For Chinese reaction to the Karakhan proposals, see Schwartz, *op. cit.*, pp. 214-215.

[14]Russell Buhite, "Nelson Johnson and American Foreign Policy," unpublished doctoral dissertation, Michigan State University, 1965.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

national conference? Do you not clearly know the result of an international conference? . . . We have been deceived before and will not be deceived a second time. . . .[15]

The CCP's advice was not without merit, but MacMurray's position prevailed until 1928.

III

In July 1926, the Northern Expedition began, with the uneasy CCP-KMT alliance—which was to split in a matter of months—still in existence. As Chiang Kai-shek's armies struggled to unite China, the Powers stood by and did not interfere. The Comintern found it inconceivable that the imperialists would tolerate the victory of the revolutionary armies without offering resistance. When it met to decide Chinese questions, the participants talked of "new" imperialist policies in the face of the successes of the Northern Expedition. They concluded that the imperialists were afraid to intervene openly and were tending toward recognition of the Kuomintang Canton government. "American imperialism is the initiator of this policy."[16]

The year 1927 was an unhappy one for the CCP. The story of how Chiang outmaneuvered Stalin by crushing the communists before they eliminated him is well known. In Peking, Chang Tso-lin raided the Soviet Embassy and executed a number of Chinese communist leaders—more martyrs to add to the thousands executed by Chiang's forces. For the most part, the communists literally took to the hills, ultimately regrouping in Kiangsi. The Central Committee, however, moved to the International Settlement in Shanghai, its leadership revamped. Thereafter, the Comintern's influence was limited largely to the coastal cities.

In June 1928, a secret CCP circular indicated that the Chinese communists were saying much the same thing to themselves as they were declaring to the world. Their view of the international situation stressed the competition between the United States and Japan in the Far East. Japan's efforts to occupy China promised to give her hegemony in the Pacific, an obvious obstacle to the spread of American influence. The United States was described as unhappy about Japanese violations of the Open Door, and the

[15]"Kao wu-sa yun-tung chung wei min-tzu fen-tou te min-chung" (Proclaim May Thirtieth Movement as Masses Struggling for National Freedom), dated July 10, 1925, *Guidebook,* II.

[16]"Kung-ch'an kuo-chi ti ch'i-tzu k'uo-ta chih-hsing wei-yüan-hui-i" (Seventh Enlarged Plenum of Executive Committee of the Communist International), *Collection . . . Communist Bandits and the National Calamity,* I, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

author of the circular indicated that this might lead to war between the Japanese and American imperialists.[17] This was a recurrent theme through 1933.

Examining U.S. foreign policy, the party came to the not unreasonable conclusion that the United States did not have a clear policy, but that a number of important Americans were hostile to Japan. The dispatch of U.S. warships to China during a Sino-Japanese incident in Shantung, toward the end of the Northern Expedition, was viewed as a threatening gesture against Japan. Similarly, the American fleet was at this time in Manila, presumably for spring maneuvers, but the communists implied a military buildup in the Pacific by the United States. Perhaps most interesting were the new slogans which the party announced: "In actions, oppose Japan; in propaganda, oppose the United States and England."[18] The slogans leave little doubt that the CCP viewed Japan as the real enemy and did not consider the United States an immediate threat.

Later in the year, in another secret party circular, the CCP analyzed the role of the imperialists in China. The author contended that although the policies of England and Japan were in "complete conflict" with those of the United States, there was a tacit understanding through which all three nations sought to suppress the revolution—a reference to the suppression of the Canton Commune in December 1927. He also declared that U.S. imperialism was without influence in China, but that Americans were very crafty and their aggressive policies very complicated. Therefore, the United States was not threatened by "bourgeois nationalist reformers"—a communist epithet for the KMT.[19] This was the communist explanation for the fact that while the Nationalist government remained hostile to Japan and still had its troubles with England, it seemed to be getting along reasonably well with the United States.

On the surface there did not appear to be anything unorthodox in this analysis of the role of the United States in China. But the leaders in the Kremlin were particularly sensitive at the time —perhaps because of the pressures Stalin felt as a result of the continuous failure of his China policies. Whatever the reason, the Comintern reacted sharply to this CCP analysis, especially

[17] *Chung-yang t'ung-kao 52* (*Central Committee Circular No. 52*), dated June 1928.
[18] *Ibid.*
[19] *Central Committee Circular No. 65,* dated September 19, 1928.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to the suggestion that American policy was *completely* in conflict with Japanese and British policy. In a letter to the CCP, the Executive Committee of the Comintern declared:

> Circular Number 65 of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party states that the policies of the British and the Japanese are entirely opposed to the policies of the United States. This is incorrect. American policy toward China, like British and Japanese policy, is imperialistic. The difference lies only in the means of application. The American "Open Door" policy is not designed to remove China from a colonial status. It is a liberal hypocrisy designed to cover up imperialist aggression. The United States is unable to adopt the same methods as England and Japan only because of the present objective conditions. The United States depends upon its own economic strength. The heart of American policy is to obtain economic control and to make the Chinese Government financially and diplomatically dependent upon the United States—unlike England and Japan who use force to consolidate their position in China.[20]

To the uninitiated, it would probably take James Reston's "Uniquack" machine to determine the difference between the CCP's original position and the "correct line" contained in the Comintern's reprimand. To the CCP, however, the order was clear: it was time to be a little more heavy-handed in belaboring U.S. imperialism. In a series of party circulars, beginning in April 1929, the Chinese communists stepped up their attack on the United States in an attempt to give America equal billing with the other imperialists. The Nationalist government, for example, was declared to be based on an alliance with the capitalist class and American imperialism. Thus the United States was linked with the hated enemy, the KMT. Comrades were urged to encourage the masses against imperialism, "especially American imperialism." The masses could be expected to see the evils of Japanese and British imperialism without difficulty, but U.S. policy was clever and could easily deceive them—especially since the masses had been subjected to bourgeois deception. "We must," declared the Central Committee, "stress the aggressive policies of the United States"; the United States was then condemned as "one hundred times worse than England or Japan."[21] Thus did the CCP atone for its sins.

Turning to the alleged conflict between the United States on the one hand and England and Japan on the other, the Chinese

[20] "Kung-ch'an kuo-chi chih-hsing wei-yüan-hui yü Chung-kuo Kung-ch'an-tang shu" (Letter of the Executive Committee of the Communist International to the Chinese Communist Party), *Hung-se wen-hsien* (*Red Records*) (Liberation Press, 1938).

[21] *Central Committee Circular No. 34,* dated April 10, 1929.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

communists concluded that one should not exaggerate the significance of the conflict. All wanted more privileges in China. Even to suppose that the American imperialists would help Chinese capitalists to develop independently or that the United States would always rule through "peaceful aggression" was arrant nonsense which ignored the essence of capitalism. Once again, the party emphasized the need to warn the masses that the imperialists were all alike, regardless of method: beware of imperialists behind liberal masks.[22]

The CCP made a special point of criticizing the U.S. call for the "Open Door," for "Equal Opportunity for All," brushing these aside as slogans by means of which the United States hoped to share privileges enjoyed by Japan and England. In this they were not far from the mark; the same sentiments were expressed by American historians, one of whom, Thomas Bailey, referred to the use of the Most-Favored-Nation clause in China as "jackal diplomacy." The Chinese communists contended that vast American investments, especially in the year since the Comintern reprimand, were exciting the envy of Japan and England. Now there was a triangular conflict in the Pacific, with England and Japan being pushed toward cooperation against the United States. As a result,

> the imperialist bandits hate each other, struggle to obtain privileges in China. All imperialists have the same aggressive policy. There is no fundamental difference between the American imperialists and those of England and Japan. The so-called recognition of customs independence and treaty revision only show the deceitfulness of the American imperialists' "Open Door and Equal Opportunity policy". . . .[23]

IV

The years 1930 and 1931 were, for the CCP, years of inner turmoil. Scapegoats for the failure of Stalin's policy in China were sought and found. Ultimately, the "returned students" group gained control of the Central Committee. Despite the fact that these "students" were largely dependent upon Moscow and out of touch with developments in the Soviet (Kiangsi) areas where the numerical and military power of the Chinese communists was concentrated, it was this group that spoke for the party when the Manchurian crisis erupted in 1931.

[22] *Central Committee Circular No. 37,* dated May 15, 1929.

[23] *Hsien-tsai ke-ming te hsing-shih yü Kung-ch'an-tang te jen-wu* (*Recent Revolutionary Situation and Communist Party Responsibilities*), June 2, 1929.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

When the Japanese army began its drive through Manchuria, it was inconceivable that any Chinese, even a group under Moscow's guidance, could avoid focusing its attacks on Japanese imperialism. But by the end of November, the CCP had remembered the other enemies of the people. In an anti-Japanese article in *Hung-ch'i Chou-pao* (*Red Flag*), official journal of the Central Committee, the writer closed with a series of slogans, one of which was "oppose imperialism, especially the British, American and Japanese plot to partition China."[24] Subsequent articles were more enlightening on the question of how the American imperialists were involved in Japanese actions in Manchuria. The salient point is that the CCP did attempt to demonstrate to the Chinese people that the United States was as great a threat to them as Japan.

In developing a new position on the United States, party writers began with the contention that U.S. policy regarding Manchuria was "totally blind." Hints of an accord between the United States and Japan followed. To the communists, this indicated American interest in a potential conflict between Japan and the Soviet Union.[25] In the next issue of *Red Flag,* the skeleton of the new line emerged: A telegram from the Congress held in the newly founded "Chinese Soviet Republic" to the Communist Party of the United States contained a reference to America as a leader among the imperialists plotting to invade the Soviet Union and to divide China through Japanese military operations.[26]

The new line was a clever one. The United States was involved in an intensifying conflict with Japan because of the ambitions of U.S. imperialists in China. This explained America's constant opposition to the Japanese aggression in Manchuria. On the other hand, the United States hoped to divert Japan into a war against the Soviet Union, and therefore American protests were never backed by action—words poured from Washington, but the sanctions were never forthcoming. One day, one side of the line could be emphasized; the next day, the other. For example, why had the United States sent warships to the Far East? In February 1932 the Chinese communists were convinced that the ships were sent as a warning to Japan. War between the United States and Japan was found to be increasingly likely. But in April the tremendous imperialist fear of the Soviet Union

[24] *Red Flag,* XXIII (November 20, 1931).
[25] *Ibid.,* XXV (undated).
[26] *Ibid.,* XXVI (undated).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

prevailed. The imperialists, the party alleged, were preparing to invade the Soviet Union, so the U.S. fleet had been sent to the Far East to strengthen the anti-Soviet alignment. Moreover, President Hoover, portrayed as the loyal representative of Wall Street, was preparing to send Secretary of State Stimson to Japan to plan the attack.[27]

Soviet fears and a signal for the "correct" line on the Manchurian incident appeared in *Comintern* on December 10, 1931, and the article, translated into Chinese, was reprinted in *Red Flag* in April. Again the argument was clever and imaginative. Despite the sharpening conflict between the United States and Japan, the United States was alleged to be supporting Japanese aggression because Washington sought to incite war between Japan and the Soviet Union. The Americans did not, however, plan to participate in the first phase of this new Russo-Japanese war. Instead, as in World War I, America would sell war supplies and lend money, thereby ending its economic crisis while Japanese and Soviet troops bled. According to this analysis, the United States would profit regardless of the outcome of the war. Japan would be weakened and the United States could easily settle accounts. The Soviets claimed that the Americans were moving ships through the Panama Canal to Alaska, proving, for their purposes, that the United States planned to invade Siberia and from there go on to invade Japan.[28]

Lest this involved explanation of the present crisis prove too much for Chinese comrades, the Soviet author concluded by admitting that he had been discussing long-range matters. In the immediate future the Japanese-American conflict would sharpen. Japan was invading an area in which U.S. interests lay. The United States was opposed to Japanese actions and used China, especially the Chinese boycott of Japanese goods, to serve its purposes.

Just how Moscow informed the Chinese party of the correct line is not always apparent. Perhaps the article in *Comintern* sufficed in this instance, as similar articles have served on other occasions. Perhaps a yet undiscovered letter arrived in Shanghai. No matter how it was done, the message came across; throughout

[27]"Shang-hai shih-pien chung Jih-Mei te ch'ung-t'u" (Japanese-American Conflict in the Shanghai Situation), *ibid.*, XXX (February 15, 1932); "Fan-tui ti-kuo chu-i chan-cheng te wu-i" (The May First for Opposing Imperialist War), *ibid.*, XXXVI (April 22, 1932).

[28]"Tui Man-chou te wu-chuang kan-shih yü fan Su-lien ta-chan te chün-pei" (Armed Intervention in Manchuria and Preparations for War against the Soviet Union), *ibid.*, XXXIV (April 2, 1932).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the year the threat of an invasion of the Soviet Union received at least as much attention in CCP publications as did the Japanese threat to China.

During 1932 there was additional evidence of CCP efforts to fan hostility toward the United States. The Nationalist government's efforts to "pacify" the communist-controlled area were persistently linked to the United States. Chiang's campaigns against the communists were alleged to be a service for American imperialism.[29] An open letter from the CCP's "Soviet Government" to the U.S. consulate at Hankow, relating to a captured missionary, declared: "But unlike you imperialists, we don't decide things by murder and arson, so we haven't the slightest intention of killing your American imperialist missionary."[30] At the end of the year, however, the line showed signs of "softening."

By then the Japanese had completed their conquest of Manchuria, and the Kremlin was worried. This was the period in which Stalin intensified his efforts to woo the United States in hope of easing Japanese pressures on the eastern border of the USSR. In December 1932, in the midst of Chiang's campaign to crush the Chinese communists, he chose to resume relations with the Chinese Nationalist government. At the same time articles separating the United States from the rest of the imperialist camp began to appear with fair regularity. It was never forgotten that the United States was an "imperialist" nation, but it was recognized, nonetheless, that the United States was willing to help China. From Moscow came a report that Japan, England and France were the major culprits among the imperialists who sought to partition China—and the moves of those three Powers were directed against the United States. Also from Moscow came an analysis of the international situation and a declaration of the duties of Comintern members. In it there were claims of British and French support for Japanese aggression and criticism of the League of Nations, which was alleged to be aiding Japan under British and French orders. No attempt was made to equate the United States with these nations.[31]

Early in 1933, *Red Flag* published a criticism of the report of the Lytton Commission[32] and referred to the growing power of the

[29]*Ibid.*, XXXV (April 9, 1932).
[30]*Ibid.*, XLIII (June 1, 1932).
[31]*Tou-cheng* (*Struggle*), XXXII, XXXIII (November-December 1932); *Red Flag*, LIII (December 10, 1932).
[32]The League's Lytton Commission presented its report on October 4, 1932; it proposed making Manchuria an autonomous state under Chinese sovereignty

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

United States and the American use of power to force other imperialists to oppose Japan. The writer noted that the United States was involved in discussions of war debts and arms limitation and contended that "without doubt" the United States would use these meetings to pressure England and France into opposing Japan.[33]

At the same time, and for months afterward, *Tou-cheng* (*Struggle*), official organ of the Chinese Soviet Republic, published articles emphasizing the earlier line, stressing the imperialistic motives behind American opposition to Japanese aggression, and working the old saw about the efforts of the United States to incite war between Japan and the Soviet Union. Writers in *Struggle* labeled the United States "master" of the hated Nanking (Chiang) government, and even called upon the people to disregard American opposition to Japan on the ground that U.S. policy was deceitful.[34] As late as May 1933, in a discussion of the U.S. decision to drop the gold standard, an article ended with the statement: ". . . we know that the difference between the Japanese and American imperialists is like the difference between six of one and half dozen of the other (*pan-chin pa-liang*)."[35]

Remembering that the Central Committee controlled *Red Flag* and that the leadership of the Chinese Soviet spoke through *Struggle,* it might be tempting to hypothesize a difference in attitude toward the United States on the part of the two groups of CCP leaders, were it not for the fact that the Central Committee had moved to the Soviet toward the end of 1932. The power struggle within the party that followed this move is not yet fully understood and it would seem unwise to speculate on the question of which group spoke through *Struggle*.[36]

V

Perhaps the best way to describe the Chinese communist view of the United States at the close of the Manchurian incident is in terms of an article that appeared in *Red Flag* in April 1933. A discussion of the conditions for an imperialist war, the article devoted eighteen lines to an enumeration of the sins of the Powers

but under Japanese control. When the report was adopted over Japanese protests in February 1933, Japan gave notice of withdrawal from the League.

[33]LIV (January 10, 1933).

[34]See articles in XXXIV-XXXVII (January-March 1933).

[35]*Ibid.,* XLI-XLII (May 20, 1933), combined issue.

[36]See Schwartz, *op. cit.,* p. viii.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in the Far East. Japan was castigated for six lines, England for five, and then six more lines dealt with the crimes of both Japan and England. The eighteenth line criticized the United States for making secret loans to the Nanking government. Then these three nations and France were attacked for their opposition to the Soviet revolution and for their preparations to invade the Soviet Union.[37] Not only does this article indicate where the CCP placed the United States in its lineup of enemies in 1933, but it is also representative of the party attitude toward the United States throughout the period 1922-1933.

Among the Powers, the United States simply did not interfere in Chinese affairs to the extent that Japan and England did. It had no sphere in which its influence prevailed. There were too few examples of its imperialist behavior, too few threads with which to weave a strong fabric of hatred. But the United States was nonetheless a capitalist country; regardless of how small the scale on which it operated, how great its reluctance and sense of guilt, the United States was one of the imperialist powers—and as such, a member of the enemy camp. If the accusations against the United States were doctrinaire, if they were based largely on theory and little on substance, if occasionally they were prompted by Moscow, there remains no reason to doubt that the Chinese Communist Party took them seriously.

Also of significance is the fact that after the KMT-CCP split, especially during the years 1928 to 1932, relations between the United States and the Chinese government were reasonably good. At a time when Japan and England were apprehensive of the effects unified Nationalist control of China might have on their interests, the United States viewed this prospect with equanimity and even satisfaction. When the Japanese invaded Manchuria, it was the U.S. Secretary of State who took the lead, if only verbally, in opposing Japan. As a result, friendship grew between the two governments at precisely the time when the Chinese government was attempting to exterminate the communists. Clearly aware of these conditions, the CCP charged Chiang with being the servant of U.S. imperialism, and attacks upon the United States intensified. Only at the close of this period, when Stalin's fears of invasion led to Soviet efforts to placate both China and the United States, did criticism of the United States become less constant.

Obviously, an examination of the evidence available leaves

[37]LXIII (undated—probably April 13, 1933).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

little hope that a communist-controlled China might be friendly to the United States. There is, however, one important qualification to remember. The story here is carried only to the year 1933, more than a decade before either the CCP or the U.S. government had to devise policies toward the other. Examination of the later period may well indicate a greater possibility of cooperation between the two. Indeed, a much friendlier CCP line toward the United States was apparent during the United Front period, and especially during World War II; yet, when the party ordered an anti-American movement, in the summer of 1946, the subsequent campaign was greatly facilitated by the wealth of anti-American arguments accumulated in the years before the United Front.

At the end of the war, the CCP could announce to its cadres, as in fact it did, that it was puzzled by Soviet policy—and yet instruct them to "proceed from hope."[38] On the other hand, the legacy of past suspicions, the lessons learned by a generation of Chinese communists, had created an environment in which it was virtually impossible to give credence to American good faith. Ultimately, the doctrinaire view of U.S. imperialism that had dominated communist thought in the 1920's and early 1930's, given substance by the tardiness of the American decision to part with the privileges of the "unequal treaties" and aggravated by constant American support of the KMT, prevailed over any CCP tendency to view America in a new light as a result of the limited U.S.-CCP cooperation in the war against Japan.

[38]Hu Hsi-k'uei, *Shih-chü pien-hua ho wo-te fang-chen* (*Changes in the Present Situation and Our Plan*), dated August 30, 1945.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE STATE-IDEA, THE NATIONAL IDEA AND THE IMAGE OF THE FATHERLAND*

by Ladis K. D. Kristof

THE purpose of this paper is to discuss and illustrate the meaning of certain concepts in the context of geopolitics. The focus is on the three concepts mentioned in the title. The first, the concept of the state-idea (*Staatsidee*), was introduced into political geography by Friedrich Ratzel in 1897.[1] Ratzel considered the state-idea as the most important among the centripetal forces holding the state-area together. The strength of the state, he argued, was directly related to the degree to which "the political idea of the state filled the whole body of the state, extended to all its parts."[2] Consciously or unconsciously, Ratzel was drawing on the ideas of Giuseppe Mazzini, the "father" of the nation-state ideology:

> A Country is not a mere territory; the particular territory is only its foundation. The Country is the idea which rises upon that foundation; it is the sentiment of love, the sense of fellowship which binds together all the sons of that territory.[3]

The more recent shift in political geography away from the historical and morphological approach and toward "a functional approach to the analysis of the political geography of a state"—in terms of both the internal problems and external relations of

*This is a modified and expanded version of the theoretical introduction to an essay, "The Russian Image of Russia: An Applied Study in Geopolitical Methodology," originally presented as a paper at the XXth International Congress of Geography (England, 1964) and now scheduled to appear, in 1967, in *Essays in Political Geography*, edited by Professor C. A. Fisher (University of London) and published by Methuen and Company. The author is indebted to a number of colleagues, in particular to Professors R. Hartshorne (University of Wisconsin) and P. L. Wagner (University of California, Davis), for reading the original essay and sending him their extensive critical remarks and/or suggestions concerning the possible application of the concept of the "image of the fatherland" to other countries.

[1] F. Ratzel, *Politische Geographie* (Munich-Leipzig: R. Oldenbourg, 1897).

[2] *Ibid.*, 3rd edition, corrected and supplemented by E. Oberhummer (Munich-Berlin: R. Oldenbourg, 1923), p. 6. Ratzel emphasized the limitations of the map: merely a "schematic representation" of an area, it "does not even give us an inkling about the political idea which animates [the state]." "As far as the leading [political] thoughts reach, that far only extends the state." *Ibid.*, pp. 6, 11.

[3] Joseph Mazzini, *The Duties of Man and Other Essays* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1915), p. 58.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the state-area—was accompanied by a reassertion of the usefulness of the state-idea in political geographical studies.[4] There is little doubt that the concept also can be helpful in studies undertaken by political scientists interested in geopolitics.[5] However, to increase its value as an analytical tool it must be subjected to certain clarifications. Specifically, it would seem necessary to distinguish between the state-idea and the national idea, and to introduce a corollary concept—at times derivative, at times primary —of the geopolitical "image" of the fatherland.

The State-Idea

Every state has a *raison d'être,* however defined and justified; this must be fairly intelligible to its citizenry and either explicitly expressed in some fundamental statement of purpose, or at least implied in the web of positive law which sanctions the centripetal forces and discourages, or directly outlaws, the centrifugal ones. This concrete reason for the existence of the state is usually sustained from below by a *spiritus movens*—a semiconscious tendency rooted in the collective psychology of national traditions and ambitions; and from above by a state-idea—a philosophical and moral conception of the state's destiny and mission in terms of universal human teleology.[6]

The state-idea helps the nation to evolve an image of itself. Looking through its prism, the nation draws strength from a sense of being pushed by history and pulled by an ideal—from a sense of past achievement and a duty to fulfill its destiny. By linking that which was with that which is to be, the nation

[4]R. Hartshorne, "The Functional Approach in Political Geography," *Annals,* Association of American Geographers, June 1950, pp. 95-139; and *idem* (in consultation with a Committee on Political Geography), "Political Geography," in P. E. James and C. F. Jones, editors, *American Geography: Inventory and Prospect* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1954), pp. 167-225.

[5]Ladis K. D. Kristof, "The Origins and Evolution of Geopolitics," *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* March 1960, pp. 15-51.

[6]Some Americans may feel uncomfortable at the thought of a state's "mission" and "destiny." However, insofar as the idea of the nation-state as conceived by Mazzini still prevails (and it implicitly prevails over wide areas of the world, even where hardly anybody ever heard of Mazzini), the justification of a state's existence is in terms of precisely such a destiny and mission, i.e., in terms of the service the given state renders to mankind at large. Mazzini was explicit in maintaining that only those nations which fulfill a mission—in other words, show the capacity and are in a position to add something to the welfare of humanity—have a legitimate claim to statehood and can as a result expect the international community to recognize and protect their right to independence. Like the individual, so also the nation above all has duties. Rights and liberties are derivative from the purpose (mission) fulfilled by each individual man and nation within the framework of the overall teleology of mankind. Mazzini, *op. cit.,* pp. 54, 77-82, *passim.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

develops an image of what it is and what it should become. Many a nation-in-becoming of today's Africa feverishly scans the records of the past for a hint as to its future identity, and, conversely, from an ideal of future identity selectively retraces history, appropriating this or that past, rejecting another. And when the broader question of African identity—of being an African—is debated, the argument of geographical contiguity is passionately invoked against that of historical continuity. Time and again, African leaders go through tortuous reasoning, trying to define what are "facts" and what merely "accidents" in history as well as geography. Needless to say, the distinction they draw is actually based on whether a fact is judged to be legitimate or not.[7]

As concepts of state and national (or, possibly, continental) identity evolve, there also emerges a feeling of belonging, of identification with a certain world and environment, both cultural and geographical. The imperial idea set Britain off from Europe and identified it with a separate, worldwide and oceanic, cultural-economic community. But as the imperial idea collapsed, the British began to develop a different concept of state and identity; they are now drawing closer to, may even merge with, Western Europe. The Turks of the Ottoman Empire era thought primarily in dynamic Pan-Islamic terms, and sharply contrasted their world with that of Europe. Even the Europeans viewed Turkish Europe as a part of the Near East. But today the Turks are espousing the Kemalist national-state idea and are strenuously arguing, and trying to prove, that Turkey is an integral part of the West. The cultural-political boundary between Europe and Asia has fluctuated throughout the ages according to the cultural and geopolitical self-identification of the border people.

The boundary between Europe and Africa has fluctuated, too. Indeed, an instructive parallel can be drawn between Spain and Russia. Both countries were subjected to an outer-European, Islamic occupation and influence, and later, in the process of a step-by-step expulsion and pursuit of the enemy, both extended beyond the limits of Europe. The two countries also went through similar periods of deliberate, rapid "Europeanization," yet failed fully to integrate with and remained (though in different degrees) outsiders to Europe, culturally as well as politically. Moreover, as in Russia so in Spain there were, and to some extent still are, two

[7]See the enlightening article by Ali A. Mazrui, "On the Concept of 'We Are All Africans,'" *American Political Science Review*, March 1963, pp. 88-97.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tendencies battling each other: one "Western," advocating the Europeanization of the country, and another resisting the "foreign," European influences "corrupting" the "true" national culture. In Russia there emerged advocates of Eurasianism, in Spain of Eur-Africanism; both see their countries as vested with a geopolitical heritage and destiny that straddles two continents and, by the same token, makes identification with Europe alone impossible as well as unwise.[8]

The State-Idea and the *Raison d'Être* of the State

The *raison d'être* of the state at its minimum is mainly negative: it is to prevent war from without and within, that is, to protect life and property. At its maximum it is predominantly positive: it helps and compels the people as individuals and as a collective to achieve certain goals; it guides them toward some "better" life.

The *laissez-faire* state's *raison d'être* is primarily negative: it is to prevent encroachments upon the freedom of "pursuit of happiness"—upon the primary, "natural right" freedoms of the individual which antedate the covenant that called the state into being. Characteristically, the framers of the United States Constitution couched the Republic's *raison d'être* primarily in negative terms, that is in terms of specific limitations imposed upon the state vis-à-vis its citizens and not in terms of duties the state assumed toward them. Equally characteristic is the fact that as long as the *laissez-faire* philosophy of government prevailed in the United States the Supreme Court emphasized the so-called freedoms *from;* now that Americans have been converted to something of a welfare state philosophy, the Supreme Court (and the government is more and more willing to recognize and even give priority to the freedoms *to* (e.g., the right to security in old age and in case of illness, the right to counsel at government expense, the right of employment).[9]

The "organic" ideological state's *raison d'être,* by contrast, insists on a negative *and* a positive role. In the context of the

[8]The only work known to this writer that dwells to any extent on the Russia-Spain parallel is Gonzalo de Reparaz', *Geografia y Politica* (Barcelona: Mentora, 1929), especially chapters VIII and IX.

[9]At the same time, the state is directed to assume duties that involve certain *positive* functions, to provide the citizen with those necessities which he in effect is unable to secure on his own. These are distinguished from the essentially *negative* nineteenth-century function of protecting the citizen against interference with that which he either acquired through individual effort or was deemed to possess by birthright.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

laissez-faire state it is the nation, more exactly the multitude of individuals, that forms the active ingredient. In the "organic" ideological state, the state and the state-idea form the dynamic, forward-looking and future-oriented element, while the nation and its idea represent the historical factor, the carriers of the heritage of the past.

The *laissez-faire* state does not, strictly speaking, have a state-idea, for its scope is too severely circumscribed by the principle "the government that governs least governs best." In the "organic" ideological state, on the other hand, the state-idea is assertive and claims priority and superiority over the commonsense, utilitarian understanding of the *raison d'être* of the state. The state exists for the sake of the idea. The state is a system, a tool, by means of which a segment of humanity is effectively organized in the image of the idea; the state is the web which "organically" unites the nation within and with the ideology.[10]

The State-Idea and the National Idea

The state-idea does not quite coincide with the national idea. The former is pre-eminently political, goal-oriented and the brainchild of a more or less sophisticated intellectual elite. The latter is less political, more historical and tradition bound, and pertains rather to the broad masses than to any select group. Still, not even the national idea can be equated with national culture. It is incorrect to define the state-idea so broadly as to make it practically identical with national culture, as some geographers do. This reduces the usefulness of the concept and tends to blur the issues. The relation of the state-idea to national culture is that of a child to its mother. One mother can give birth to several children who, though related to each other, may exhibit fundamentally different characteristics and compete vigorously with one another.

The cultural heritage, accumulated as it is under various circumstances—on purpose, accidentally, or imposed from without—

[10]Some tension between the *raison d'être* of the state and the state-idea is unavoidable. The concept of *raison d'être* of the state has not only an etymological but also a certain logical affinity to reason of state (*Staatsraison*), which in turn is associated with politics of realism (*Realpolitik*), that is, politics essentially ruled by empirical considerations and guided by expediency, hence impervious to the ideological argument. The concept of the state-idea, by contrast, implicitly emphasizes ideology, which in practical terms may mean a policy that endangers the existence of the state for the sake of the idea; a policy in which the *raison d'être* of the idea takes precedence over the *raison d'être* of the state.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

is a mixed blessing .The national idea abjures some components of this assorted heritage even though they may be firmly woven into the fabric of the national way of life. Who could deny that a conspicuous streak of ethnic, religious and racial prejudice is (or at least was for a long time) deeply ingrained in the mainstream of the American cultural heritage? Yet, no one can say that prejudice has ever been a part of the American idea. The national idea is thus, essentially, an idealized self-image of the nation, the *acceptable* part of the national culture; the heritage, true or imaginary, of which the nation is proud, which is to be emulated. The relationship of the national idea to national culture parallels that of the state-idea to the national idea. It is a relationship of primary dependence loosened through a process of selectivity, intellectualization and innovation, as well as by gradual politicization.

The distinction between the state-idea and the national idea is rooted in the relationship between the *raison d'être* of the state and nation, respectively. The nation need not justify its existence to the same extent as the state, for it simply *is,* and it *is* much more on the basis of certain imponderables and psychological elements than on the basis of a rational set of principles. The national idea —the centripetal sentiments born out of the consciousness of a separate identity—is less an expression of the material state of facts than of a certain state of mind, or, rather, state of heart. Feelings and beliefs, secular as well as religious, are of crucial importance. The cult of a national patron saint, and the place it is practiced, may at times assume major importance. They give the fatherland an additional dimension, sometimes another capital, too.[11] They unite the citizenry on the level of supernatural expectations even at a time when in the natural realm everything seems pulverized in a maze of centrifugal aspirations.

The national idea, the *raison d'être* of a nation, is then an internal question of the nation itself—a problem of self-respect,

[11]E.g., the Mexican *Virgen del Guadalupe*, or the "Queen of Poland" *Matka Boska Jasnogórska* (in Czestochowa), or the Lithuanian *Vilniaus Ausros Vartu Gailestingumo Dievo Motina* (often referred to in past times as the Queen, or Grand Duchess, of Lithuania). Sometimes the religious and the secular capitals are centers of competing ideas. For instance, in Mongolia, where for centuries religion was national while state power (as well as the state-idea) was foreign, the towns are, in their origin, either national-religious centers, i.e., monastery towns, like Ulan-Bator (Urga), or foreign-administrative centers, i.e., centers of power from without, like Jibhalanta (Uliassutai) and Jirgalanta (Khobdo), both of which were founded by the Manchurian conquerors. Cf. I. M. Maiskii, *Mongolia nakanune revolutsii* (2nd revised edition; Moscow: Izd. vostochnoi literatury, 1959), pp. 96-102.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of moral purpose—rather than a question of external relations. A state often has to justify in the eyes of the outside world its reason of, and right to, existence, because its existence depends on the consent, willing or unwilling, of other states. A nation (that is, a nation in the cultural and ethnic sense), on the other hand, largely exists regardless of the consent of the political community and law, national or international. A nation may live irrespective of whether it has any rights, but a state that loses its rights ceases to exist. The state being in the first place a legal personality, its existence is to a large extent conditional upon substantial conformity to certain uniform standards of behavior, external and even internal.[12] A nation, however, survives precisely because of *divergent* behavior; its *raison d'être* is cultural distinctiveness, a touch of uniqueness.

The State-Idea versus the National Idea: The Case of Russia

In practice, the difference between the state and national ideas is usually rather subtle, a matter of shades, but this is not always so. For instance, in Russia this difference has been sharpened by a recurring explicit contraposition, an emphasized dichotomy between *narod* and *gosudarstvo*—the aims and ideals of "the people" and "the state." In fact, the official language and terminology openly acknowledged a certain duality when it sanctioned the distinction between *russkii* and *rossiiskii,* between what pertains to the (Great) Russian people and what to All-the-"Russias."[13] While the German, French or Spanish nations had "their"

[12]In the past, the precondition for the recognition of a state as a member of the international community (i.e., for the extension to it of the protection of international law) was its accession to a certain minimum standard of acceptable behavior in *external* (interstate) affairs only. More recently, especially under the Charter of the United Nations, there has been an attempt also to set a minimum standard of civilized behavior in *internal* affairs: a minimum standard to which the national law of all member (and possibly also nonmember) states should conform. The state that refuses to conform to those standards in either external or internal affairs becomes an outcast; in extreme cases virtually an outlaw, fair game for anyone. In a limited sense, this is the situation in which Mainland China, Rhodesia and South Africa find themselves today for having violated, in the eyes of a segment of the international community, the minimum standard of acceptable external or internal behavior.

[13]Etymologically, *rossiiskii* and *Rossiia* are Russified versions of the Latin (or Greek) words for Russian and Russia. They are forms of speech introduced in the sixteenth century when the Muscovite rulers were preoccupied with the adoption of ways, titles and emblems that would emphasize the Russian monarch's absolute equality with any European sovereign. (It was then that the two-headed eagle was put on the state seal, just to make sure the Russian Tsar was not inferior to the Sovereign of the Holy Roman Empire.) Originally, the new forms did not carry a different meaning and were used interchangeably with the old ones. But

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

empires, the Tsarist Empire was officially not "Russian"; it was not *Russkaia Imperia* but *Rossiiskaia Imperiia,* and the tsar was not *Russkii Imperator* but *Imperator Vserossiiskii.* Neither is there within the Soviet Union a Russian (*Russkaia*) Federal Republic, only a *Rossiiskaia* Federal Republic.[14] Similarly, there is no Russian Communist Party (not even a *Rossiiskaia* C. P.) although there is a Ukrainian, Lithuanian, and Armenian Communist Party, and so on. The highly sensitive distinction between the political connotations associated with *russkii* and *rossiiskii*—nationalistic Russian versus supranational All-Russian—was the reason why the pre-1917 Russian Social Democracy never called itself *Russkaia* S.—D. R. P. but always *Rossiiskaia* S.—D. R. P.

Some Russian statesmen have favored the *russkaia* (national) idea, others the *rossiiskaia* (state, or imperial) idea; still others tried to fuse the two. And, of course, there were a variety of nuances of national and state ideas. Whether the political idea dominating the Soviet Union today should be classified as a state-idea or a national idea is as controversial as the question of the existence of a "Soviet fatherland" and "Soviet nationality" (or "Soviet man").

The state-idea as the dominant coalescing force implied that effective integration of All-the-"Russias" was to be by means of "Rossification"—the development of an unswerving loyalty and direct attachment to the person of the tsar, by God's will the sole-power-holder (*samoderzhets*) and head of *the* Church. "Rossification" was permeation not so much by ways and things specifically Russian as by the spirit of the Orthodox Church. Not unlike the

their introduction having coincided with the creation of a multinational Russian Empire extending far beyond the old Russian (*russkiia*) lands, the connotation imperial Russian became associated with them. The old form *russkii* (and *Russ*) has been retained for the designation of that which is national (ethnically) Russian. But in certain grammatical formations arbitrariness in the choice between the two forms persists—e.g., the Great Russians are *velikorossy* and the Little Russians are *malorossy,* while the White Russians are *belorussy;* and notwithstanding these forms, when speaking about the respective languages it is *velikorusskaia, malorusskaia* and *belorusskaia mova.* See the articles by P. F. Vinkler, "Gerb, gerbovedenie," and D. Anuchin, "Rossiia v etnograficheskom otnoshenii," in *Entsiklopedicheskii Slovar Brokgauz & Efron* (St. Petersburg), Vols. VIII (1893) and XXVII (1899), pp. 461 and 139 (of second half of the volume), respectively. See also V. O. Mikhnevich, "Kto i kogda vydumal Rossiiu," in his *Istoricheskie ocherki i razskazy,* Vol. I (St. Petersburg, 1900), pp. 1-27; Petr Struve, "Imperiia i Rossiia," *Rossiia i Slavianstvo* (Paris), No. 202, October 8, 1932, p. 1; and Gustave Alef, "The Adoption of the Muscovite Two-Headed Eagle: A Discordant View," *Speculum,* January 1966, pp. 1-21.

[14]This is apparently with a view to the various national groups which, though reduced today to the status of small minorities within the Republic, remain conscious of their historical rights that preceded Russian imperial expansion and colonization.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

present policy of sovietization, which applies to minorities the principle "national in form, socialist in content," "Rossification" saw the essence in Orthodoxy, not in Russianism. No less an arch-conservative than K. P. Pobedonostsev, the Procurator of the Holy Synod, approved the translation into Tartar of various Orthodox texts to facilitate the "Rossification" of the Muslim population. He specifically supported the principle "national in form but Orthodox in content."[15]

The Orthodox idea, not the Russian tongue or civilization, was the *spiritus movens* of the tsardom. Russia was first of all Holy, not Russian. Conversely, those who had still not embraced Orthodoxy could not, in the eyes of a Pobedonostsev, be regarded as genuinely integrated, or even wholly worthy of trust, no matter how Russified they might appear. They were not to be trusted except in secondary government positions, for they had not internalized that which alone had the power to generate in them a spiritual bond of loyalty and a true understanding of what Russia was and stood for. The non-Orthodox Russian had merely the capacity to be a *passively* loyal subject—to render Caesar what was Caesar's —not *actively* to participate in formulating and fulfilling Russia's higher Orthodox mission and destiny. He could be only in the limited, secular sense a loyal subject of the tsar qua sovereign ruler of a multiracial, multinational and multireligious empire. Russia's eighteenth-century rulers were time and again criticized precisely on the ground that they used numerous non-Orthodox diplomats and generals not merely as experts—not exclusively in executive capacity—but also abandoned to them policymaking decisions.

The national idea, on the other hand, implied Russification (or at least Slavicization). Its two molds, Slavophilism and Pan-Slavism, emphasized the primacy of things and values Russian (or Slav) above the imperial state-idea and *raison d'état*. The national idea saw ethnic, not religious, ties as the foundation of loyalty to the fatherland.[16] Hence the geopolitical base of those ties had to be

[15]Robert F. Byrnes, "Pobedonostsev on Government Instruments," in E. J. Simmons, editor, *Continuity and Change in Russian and Soviet Thought* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955), pp. 113-128; quotation on p. 126.

[16]The Slavophiles did emphasize religious ideas, but not organized religion. Laymen were seen as guardians of religious truth coequal with the clergy. In case of conflict, Slavophiles' sympathies were apt to be with the dissenters, that is, "the people," who were far less suspect of having become corrupted than the Church hierarchy. In fact, the impression was sometimes created that, ultimately, "the people" were to be considered the arbiter in matters of religion, for they were the Messiah on earth—the sufferer and redeemer. Hence it was not ties of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

expanded. Lands inhabited by Orthodox Christians, for instance Armenia, wrested from the Turks, were also to be opened to Russian colonization.[17] The "Germans" in the tsar's family and entourage were time and again branded a corrupting, virtually treasonable element whatever their strict, even fanatic support of the Orthodox Church and throne. The "true" Russian ways and ideas were those "of the Slavs as of old," and since these were allegedly democratic and dating from pre-Christian times, the relevance and value of autocracy and Orthodoxy for the Russian nation was questioned. While the government and Holy Synod equated all dissenters, religious as well as political, with traitors, the Slavophiles elaborated the theory about the natural goodness of "the people" and intrinsic wickedness of the "superimposed" state.

The Pan-Slav mold of the national idea tended, in its "conservative" (imperialistic) variant, to overlap with the state-idea. But the Russian Empire could only ally itself with Pan-Slavism; it could use it, but not identify itself with it. A latent tension between the nationalist and the statesman, the national idea and the *raison d'état,* has been a phenomenon recurring everywhere. Bismarck had to face the problem after both Sadowa and Sedan. In the enormous Russian Empire, the gap between the national idea and the requirements of the *raison d'état* was particularly acute. The ruling Great Russian element constituted (as of 1897) only 45 per cent of the tsar's subjects, and the non-Slavs were a majority on extended tracts of the national territory. In terms of the political and geopolitical problems with which the Russian Empire had to grapple, both internally and externally, the national idea was woefully inadequate. It focused exclusively on the Russified off-center areal core. Worse still, it showed passionate

religion that bound the people; rather, it was the ties spawned by the people that were religious. Of course, there also was a "right" Slavophilism, the *kvasnoe slavianofilstvo* (jingoistic Slavophilism), which denied all dichotomy between the state and the nation, the tsar and "the people," and supported the government and its "official nationality," including official Orthodoxy. But this Slavophilism would deny, too, the very existence of our distinction between the state and the national idea. For an exposition of the views of A. S. Khomiakov, the Slavophile authority on theology, see P. K. Christoff, *An Introduction to Nineteenth-Century Slavophilism, Volume I: A. S. Xomjakov* (The Hague: Mouton & Company, 1961), especially pp. 157-163.

[17]Barely had the Armenians had time to greet the Russian troops as their Christian saviors from sure extermination at the hands of the Turks, during World War I, when they heard about a plan afoot to send Cossack settlers into their country. One also should recall the 1903 confiscation of the treasury of the Armenian Church in Russia, which was pushed by Russifiers in high places.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

preoccupation with lands and people that were, and have always been, far outside the sovereign realm of the state.

An interesting case of such preoccupation were the ideas preached by F. I. Tiutchev, a leading Pan-Slav poet who was at the same time considered the "de Maistre of the Russian Orthodox Church." Combining Pan-Slav with Orthodox imperialism, he claimed that the problems of Europe would not be settled until Rome became the residence of an Orthodox pope, subordinated to the tsar residing in Constantinople. Thus Rome was to be the religious and Constantinople the secular center of "the great Orthodox Empire, the legitimate Empire of the East."[18] In a poem, "The Geography of Russia" ("Russkaia geografiia" [1848]), Tiutchev described the "Russian realm" as extending

From the Nile to the Neva, from the Elbe to China
From the Volga to the Euphratus, from the Ganghes to the Danube.

Thus his version of the cultural-political *Lebensraum* legitimately belonging to the future Russo-Slav-Orthodox empire extended far beyond anything the imperial Foreign Office in St. Petersburg ever dreamed of.[19]

Given the geopolitical nature of the Russian Empire and the nature of the Russian national idea, the latter was incapable of generating an effectively integrating sentiment in much of the empire's territory. The imperial state-idea was in this respect decidedly superior. It had the advantage of operating on two levels. It could either reduce its standard of loyalty to a minimum, i.e., to purely political matters, or aim at developing a maximum bond of loyalty founded on a religious communion. On the secular level it appealed to the tradition of respect for the established, legitimate and awe-inspiring might of a great power enhanced by the reassuring image of a benevolent and protective "father-tsar."

[18]K. Pigarev, *Zhizn i tvorchestvo Tiutcheva* (Moscow: Akademiia Nauk SSSR, 1962), pp. 125, 130.

[19]If the geopolitical aims of the tsarist Foreign Office ever coincided in part with Pan-Slav ideas, then it was with the ideas of the early Pan-Slavs (of the pre-1848 period) who were Poles, namely, J. Lelewel, W. Jablonowski and A. Gurowski, especially the latter two. Both Jablonowski and Gurowski recognized that Russia was substantially an Asiatic power in the cultural-ethnic as well as territorial sense, and could aim only at rather limited objectives in Europe. Hence the boundaries of the Pan-Slav realm were to extend, according to Gurowski, "from the Arctic Ocean to the Mediterranean and from the Vistula to the Pacific." Z. Klarnerowna, *Slowianofilstwo w literaturze polskiej lat 1800 do 1848* (*Studja z zakresu historji literatury polskiej,* Nr. 4; Warsaw, 1926), pp. 103-104. Gurowski's Pan-Slav ideas are analyzed in detail in K. Ostaszewski-Baránski, *Panslawista polski Adam hr. Gurowski* (Lwów, 1909).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

On the spiritual level, it appealed to a supernatural authority and to ideas panhuman in scope. Thus, the state-idea could, according to circumstances, cast itself in the mold of a down-to-earth, territorially circumscribed policy, or again emphasize lofty, worldwide aims.

The Iconography of the Fatherland

"Every state," said Ratzel, "is a piece of humanity and a piece of land."[20] The state-idea, the *raison d'être* of the state, and the national idea represent the various intellectual, practical and emotional ingredients linking the given "piece of humanity" with the corresponding "piece of land"; and once a bond is forged which transcends the merely formal, legal ties, the latter is raised to the status of fatherland. But the idea of one's fatherland is abstract; it is the visual image, the iconography of it which is concrete and alive.

Political scientists often speak of the image a nation consciously or unconsciously tries to project, or conversely, the image one nation has of another. This is not enough. Parallel to and in interaction with the image of the nation there also evolves an image of the fatherland from which the sentiment of national identity cannot be abstracted. To be *of* a nation means above all else to be *of* a country—a countryman. It also means to fit into the visual world of the country with which that national group identifies itself. A man's dress, his house or garden, or a city, village and the surrounding countryside are perceived as "foreign" or "ours" according to whether or not they harmonize with the cherished picture of the fatherland. Sudden changes in the familiar outlook of men and landscape seem jarring intrusions incompatible with that which is treasured and valued—alarming fissures in the normally soothing, reassuring image of the homeland outside which one feels an alien in an alien world. It is for this image of the fatherland that men are willing to die; indeed, through it they seem as if to transcend death itself. In Kipling's words, "Who dies if England live?"[21] Englishmen were not asked to die so that other Englishmen might live; it was so that England might live that countless Tommies marched to their death. But they did so not for England as it really was. The land that commanded the lives of its countrymen was—observed Kipling—

[20]Ratzel, *op. cit.*, p. 2.
[21]Rudyard Kipling, *For All We Have and Are* (1914).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

not the one of "only putty, brass, an' paint" but "the England of our dreams."[22]

The image of the fatherland both real and "of our dreams" is, however, never merely a visualization of the familiar—beloved and idealized—landscape. It also includes a vision of the qualities that make the land partake of our dreams, a vision of our past and future. In fact, what we *choose* to see in the external world around us—the men, the nature, the landmarks in the landscape we incorporate as typical of the image—is that which fits into our conception of the *true* history and destiny of the fatherland. Everything else does not really belong in the picture for it represents chance intrusions from without, mere accidents of history. From the "cradle" or "heartland" of the country comes the "legitimate," "typical," "good." Indeed, the image of the fatherland almost always includes the notion of such a territorial core playing the role of a "spring-well," a "heart" from which the nation's ultimate strength, moral and/or material, is drawn. The patriot dips his brush in this "spring-well" when painting the icon of the fatherland of his dreams.

Thus, for instance, many an Indian nationalist is inclined to glorify the interior of his country—its sights, its monuments, its ancient ways of life—for it was there that Aryavarta, the home of the old, original Aryan culture was located. Time and again Aryavarta is referred to as the "heartland" of India. However, it is an open question exactly how far north and south the "heartland" extended, and the ways of life and customs substantially differed between the several northern and southern provinces. Hence, both ancient and modern writers have tended to expand or confine the presumed boundaries of Aryavarta in order to include or exclude certain regions whose traditions and values they wanted either to praise or to condemn as conforming or not conforming to the "true" Indian ways. Characteristically, Jawaharlal Nehru—whose ideal was a large, united India extending over all of the subcontinent and beyond, and embracing both the Hindu and Moslem population—did not look with favor upon the idea of linking modern India to the heritage of an Aryavarta because it was "confined to the lands of the Aryas."[23] He obviously preferred to link the fate of his country to the era and heritage of Bharatvarsha that

[22] *Idem, The Return.* For a recent, enlightening study on this subject see David Lowenthal and Hugh C. Prince, "English Landscape Tastes," *Geographical Review,* April 1965, pp. 186-222.

[23] Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India* (New York: John Day, 1946), p. 97.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

evoked the image of a united India. For the same reason, of the two great Indian epics, the *Ramayana* and the *Mahabharata,* Nehru had a marked preference for the latter.[24] The *Ramayana* is, in terms of Nehru's concept of India, a little too narrow and provincial, for its story is limited to the "Aryan expansion [from the central "heartland"] to the south." The *Mahabharata* paints a broad historical picture dating from

> the period when foreign [i.e., non-Aryan] elements were coming into India and bringing their customs with them. . . . [It describes] the great civil war . . . [that] marks the beginning of the conception of India as a whole, of Bharatvarsha. This conception included a large part of modern Afghanistan, then called Gandhara, which was considered an integral part of the country. . . . In the *Mahabharata* a very definite attempt has been made to emphasize the fundamental unity of India; . . . [it expresses] the idea of a single centralized India.[25]

In Russia, the so-called Westernizers looked upon the forward-oriented capital of St. Petersburg as the epicenter of Russian life. Thus the Neva Embankment of St. Petersburg was called by Alexander Kerensky "the majestic heart of the Russian Empire."[26] The Russian Slavophiles, on the other hand, insisted that "St. Petersburg as the capital of the Empire did us untold, immeasurable harm." Situated "on the extreme periphery" of the country, in a "most unfavorable" location, St. Petersburg was completely unsuitable to be the administrative center of the state. Moreover, its "contiguity with Europe" was responsible for the absorption of foreign influences which made the Russians into "monkeys of Europe." The capital, argued the Slavophiles, should have re-

[24]"Great as the *Ramayana* is as an epic poem, and loved by the people, it is really the *Mahabharata* that is one of the outstanding books of the world." *Ibid.*

[25]*Ibid.,* pp. 97-98. It should be noted here that in India (as well as elsewhere, e.g., in Brazil) there are weighty practical arguments why attention should be turned toward the "heartland" of the interior. Appeals to ancient historical traditions and values associated with Aryavarta are in part but a convenient ideological framework used by those Indians who would like to see the supremacy of the coastal cities (Bombay, Calcutta, Madras) challenged. Emphasis on the latter represents a survival from the days when India was outward-oriented toward the imperial motherland and its interior divided into several separate hinterlands each bound to one of the dominant coastal cities by a distinct transportation network. The colonial railway network was, in fact, purposely designed to stimulate regional sea orientation, and because of this acted as a centrifugal, disintegrative force in terms of the subcontinent as a whole. To transform India into an effectively integrated socio-economic entity, rival urban and industrial centers must be built in the inland, on the plateau, and the transportation network must be redesigned with that in view. For an interesting case study of problems of interior plateau versus coastal lowland development see Richard P. Momsen, Jr., *Routes over the Serra do Mar: The Evolution of Transportation in the Highlands of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo* (Rio de Janeiro, 1964).

[26]Alexander Kerensky, *Russia and History's Turning Point* (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1965), p. 20.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mained in Moscow, the city whence "the hand of Russia was laid upon the East, the then Tartar Volga, Urals, Siberia—entire kingdoms of most valuable and [now] undetachable [from the Empire] lands"; or it could have been located in "Nizhnii Novgorod, the internal, industrial core [of the country] and the Russo-Asian market place."[27] Still other Russians, rejecting the ideas of both the Westernizers and Slavophiles, wanted the capital moved back to Kiev, "the Mother of Russian towns," for this would permit a "return to the original, European channel" in Russian history—that is, it would deliver the country from the derivative, imitative civilization seeping in through St. Petersburg and also free it from the "base" mentality of Moscow, the acropolis of a "Mongol-Tartar Russia."[28]

A similar competition between rival national centers can be observed in China where the South and the North, with Nanking and Peking as the respective capitals, symbolize two different heritages. Sun Yat-sen chose Nanking as his capital to point out that his movement was linked to the traditions of the South China Ming period. He thus emphasized the national Chinese character of the 1911 revolution as opposed to the foreign heritage represented by the Ch'ing emperor, a descendant of the invaders from the North. When Peking was captured by the Kuomintang in 1928 and renamed Peiping,[29] this was not only a military but also a symbolic reassertion of the southern capital's claim to supremacy. Mao Tse-tung's triumph made Peking once more the capital of China. Of course, Chiang Kai-shek, as well as his American friends, continue to refer to Peiping, not Peking.[30]

Alienation: The Case of *Dépaysement*

One could cite many other examples of rivalry between national heritages and the related competition between "heartlands,"

[27]P. Kh. Grabbe in his Mémoirs for January 28, 1854, in N. Barsukov, *Zhizn i trudy M. Pogodina,* 22 vols. (St. Petersburg: M. Stasiulevich, 1888-1906), Vol. XIII, p. 37.

[28]A. K. Tolstoi, *Sobranie sochinenii,* 4 vols. (Moscow: "Khudozhestvennaia literatura," 1963-64), Vol. IV, pp. 271, 273, 281 (letters to P. B. Markevich of March 26 and April 26, 1869, and speech in the English Club of Odessa, March 14, 1869). Similar views are expressed by Tolstoi in many of his works, e.g., in the ballad *Zmei Tugarin* (especially stanzas 9, 14 and 22), in the epic *Kniaz Serebrianyi,* as well as in the trilogy of historical dramas *Smert Ioanna Groznogo, Tsar Fedor Ioannovich* and *Tsar Boris.* For strong support of Tolstoi's views by a prominent Russian politician see V. V. Shulgin, "Kiev, the Mother of Russian Towns," *Slavonic Yearbook* (*The Slavonic and East European Review*), Vol. XIX (1940), pp. 62-82, especially p. 71.

[29]Peking and Peiping mean Northern Capital and Northern Peace, respectively.

[30]See Hugh Tinker, *The City in the Asian Polity,* inaugural lecture, November 28, 1963 (London: School of Oriental and African Studies, 1964), p. 13, and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

capitals, and, more broadly, images of the fatherland. But the problem is wider than tensions between competing concepts of the nation's heritage and destiny. What is involved is the interrelationship between all three of the basic elements we have mentioned: a piece of humanity, a piece of land, and a spiritual heritage and aspiration. Man must strive to be in harmony with each of these elements. This may prove difficult. One may find it easy to identify one's self with one or two but not all of them. One may, for instance, love the people but hate the land, or vice versa. Persecuted minorities often develop an attachment to the land all the stronger the more they become alienated from the people. A Jewish lady from Poland, settled in Palestine for years, who met by chance a Polish traveler immediately began to reminisce about her native country, "that beautiful land"—the pine forests, the lakes, the birch trees, the weeping willows. "I love Poland," she conceded with deep conviction, and then quickly added "but I hate the Poles."

The opposite phenomenon—attachment to the people and cultural environment but alienation from the natural environment—is well illustrated by the Englishmen who, though deeply attached to their countrymen and to their country's culture, have such a distaste for the English climate that they choose to settle abroad in warmer lands. There, far from England, they immediately proceed to recreate around themselves a little island of English landscape and civilization.[31]

Every manifestation of disharmony between man and his milieu generates a feeling of alienation. This must be overcome; and in order to overcome alienation from reality one seeks a substitute for reality. That substitute may be sought in another, actual or imaginary, reality by shifting on the plane of either time or space, or both. The common *shift in time* is toward an idealized past—toward the "good old days," the "pure" past when the fatherland and people were true to themselves. Another common shift in time is toward an idealized future—the paradise, the Utopia. The image of a *future*-land is substituted for the image of the *fathers'*-land.

The case of a *shift in space,* toward a new geographical location, occurs when we react to a type of alienation best described by the

Sen-dou Chang, "Peking: The Growing Metropolis of China," *Geographical Review,* July 1965, pp. 313-327.

[31]See Ladis K. D. Kristof, "Political Laws in International Relations," *Western Political Quarterly,* September 1958, pp. 598-606, especially pp. 600-601.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

French word *dépaysement*. When we do not feel at home in our own country, we feel obliged to seek another *pays,* another country, a substitute fatherland. The communist, frustrated by the capitalist regime and bourgeois spirit of his homeland, may feel alienated (*dépaysé*) enough to declare the Soviet Union his true fatherland;[32] perhaps he may even migrate there. To many a European of the 1848 generation America became the true home after he could not feel at home in his native land. In countries of a continental or subcontinental size—like Russia, China or India—the geographical shifts that followed various kinds of *dépaysement* tended to take place within the bounds of the country. The shift was merely from one real and/or symbolic center of the country to another in order to appeal to a different heritage for the sake of a different morrow.

Thus the iconography of the fatherland is ever being adjusted to harmonize with evolving aspirations, with the anticipated future. Chronology and chorology—the historical and geographical sequence of events—are manipulated to converge precisely on the spot with which we seek self-identification, and which we name *our* country. For though as men we value human relationships most, we cannot become an integrated piece of humanity in the abstract, only in an environment of time and space in which we feel at home—which we wish to be our children's *father*land.

Our discussion of the image of the fatherland shows that to conceive of geopolitics solely as a study of the relationship between geographical factors on the one hand and political factors on the other, is misleading. We can speak of a relationship between several factors only as long as they are discrete and separable. In the image of the fatherland, however, the geographical and political virtually fuse. We can separate from the human, political element only that which is outside man. But the image of the fatherland is too much a part of our most intimate personality, too intertwined with the whole complex of our physical, psychic and intellectual being, to permit any such separation. Ideas can be abstracted from man. It is not, however, the same thing to speak

[32]French communists have in the past often used the slogan "France is our country, but the Soviet Union is our fatherland." A communist deputy, A. Musmeaux, declared on March 3, 1950, in the French National Assembly: "And when you tell us that the Soviet Union is our fatherland we do not consider this an insult. We glorify ourselves with it and are proud of it." On the implications for the political system of such a "geopolitical schizophrenia"—dichotomy between the geographical and spiritual fatherland—see Ladis K. D. Kristof, "The Nature of Frontiers and Boundaries," *Annals,* Association of American Geographers, September 1959, pp. 269-282, especially pp. 278-279.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the idea of the fatherland and the image of the fatherland. The two are about as different as the idea of the father and the image of the father. One of the difficulties posed by the study of the image of the fatherland is the inadequacy of the scientific method of investigation, which relies so heavily on dissection and abstraction. The ancient philosophers taught us that when both abstract ideas and common speech fail us, the language of the poets may be the only suitable one. Indeed, it is not an accident that to convey the essence and subtle meanings of the image of the fatherland, we must time and again turn to a poet for a suitable quotation.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

POLITICAL STRUCTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN TROPICAL AFRICA

by P. J. Idenburg

ANY consideration of problems concerning the development of constitutional law in the new states of tropical Africa must take into account the fact that this development is still in full swing. Since their independence—first gained by Ghana in 1957—most of these countries have already passed through many phases. All aspects of their social life are subject to frequent changes, often of a radical nature. Political organization is no exception. For this reason any attempt to arrive at a systematic classification cannot be completely successful. Some countries would very soon have to be put in another category: what is true today is often no longer true tomorrow.

Besides, our Western type of constitutional law is not by any means entirely suited to African conditions, and the solutions that have been applied in tropical Africa are, as African statesmen like to argue, solutions of a particular—specifically "African"—nature. Virtually all dissertations by African statesmen stress that African conditions cannot be measured by Western standards. To give only one example, Sékou Touré put it as follows in an article in *Foreign Affairs* (October 1962):

> An attempt to solve specific African problems out of context, according to some half-understood universal concept, neglects the especially important social factors. Such an approach assumes that science has reached its limits, that mankind's present knowledge is absolute and immutable, and that in these matters there is nothing further to be expected, attempted or desired. It implies that human society, having reached maturity, begins to decline.

After dealing with the problems confronting the African countries, Guinea's President Touré concluded that the policy to be pursued "is a question of affirming our 'Africanity.'" The precise meaning of this "Africanity" cannot easily be determined. Sometimes one gets the impression that it is a convenient smoke screen to hide behind. In any case, African statesmen use the term in an attempt to convey that they do not necessarily consider themselves bound to accept Western tenets in the matter of con-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

stitutional law. Here and there we come across surprising phenomena that cannot easily be fitted into the conceptual patterns with which we are familiar. I therefore propose to limit myself to indicating a few trends which are discernible in tropical African development, and will consider these against the background of political structure in the area.

I

These new states have to cope with—or rather build upon—a twofold past, the traditional one and the colonial one, the latter having introduced Western ideas and (as Europeans often say, not without a certain degree of pride) made possible contact with the modern age. In general we find that when rules of Western constitutional law are introduced, their application is frequently influenced by traditional conceptions. More particularly it can be said—and this will emerge more clearly in the course of this exposition—that the whole parliamentary system, the form of which has been taken over from the West, is applied in a way that is incomprehensible to the Western observer, unless he is familiar with the traditional structure of African society and the political ideas connected with it.

This traditional political structure varies greatly. In some territories we find a highly differentiated hierarchical, traditional political pattern; in others, a community where the biggest political structure is the small village, while elsewhere even that does not exist. For example, in Northern Nigeria the Sardauna of Sokota, the traditional head and Prime Minister, rules over emirs, each of whom administers parts of this vast territory; below them there is a minute subdivision of lesser authorities, headmen and other local rulers. At the other extreme, traditionally the largest unit in Kenya is a homestead, an extended family-grouping. Between these extremes we notice every possible shade of difference. In regions where the colonial power found no indigenous political system of any significance it introduced a Western administrative organization, almost entirely copied from the mother country. As one example among many we can cite the Ibos in Eastern Nigeria, who received an organization made up of counties and boroughs, with the same functions and the same definition of duties as in Britain. Elsewhere, as in Kenya, where there were no native chiefs, these were appointed by the colonial government. Although the structure in this case was

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

derived from the traditional society, in the eyes of the population the officials appointed by a foreign power never acquired the prestige of native rulers in other areas with the same title. They were regarded with a certain distrust as being the tools of the colonial power. In the territories under French rule it was fairly general for a considerable part of the administrative organization to be taken over by France, special attention being paid to the uniformity and centralization which are typical of the mother country.

After independence, the rulers of the new countries had no alternative to basing a political structure on that of the existing colonial administrative organization. It is evident, however, that everywhere they feel most attracted to systems with strong centralized power in a unitary concept of government. The traditional authorities can be fitted into these political systems, not as separate centers of power, but as individuals. If they prove to be uncooperative they will be eliminated. This process is still under way. There is hardly a place where the traditional chiefs have lost their influence altogether, if in colonial times this influence was of any significance, but in many of the new states the struggle between modern government and traditional authority is assuming dramatic proportions.

The most radical action was taken in Guinea, where the traditional chiefs were simply swept away. The powerful trade union movement, on whose support the only party permitted in Guinea depends, and which has ramifications extending to the smallest village, has so far prevented any reaction from the already weak traditional authorities. However, even there, if the internal difficulties become still greater than they are now, it is not impossible that the malcontents will try to rally round these rulers of former days. In another former French territory of West Africa, the Upper Volta, in which the age-old powerful Empire of the Mossi is situated, the Emperor tried to dislodge the representatives in the legislative assembly after the declaration of independence and to proclaim a constitutional monarchy.[1] This coup was unsuccessful and the government was able to push aside the claims of the royal house. In yet another of the former French West African territories, Senegal,[2] the ex-premier, Mamadou Dia, who

[1]The "Emperor" of the Mossi, Moro Naba, appears to be gradually losing his influence at present.

[2]With reference to Senegal, see H. Deschamps, *Le Senegal et la Gambie* (Paris, 1964), in the series "Que sais je?."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

was known to hold fairly radical views, was sentenced by the highest court of law to detention for life in a fortress when his attempted coup failed. He went a long way toward eliminating traditional authority as a power factor in the administration of the country.

How greatly political development varies is shown by the fact that in the Ivory Coast the person of the present Head of State, Félix Houphouet-Boigny, combines modern statesmanship with traditional authority. This was also the case with the Abbot Boganda, head of the Central African Republic, who was killed in a plane crash some years ago. Boganda's authority extended far beyond his own country simply because he combined both forms of authority in himself. His wisdom and level-headedness led observers to believe that he might exercise a stabilizing influence in all of Equatorial Africa. In Cameroon, now a federal republic, an entirely different solution to the problem was found: an article in the constitution stipulates that the rights of the traditional chiefs will be maintained. However, to what extent this will in fact prove to be the case remains to be seen.

In some of the former French African territories, surprisingly, traditional chiefs have formed professional organizations so that they can continue to exercise a significant political influence in elections owing to their personal authority. This is the case in Upper Volta, Niger and Chad, among other states.[3]

II

Let us now turn to the territories which used to be under British rule. In Ghana, soon after independence, the opposition, both in Ashanti and in the Northern Territories, found considerable support from the traditional chiefs and was in some cases led by them. The Ghanaian government fought these opponents relentlessly. The introduction of the unitary state authorized by the Constitution of 1960 and the consequent abolition of regional legislative assemblies was the first step toward robbing the regional chiefs of their influence. The appointment of chiefs and the power they wield were ultimately dependent on the will of the President of the Republic. Although in accepting office President Nkrumah had to swear that the institution of traditional chiefs would be preserved and protected in Ghana, this had become

[3]In Niger and Chad the entire political situation was altered by the action of the traditional chiefs.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

no more than an empty phrase. The reality was very different: the ruling party was strongly anti-traditional and expressed this by constantly undermining what was left of the chiefs' authority.

On February 24, 1966 the Nkrumah Government was overthrown by a coup d'état engineered by Ghana's armed forces and police under Lt. General J. A. Ankrah. In July 1966 a chiefs' conference convened in Kumasi, the first of its kind since Ghana became independent. It can be expected that the position of the chiefs will be strengthened by the new constitution, now being drafted, which will pave the way for restoration of civilian rule.

Sierra Leone has a completely different system. Twelve of the seventy-four members of the House of Representatives—the Legislative Assembly—must be Paramount Chiefs, elected not by universal suffrage but by the chiefdom authorities. They serve as ministers, statesmen of the party in office, working constructively within the constitution, and as judges in the courts of customary law. However, future constitutional development in Sierra Leone is now uncertain, following a military coup d'état in March 1967 which established a National Reformation Council under the chairmanship of Lt. Colonel Juxon Smith.

Of particular interest is the relation between traditional and modern authority in Nigeria. Northern Nigeria was, until recently, completely in the grip of tradition. Feudal conditions gave the impression that life had long stood still and that the influence of modern statecraft and social concepts was very little felt, if at all. In this part of the Federation of Nigeria, which has by far the largest population, the traditional chiefs reigned almost supreme. The Northern Nigerian constitution placed the ultimate power to appoint and dismiss them in the hands of the regional House of Chiefs. The influence of the Northern House of Chiefs corresponded to the importance of the traditional rulers who comprised it. Besides the House of Chiefs there was also a regional legislative assembly, elected by the people. Although in recent years a majority of the members of this assembly have been elected, the authority of the chiefs, with their aura of divinity, was so great that the people's representatives would scarcely venture to pit their will against that of the rulers. In the event of a difference of opinion between the assembly and the House of Chiefs a joint session was required in order to reach a decision. So far in such cases the chiefs have usually been able to assert their will.

The constitutions of the Western and Eastern Regions of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Nigeria also provided for an Upper House of Chiefs. The chiefs thus had a fixed place in the system of government according to the rules laid down, but these rules were more or less artificial and the realities of political life could not be made to fit them. It was only in Northern Nigeria that the House of Chiefs had real power in all legislation, except that which related to finance.

In mid-January 1966, following an attempted coup by a small number of army officers, which resulted in the death of Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa and the premiers of the Northern and Western Regions, the administration of Nigeria was handed over to the military and the police under the control of Major General John Ironsi. In all regions the respective military governments were made directly responsible to the supreme Military Council. Nigeria was to be a centralized state, with the regions abolished and a number of territorial areas established instead. On the first of August 1966, however, federal government was provisionally restored, owing to another coup d'état, as a result of which Lt. Colonel Yakabu Gowon assumed leadership of the country. Federalism proved too strong to be abolished. A conference was called to draft a new constitution. The military government suggested four types of political structure for consideration: (1) a federal system with a strong central government; (2) a federal system with a weak central government; (3) a confederation; (4) an entirely new arrangement "which will be peculiar to Nigeria and which has not yet found its way into any political dictionary." The consideration of a unitary government and the other extreme, a complete breakup of the country, were excluded. However, when the Constituent Assembly debated these alternatives, serious differences of opinion developed; none of the alternatives was acceptable to all former regions. Tension increased and finally at the end of May 1967 the Ibo-dominated Eastern Region seceded and its leader, Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu, declared the region to be the independent state of Biafra.

Another former British territory where the authority of the traditional rulers has raised great problems in modern administrative structure—and long delayed the achievement of independence—is Uganda. In order to meet the demands of the rulers of the four kingdoms, Buganda, Bunyoro, Toro and Ankole, whose provinces cover a large part of Uganda, a federal constitution was introduced under which the kings were granted fairly extensive

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

autonomy. A similar form of self-government was authorized for the Busoga district. The problem was how modern democratic government based on elected representation of the people could be combined with the authority of the powerful kings. The greatest difficulties naturally emanated from the most important kingdom, Buganda, whose ruler, the Kabaka, even threatened secession if traditional rights were not properly respected.

The solution finally accepted was that while the President, Head of State of Uganda, would be elected by the members of the Legislative Assembly, these representatives of the people would be able to make their choice only from among the rulers of the kingdoms belonging to the Federation and the constitutional chiefs of districts. As expected, the Kabaka of Buganda was made President in the first election and the chief of the Busoga district was elected Vice-President. In this way the prestige of the kings was upheld, although the President and Vice-President had little real power. Because of these political circumstances, Uganda was exceptional in having a supreme authority who, in contrast to the tendency elsewhere, did not personify the power of the state. Meanwhile, within the kingdoms there was a certain amount of democratization. In Buganda, the Kabaka himself had become a constitutional monarch, while the members of the provincial legislative assembly, the Lukiko, were no longer appointed by him as they used to be, but elected by the people.

In February 1966, as a result of a constitutional crisis, the President and Vice-President were deposed. On April 15, 1966 the Uganda Parliament adopted a new constitution tabled by Prime Minister Dr. Milton Obote, which provides for an executive President and strong powers for the central government. The positions of Head of State and Prime Minister are furthermore filled by one person. Even in Uganda traditionalism did not maintain its political power.

In Kenya, where tribal differences are so great that even a man like Jomo Kenyatta could initially not inspire a sufficiently united front to establish a unitary state, a large degree of decentralization served to prevent the disintegration of the country and possible anarchy. Under this structure extensive powers, including the appointment of officials and control over the police, were granted to the provinces. In the constitution which came into force when Kenya gained its independence at the end of 1963, curtailment of the powers of the component parts of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Federation signified a first step toward a unitary state. The declaration of Kenya as a one-party Republic under President Kenyatta in December 1964, after the leader of the opposition had dissolved his party, points in the same direction.

Among the former British territories in tropical Africa only Nigeria and Kenya had functioned under a two-chamber parliamentary system, the intention being that the Senate would protect the interests of the regional minorities. As we have noted, Nigeria is deliberating on a new constitution, and in December 1966 Kenya's Senate voted to merge with the House of Representatives.

The President of Tanganyika, Dr. Julius Nyerere, signed an agreement for amalgamation with Zanzibar and Pemba on April 26, 1964. The new state is officially called the United Republic of Tanzania. The agreement, drawn up along the lines of the Union of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, merely makes such a Union possible and gives it authority to regulate foreign affairs, internal security (police), citizenship and immigration. Like Northern Ireland in that other Union, Zanzibar retains its own Parliament, while the interests of the Union are dealt with in the Parliament at Dar-es-Salaam. In the summer of 1965 Tanzania constitutionally became a one-party state, and in September 1965 President Nyerere was re-elected for a five-year term.

Following a referendum the Democratic Republic of the Congo (the former Belgian Congo) acquired a new constitution on August 1, 1964, which provides for a federal republic, a bicameral system, and a semi-presidential regime. Under its terms twenty-one provinces were created, each with a full complement of ministers and senior officials, besides the free town of Leopoldville. This made administration exceedingly expensive, but it was felt that carrying federalism through to the extreme would provide the answer to the strong rivalries which kept cropping up in the central Parliament in Leopoldville. The traditional authorities, who had already lost much of their power, are granted no special rights in this constitution. In March 1966 the Head of State, Lt. General Joseph D. Mobutu, ruled that the legislative powers would be vested in the President and exercised by decree. Parliament must be informed of these decrees, but has been deprived of all influence upon them.[4]

[4]R. Cornevin, *Histoire du Congo-Léo* (Paris: Berger-Leviault, 1963), provides in the last chapter an excellent survey of developments in Congo-Léo after independence.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Owing to the difficulties both parts of the Cameroon Republic have experienced in adjusting to federal government—the Southern British Cameroons joined with the former French-administered Trusteeship Territory of Cameroon after plebiscite in 1961—the position of the President of the Federation is a strong one. President Ahmadou Ahidjo holds the mediating power between the two parts, West (British) and East (French). Besides, the constitution of this Republic shows the same pattern as that of all former French territories belonging to the French "communauté," a powerful executive and a feeble Parliament, ever dwindling in influence.

In October 1964 Northern Rhodesia became an independent Republic under the name of Zambia. President Kenneth Kaunda's wise and moderate statesmanship has proved beneficial to the political development of this state in which the interests of a powerful European minority had to be harmonized with those of the African majority. The Africans were exceedingly resentful because of their frustration during British rule, and especially during forced participation in the European-dominated Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland from 1953 to 1963. Even here, however, a democratic parliamentary regime could not be preserved, and more and more Europeans believe their future in Zambia is jeopardized.

In July 1964 Nyasaland became the independent state of Malawi. Dr. Hastings Banda, one of the most paternalistic rulers of tropical Africa, created a strong opposition within his own ministerial team as a result of the condescending way in which he treated his colleagues. After dissenting political leaders were eliminated from the executive, his regime, supported by a strong youth movement modeled along fascist lines, became even more autocratic.

III

One of the most significant political developments in tropical Africa, and in developing countries generally, is the trend toward presidentialism. There is under way a progressive transfer of power from Parliament to the Head of State, who thus is gradually concentrating all the power of the state in his own person.[5]

[5]On this point see Gwendolyn Carter, editor, *African One-Party States* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962); Julius Nyerere, *Democracy and the Party System* (Dar-es-Salaam, 1963); and Chief H. O. Davies, "The New African Profile," *Foreign Affairs,* January 1962.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In both the British and French territories African statesmen are seeking to establish a link with the constitutional law of the former mother country. The image of absolute executive power as wielded by the leaders of the majority party in British constitutional practice has a great attraction. Africans approve the idea of unlimited control by the administration in office, while the significance of the opposition is not fully appreciated. In the former French territories the strong position of the Head of State under the Gaullist Constitution of 1958 inspires admiration and favor.

In most of the former British territories a classic parliamentary system was adopted immediately following independence. The French territories, where the Gaullist Constitution had a predominant influence,[6] applied what we might call an "inegalitarian parliamentary system." In the Congolese Republic the new constitution considerably strengthened the position of the President, but as we have seen, even this constitution was not respected by the present Head of State. Three English-speaking states, Nigeria, Uganda and Tanganyika, had a dual form of executive power: both a President and a Prime Minister. This form of government was abandoned in Uganda. In Tanganyika it was given up after the fusion with Zanzibar. The position in Nigeria is still uncertain, pending the adoption of a new constitution.

Among the former French territories Senegal and Cameroon also began in this way, but neither kept the dual executive. The tendency is for the parliamentary system to be maintained to some extent, but for the office of Head of State and Head of Government to be filled by one and the same person. In the case of the former French territories the reason can undoubtedly be found in the peculiar position they initially occupied as new states in the French Community. By virtue of Title IV of the 1958 French Constitution, they had only internal autonomy and the President of the French Republic in his capacity as head of the Community remained Head of State. Thus at first there was no reason for any of these states to appoint a Head of State; when they acquired complete independence, they opted for the familiar, virtually one-man type of government.

[6]For the texts of the constitutions of the former French territories consult P. F. Gonidec, *Constitutions des états de la Communauté* (Paris, 1959) and for later amendments consult the journal *Revue Juridique et Politique d'Outre-Mer*. See also J. Buchmann, "La Tendance au presidentialisme dans les nouvelles constitutions Negro-Africaines," *Civilisations*, Vol. XII, No. 1 (1962), pp. 46-68.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

This combination of Head of State and Head of Government in one person who is not responsible to Parliament but only to the electorate is the first of two important trends in the political development of the new states of tropical Africa. The second is the steady growth of a one-party system in conjunction with a highly centralized form of government.[7] Although most of the new states started with a multi-party system, in a great many of them the opposition has been suppressed in the few years since independence, either because its leaders have been imprisoned or banished or because it has been swallowed by the majority party.

This attitude toward the opposition must be viewed against the psychology which leads those in authority to identify themselves with the state. As a result of the identification of state and government,[8] political opponents become not merely people who hold different opinions about how the country should be governed but enemies of the state, i.e., deadly personal enemies. Although the African intellectuals have created the idea of a "nation" in their countries, nationalism does not convey the concept of citizenship in the sense generally accepted in the West. The essence of traditional communities, which know no "citizenship" but are built solely on personal loyalty to a traditional leader, is still a powerful force. The new states lack stability largely because they have been based almost exclusively on personal veneration for and loyalty to the Head of State; consciousness of being a "citizen" is seldom present.

The electoral system, which knows no proportional representation, favors excessive representation of the majority party and prevents the opposition in most states—quite apart from the psychological factor mentioned—from making its presence in Parliament felt sufficiently, if at all.[9] It therefore soon becomes an extra-Parliamentary opposition, which is regarded as undermining state authority. This situation becomes even more serious when, as often happens in one-party states, only one list of candi-

[7]On this subject see "The Opposition in Tropical Africa," *Bulletin of International Commission of Jurists,* October 1962, and Martin L. Kilson, "Authoritarian and Single Party Tendencies in African Politics," *World Politics,* January 1963.

[8]See Edward Shils, "The Political Development of the New States," *Comparative Studies in Economy and History,* April-June 1960, where this identification of state and government is clearly described.

[9]See G. Bennett and G. C. Rosberg, *The Kenyatta Election* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961); G. Bennett, "Kenya's Little General Election," *The World Today,* August 1966; and W. J. M. MacKenzie and K. E. Robinson, editors, *Five Elections in Africa* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dates is presented at elections: the voter is given only the alternative of voting for the majority party list or expressing his disapproval of it, without being allowed the option of putting forward the party or persons of his own choice. Often African intellectuals who have been unable to agree with the way the government is running their country declare that in almost all the new states it is practically impossible to get a ruling political party out of office by legal means. There is no doubt that they are right.

The crisis of confidence which exists in most of the new states of tropical Africa results from the fact that promises by political leaders in power and expectations of an improved level of living were not fulfilled. In many cases this has led to military coups d'état. Officers of the armed forces, usually trained in a European manner, have a different attitude toward life than the modern ruling élite. Military discipline has induced a broad outlook on public affairs which, even if rather primitive, is detached from the private interests that often corrupt public administration. Military regimes range from conservative to leftist authoritarian. They are, however, always anti-traditional and noted for a certain aloofness from influences contrary to the public weal. The military recruit their contingents and also their leaders predominately from the lower layers of society, the *petit bourgeois* and the small traders. Trade unionists, young intellectuals not integrated into the ruling hierarchy, and discontented members of the ruling party, all rally round the only body in the state having power to act independently to remedy real or supposed complaints against the administration of the day. Thus another kind of one-party state comes into being—military dictatorship—which sees banning the prevalence of private interests over the interests of the state as its first duty. After some time the military leaders may come to realize that the complex problems of government in new states cannot be solved by techniques of military practice alone. They declare that they want to restore civilian rule and parliamentary democracy as soon as possible, but the military dictatorship mainly continues.

IV

An extremely important factor in the political development of Africa is the form of guarantees against abuse of power by the majority vis-à-vis native or non-native minorities. Since the latter also include the white minority group, this matter has vital bearing on the position of Europeans in tropical Africa in the immediate future.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It is only ten years since the Loi Cadre, also called the Loi Defferre after the then Minister of Colonial Affairs, put an end to the electoral system universally applied in the former French territories, under which almost all Africans and the Europeans voted on different lists. Election on a "European" list depended on considerably fewer votes than election on an "African" list. This meant, in effect, that one "European" vote was equivalent to many "African" votes. Even more recently in the British tropical African territories, where there is a permanent mixed population, the non-natives sent a total of members to the representative bodies which was out of all proportion to their numerical strength. Not long ago the Africans were not represented at all on these bodies.

An even moderately satisfactory discussion of the problem of protecting generally accepted human rights goes far beyond the scope of this paper. Because of its importance, however, I should like to touch upon two aspects of this problem: First, what has been done since independence to guarantee the rights of ethnic minority groups and traditional leaders, as well as regional interests, in the tropical African states; second, what procedures obtain with respect to protecting the fundamental rights of individuals.

In some territories a solution to the first question has been sought in the institution of a special representative body whose membership is not directly dependent on the numerical strength of any particular minority. It need hardly be argued that this is only a limited remedy. The fact is that, as against the usually extensive protection given to certain minorities in colonial days, the present African political leaders are generally not prepared to lay down such protection in writing. In any case, even if they had the breadth of vision to take action in this respect, they would without doubt lose popularity by doing so. Proposals to secure the rights of minority groups in law will therefore rarely be evaluated objectively. Such proposals are felt to indicate a lack of confidence in the majority's preparedness to give minority groups a fair deal—though political realities give much cause for such lack of confidence. African political leaders do not want a special court of appeal to watch over the rights of minorities. Under African conditions discrimination against a minority may sometimes be desirable or even necessary. Discrimination against non-natives may be used deliberately to further Africanization, and discrimination in favor of backward groups of the population may serve to lift them out of their low situation.

Added to this is the problem of protecting the traditional

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rulers, which we discussed above. In many cases there is some justification for the objection that these authorities retard progress and hold up the achievement of a modern state structure. In African circles, Uganda, where the rights of the traditional rulers were so strongly protected in the constitution, was accused of neo-traditionalism—a term which connoted extreme backwardness. As a rule much the same thing applies to the protection of regional interests. In the sometimes herculean struggle to create a true unitary state—the prime necessity for economic and social progress—there is no room at present, in the view of African politicians, for the promotion of regional interests. In short, the interests of all these minority groups — Europeans, traditional rulers, non-native population groups — and regional interests sink *into insignificance beneath the overriding interest of the development* of the state. There is also a certain amount of bitterness toward the minority groups because they had proportionately too much influence before independence.

Most of the constitutions, in former British and French territories alike, express every respect for the fundamental civil freedoms. Generally they include a declaration of human rights in detail or make reference to a Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Nowhere, however, can laws be put to the test by the judiciary by reference to the constitution as the final authority. If it were possible to test these laws, it would certainly be doubtful whether the executive power would agree to respect a judicial decision against it. No other state goes as far as Guinea, where the independence of the judiciary is denied officially, but in most states the independence of courts is highly dubious in practice. Even in Nigeria, which prided itself on fostering an independent judiciary, a decision given against the federal government by the supreme court of appeal led to legislation with retroactive effect in order to make this decision invalid. This happened in the Akintola case.[10] The federal government had dismissed from office Akintola, a chief from the Western Region. Akintola took the government to court in order to secure a decision on the legality of his dismissal. After the Nigerian courts had found against him, the Privy Council pronounced that he had been unlawfully dismissed from office. The federal government then introduced legislation with retroactive effect which robbed this decision of its force.

[10]See the case Akintola v. Governor of Western Nigeria and Adegbenro. For critical comment, see S. G. Davies, "Nigeria: Some Recent Decisions on the Constitution," *International and Comparative Law Quarterly,* Spring 1962.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In Ghana and Tanganyika a Preventive Detention Act cut down the protection the judiciary could offer. In both countries a man could be held prisoner for five years without the possibility of appeal to the courts and without the judiciary itself being able to intervene. Certain guarantees for detained persons, e.g., the right of appeal to a special commission, by no means removed objections to the eclipse of the judiciary's power. The Preventive Detention Act was repealed by the Ghana military government in April 1966.

V

Everywhere in the new tropical African states the representatives of the people are losing more and more ground to the executive power vested in the Head of State. Bills have to be passed within a certain time or else the executive can enact them by decree. Even parliamentary control over budget legislation in many cases has been curtailed. Control over a Head of State who takes over the legislative power in an emergency or in the interest of the state—as permitted by many constitutions—may perhaps exist here and there in theory, but in practice it is not effective.

Despite all the new constitutions with their modern trappings, the trend of constitutional development is actually a return to the traditional institutions of public government: the authoritarian ruler with his consultative council, a ruler who can be removed from office by positive action on the part of his people only if he seriously abuses his authority, but who, for the rest, combines in his own person the highest legislative, executive and judicial power. This personification of power is in keeping with tradition, but to hold to such a tradition does not permit effective application of modern constitutional concepts which have been laid down by law and to which lip service is paid.

The propaganda of the majority party among the underdeveloped masses strengthens the tendencies toward absolutism and makes it difficult for the ruler to protect the rights of minority groups, even where he might wish to do so. The masses would soon regard this as a betrayal of the national ideal which the majority of them support, even if they are not able to formulate it.

This is not a very optimistic prospect for the immediate future. But let us remember that democracy was not achieved in a day in Europe either, and that even today it is not fully established in many countries.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE LEGALITY OF THE McMAHON LINE: AN INDIAN PERSPECTIVE

by Bishwanath Singh

THE first attempt by the Chinese communists to open the question of the Indo-Tibetan boundary was made in a letter from Premier Chou En-lai to the late Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru on January 23, 1959. In it he alleged that as "the Sino-Indian boundary has never been formally delimited" and as historically "no treaty or agreement on the Sino-Indian boundary has ever been concluded" between China and India, the entire border was unsettled and therefore negotiable. Since this was in contradiction to China's previous stand on this point, Chou added that China had not raised this question earlier "because conditions were not yet ripe for its settlement and the Chinese side, on its part, had had no time to study the question."[1] The Indian government denied this contention and asserted that the entire boundary is well-settled by custom as well as by treaties.

At the time, Peking had begun military operations to bring Tibet under full Chinese control. On March 31, 1959 the Dalai Lama and his party crossed into India and were given political asylum. This Indian action, which is in consonance with customary international law as well as with the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, perhaps looked like a red rag to the Chinese bull. In his letter of September 8, 1959 to Nehru, Chou challenged the whole basis of the McMahon Line because, according to him, the issue of the Indo-Tibetan border was not on the agenda of the Simla Conference of 1913-1914, nor was the matter discussed there. In addition, the exchange of letters between the British and Tibetan delegates regarding this line was made in secret, and "the so-called McMahon Line was a product of the British policy of aggression against the Tibetan Region of China and has never been recognized by any Chinese Central Government and is therefore decidedly illegal."[2] In that letter Chou laid claim to a large portion of Indian territory.

This article seeks to demonstrate that Chinese rejection of the legality of the McMahon Line is based on arguments that are both factually incorrect and legally irrelevant.

I

A perusal of the correspondence between the British and Chinese

[1]Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed Between the Governments of India and China (1954-1959)* (New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, 1959-1962), I, 52. (Hereafter cited as *White Paper*.)
[2]*Ibid.*, II, 29.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

governments leading to the Simla Convention provides ample refutation of the Chinese allegations that the Indo-Tibet boundary was not discussed at the Simla Conference. About the then position of Tibet, the Chinese *Year Book* of 1919-20 states that when the year 1913 opened

> the Chinese had been completely driven out of Tibet, and on January 11, 1913, Tibet declared her independence by concluding a treaty with the Hutukhta of Urga, the Ruler of Outer Mongolia. . . . Meanwhile, President Yuan Shih-kai sent a special delegate to Chiamdo to meet representatives of the Dalai Lama in order to discuss terms of peace and the definite demarcation of the frontier.[3]

According to the terms of the Anglo-Tibetan Agreement of 1904, the government of Tibet had agreed that, without the previous consent of the British government "No portion of Tibetan territory shall be ceded, sold, leased, mortgaged or otherwise given for occupation, to any foreign Power."[4] The continuation of the Sino-Tibetan feud would have led to new friction, hostilities and instability along the Indo-Tibetan border. All these factors necessitated a tripartite conference among Great Britain, Tibet and China.

On June 4, 1913 the Chinese President expressed himself in favor of a tripartite conference. Prior to the conference, the British government, in a note, explicitly informed China that Tibet had the capacity to enter into independent treaty relations with Britain. It insisted that Tibet must be admitted as an independent party in the conference and stressed on her behalf that "it was the intention of His Majesty's Government that the delegates should attend the conference on an equal footing." The Chinese did not challenge the British contention. Clearly the circumstances called for some positive reaction on the part of the Chinese government if it had any serious objection to raise. It failed to do so, and, therefore, must be held to have acquiesced to the British stipulation. This is further proved by China's subsequent conduct during the course of negotiations.

China also accepted the credentials issued by the Tibetan government to its plenipotentiary at the Simla Conference of 1914. In a note of August 7, 1913 to the British representative the Chinese Foreign Office stated:

> A Presidential Order was received on 2nd August appointing Ivan Chen as Special Plenipotentiary of Chinese Government for the conduct of negotiations relating to Tibet. It therefore devolves on our Government to order Ivan Chen to proceed to India as speedily as possible to *open negotiations for a treaty jointly with the Tibetan Plenipotentiary and the Plenipotentiary appointed by the British Government* and to sign articles which may be agreed upon *for the purpose of removing all difficulties which have existed hitherto in regard to Tibet.*[5] (Emphasis added.)

Ivan Chen was Special Commissioner for Foreign Affairs in Shanghai. The British representative on August 25, 1913 informed the Chinese

[3]H. T. M. Bell and H. G. W. Woodhead, *The China Year Book, 1919-1920* (London: George Routledge & Sons), p. 616.

[4]Article IX. See International Commission of Jurists, *The Question of Tibet and the Rule of Law* (Geneva, 1959), p. 111.

[5]*Report of the Officials of the Governments of India and the People's Republic of China on the Boundary Question* (New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, February 1961), p. 114. (Hereafter cited as *Officials' Report.*)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

government: "His Majesty's Government note with satisfaction the Chinese Government's acceptance of the principle of equality of status of the representatives and of the tripartite character of the negotiations."[6]

It is clear that the purpose of the conference was to discuss all important matters relating to Tibet. As the credentials of Lon Chen Shatra, the Prime Minister of Tibet, stated: "I (the Dalai Lama) hereby authorize Srid Dzin Shatra Paljor Dozi *to decide all matters that may be beneficial to Tibet* and I authorize him to seal all such documents." (Emphasis added.) Similarly, the credentials of Arthur Henry McMahon, Foreign Secretary of the Indian government, stated that the negotiations were being held "for the conclusion of Convention *to remove all such causes of difference and to regulate the relations between the several governments.*" (Emphasis added.) The Preamble to the Simla Convention also stated that the High Contracting Parties,

being sincerely desirous to settle by mutual agreement various questions concerning the interests of their *several States* on the continent of Asia and further to *regulate the relations of their several Governments,* have resolved to conclude a convention on the subject and have nominated for this purpose their respective Plenipotentiaries.[7] (Emphasis added.)

The first step toward solving "all matters" and "all difficulties" relating to Tibet certainly had to be an agreement on its international frontiers—and this *was* the first question discussed. On February 17, 1914, at the fourth meeting of the full conference, in which the Chinese representative was present, McMahon tabled a statement of the "historic Tibetan frontiers."[8] The accompanying map showed Tibet's entire boundaries (with China and with India) ringed by a red line. After full discussion, the draft Convention together with the map was submitted at the seventh meeting of the full conference on April 22, 1914, and on April 27 the three plenipotentiaries initialed the map and the draft Convention. The initialed map was an important part of the Convention. Article 9 of the Convention states: "For the purpose of the present Convention the borders of Tibet and the boundary between Outer and Inner Tibet, shall be shown in red and blue respectively on the map attached hereto." (Inner Tibet was the part of Tibet adjoining China, over which the latter was given some control in temporal matters. Outer Tibet was given full autonomy.) Thus, it is incorrect on the part of China to say that the Indo-Tibetan boundary was not discussed at the Simla Conference.

However, from the point of view of international law, the relevant question is whether the Indo-Tibetan boundary was discussed with, and agreed to by, Tibet, which was participating in the conference as an independent state, and therefore on a footing of equality. The right to enter into international treaties is an essential attribute of statehood.[9]

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 114-115.
[7] See International Commission of Jurists, *op. cit.*, p. 124.
[8] *Officials' Report*, p. 112 .
[9] See Oppenheim, *International Law*, edited by Arnold D. McNair. (London: Longmans, Green, 1928), I, 705-711.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

China also had accepted (as the Indian Prime Minister's letter of September 26, 1959 to the Chinese Prime Minister pointed out), both by word and deed, the capacity of Tibet at the Simla Conference to conclude treaties with Britain and China "on an equal footing."[10] It is on record that notes expressly confirming the McMahon Line were exchanged between the British and Tibetan plenipotentiaries on March 24-25, 1914. Thus, on March 24, 1914, McMahon wrote to Lon Chen Shatra:

> In February last you accepted the India-Tibet frontier from the Isu Razi Pass to the Bhutanese frontiers as given in the map . . . , of which two copies are herewith attached, subject to the confirmation of your Government. . . . The final settlement of this India-Tibet frontier will help to prevent causes of further dispute and this cannot fail to be of great advantage to both governments.[11]

On the next day, Lon Chen Shatra, in his note, stated:

> As it was feared that there might be friction in future unless the boundary between India and Tibet is clearly defined, I submitted the map, which you sent to me in February last, to the Tibetan Government at Lhasa for orders. I have now received orders from Lhasa, and I accordingly agree to the boundary as marked in red in the two copies of the maps signed by you subject to conditions, mentioned in your letter, dated the 24th March, sent to me through Mr. Bell. I have signed and sealed the two copies of the maps. I have kept one copy here and return herewith the other.[12]

This fact was also pointed out by the Indian Prime Minister in his letter to the Chinese Premier on March 22, 1959. He stated that the McMahon Line "was drawn after full discussion and was confirmed subsequently by a formal exchange of letters: and there is nothing to indicate that the Tibetan authorities were in any way dissatisfied with the agreed boundary."[13] Even the Chinese Plenipotentiary at the Simla Conference, who had raised some objections to the boundaries between Inner Tibet and Outer Tibet, and between Inner Tibet and China, had made no reservation in respect to the Indo-Tibetan frontier either during the discussions or at the time of signing the Convention.

It is true that the Chinese government later refused to sign and ratify the Convention, but the reason for its refusal was not the McMahon Line but the boundary between Inner Tibet and China and between Inner Tibet and Outer Tibet. However, nonratification of a multilateral treaty by one of the High Contracting Parties cannot in any way prejudice the sovereign right of the other parties to ratify the treaty and thereby to assume the rights and obligations arising out of that treaty between themselves. Thus, the British government, in a note on June 25, 1914, informed the Chinese government that

> the patience of His Majesty's Government is exhausted and they have no alternative but to inform the Chinese Government that, unless the Government has signed before the end of this month, His Majesty's Government will hold themselves free to sign separately with Tibet. In that case, of course, the Chinese will lose all privileges and advantages which the Tripartite Convention secures to them.[14]

[10] *White Paper*, II, 38.
[11] Aitchison, *A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads Relating to India and Neighbouring Countries* (Calcutta: Government of India, Central Publication Branch, 1929), XIV, 34.
[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 34-35.
[13] *White Paper*, I, 56.
[14] *Officials' Report*, p. 113.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The McMahon Line is a matter between India and Tibet, and both have signed and ratified the Convention establishing it. The exchange of these letters fully exposes the hollowness of the Chinese contention that this boundary line was not discussed and was secretly entered into with Tibet. Even this allegation would not make the line voidable at the option of China or, for that matter, any of the parties—because China had no *locus standi* over the matter, and because once a treaty, particularly a boundary-treaty, is freely signed and ratified by the competent parties, it becomes binding and creates rights *in rem*.

II

The second Chinese objection is that the McMahon Line is the result of the expansionist policy of the British Government in India. This argument lacks any historical basis. In fact, the McMahon Line did not create a new border; it only clarified and confirmed the historic, traditional boundary between India and Tibet, which had been well-recognized and beyond dispute for centuries, and which runs for the most part along the natural watersheds of the Brahmaputra along the crest of the Himalayan ranges. It was not the McMahon Line which created the border: the 1914 Convention only provided an additional sanction to an already existing traditional frontier.

This is evident from accounts of travelers and even certain Chinese documents, apart from the Indian revenue records and other irrefutable sources. Thus Michell, in his authoritative *Report on the North-East Frontiers of India* (1883), stated that "In 1820 before we took possession of Assam, the Mishmis were obedient to the orders of the Assam Government and paid tribute to Sadiya Khowa Gohains." (p. 97.) T. T. Cooper, in his book *The Mishmee Hills* (p. 213), giving an account of his travel in 1860 in this region, wrote: "With the first dawn of day, we left Larkong and commenced the ascent of the boundary mountain, a long, steep ridge, rising to a height over 5000 feet. The ridge runs almost due east, and forms a well-defined limit between the Assamese and Tibetan ground." This account, written in 1873, shows that the boundary between Assam and Tibet ran along the top of the range.

In the maps prepared by Emperor Kang Hi, published by Du Halde in his *Description de la Chine* (1737), the southernmost limit of Tibet in the eastern sector corresponded to the traditional boundary alignment between India and Tibet. The map of Tibet in the *Complete Atlas of China,* published by the China Inland Mission in 1908, and the map in *Chung Kuo Chin shih yu ti tu Shwo* (p. 30), published by Chiao Chung Academy at Canton in 1910, showed an international boundary alignment which corresponded largely with the boundary shown on Indian maps. Similarly, the map of Tibet in the *New Atlas and Commercial Gazetteer of China* (1917), the map published by Peking University in 1925, and the *Postal Atlas of China* (1917) showed approximately the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

same Indo-Tibetan boundary east of Bhutan as does the McMahon Line. These extensive and varied sources[15] prove that the present Indian border alignment, i.e., the McMahon Line, has been the customary and traditional border for centuries, and is not the creation of the expansionist policy of British imperialism.

But even if, for the sake of argument, the Chinese contention is accepted, it does not invalidate the McMahon Line, nor does international law take into account such objections. Almost the whole of the boundaries of the American states as well as the African states is the result of imperialist expansion. Even after the departure of the imperial powers, the boundaries created by them for the countries under their rule have remained intact. No country has challenged their legality on this ground, nor could any such challenge be upheld in a court of law.

III

Communist China asserts that the Indo-Tibet border in the east has never been demarcated, and hence "the so-called McMahon Line" is totally unacceptable to her. According to her, "an international boundary signifies a demarcation line up to which neighbouring states exercise their sovereignty over their respective territories, and must be jointly defined by the states concerned."[16]

The Chinese conception of international boundary does not correspond to the accepted principles of international law on this point. International law does not in all cases require the physical demarcation of boundaries by ground pillars. The International Court of Justice, in a recent case (Cambodia vs. Thailand) concerning jurisdiction over the temple of Preah Vihear, held: "There are boundary treaties which do no more than refer to a watershed line, or to a crest line and which make no provision for any delimitation in addition."[17] In the same case the World Court argued: "When two countries establish a frontier between them, one of the primary objects is to achieve stability and finality." To achieve this object, it is not always necessary for an international boundary to be demarcated by pillars.

In many cases states regard a watershed indication as quite sufficient, sometimes even better than boundary pillars, to achieve the certainty and permanence of an international boundary. Judge Sir Percy Spender held, in the Temple of Preah Vihear case, that in an inhospitable and forbidding terrain, practical men, who are called on to make a practical decision, cannot insist on demarcating the boundary on the ground by pillars.

> The stipulation of the line of the watershed . . . and the crest line . . . was itself an obvious and appropriate way of defining definitively and with certainty the

[15]See *ibid.*, pp. 103-109.
[16]*White Paper*, IV, 9.
[17]See International Court of Justice, *Reports of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders: 1962*, for the *Case Concerning Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia vs. Thailand), Merits, Judgment of 15 June, 1962*, p. 34.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

northern frontier line. . . . The line of the watershed—and the crest line—were natural and permanent lines. There are . . . boundary treaties which do no more than refer to a watershed line or a crest line and which make no provision for any further delimitation. It is not evident why the Mixed Commission should have felt obliged to give to the line of the watershed—or the crest line—any more specific delimitation than that which the Treaty already provided.[18]

In the light of this judgment of the World Court, it is no longer accurate to say that "international law has not formally accepted the watershed principle as a universally recognized norm."[19] There is now definite legal validity in restoring to a watershed as a norm for fixing international boundaries in a treaty, because it sometimes provides more certainty and permanence than the boundary pillars. The Chinese, in defining an international boundary, have conveniently sought to explain away this crucial point.

The McMahon Line has not been physically demarcated by pillars,[20] because for most of its length it traverses the main Himalayan crest line and includes 20,000-foot peaks. For a similar reason, large sections of the Durand Line, delimited in 1893 (now in Pakistan), had never been demarcated; yet it has not been nullified or invalidated. The McMahon Line was clearly delimited by Article 9 of the Simla Convention and runs along the main watershed; thus, based on the above-quoted judgment of the World Court, its validity cannot be challenged on the grounds that it is not marked by pillars. The note of the Indian government to the Chinese government on February 12, 1960 correctly enunciated the principle of international law on this point:

. . . traditional boundaries in mountainous areas tend to follow the main watershed rather than any other natural feature. This is because a watershed is the best of all possible natural boundaries. It is liable to no change and is readily recognizable. Where there are a series of mountain ranges, it is the watershed range rather than any other that becomes the traditional boundary, because the people on both sides tend to settle up to the sources of rivers but not beyond. That the alignment of the northern boundary of India throughout follows the major watershed supports the fact that this became the boundary through custom and tradition.[21]

The fact that the McMahon Line runs generally along the main watershed range supports the Indian claim that it is the natural international boundary in that area. As the line of the watershed is precise and permanent, it naturally did not warrant the erection of pillars. In any event, it would have been nearly impossible to erect ground demarcations, as the line of the watershed traverses through high, almost inaccessible mountainous terrain. The team of Indian officials who negotiated with

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 115.

[19] See J. S. Bains, *India's International Disputes* (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1962), p. 149. For variations of the watershed principle, Dr. Bains has cited Stephen B. Jones, *Boundary Making* (Washington, 1945), pp. 101-104; C. V. Adami, *National Frontiers in Relation to International Law* (London, 1927); S. W. Boggs, *International Boundaries: A Study of Boundary Functions and Problems* (New York, 1940).

[20] In his letter of March 22, 1959 to the Chinese government, Pandit Nehru wrote: "It is true that this frontier has not been demarcated on the ground in all the sectors but I am somewhat surprised to know that this frontier was not accepted at any time by the Government of China. The traditional frontier, as you may be aware, follows the geographical principle of watershed on the crest of the High Himalayan Range, but apart from this, in most parts, it has the sanction of specific international agreements between the then Governments of India and the Central Government of China." See *White Paper*, I, 55.

[21] *White Paper*, III, 89.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Chinese communists in 1960 argued that the Sino-Burmese Agreement of January 1960

> proves that the traditional boundary lay along the Himalayan watershed and that it was precise long before the recent treaties of formal delimitation. If there was for northern Burma such a precise traditional boundary along the watershed as has now been confirmed, it could not possibly be suggested that the traditional boundary for the Eastern Sector of India did not run along the same watershed but much to the south along the foothills; and if it is now accepted, as it must be, that the "McMahon Line" adhered to the traditional boundary of northern Burma, it could not be something else in the Indo-Tibetan sector. It should also be obvious that the Chinese official maps which were grossly erroneous in departing from the watershed in Burma to include vast areas of Burma in China, are equally erroneous when showing the boundary in the Eastern Sector along the foothills of the Himalayas, and the "McMahon Line" represents the true traditional boundary along the Himalayan watershed, as much for India as for Burma.[22]

IV

China's contention that she never agreed to the McMahon Line, and therefore is not bound by it, is equally untenable. The Chinese have accepted the McMahon Line by word and deed, even though their acceptance cannot be deemed necessary under international law to establish its legality. The line was delimited by Article 9 of the Simla Convention of 1914 and this was initialed by the Chinese Plenipotentiary. On the refusal of the Chinese government to ratify the Convention, McMahon and Lon Chen Shatra duly signed it on July 3, 1914, after serving due notice to China. The Chinese Plenipotentiary at the Simla Conference had not objected in any way to the boundary line between India and Tibet as shown in the map accompanying the Convention, initialed by him. H. E. Richardson, a respected authority on Indo-Tibet relations, wrote in the *Times* (London) on September 16, 1959:

> The Chinese Government, when refusing to sign the Convention already initialled by its plenipotentiary, stated that the only objection to the proposed Treaty was on the issue of the frontier between Tibet and China; there was no question, either specific or implied, about the McMahon Line as the frontier between Tibet and India. The same position was formally repeated by the Chinese Government when seeking to reopen negotiations in 1919.

The Treaties and Agreements With and Concerning China, 1894-1919 (p. 582) also records that China's refusal to sign the 1914 Convention was "based upon her objection to the inclusion of Chiambo in Outer Tibet, and the inclusion of Litang and Batang," which China claimed to be part of its Szechwan province, in Inner Tibet. It its memoranda of April 25 and June 13, 1914 and May 30, 1919, the Chinese government listed its objections to the 1914 Convention; they were solely related to the boundary between Inner Tibet and China and between Inner Tibet and Outer Tibet.[23] This gives weight to the fact that China had no objection to the Indo-Tibetan boundary accepted by the 1914 Conference.

[22] *Officials' Report*, p. 283. For Sino-Burmese Border Agreement, see *The Statesman* (New Delhi), February 1, 1960; also Frank N. Trager, *Burma: From Kingdom to Republic* (New York: Praeger, 1966), pp. 240-255.
[23] *White Paper*, II, 38-39.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Olaf Caroe, who spent nearly thirty years in the Foreign and Political Department of the Government of India, and who was Foreign Secretary of India from 1939 to 1945, pointed out that the McMahon Line was clearly shown in the map initialed by all three plenipotentiaries, including the Chinese, and clearly delimited by Article 9 of the 1914 Convention. Hence, he concluded, the Chinese cannot now plead ignorance of its existence. He emphasized that it was

> to explain away this damaging fact that Peking was now putting forward the wild accusation that the McMahon Line was secretly agreed to between the British and the Tibetans without Chinese knowledge. In fact, the McMahon Line was shown on the map initialled by the Chinese representative in Simla in April 1914 which clearly indicated that the then Chinese Government was fully aware of it. It was thus inconceivable that the Chinese negotiator or his Government could really have remained in ignorance of this part of the red line, as Peking now pretended.[24]

Even if China remained in ignorance of the McMahon Line, in spite of being served with the map, her plea of error cannot now be accepted. As the World Court held: "It is an established rule of law that the plea of error cannot be allowed as an element vitiating consent if the party advancing it contributed by its own conduct to the error or could have avoided it, or if the circumstances were such as to put that party on notice of a possible error."[25] If China remained in ignorance, it was the result of her own conduct, not that of India or Tibet.

The Aitchison treaties series (Vol. XIV, 1929 edition) published the Simla Convention, and the McMahon Line was shown in official maps published from 1937 onward. These maps were widely circulated.[26] But until 1959 China did not raise any objection. From this evidence, the inference is irresistible that China had accepted the McMahon Line without any objection. It is worthwhile to reproduce a passage from the judgment of the World Court in the Preah Vihear case, which bears vitally on this point.

> In fact, although Thailand made complaints about the frontier line in a considerable number of regions, she made none about Preah Vihear. . . . it is precisely the fact that Thailand had raised those other questions but not that of Preah Vihear which require explanations; . . . *The natural inference . . . [is] that she did not do so because she accepted the frontier at this point as it was drawn on the map.*[27] (Emphasis added.)

As pointed out above, when India and Tibet—the countries concerned—accepted and ratified the McMahon Line, China's acceptance became immaterial because she had no *locus standi* on this issue. China had no authority in Lhasa from the fall of the Manchu dynasty in 1911 until the initial intrusion of communist power in 1950.[28] Olaf Caroe, in his analysis of the border issue for the Manchester *Guardian,* rightly maintained that Britain and Tibet were fully competent at the

[24]Manchester *Guardian*, February 13, 1960; quoted in *The Times of India,* February 15, 1960.
[25]International Court of Justice, *Reports, op. cit.*, p. 24.
[26]See *White Paper,* II, 39.
[27]International Court of Justice, *Reports, op. cit.*, pp. 26-27.
[28]See Bishwanath Singh, "The Position of Tibet in International Law," *Indian Journal of Political Science,* July 1965.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

time to enter into a formal agreement on the India-Tibet frontier. China has now "completely overlooked the vital point that the then Government of China had agreed to the attendance of Tibet as a fully empowered third party to the Simla Conference." Thus, China's present denial of the legal capacity of Tibet to enter into the boundary treaty in 1914 is untenable. The fact that a change in the status of Tibet was effected by Chinese communist aggression in 1950 does not in any way void the treaty of 1914 entered into by Tibet.[29] This would be contrary to any law. Boundary treaties create permanent interests and are not affected by state-succession or even war. They create rights *in rem* and not merely rights *in personam*.[30] As McNair observes:

> There is a class of treaties which declares, creates, or regulates rights of a kind usually regarded as permanent, using that term not in the sense of eternal but as indicating something of which its owner cannot normally be deprived against his will. Examples of these rights are the rights of a State . . . arising from a boundary treaty of cession, and so forth.[31]

Thus, the McMahon Line, created by the Simla Convention, is not voided by the extinction (perhaps only temporary) of the international personality of one of the two High Contracting Parties, i.e., Tibet. Dr. K. Krishna Rao cogently argues that "the present boundary alignment had been established in law, well before the People's Republic of China came into existence. Consequently, as the People's Republic of China could not start out with more rights than its predecessor possessed, it could not raise any fresh claims to Indian territory."[32]

V

It is important to note that Communist China's conduct up to 1958 provided additional confirmation of the McMahon Line. That India has been continuously and peacefully exercising her jurisdiction over the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA) to the McMahon Line is proved by survey reports, revenue records, census reports, official maps, constitutional provisions and legislative enactments, as well as by the exercise of effective administrative jurisdiction.[33] The Indian Constitution in its Sixth Schedule makes provision for the NEFA area.

On August 21, 1950, the Foreign Ministry of China sent a note to the Indian Ambassador which stated, among other things, that the Chinese government "is happy to hear the desire of the Government of India to stabilise the Chinese-Indian border." In its reply of August 24 the Indian government stated clearly that "the recognised boundary between India and Tibet should remain inviolate."[34] These letters suggest that China and India must have assumed that the boundary was known and recognized by both sides, because only such a fixed boundary can be

[29]The author owes this point to Dr. K. Krishna Rao, Joint Secretary to the Indian Ministry of External Affairs.
[30]Arnold D. McNair, *Law of Treaties—British Practice and Opinions* (Oxford, 1938), p. 542.
[31]*Ibid.*, pp. 538-539.
[32]See *Indian Journal of International Law*, July 1962, p. 365.
[33]See *Officials' Report*, pp. 201-211.
[34]*Ibid.*, p. 85.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"stabilised" and kept "inviolate." China at that time gave no indication that she had any reservation about this boundary alignment.

On November 20, 1950, Nehru declared in the Lok Sabha that "the McMahon Line is our boundary, map or no map. We will not allow anybody to come across that boundary." He also said this to Chou En-lai orally and in written communications. In 1954, when a Sino-Indian agreement was negotiated which purported to deal with all outstanding issues between India and Tibet inherited from the British days, no border question was raised by China.[35] This attitude on the part of China naturally gave the impression that there was no border dispute between the respective countries; otherwise, how could the signatories solemnly promise to respect each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty? China's silence at that time can only mean that there was no border dispute and China had accepted the existing international boundary with India, or if she had a grievance, she had concealed it. "This concealment on the part of China," as Dr. Rao argued, "is totally incompatible with the rules of International Law."[36]

Some Chinese maps had appeared which showed portions of Indian territory as part of China. In October 1954, Nehru, while on a visit to China, drew the attention of Chou En-lai to these maps and stated that "so far as India was concerned we were not much worried about the matter because our boundaries were quite clear and were not a matter of argument." The Chinese Premier was good enough to reply to him that "these maps were really reproductions of old pre-liberation maps and that he had no time to revise them."[37] Again in 1956, while discussing the Sino-Burmese border with the Indian Premier in Delhi, Chou referred to the McMahon Line. The minutes of the conversation which Nehru sent to Chou contain this passage:

> Premier Chou referred to the McMahon Line and again said that he had never heard of this before though of course the then Chinese Government had dealt with this matter and not accepted that line. He had gone into this matter in connection with the border dispute with Burma. Although he thought that this line, established by the British Imperialists, was not fair, nevertheless, because it was an accomplished fact and because of the friendly relations which existed between China and the countries concerned, namely, India and Burma, the Chinese Government were of the opinion that they should give recognition to the McMahon Line.[38]

It is significant that Chou did not repudiate the minutes of that talk. Chinese passiveness in the face of these given facts would normally mean affirmation of the McMahon Line.

Yet, in 1958 an official Chinese magazine published a map of China which included as part of China a large portion of Indian territory in NEFA, Uttar Pradesh and the Ladakh area. New Delhi promptly drew

[35]Note by the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, to the Chinese Embassy in India, November 4, 1959, *White Paper*, II, 20.
[36]Radio talk by Dr. Rao, reported in the *Indian Nation* (Patna), May 30, 1963.
[37]Letter from the Prime Minister of India to the Prime Minister of China, December 14, 1958, *White Paper*, I, 49.
[38]*Ibid.*, I, 49-50.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the attention of the Chinese government to this incorrect map. The Chinese government, in reply, offered the same plea that it was only a reproduction of the old map, but ominously added that it had "not yet undertaken a survey of their boundary, nor consulted with the countries concerned."[39] This amounted to a broad hint that the Indo-Tibetan border was an open and negotiable issue. Nehru, in his letter to the Chinese Premier on December 14, 1958 repudiated this implication and stated: "There can be no question of these large parts of India being anything but Indian, and there is no dispute about them. I do not know what kind of survey can affect these well-known and fixed boundaries."[40] It was in his letter of January 23, 1959 that Chou En-lai finally made clear his true intentions. Going back on all that he had said, he raised the question of the entire Indo-Tibetan boundary, including the McMahon Line, and eventually laid claim to some 90,000 square kilometers of Indian territory.

VI

The Chinese attitude toward the Indo-Tibetan border is characterized, as the foregoing account clearly shows, by a marked inconsistency. Chou argues that he did not raise any border question earlier because "conditions were not yet ripe." This proves that the Chinese government deliberately pursued a policy of duplicity. In international law, a state is not free alternately to affirm and deny facts and principles according to the exigencies of the moment. The judgment of the International Court of Justice in the Preah Vihear case also upholds this established principle of customary international law. The judgment says,

> It has been contended on behalf of Thailand that this communication of the maps by the French authorities was, so to speak, *ex parte*, and that no formal acknowledgment of it was either requested of, or given by, Thailand. In fact, as will be seen presently, an acknowledgment by conduct was undoubtedly made in a very definite way; but even if it were otherwise, it is clear that the circumstances were such as called for some reaction, within a reasonable period, on the part of the Siamese authorities, if they wished to disagree with the map or had any serious question to raise in regard to it. They did not do so, either then or for many years, and thereby must be held to have acquiesced. *Qui tacet consentire videtur si loqui debuisset ac potuisset.*[41]

The World Court further held,

> Even if there were any doubt as to Siam's acceptance of the map in 1908, and hence of the frontier indicated thereon, the Court would consider, in the light of the subsequent course of events, that Thailand is now precluded by her conduct from asserting that she did not accept it. She has for fifty years enjoyed such benefits as the Treaty of 1904 conferred on her, if only the benefit of a stable frontier. France, and through her Cambodia, relied on Thailand's acceptance of the map. Since neither side can plead error, it is immaterial whether or not this reliance was based on a belief that the map was correct. It is not now open to Thailand, while continuing to claim and enjoy the benefits of the settlement, to deny that she was ever a consenting party to it.[42]

[39] *Ibid.*, I, 47.
[40] *Ibid.*, I, 51.
[41] International Court of Justice, *Reports, op. cit.*, p. 23.
[42] *Ibid.*, p. 30.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Each sentence of this judgment has remarkable bearing on China's conduct regarding the Indo-Tibetan boundary. China never protested in any way India's open exercise of jurisdiction in these areas and its manifestations in various forms—official maps, declarations, legislative enactments—and always encouraged India to believe that China did not in any case wish to challenge the validity of this centuries-old international boundary. She enjoyed the benefit of a stable frontier and utilized the peaceful period up to 1959 to build a massive armed force and construct strategic roads in the vicinity of the frontier, while continuing to delude India as to her true intentions. On the other hand, India promptly repudiated any inaccuracy in maps or any suggestion—direct or indirect—questioning the validity of the Indo-Tibetan border.

If China did not question the validity of the McMahon Line from 1914 to 1959 she is precluded, according to the doctrine of estoppel, from questioning it now. This principle was amplified by Judge Alfaro in his separate opinion supporting the judgment of the World Court in the Preah Vihear case:

> . . . a State party to an international legislation is bound by its previous acts or attitude when they are in contradiction with its claims in the litigation. . . . Whatever term or terms be employed to designate this principle . . . its substance is always the same: inconsistency between claims or allegations put forward by a State and its previous conduct in connection therewith, is not admissible (*allegans contraria non audiendus est*). The acts or attitude of a State previous to and in relation with rights in dispute with another State may take the form of an express written agreement, declarations, representation or recognition, or else that of a conduct which implies consent to or agreement with a determined factual or juridical situation. . . . A State may also be bound by a passive or negative attitude in respect of rights asserted by another State, which the former State later claims to have. Passiveness in front of given facts is the most general form of acquiescence or tacit consent. Failure of a State to assert its right when that right is openly challenged by another State can only mean abandonment of that right. Silence by a State in the presence of facts contrary to or prejudicial to rights later on claimed by it before an international tribunal can only be interpreted as tacit recognition given prior to the litigation.[43]

India has all along, in good faith, relied on the fact that China has not questioned the validity of the well-established Indo-Tibetan border, either before or after the advent of communist rule. It has been the policy of Communist China consistently to mislead India into this belief. The Panchsheel principles, which provide, among other things, for nonaggression and respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of each other, have been reaffirmed on more than one occasion in joint declarations by the two countries. It is inconceivable that one state can agree to respect the territorial integrity and sovereigny of another country without agreeing to respect her international frontiers. Chinese passiveness in the face of Indian assertions through constitutional and legislative enactments, administrative actions, and maps and communications,

[43] *Ibid.*, pp. 39-40. The principles of law cited by Judge Alfaro in this quotation are: "*nemo potest mutare consilium suum in alterius injuriam*"; *nullus commodum capere de sua injuria propria*"; and "*venire contra factum proprium non valet.*"

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

forces one to the conclusion that China had acquiesced in the boundary as asserted by India.

VII

In the circumstances discussed above, the unprovoked and massive aggression on India by China in 1962 and her continued occupation of a big chunk of Indian territory is a patently illegal act. China is obliged, under international law, to vacate this territory and to pay compensation to India for damages. It is no wonder that the five Colombo Powers, after carefully weighing the facts of the situation, asked China to withdraw from Indian territory illegally occupied by her. In order to hoodwink world public opinion, China accepted the Colombo proposals "in principle," that is, in the spirit of Bismarck's observation: ". . . when you say that you agree to a thing in principle, you mean that you have not the slightest intention of carrying it out."

China has spurned the Indian proposal[44] to refer the differences regarding the boundary to the International Court of Justice or to binding international arbitration. Instead, China has been pressing her belated claim—after almost fifty years and after fully reaping the benefits conferred by it—that the McMahon Line is illegal. Open inconsistency is the keynote in the conduct of China, and this "can only be described as grossly and deliberately misleading."[45] "Inconsistency," as Judge Alfaro pointed out, "is (and has been for many years) a practice at which the combined efforts of justice and international harmony must be directed."[46]

[44]Note given by the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, to the Embassy of China in India, April 3, 1963.

[45]*Officials' Report*, p. 274.

[46]International Court of Justice, *Reports*, *op. cit.*, p. 49. In the words of the late Professor Lauterpacht, "A State cannot be allowed to avail itself of the advantages of the treaty when it suits it to do so and repudiate it when its performance becomes onerous." Lauterpacht, *Report on the Law of Treaties*, UN Document A/CN 4/63, March 24, 1953, p. 157.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CHINA'S MILITIA AND MAO TSE-TUNG'S "PEOPLE'S WAR"

by Hyobom Pak

THE bellicose tone of the Battle Hymn of the Chinese militiamen reverberates throughout Communist China today.[1] Characteristically, with "a rifle in one hand and a hoe in the other," these militiamen (*min-ping*), ranging from 16 to 55 years of age, are silhouetted all over the country, in groups, squads, platoons and companies.

While dutifully participating in a variety of public events—for example, parades on major holidays or "Resist-America, Support-Viet Nam" rallies—the *min-ping* are constantly reminded of their "sacred duty" to serve party and state as the "wall of iron and steel" in national defense and on production fronts. Through their fist-swinging, slogan-shouting demonstrations they also fulfill the important task of articulating "public sentiments" for the party on important political issues, both internal and external. They represent Mao Tse-tung's boasted "inexhaustible source" of manpower. They are highly disciplined and regimented, taxed nearly to the limits of endurance by hard labor for long hours day after day, seemingly anesthetized to suffering by Mao's political narcotic—militant heroism. Above all, an intense animosity toward the United States, whether forged or genuine, prevails among the militarized portion of China's vast masses, now ostentatiously called *jen-min wu-chuang-tui* (people's armed forces).

I

Mao's revolutionary strategy, the key to an understanding of his concept of "people's war," requires every citizen to be a soldier. During the fighting against the Japanese and Kuomintang (KMT) enemies, almost every able-bodied person in communist-held areas was involved in one way or another. Resolute armed struggle by the entire nation, in the nature of a protracted conflict against the enemy, foreign and domestic, represents the *sine qua non* for Mao's people's war.

Peking has given greater attention to revitalizing and publicizing the people's war concept since 1958, following three separate but closely

[1]Over the Taiwan Straits the surging billow runs high,
The raging flame of "Resist-America" is sky-high;
We, the 600 million people, have arisen in arms,
Behold, fighting Red banners are everywhere, near and far;
Greater is our production, higher is our fighting morale;
Higher is our fighting morale, let's smash the American imperialist rifler.

The writer's own translation; cited from *Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien*, August 1, 1960 (inside back cover).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

related events: the "offshore islands" crisis, the introduction of "people's communes," and the reorganization of the militia. These events took place almost simultaneously in that year. The crisis over the Taiwan Straits produced a virulent hate-America campaign and a state of near war-hysteria. This coincided with the drastic economic and social experiment, the establishment of people's communes, as China's leaders sought desperately for a way to increase production. The communes, in turn, provided the new structural unit on which the regime subsequently reorganized the militia in order to improve productivity and strengthen labor discipline among the masses.

In view of the traditional scheme of Mao's people's war, in which the masses have played a dual role as producers and fighters, the establishment of communes is a logical measure. The two roles of the militiamen find popular expression in the term *wu-kung-ho-i,* i.e., "combine labor with military service," with special emphasis on the former. The principle of *wu-kung-ho-i* represents the core of the Chinese theory of people's war.

Mao attaches great importance to mobilizing the masses. Only recently he declared that "the deepest root of the power for war exists in the midst of the masses of the people."[2] In this connection, the Japanese North China Expeditionary Army, in its organ *Shinpei* (*Divine Soldier*) in 1943, observed: "Of the main characteristics of the Chinese Communist army the most fundamental one is their success in arming the masses. If the character of modern warfare lies in its all-out national war, the Chinese Communists then are waging the most thorough-going modern warfare."[3] Mao and his cohorts seem to have mastered the technique of people's war as shown by their success, since the early days of the revolution, in militarizing the otherwise elusive masses for their cause.

II

Perhaps the earliest source that reveals the formal initiation, but not actual implementation, of a communist-programmed militia is the draft outline, "The Organization of a Local Civilian Volunteer Militia in Peking to Serve as a Secret, Armed Army of the Kuomintang," prepared by K'o-erh-te (believed to be a Russian) in Peking. Though the exact date for the document is unknown, it was presumably adopted some time in 1926, because in July of that year a resolution of identical nature—"Resolutions on the Red Spears Movement"—was adopted by the party in Shanghai.[4]

While the latter document indicated that "the [Red Spears] organ-

[2] *Jen-min Jih-pao* (*JMJP*), November 8, 1964; in *Survey of China Mainland Press* (*SCMP*), No. 3350, December 4, 1964, p. 1.

[3] *K'ang-chan Pa-nien lai ti Pa-lu-chün yü Sin-ssu-chün* (*The Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army in the Eight-Year Resistance War*) (The General Political Department of the 18th Group Army, 1945), p. 209.

[4] C. Martin Wilbur, and others, editors, *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China, 1919-1927* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956), pp. 303-361.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ization has become the real [armed] force of the people" in the countryside, it failed to specify whether the Red Spears should serve as reserve units for the then communist-supported Revolutionary Nationalist Army. The former document, in contrast, specifically instructed that "it is necessary to organize [the militia as] a large reserve army which can rise in armed struggle in times of danger . . . within the shortest period."[5] Years later, Lo Jui-ch'ing, the then Chief of the General Staff of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), purged during the current Cultural Revolution, made an almost identical statement concerning the merits of the militia: "The expansion of the militia is to ensure the army of its continual flow of manpower at any time it may become necessary and for any number it may call for."[6]

Although we are not certain as to the role Mao played at these gatherings, particularly at the Shanghai meeting in 1926, it seems reasonably clear that the doctrinaire, but not yet entirely urban-oriented, leadership of the party at that stage had already recognized (contrary to the general view) the need for arming the masses, especially the peasants. They were to be used, not for seizing local power immediately, but primarily to fight the warlords.[7] Mao has generally been given much credit for his recognition of the importance of the peasants' role in the Chinese revolution. But this may not be fair to the pre-Mao leadership of the party, because as early as 1922 party leaders had clearly recognized as "the most important factor" the revolutionary potential of the 300 million Chinese peasants.[8]

It was only during the May Thirtieth Movement, growing out of the anti-foreign mass movements in Tsingtao and Shanghai in 1925, that Mao himself came to appreciate fully the potential force of the peasantry.[9] His reputation as the foremost military theorist on people's war can be attributed in large part to the unsuccessful armed adventures in urban centers pursued by the party under Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, and the later disasters under Li Li-san. These defeats caused Mao to re-evaluate the Leninist theory of armed struggle and his own practical experience in insurrection in the remote countryside of Hunan. Following his retreat into the Kiangsi hinterlands, Mao searched for a desperately needed working substitute for the calamitously ineffectual urban uprising. He eventually brought forth his new strategy of agrarian revolution.

If Mao's decision to utilize the revolutionary potential of the peasants was made only at the time of the May Thirtieth Movement, he and his youthful comrades during the days in Kwangtung must have had immediate success: a communist source indicates that they had created within a year (by May 1926) "a peasants' self-defense army of more

[5]*Ibid.*, p. 361.
[6]Lo Jui-ch'ing, "Expand Militia Divisions, Reconstruct and Defend the Fatherland," *Hung Ch'i*, No. 10, 1960, p. 19.
[7]Wilbur, *op. cit.*, p. 304.
[8]Ch'en Kung-po, *The Communist Movement in China*, edited by C. Martin Wilbur (New York: East Asian Institute of Columbia University, 1960), p. 120.
[9]See Stuart R. Schram, *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung* (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 27.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

than 30,000 men."[10] In his article written for *Pravda* in 1952, Chu Teh stated that "Workers' Pickets and Peasants' Self-Defense Corps were able to take part in the Nanchang uprising on August 1, 1927," the date on which Army Day is now celebrated in China.

Mao actually introduced the militia system for the first time in the party organization at Chingkangshan probably during 1929 (he had already talked about Red Guards in 1928) in order to rebuild his badly beaten peasant army. By the time the Juichin Soviet Republic was established, in 1931, a combined force of Red Guards (the forerunner of the present militia) and Young Vanguards (Pioneers) had reached a total of 2,560,000. By 1934, when Chiang Kai-shek launched his fourth encirclement campaign, those irregular units had grown to eight times the size of the Red Army. But the communists had not yet fashioned an orderly structure for the armed masses.

The War of Resistance against Japan compelled the party to organize the irregular units on a more unified, disciplined basis. By this time the party had instituted the militia, distinguishing it from other mass units such as the People's Self-Defense Corps (often called the Red Tasseled Spears). The latter corps, lightly armed and manned chiefly by able-bodied local villagers, men and women between 18 and 55 years old, was charged with duties such as carrying messages, patrolling villages, transporting provisions and ammunition, and carrying the wounded. Enlisting its cadres and elite members from the Self-Defense Corps, the militia was made up of young people from 18 to 35 years of age, better armed to carry out more dangerous assignments —combat operations in close coordination with regular units, guerrilla fighting, and intelligence gathering. In theory, the militiamen were never to be separated from their production activities for any extended period, but in practice large contingents of them, serving as "alternate combat units," often had to follow the army far from home to participate in campaigns, usually on the outer flanks. They were trained in an impressive array of battlefield tactics, such as "sparrow battles," mine and tunnel warfare, concentration and dispersal, "joint defense" tactics, and "hurricane methods."[11]

Nostalgic accounts of militia activities and episodes of heroic deeds of militiamen in wartime are commonplace in current communist literature. The Chinese communists have not stinted in their praise of the militia's war record. During the eight years of the Resistance War, the militiamen fought a total of over 290,000 battles and in the three years of the Civil War they fought more than 100,000 campaigns.[12] Mao, noting the heavy loss of life suffered in the course of the wars, paid the militia a tribute when he said that the Red Army without the armed

[10] *JMJP*, June 28, 1962; in *SCMP*, No. 2780, July 18, 1962, p. 2.
[11] Mine and tunnel warfare was the most effective means used by the militiamen to harass the enemy during the revolutionary wars. The successful Chinese experience in these tactics, particularly tunnel warfare, is no doubt responsible for their use in the Viet Nam conflict.
[12] *Shih-shih Shou-ts'e* (*Current Events*), No. 15, August 6, 1962; in *Selections from China Mainland Magazines* (*SCMM*), No. 330, September 10, 1962, p. 5.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

masses would be like "a one-handed general" and that the victory of the Chinese people would have been impossible without the militia.[13] Recognizing the vital role of women in the militia who served as village scouts, medical assistants, road repairers, and even laundresses, Mao composed a poem in 1961 and dedicated it to them:

With rifles firmly in their hands,
How gallant and heroic the militiawomen look,
When the dawn first greets them on the drill ground;
How unyielding and dedicated China's militiawomen stand,
They love not colorful dress but military tunic.[14]

III

Today the militia is composed of ordinary units and basic units.[15] The former are manned primarily by men from 31 to 55 years of age and women from 16 to 50 who, although good citizens, are physically unfit for membership in the basic militia units. Those ordinary militiamen who are under the age of 30, and those who are between 31 and 40 with no experience in active duty, constitute the second reserve of the PLA. The basic units include those men and women between 16 and 30 years of age (in some cases 18 to 25) who are physically and "politically" better fit, together with demobilized soldiers. These are better armed and regularly given advanced military training. Of the basic militiamen, furthermore, those who have served on active duty form the PLA first reserve.

The militia is a typical communist organization, based on democratic centralism. While it is placed under the direct control of the local party organ in matters of a nonmilitary nature, it takes orders from the superior organ of the PLA's Military Sub-District in military matters. This dual chain of command reflects the special nature of the militia's functions—military and civilian (i.e., production). When issues are in conflict between the military leadership and the local political administration, the militia are expected to follow the decision by the higher military organ.[16]

The Chinese communists make no secret that the militia functions to ensure the PLA of the immediate availability of reserve forces; to serve as a "shock force" in production; to create loyal, law-abiding citizens indoctrinated with "revolutionary virtues"; and to change the mental outlook of the people so that they will take "a firm stand for communism." The most important functions are the first two. The principle of "everybody a soldier" is a basic policy of the party when armed struggle is the principal form of revolution, but it is also "an important

[13] *JMJP*, November 8, 1964; in *SCMP*, No. 3350, December 4, 1964, p. 2.
[14] The author's own translation; cited from *Jen-min Shou-ts'e* (*People's Handbook*) (Peking: Ta-kung-pao Press, 1964), p. 2.
[15] By 1959 the militia had increased to 220 million; 30 million were basic militiamen, and 4 million of them had completed live-fire practice.
[16] *Kung-fei Min-ping Kung-tso Yen-chiu* (*A Study of Red China's Militia Work*) (Taiwan: Reference Bureau, the Judicial-Administrative Department, 1960), p. 13.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

strategic measure for defending the socialist revolution and socialist reconstruction."[17] The militia, as one of the principal means of armed struggle, represents a crucial part of the strategy ostensibly aimed at "American aggression," but it serves an important function in regimenting the masses as an armed *corvée*.

Although the militia performs vital military and economic functions, the mobilization of the entire nation through the militia appears designed primarily to strengthen citizenship and ideology—the psychological armament of the masses. Fu Ch'iu-t'ao, Senior General of the PLA and Director of its Department of Mobilization, pointed out in 1958 that the people's war has "a profound political and strategic significance, because . . . we encourage the people's ambition, undo the enemy's prestige [of nuclear supremacy], bring into play the spirit of our people to strive for the position of a [great] power, cultivate magnificent heroism, and fortify the fighting will of the people in defense of the motherland."[18]

In order to spur their people on to the great task of catching up with the West in the field of nuclear and missile weaponry, Chinese leaders stress heroism, self-sacrifice, and the importance of the themes, "man over material" and "the moral atom bomb over the atom bomb." They admit that "the atom bomb is very powerful," but point out that "the material atom bomb is something we've already mastered," and "the moral atom bomb is a thing which the enemy can never obtain. . . ."[19] Such a view underscores Mao's general attitude that "weapons are the main, but not the decisive, factor in a war; the decisive factor is men, not materials."[20] It also adheres to the communists' continued emphasis on "politics in command," i.e., ideology over technique.

The reason for Mao's success in politicizing the masses lies in his ability to maintain a sense of national urgency. Throughout the history of Chinese communism, Mao and his party have directed the masses to struggle against the warlord-militarists, the Japanese, the Kuomintang, U.S. "imperialism," economic backwardness, and any other force standing in the way of the Maoist world revolution. Communist China's involvement in the Korean War and her unending cold war with the United States ever since have provided Mao with the much-needed environment of urgency and crisis. In this sense, the crisis over the Taiwan Straits in 1958 and the present war in Viet Nam have been welcome events.

At the root of Chinese jingoism and crisis-mongering is a fear of the superior economic and military power of the United States. Chinese leaders try to conceal it by their attempts to intimidate and bluff, and their denunciation of the United States as a paper tiger. Nonetheless,

[17] *JMJP*, November 8, 1964; in *SCMP*, No. 3350, December 4, 1964, p. 1.
[18] *Hung Ch'i*, No. 10, October 16, 1958; in *Extracts from China Mainland Magazines* (*ECMM*), No. 150, December 8, 1958, p. 11.
[19] *SCMM*, No. 457, February 23, 1965, pp. 41-42.
[20] *Ch'ün-chung* (*The Masses*), Kiangsu, No. 5, October 1, 1958; in *ECMM*, December 8, 1958, p. 6.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

there are noticeable signs of Chinese caution in Asian politics, for example along the Indian-Sikkim border, and to a certain extent in their vociferous but distant support of the war in Viet Nam. While the Chinese attempt to screen their fear of and respect for U.S. material strength, the American public has created for itself a myth of invincible Chinese "human sea" tactics, remembered from the Korean conflict. Mao seeks to exploit this American fear by massive propaganda to strengthen the image of an "inexhaustible supply" of Chinese armed masses.

IV

Despite the regime's effort to convert the entire nation into a garrison for production and defense, widespread discontent and problems beset the government. The communists admit that some people believe the militia is not necessary in a time of peace and may even hurt production.[21] There are "militia dodgers" in some regions, "quite a number of eligible young men who have not yet been enrolled into the militia" for unspecified reasons.[22] In addition, as the commune system failed to satisfy economic demands, large numbers of youth left the countryside, thereby further undermining local militia units; some of the militia organizations were infiltrated and even controlled by many of the so-called five undesirable elements, ex-landlords, rich peasants, reactionaries, corrupt elements and rightists.

The seriousness of the problems afflicting the militia was most fully revealed in the "Telephone Conference," a classified document for cadres above the regimental level, which was published on January 17, 1961 in the *Work Newsletter* by the PLA's General Political Department. According to the "Telephone Conference," which seems to be an unofficial summary of the militia purge of 1960, many of the militia regimental and battalion commanders have committed manslaughter, manhandling, rape and highway robbery, have insulted and beat people and illegally searched homes.[23]

The overall weakening of discipline and efficiency in militia units is also caused by the poor management of militia weapons. Miscalculation, loss, damage and theft have become "very serious" problems, for "no one clearly knows how many guns and rifles there are in each province, and who really control them."[24] The communists insist that control of weapons is "a political problem," and thus the political commissar is responsible for seeing that all weapons are handled by "reliable" militiamen of poor peasant origin.

To cope with disciplinary problems the Chinese have intensified "class education" among the militiamen. The most widely used and effective

[21] *Shan-si Jih-pao*, Sian, February 28, 1960; in *SCMP*, No. 2244, April 26, 1960, p. 10.
[22] *Liao-ning Jih-pao*, February 28, 1960; in *ibid.*, p. 19.
[23] Nai-kuang Hsiang, *The Militia—A Thorn in the Peiping Regime's Side* (Taipei: Asian People's Anti-Communist League, 1963), pp. 4-5.
[24] "China Topics," October 26, 1962; in *Extracts from China Mainland Publications* (*ECMP*), No. 72, October 30, 1962, pp. 8-9.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

method of ideological education at present is the "remember past miseries" meeting. At these affairs, sponsored and supervised by leading party and militia cadres on the local level, participants contrast the "happy life the masses enjoy at the present" with the "hard life they had under the KMT rule." This time-tested technique of communist accusation is as useful today for mass agitation as it was during the agrarian reform movement; its main targets now are the "U.S.-KMT aggressors" rather than the rural bourgeois. Thus, the psychological basis of the present militia buildup is the appeal to the masses to safeguard at any cost "the present happiness of the masses"—which is to say, the salvation from "class antagonisms" offered by the party.

Without alienating themselves from the people, the Chinese communists have broken the traditional Chinese distrust of, and even contempt for, soldiers. An old Chinese proverb says "good iron should not be made into nails, good men should not become soldiers." Now the communists have transformed this into the popular catch phrase: "Good iron should be made into nails, good men should become soldiers; good iron should be made into screws; good men should join the Liberation Army."[25] A Kuomintang secret document[26] circulated among high KMT army officers, reveals that the key to breaking down the traditional contempt for the army lay in the following recruitment procedure adopted by the communists: The first step was land redistribution among the peasants in each village. Then, an "exceedingly thorough" propaganda effort was directed at the peasants in four stages: (1) The poor owe their betterment to the struggle of the party and the army. (2) In order to protect and keep newly acquired land, the corrupt elements and bully landlords must be smashed. (3) In order to guarantee freedom and welfare, one must join the army. (4) When sentiment has been sufficiently aroused, village cadres set the example and join the army; soon parents, wives and children are encouraged to send their beloved ones.[27]

A myriad of rules and regulations affect the daily life of militiamen. Observance of them is voluntary, but anyone violating them is subject to punishment by persuasion, warning and dismissal. These written codes of behavior, such as the "three-eight" work style and the "five-good" qualities—as well as the PLA's "three rules of discipline and eight points for attention,"[28] to which all militiamen also must conform—seem to have an ideological, rather than a legal, purpose.

[25]Shih Ch'eng, *Kung-chün Nei-mo Chieh-p'ou* (*An Analysis of the Communist Army*) (Hong Kong: The Freedom Press, 1951), p. 46.

[26]*Chiang Kai-shek Army Appraises Its Enemy*, from an Official Secret Document of the Kuomintang Military Officers Training Corps, Nanking, 1947? (New York: Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy), p. 5.

[27]*Loc. cit.*

[28]The "three rules" are: (1) Obey orders under all circumstances. (2) Do not steal a single needle or a piece of thread. (3) Hand in all booty to the government.

The "eight points for attention" are: (1) Talk politely to the people. (2) Observe fair dealing in all business transactions. (3) Return everything you have borrowed. (4) Pay for anything you have damaged. (5) Do not beat or scold the people. (6) Do not damage crops. (7) Do not fool around with women. (8) Do not ill-treat prisoners of war.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The official in charge of the militiaman's ideological life is, as in the PLA, the political commissar who is assigned to all militia units above the company level. He is the party's watchdog "whose curiosity has no limits." It is his duty to know everything about the soldier, especially whether he thinks Mao's thoughts and is loyal to party policy. He is the last link in the chain of authority stretching from the nerve center of the militia—the Central Military Committee of the Communist Party.

The militiaman is given thorough military training including practice with grenades, flame-throwers, anti-aircraft guns, and artillery; battlefield tactics, chemical warfare, anti-tank gunnery, mine warfare, navigation, gliding, sentry duty, quick marching, lectures on military problems, and reports on combat experiences. The last two programs are the major activities of the so-called Militia Days generally held for a few days every month. Military exhibitions are an important feature of the current training program, for they serve a propaganda purpose and "diffuse military knowledge" among the masses.

Combat realism has been added to the militia training schedule in the last two years. In a contest to cross Kunming Lake (near Peking) in the summer of 1964, for instance, ten-men squads of a Peking college, each carrying a light machine gun and seven rifles and using a simple raft of wood and bamboo, covered the distance of 600 meters in 14.188 minutes.[29] Similar events were held elsewhere in the country. During the last two years the communists have initiated aviation training, especially in gliding, for the purpose of creating a reserve for the militia's technical airmen and the People's Air Force. At present, there are eight part-time schools for junior gliders, all opened in 1965.[30]

Another innovation of the training program during recent years is military camping, designed to spread military knowledge especially among the urban youth from colleges, factories, mines, enterprises and government bureaus. This shift in emphasis appears to indicate that the Chinese are currently in the process of reorganizing and reindoctrinating urban militia units, particularly from colleges.

V

Chinese communist policies have been favored, rather than hampered, by the vicissitudes of crisis politics. In fact, Chinese leaders have deliberately sought to create crises where they did not exist or to exaggerate them when they did arise, in order to stoke the fires of revolutionary struggle and increase the military power of the country. They have come a long way in their effort to terminate China's centuries-old stagnation and create a new image for her in world affairs. Such an ambitious scheme of reasserting and expanding Chinese power would have been unthinkable without building a massive military capability.

[29]New China News Agency, Peking, August 13, 1964; in *SCMP*, No. 3287, August 26, 1964, p. 2.
[30]*T'i-yü-pao*, Peking, December 4, 1964; in *SCMP*, No. 3368, December 31, 1964, pp. 6-19. They are located in Tsinan and Shanghai in east China, Chengtu and Chungking in the southwest, Tientsin and Paoting in the north, Wuhan in the central-south, and Chinchow in the northeast.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Crisis politics continues to dominate events. From 1950 to the present, Communist China has been the scene of one systematically planned revolution or "crash" program after another: for example, the agrarian revolution of 1950, the initial industrialization effort of the early 1950's, the economic and social revolution (in the form of communes) and the Great Leap Forward of 1958, and the accelerated nuclear program, which culminated in the detonation of China's first atomic device in 1964.

The 1958 decision to reinforce the militia can be seen as one more Maoist revolutionary measure to convert China into a national garrison. One might, indeed, describe Mao's immediate objective as "garrison socialism." In view of its broad social implications—one-half of China's 650 million people is estimated to be a part of it—the reorganized militia forms the backbone of Mao's people's war.

Internally, the people's war is nothing less than an economic battle in which peasants and workers of militia units continue to bear the crushing burden of production. The militia, guided by Mao's thoughts, is assigned the task of outstripping the economic achievements of the Nuclear Club's senior members. Externally, the notion of the people's war is expected to continue to frighten the West, *and* the Soviet Union, through the formidable manpower reserve represented by the strengthened militia.

How long can the Chinese leaders effectively manage and exploit the armed *corvée?* The answer will depend on whether, through manipulation of the power structure of a totalitarian state, they generate and sustain the essential forces of social cohesion—especially the major national aspiration: the creation of a new, strong Middle Kingdom to recover Chinese stature and prestige. Through indoctrination of the masses, Mao will endeavor to nurture the revolution and pass on to his hand-picked successor the "moral atom bomb," the people's war. Whether the Chinese people will be content for many more years to drink from the regime's fountain of "garrison socialism" is impossible to answer. This experiment with a people's militia may be the crucial test of the Chinese communist system.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Reviews

On "Out-Administering" the Insurgent*

by Bryce F. Denno

The late Bernard Fall contended that victory in a war of insurgency, such as that in Viet Nam, goes to the side which "out-administers" its opponent. In *Defeating Communist Insurgency,* Sir Robert Thompson, drawing on some sixteen years of counterinsurgency experience in Malaya and Viet Nam, arrives at a similar conclusion. Military action, he agrees, is indispensable but only because it helps to create an environment favorable to the nonmilitary effort designed to eliminate the insurgent's "government" and substitute that of the counterinsurgent. Nonmilitary activity in Viet Nam, which has been variously termed "pacification," "rural reconstruction" and "revolutionary development," constitutes "the other war" in which the Allies are trying to "out-administer" the Viet Cong. Because this side of the conflict is currently receiving so much attention, the appearance of Sir Robert's book—in essence, a manual on how to "out-administer" an insurgent enemy — is especially timely. However, apparently to avoid misinterpretation of some of his observations as criticism of current policy in Viet Nam, the author stresses that his book "is not related to the current situations in either Malaya or Viet Nam, though certain parts of it could still be applicable." (p. 10.)

Analysts of wars of insurgency have emphasized the inherent asymmetry between insurgents and the government they are trying to overthrow. The French authority, David Galula, dramatized this asymmetry by comparing the military contest between lightly-armed guerrillas and conventionally-armed government forces as a struggle between a fly and a lion in which "the fly cannot deliver a knockout blow and the lion cannot fly." In studying recent counterinsurgency strategies advanced by experienced operators such as Sir Robert, one is impressed by the fact that their proposals tend to make counterinsurgency and insurgency more symmetrical. As an example, Galula contends that the insurgent must start with a convincing cause and clear political objectives. Likewise, Thompson stresses that the government opposing insurgency must have a cause and well-defined political objectives. Both assert that good propaganda and intelligence are indispensable to the insurgent and the counterinsurgent alike. The insurgent must operate militarily according to a central plan; however, actual operations depend on the initiative of local leaders, writes Galula. In similar fashion, Thompson stresses that military counterin-

**Defeating Communist Insurgency.* By Sir Robert Thompson. New York: Praeger, 1966. 171 pp. $4.95.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

surgency operations, although performed in accord with a master plan, depend on small-unit leaders for their successful execution.

Above all, both insurgent and counterinsurgent must rely on an extensive and well-organized bureaucracy of "civil servants" to control and gain the support of the population at the grass-root level. For, as Thompson explains, "The best of plans, programmes and policies will remain nothing but good intentions unless the machinery exists to execute them so that they make their impact throughout the country." (p. 70.) In World War II days, when the Viet Minh were organizing cadres to control rural villages in northern Viet Nam, the then Secretary of the Communist Party of Indochina, Truong Chinh, complained that French colonial rule had stifled development of effective and politically-conscious Vietnamese administrators. Today, in organizing the 59-man "revolutionary development teams" which form the backbone of the current pacification effort in South Viet Nam, the Saigon government is having comparable difficulty finding adequate numbers of administrators.

In making these points, Thompson says nothing novel or spectacular. The fact that he does not reinforces a belief long held by many students of counterinsurgency: The principles of counterinsurgency, like the classic principles of war, have long been evident. Their application, however, remains an art. How, for example, does one allocate available manpower between the equally indispensable military and nonmilitary efforts?

Thompson feels that the armed forces in Viet Nam have appropriated much more than their proper share of available manpower and have especially attracted the more ambitious and capable young men. Accordingly, fewer and less talented men have been available for the pacification effort. There are not enough qualified policemen, for example. Thompson maintains that the police should outnumber the soldiers by two or more to one. Further, he points out that there are virtually no civilian province or district chiefs in South Viet Nam. To obtain this managerial talent, Saigon has been obliged to turn to the army. Discounting the fact that province and district chiefs have military as well as administrative responsibilities, Thompson's point is well taken. He also decries the unhealthy political influence exercised by South Viet Nam's armed forces, although he suggests no remedy in a country whose continued existence depends on military success.

Another facet of counterinsurgency which is simple in theory but extremely difficult in execution is the coordination of military and nonmilitary efforts so that they reinforce, rather than defeat, each other. Here again, Thompson is critical in his assessment of some of the military operations the South Vietnamese conducted during his tour of Viet Nam. During "search and clear" operations designed to find and destroy the Viet Cong, for instance, government forces were

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

prone to shell and bomb villages from which they were receiving enemy fire—thus inevitably killing the innocent as well as the enemy. He comments: "The communists are not slow to make propaganda capital out of all excesses committed by the government, with the result that most search and clear operations, by creating more communists than they kill, become in effect communist-recruiting drives." (p. 35.) Having participated in many search and clear operations, this reviewer regards this observation as one of the very few examples of British overstatement appearing in a book written with obvious restraint, tolerance and understanding.

Thompson comments on many issues pertinent to Viet Nam today. One concerns the supposed requirement that counterinsurgents must outnumber the insurgents by ten to one. "Nonsense," says Sir Robert, who claims this ratio is not a "prerequisite but an indicator" of how the war is going. How can the Viet Cong keep recruiting additional manpower to replace their admittedly heavy losses? This is a simple matter, Sir Robert maintains, in the light of the very small ratio between the men they maintain under arms and the manpower available in areas they control. How should the National Liberation Front be treated in any future peace talks? While Sir Robert does not address himself directly to this question, he does point out that the Malayan government prolonged the war for five additional years rather than agree to peace conditions proffered by the Malayan Communist Party which would have permitted that party legal representation in the postwar era.

Sir Robert has written a hard-headed book which is especially valuable during a time when policy on Viet Nam, debated around the world, may even decide the results of the next American election. He provides a timely reminder that any policy in Viet Nam must eventually be, at least in major part, implemented by the Vietnamese. To repeat his words, "The best . . . of policies will remain nothing but good intentions unless the machinery exists to execute them. . . ."

An American-Soviet Concert?*

by David B. King

The current preoccupation of the United States with Far Eastern affairs has given rise in the European press to occasional expressions of concern that American interest in Europe has reached an all-time low. If the recent flow of books commenting upon the history and future of our connection with Europe is a fair indication, then these fears are groundless. One of the shorter and more interesting of these treatments is *The Cold War . . . and after* by the late Professor Charles O. Lerche, Jr., of American University.

Lerche, during his distinguished career, published extensively in the field of international relations. In this book he has made another

**The Cold War . . . and after.* By Charles O. Lerche, Jr. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965. 150 pp. $4.95.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

worthy contribution to the realization of a goal stated in his earlier *Foreign Policy of the American People* (1958), that of strengthening the participation of an educated public in policy formulation. Given this concern for the layman, one might expect that his presentation would not always be pertinent to the expert. However, Lerche's conclusions and prescriptions—and his denial that he is offering prescriptions is puzzling—are certainly directed also to those who formulate policy and deserve from them careful attention.

Lerche sees the Cold War as a chiefly European phenomenon that has run through several phases and is now "obsolescent if not yet obsolete." (p. 130.) He declares that "the world, for all practical purposes, has left the cold war behind." (p. 131.) The attitudes and strategies that have served us for the past twenty years are no longer suitable, and we must prepare ourselves to accept new ones. An attempt to restore international order through close cooperation with the Soviet Union, while no longer a simple matter because of the rejuvenation of the lesser powers, is offered as the policy best suited to serve the future interests of the United States and world peace. These are the essentials of Lerche's book, written in part in a frank and appealing style and in part in the jargon popular with some social scientists.

The major strength of the work lies in its ability to clarify for us two decades of jumbled history by imposing upon the events a reasonable pattern. The treatment of the Cold War as a completed unit lends itself to a periodization of its rise and fall: 1945 to 1950 is seen as the time during which a system of bipolarity developed, and 1950 to 1954 as an era of stalemate. From 1954 to 1960 a "liquidation of the bipolar idea" took place, while the half-decade since 1960 witnessed a sharp diminution of the "scope of dominion" of both the United States and the USSR. A result of this last development has been an increase in the willingness of both powers to work together. (p. 96.) The dates used here might be disputed, and even Lerche, judging from his discussion of the events of 1956 and 1962, appeared to have his reservations. Still, they are good choices and can be accepted as parts of a convenient simplification.

Occasionally Lerche's attempts to clarify result in oversimplification. His judgment, for example, that the deterioration of the balance of power can be traced to an attempt by Imperial Germany to achieve European hegemony is debatable. So is his assertion that our perception of the struggle between the Americans and the Russians since the end of World War II can be improved by viewing it as a contest between the ideals of Wilson and those of Bismarck. One can also take issue with the attempt to make Soviet intentions less problematic by denying that their long-range, ideologically-derived goals are relevant to our day-to-day dealings with the USSR. It is one thing to argue, as Lerche does not, that we can be certain

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that the Soviet ideological position has changed or that ideology has ceased to matter for the Soviets in foreign affairs. It is something else again to conclude, as he does, that there is no significant relationship between ideology and policy.

Again he goes too far when he makes his point that the Cold War has been in important respects an unnatural era in international relations and thus an interruption of the classical pattern of limited-goal diplomacy. Although there may be some validity to the often-made assertion that U.S. leaders during World War II (thus at the onset of the Cold War) tended to put military above political considerations, it is definitely not true that "between 1939 and 1945 war became finally separated from politics." (p. 6.) Diplomatic factors influenced our wartime decisions time and again. The "unconditional surrender" declaration that Lerche uses as an illustration does little to support his case. With its intention of mollifying the Soviets and of discouraging them from making a separate peace treaty with the Nazis, it would seem on the contrary to have been a model of that very diplomacy that Lerche saw disappearing. These overstatements could easily have been avoided, for none of them is essential to the central themes of the book.

Whatever the deficiencies of his arguments, when Lerche contends that it is time to revise our attitudes toward the Soviet Union he is generally persuasive. To this reviewer, his seems in many ways an intelligent middle course between those who remain reluctant to see the possibilities for *détente* and those who anticipate a solution to world problems that would not only eliminate Cold War frictions, but also remove for all time the factor of power from international relations. Lerche sees the difficulties involved in relaxing the tensions produced by present conflicts and does not expect too much. He notes that the arrival of true harmony would be embarrassingly disruptive to established domestic as well as foreign affairs patterns and would require both the United States and the Soviet Union to face problems that they would approach only reluctantly. The moderation evidenced in these views, however, does not prevail when he turns to outlining a course of action for the United States in decades to come.

For the future conduct of U.S. foreign policy, Lerche has two recommendations. The first is to attempt to work with the Soviet Union to put "limits of safety" around the remaining Cold War issues in order to prevent them from becoming unnecessarily dangerous. (pp. 135-139.) There is nothing extravagant in this advice, and perhaps it is being followed even now. The second suggestion, on the other hand, is for something far more radical: the United States and the USSR should, he believes, join forces in order to effect "the restoration of great-power mastery over the international political process." (p. 135.) A "Soviet-American concert" would no longer have the ability to determine events that it had in the late 1940's. Still,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Paris and Peking, today's chief insurgents, could be kept in check if Moscow and Washington confronted them "united in their determination to control world politics." He sees as a result of this cooperation a return to the "classical patterns of great-power relations." (p. 142.) Concerning this last point, it is hard to see how such a result could follow, since the classical pattern as usually envisioned involves several major powers rather than only two.

There can be many objections to the proposal that the two great powers of today make common cause in the years ahead. The most telling one, perhaps, is that it would have little chance of success in ordering world affairs. Concentrating as he does on Europe, Lerche is no doubt predisposed to overlook the problem of keeping China subordinate to such a duopoly. But what of Europe herself? Lerche is not alone in assuming that Europe will never again be the seat of a major world power. As the Common Market sputters along the path to unity, it is hard to conceive of startling political developments occurring in the next several decades. Yet the economic potential is there. A look at the estimated gross national products for 1975 (see Bruce M. Russett, *et al., World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators,* New Haven, 1964) reveals that a combined Europe (including Britain and excluding the Soviet Union) would be economically only a little less strong than the United States. The Common Market nations alone will be not much inferior to the USSR. With the addition of Britain—or China, whose growing ties to the German Federal Republic and de Gaulle's France suggest that she may some day be an ally of Europe —they would be somewhat superior.

To add up gross national products is not, to be sure, to create great-power blocs. The temptation, however, to make something of the possibility of becoming once again independent may lead Europe into new paths. In the meantime, the point would seem to be that there is too much of the globe that is neither American nor Russian. The economics of world development show few signs of favoring mastery by either of today's superpowers, or, assuming the possibility of collaboration, by both of them together. The Soviet Union and the United States, rather than concerning themselves with how to preserve their exclusive direction of things, might better prepare to deal with a number of world powers and adjust their outlooks to suit conditions that may, during the last quarter of the century, be even less like those of 1945-1965 than Lerche suspects.

One can be grateful that Lerche wrote such a book. All too often such studies conclude with little more than pious ambiguities. Here we are given a plan that is clear and provocative. If it leads to a thorough debate, as we can be sure its author intended, our understanding of the choices before us can only be the better for it.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Communist Parties in Asia*

by René Peritz

A milestone in the development of the Asian communist movement was passed in September-October 1965 when, to the surprise of many observers, the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) attempted to seize the reins of power from the aging and vacillating hands of President Sukarno. The subsequent smashing of the communist apparatus and the wholesale and indiscriminate slaughter of PKI officials and rank-and-file supporters on Java and the outer islands has focused attention on certain basic propositions about the nature of the communist party in the individual Asian state.

A case can still be made for the conspiratorial theory that the Asian communist movements are directed either by the Soviet Union or the Chinese People's Republic. As proof of this guidance, some observers point to the directives and financial support delivered by the major communist powers to the various national parties, and allege that Peking and/or Moscow are able to reinforce their demands by means of ideological if not economic pressure — and, in some cases, even by physical coercion. On the other hand, many experts on Asian affairs have begun to present new evidence and new theories about the emergence of a national, even ethnic-oriented, movement or party organization that bears only general resemblance to the monolithic prototype found in the USSR and Communist China. They claim to have uncovered various patterns of communist and left-wing leadership, recruitment, ideological preferences, and even tactical priorities by looking at the total setting of the Asian state.

It is generally this latter view that prevails in Professor Robert A. Scalapino's symposium on *The Communist Revolution in Asia.* This book of thirteen individual essays provides a country by country (Thailand and Cambodia are omitted) survey of local communist organizations. The editor has asked each of his contributors to write in detail about the communist movement within one country and to discuss in broad terms the evolution of the local party during the last few decades of turmoil and nation-building. There seem to be only two common threads binding the individual pieces into an integrated framework. The first is a provocative piece by Scalapino entitled "Communism in Asia: Toward a Comparative Analysis." The second is a conscious and often belabored effort by the contributors to relate recent events in their respective countries to the Sino-Soviet dispute. As can be expected from a joint effort, the essays differ markedly in style, emphasis and overall conclusions.

Only in Scalapino's introduction does the reader gain a sense of continuity about the subject and, more important, an appreciation of the

**The Communist Revolution in Asia: Tactics, Goals, and Achievements.* Edited by Robert A. Scalapino. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965. 405 pp. $10.00 (text, $7.50).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

processes that have given each party its distinctive national characteristics. He has by and large successfully identified the dominant strains of thought and strategy within the parties. He suggests that the basic elements of any communist organization are formed and coalesced in specific stages of development from "party beginnings to the aftermath of total victory"; that the mechanics of party decision-making are determined by the qualities of leadership present in the communist oligarchy; and that the leaders are constantly evaluating various techniques for enlarging their membership and defining the basic nature of the "enemy." The populace in turn must be mobilized by the party's judicious use of united front tactics and organization of mass associations so that the ruling classes can eventually be overthrown.

At this particular juncture in the national party's evolution, its influence can be increased or diminished by a crucial political decision. The leaders must choose whether they wish to "legitimize" the party by ever closer association with the accepted national charismatic leader—often the "father"—of the country and thereby risk being captured and absorbed by rival forces or, alternatively, whether they wish to attack and undermine the leading and often Western-educated elements of the dominant nationalist movement. A decision of the former type would be calculated, in the party's strategy, to lead to the establishment of a "people's democracy," and in the latter case to the possible instigation of a "people's war."

While one can hardly expect the Asian communist parties to be mirror images of the Chinese organization, it is this structure that is often considered a model worthy of emulation in Southern Asia. Communist manuals, training programs, speeches and exhortations to the party faithful and the general public, from India eastward to Korea, have been based largely on the programs and successes of the Chinese Communist Party. Hence, many of the local communist structures in Southeast Asia tend to be variations on the basic Chinese theme. Chalmer Johnson, a member of the Executive Committee of the University of California's Center for Chinese Studies, describes the *modus operandi* that since 1927 has enabled the Chinese party to derive its strength from indigenous leaders and cadres. This overall strategy became a significant addition to the communist concept of local revolutions and contributed greatly to the widespread acceptance by Asian communists of Mao's theory on creating the proper revolutionary environment and gaining mass support.

In Indonesia, the PKI, estimated before 1965 to have the support of nearly one-fourth of all voters, was waiting in the wings for the optimum time to seize power. Following its abortive coup at Madiun in 1948, the PKI had stressed Marxist-Leninist precepts of organization and ideology and had attempted to become a respectable "national" party by emphasiz-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing the domestic struggle against "imperialists" and the greater international conflict against the powerful NECOLIM (neocolonial-imperialist) nations. Guy J. Pauker of The RAND Corporation, in his essay, warned that a strong PKI allied with the charismatic, left-leaning Sukarno was bound to be successful in any battle for supremacy. He suggested that "Were the communists to lose Sukarno as a protector, it seems doubtful that other national leaders, capable of rallying Indonesia's dispersed and demoralized anticommunist forces, would emerge in the near future. Furthermore, these forces would probably lack the ruthlessness that made it possible for the Nazis to suppress the Communist Party of Germany a few weeks after the elections of March 5, 1933, an election in which the Communist Party still won five million votes, almost 13 per cent of the total." (p. 268.) The events of the past two years have not accorded with his analysis.

Predictions as to the future of communist parties in Southeast Asia are based on hazardous speculation at best. This point is made even more clearly in the paper dealing with the three separate, and by no means equal, Malaysian communist parties and factions. After discussing the relationship between the Malaysian Communist Party and the Sino-Soviet dispute in three-quarters of a page, Frances L. Starner, sometime lecturer in political science at the University of Singapore, states unequivocally that "Nowhere has the Communist Party of Malaya shown its complete subservience to the Chinese communists so much as on the question of the split within the international communist movement. In fact, on this question it appears that the Malayan communist line may be literally made in Peking. This requires little elaboration." (p. 249.)

Her main thesis may very well be true, but it should be pointed out that her major source of information is the *Malayan Monitor,* a publication edited in London by an expatriate Chinese-Malaysian who has been absent from Singapore and Malaysia for over fifteen years. Investigation of other sources of data, such as *The Freedom News* (Singapore) or *Harian Rakyat* (Djakarta), might have led her to slightly different conclusions. However, Professor Starner's statement seems generally valid, for membership in the local communist movement is often equated with country and ethnic preferences. Thus Sarawak's communists are almost exclusively Chinese and are not known to have become members of the Indonesian-based communist party—neither are they members of the Malayan Communist Party.

Nowhere are these interesting points dealing with ethnic and other commitments better made than in the discussions dealing with the split communist parties of Ceylon, Laos and Burma. Pro-Moscow preferences within these parties have led to the creation of pro-Peking counterparties, and in the process the smaller party or faction often finds itself dependent for survival upon communal political

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

forces. India is a case of more than casual interest in this regard. Professor Ralph Retzlaff examines fully the many complex Indian communist declaratory policies and tactics, ranging from constitutional parliamentary opposition to irrational, *ad hoc* opposition to the Congress Party. The individual assessments of the North Vietnamese, Japanese and Nepalese communist parties are all perceptive accounts of trends, policies and schisms.

From a reading of these papers, one draws the conclusion that the Asian communist movements have become increasingly polycentric on the international level and have sunk roots into several of the Asian nations. Moreover, as long as Malaysia, Ceylon and other states have not solved their ethnic and minority problems, the local communist parties are likely to remain ethnically divided. The quandary of the party is its inability to appeal to all communal groups; where the nations are communally divided, the party tends to reflect the narrow aspirations of one particular—and often a minority—racial group.

This is an important book for the student of Asian affairs and the government policymaker with responsibilities for Asia; indeed, one might say it is indispensable for it is the only available analysis of its kind. Despite occasional substantive inaccuracies and superficial treatment of some topics, these essays on the whole are in the best tradition of meticulous and objective scholarship.

Communist China and the Security of Asia*

by David S. Crist

The first explosion by the Chinese communists of an atomic device in October 1964, followed by several more sophisticated tests in succeeding years, brought Americans face-to-face with the formidable and growing threat posed by the Peking regime. The Chinese challenge is magnified by the support provided to North Viet Nam's aggression against the South and by Lin Piao's recent reinterpretation of Mao's "people's war" strategy.

Well in advance of these developments in the Chinese People's Republic, U.S. government officials and the community of scholars and specialists in international relations, East Asian affairs and military security at American and foreign universities and research centers began a massive, if largely uncoordinated, effort to analyze Chinese intentions and capabilities. In the last few years, the findings of these studies have been published in increasing numbers of books and journals and have helped to put into proper perspective the growth of Chinese strength and ambitions. Research on the power and policy of Communist China as related to the security of

**The American People and China.* By A. T. Steele. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966. 325 pp. $7.50.

China and the Peace of Asia. Edited by Alastair Buchan. New York: Praeger, 1965. 249 pp. $6.00.

Communist China in World Politics. By Harold C. Hinton. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966. 527 pp. $10.50 (text, $7.50).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the United States and the noncommunist Pacific-Asian area has today nearly achieved the prominence that once belonged exclusively to the strategic analysis of European security and the Soviet threat.

A. T. Steele's *The American People and China,* published by the Council on Foreign Relations in the series on "The United States and China in World Affairs" (a three-year program of studies begun in 1962), is one example of an important contribution from nongovernmental research programs. The author, a former newspaper correspondent who reported from China for eighteen years, sets out to show how U.S. public and private opinions concerning Communist China are formed and how these attitudes affect national policies. The book opens with an introductory section on traditional American attitudes toward China, with special emphasis on the post-1937 period and the roles played by Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek. Steele then presents the findings of interviews and public opinion polls which he has used to determine the attitudes of the "public" and "opinion leaders." The nationwide sampling of 1,501 individuals was done in 1964 by the Survey Research Center, University of Michigan, while the interviewing of some 200 opinion leaders, including academic "China watchers" and government specialists and officials, was done by the author.

In the third part of the book Steele turns his attention to the problem of providing enough accurate information to the public, and investigates the role of pressure groups, the press and universities. Finally, he examines the impact of public opinion on the formulation of foreign policy. Although he feels that the American public is both misinformed and uninformed about China, he believes that there do exist islands of intelligence and rational thought at some public levels. And he believes that the American people would welcome a cool-headed public debate on U.S. policy alternatives vis-à-vis China.

This reviewer doubts that much can be done to overcome the level of public ignorance and basic unconcern, evidenced by the finding that 28 per cent of the public in the spring of 1964 remained unaware that the communists rule mainland China. Unhappily, this level of ignorance can be found on most foreign policy issues, and one can safely surmise that 28 per cent of the same cross-section of the American public would not know that England today is ruled by a Labour Government. Thus, this finding should not be too surprising although it is deplorable, and it certainly gives pause if one believes that public opinion really does have an impact on national policymaking.

Steele concludes that it would be desirable to have "a frank and searching public discussion of our China policy and a re-examination of this policy both inside and outside Congress. . . . It does not matter whether such discussion does

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nothing more than confirm our present policy as the best available under the circumstances or, on the other hand, points the way to new and better approaches. If such discussion succeeds in clarifying public thinking on a matter of grave concern to our national interests, it will have served a useful purpose." (p. 248.) But he warns that "if there is to be a re-examination of our China policy, those Americans who want it will have to make themselves heard in stronger, clearer and more insistent tones. Only in such circumstances is the President likely to consider taking the initiative in the matter." (p. 250.)

In September 1964 the British Institute for Strategic Studies held its annual conference at Oxford to consider the problem of Communist China and its impact on the Pacific-Asian area and world security. Fourteen papers were delivered, discussed, revised and then published in the book *China and the Peace of Asia*. This work does not pretend to treat all subjects relating to China and Asia, but does put forward, in Alastair Buchan's words, "a number of important new insights into some of the most crucial questions of Asian security by men of experience and of responsibility for grappling with them." (p. 7.)

Since it is impossible to review all fourteen essays within the space of a few paragraphs, we will concentrate our attention on those by William P. Bundy, Samuel B. Griffith and Morton Halperin. But the list of authors and topics in this volume is so impressive that we should at least note the others: Jean Chauvel on "Coexistence in South East Asia: A French View"; Sir Robert Scott, "Conflict and Coexistence in Asia: A British Perspective"; Klaus Mehnert, "The Effect of the Sino-Soviet Conflict in Asia"; V. C. Trevedi, "The Defence of India"; P. J. Honey, "The Outlook in Indo-China"; George Modelski, "Indonesia and her Neighbours"; David Galula, "Subversion and Insurgency in Asia"; Charles Wolf, "The Limitations of Nuclear Deterrence in Asia"; Sir Allen Brown, "The Security of Australia"; Kiichi Saeki and Kei Wakaizumi, "The Problems of Japan's Security"; and John W. Holmes, "Techniques of Peacekeeping in Asia." Although these essays were presented one month before Communist China's first atomic test and much has occurred in Asia since then, most of them stand up well to the test of time and events.

In his contribution, "The United States and Asia," William Bundy, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, maintains that the central factor affecting the security of Asia is a "militant and aggressive" Communist China. U.S. policy "seeks to deal with the central aggressive Communist power and its satellites by preventing their expansion as the first and essential step towards whatever relationship may later evolve." (p. 21.) "We believe," he continues, "that security is a basic requirement in the non-Communist countries." Having established this underlying theme, the author then examines the spe-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cific application of U.S. policy in the Pacific-Asian area, including South Viet Nam. The remarkable fact about Bundy's piece, re-read in 1967, is that U.S. policy and action during the intervening period seems to have followed his guidelines closely and consistently.

These same policies contained the militant communism of the Soviet Union in Europe through such security measures as the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the Berlin airlift, and the U.S. troop buildup in Germany. In Asia, containment and security policies have taken the form of resisting the communist invasion of South Korea, aiding the Chinese Nationalists in the Taiwan Straits, helping to save Laos from complete capture by the Pathet Lao, and resisting aggression by Hanoi against South Viet Nam.

During the past several years, Samuel Griffith and Morton Halperin have become two of the most respected specialists on Chinese communist military power and strategy. Griffith's essay, which estimates "The Military Potential of China," has proved to be lastingly accurate, and could serve as an introduction to his recent book *The Chinese People's Liberation Army* (1967). He writes that China's "capability for sustained conventional action on a major scale outside her own borders is poor. Her present military impotence stems largely from the stoppage of Soviet aid. The result has been that for the last five years she has been deprived of the military hardware, technical assistance and professional advice which was essential if she were to create a balanced defence establishment." (p. 87.)

On the other hand, Griffith warns, her "capabilities in the paramilitary field—the entire spectrum of insurgency, of which guerrilla warfare is but a part—are high, particularly in South East Asia. With relatively slight investment of resources, and at very little risk, she stands to receive a disproportionate return." He goes on to show how the Chinese can easily "exfiltrate selected young men and women for intensive political indoctrination and training as propagandists, organisers, terrorists, saboteurs, and guerrillas. These agents can then be put back as nuclei for cells. . . . One may suspect that when Chinese troops pulled out of the North East Frontier Area (NEFA), they took with them a number of candidates for this schooling, and it should come as no surprise to the Indian government if, in say 1967, it finds itself suddenly faced with this very threat in NEFA." (pp. 89-90.)

Griffith concludes that the Chinese communists "are determined to extend their influence, at the least risk and cost to themselves, to susceptible areas. If a limited military adventure offers a handsome pay-off at very low risk, they will probably embark on it. It is part of our business to narrow the field of choices open to them and thus to deny them strategic options from which they may reap large returns on small investments." (p. 91.)

Halperin's analysis of "China's

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Strategic Outlook" is an offshoot from research he was doing at Harvard University under the auspices of the Center for International Affairs and the East Asian Research Center. His larger work, *China and the Bomb* (1963), was written prior to the first Chinese atomic test, but was subsequently revised and updated for publication in 1965. In 1965, he also collaborated with Dwight H. Perkins on a book entitled *Communist China and Arms Control,* written as part of a project undertaken by Harvard under contract to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

One of the most interesting and valuable sections of Halperin's essay concerns Peking's views of wars of national liberation. "The Chinese have argued with the Russians . . . that [these wars] are very unlikely to lead to large-scale conventional war or in particular to general nuclear war. The Chinese believe that the threat can be kept under control. . . . The Chinese are not willing to run greater risks than the Russians. They just have a different, and possibly more correct assessment, of how dangerous it is to support wars of national liberation." (pp. 105-106.)

He argues that along the border areas (with the exception of Viet Nam) the Chinese stress not revolutionary warfare but the combination of military pressure, the threat of military force, and political and diplomatic promises, gestures and threats. They seek to dominate these countries, to establish hegemony over them. "One finds a pattern of policy in Burma, in Nepal, in Cambodia, in which the Chinese go through the stage of concluding a treaty defining the boundary, a treaty of friendship aiming at a gradual establishment of Chinese hegemony. . . . There has been no attempt even to exploit local situations which might make possible the Communisation of these countries in the short run. They are prepared to work with the groups in power, to accept curbs on the Communist parties and on the overseas Chinese in these countries." (pp. 106-107.)

Halperin feels that the reasons for this strategy lie in the "historical pattern of Chinese policy towards these areas. They feel correctly that they can get the degree of control that they want over these countries, the elimination of American bases [and influence], the establishment of Chinese influence, without the regimes becoming Communist." With regard to U.S.-Chinese relations, he is unequivocal: The Chinese "accept the fact that the United States will continue to be their major enemy and that there is no possibility of any settlement. . . . To seek a *détente* would be dangerous and meaningless, and they simply have to resign themselves to the fact that for the indefinite future they face a . . . very powerful enemy in the United States." (p. 108.)

Communist China in World Politics, written by Harold Hinton under the auspices of the Institute for Defense Analyses, is a comprehensive history of Communist China's foreign policy and worldwide relations since 1949. The result of his

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

prodigious labors is a valuable reference work for the most serious and informed specialist and a textbook for advanced undergraduate and graduate students. The contents are carefully organized and indexed so that the vast and complicated subject matter is presented in logical order with helpful cross-references.

Hinton begins his study by probing the roots of Communist China's foreign policy and its broad course through fifteen years. In parts two and three, he examines China's position on the world stage and her role as an Asian power, and in part four he offers his conclusions. The author's development of the subject of Communist China as an Asian power is the heart of the book. He traces diplomatic actions, military threats, moves and countermoves and counter-countermoves, especially in his chapters on Taiwan and the Offshore Islands, the Korean War, and border problems and policies. In a particularly informative section, he unravels the tangled skein of the Sino-Indian border crisis.

Hinton's views on how the United States might cope with Communist China (pp. 469 ff) are controversial. Yet there are many in and out of government, including this reviewer, who agree with him that the U.S. policy of containment is the correct one, and that diplomatic recognition by the United States in the foreseeable future appears "not only unnecessary and undesireable but infeasible." (p. 493.) His understanding of the Communist Chinese, their objectives and strategies, leads him to the following conclusions: "The present, when Mao's death seems fairly imminent and his regime may be due for a political time of troubles, is hardly the moment to abandon or substantially modify a policy that on the whole has produced results advantageous to the United States and the free world. A careful study of the history of the Cold War . . . would bear out the assertion that Communist 'mellowing,' following a phase of acute frustration, is best promoted by an American policy of intelligent (not blind or irrational) firmness and even toughness, including threats when necessary. The continued effectiveness of such a policy of course assumes a maintenance of at least the present degree of American strategic superiority over the Soviet Union, which the CPR would like the Soviet Union to eliminate, but which the Soviet Union could not eliminate without reducing its people once more virtually to the subsistence level." (p. 494.)

". . . A significant improvement in the CPR's domestic and foreign policies, and therefore in its relations with the United States, Asia, and the world, would seem to require a change of leadership in Peking sufficient to produce a major reorientation of thinking. Such a change appears most unlikely during Mao's lifetime and during the tenure of his immediate successors. After that, we may at least be permitted the luxury of cautious hope." (p. 498.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Books Received

NOTE—By special arrangement with the Foreign Policy Association, readers of ORBIS may obtain from the FPA's Book Center any books listed below published in the United States (except paperbacks) at the publisher's regular list price. Post free for domestic orders only. Send orders with check or money order to Desk O, World Affairs Book Center, 345 East 46th Street, New York, N.Y. 10017. (This arrangement also applies to books reviewed in ORBIS.)

I. POLITICS, HISTORY, ECONOMICS

Acquaintances. By Arnold J. Toynbee. New York: Oxford University Press, 1967. 312 pp. $7.50. The distinguished historian reminisces about 24 acquaintances who made a lasting impression on him, including Nehru, Hitler, T. E. Lawrence, the Webbs, Sir Alfred Zimmern, Lord Bryce, Sir Lewis Namier and Jan Smuts.

Economic Policies toward Less Developed Countries. By Harry G. Johnson. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1967. 279 pp. $6.75. Harry Johnson, Professor of Economics at the University of Chicago from 1959 to 1966 and now at the London School of Economics and Political Science, surveys the main economic issues affecting U.S. relations with less developed countries and explores alternative policies open to American statesmen. He examines such subjects as the impact of the 1964 UNCTAD; the obstacles to efficient development of the world economy; the role of foreign aid, private investment and international commodity agreements; methods of stabilizing export earnings; preferential trade arrangements; the problem of international monetary reform; and the commodity-reserve-currency proposal.

Guide to the Study of International Relations. By J. K. Zawodny. San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1966. 151 pp. $5.00 ($1.95, paper). This volume is a valuable tool for the student and researcher who must locate diverse materials in many disciplines. Prepared by Dr. Zawodny, Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania, it is an arrangement of selected sources, not a catalog of all useful materials. There are more than 500 cross-indexed entries which have been classified under 26 major subject headings and annotated, except in the case of journals. The subject headings include U.S. government archives, behavioral sciences, bibliographies, biographies, international law and organization, newspapers, periodicals, statistics and other quantitative data, and treaty collections.

The Industrial Society: Three Essays on Ideology and Development. By Raymond Aron. New York: Praeger, 1967. 183 pp. $4.95. Professor Aron explores the nature of the industrial society and the qualitative contrast between development and underdevelopment; the possibility that the Soviet and Western systems are variants of a single type which are not obliged to converge but may exist together in tolerance; the slackening ideological emphasis on differences of means in determining concepts of economic development, social order and national growth; and the options open to developing countries in proceeding toward modernization. In so doing he provides a critique of the relevant theories propounded by Walt W. Rostow, Colin Clark, George Lichtheim, Morris Ginsberg and H. D. Aiken.

International Peace Observation: A History and Forecast. By David W. Wainhouse and others. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966. 662 pp. $10.00.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A collection of 70 case studies of peace observation drawn mostly from League of Nations, OAS and UN experiences. Peace observation is defined as third party intervention by the organized world community "in a threatening situation with a view to permitting calmer judgments to allay the potential or actual conflict." The authors provide a brief background to each case, describe the structure and action of the observation mechanism, and evaluate each experience. They conclude that considerable progress has been made in the development and use of this technique and look for it to be a valuable tool in the future.

New Dimensions for the United Nations: The Problems of the Next Decade. Edited by Clark M. Eichelberger. Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, 1966. 225 pp. $6.00. The 17th Report of the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, presented by its editor-chairman, considers various problems facing the UN. These include reconciling the power of states with their sovereign equality, developing the lawmaking and peacekeeping functions of the UN, reducing the gap between rich and poor nations, safeguarding and improving the efficiency of the Secretariat, and arranging international administration of the seas beyond the continental shelf.

Pilsudski's Coup D'Etat. By Joseph Rothschild. New York: Columbia University Press, 1966. 435 pp. $10.00. One of the East Central European Studies of Columbia University, this is an inquiry into the causes, events and consequences of retired Marshal Pilsudski's May 1926 coup against the crumbling parliamentary system of the Polish "successor state" after World War I. The coup inaugurated a semidictatorship experimenting in *sanacja* (moral renovation), with emphasis on state power to the neglect of social issues, yet in spite of "ideological poverty and lack of social anchorage" it kept the restored state from disintegrating. It also signaled the failure of parliamentary democracy throughout East Central Europe in the interwar period. As a case study of a coup d'état, the work offers understanding of other unsuccessful efforts to import the Western governmental model into poor and politically unstable areas.

Political Handbook and Atlas of the World—1967. Edited by Walter H. Mallory. New York: Harper & Row (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1967. 366 pp. $8.50. A standard reference annual in its 40th year, up to date as of January 1, 1967. Complete with a 32-page map supplement in color, it covers all independent countries, furnishing information on the composition of governments, the programs of political parties and their leaders, the political affiliations and editors of leading newspapers and periodicals, and summaries of recent political events, both domestic and foreign. It also describes the organization, functions and personnel of the United Nations and associated international agencies.

The Race War: The World-Wide Clash of White and Non-White. By Ronald Segal. New York: The Viking Press, 1967. 416 pp. $6.50. Mr. Segal, whose autobiography *Into Exile* (1963) described his anti-apartheid activities in his native South Africa, now champions the cause of the "coloured poor" on a worldwide scale. In chapters on the black world of Africa, the colored world of South America, the white world of the United States, London and Moscow, the yellow world of China, and the (uniform) "colour of want," he relates present racial antagonisms to "rich white" dominance, which the industrial nations will not surrender without compulsion. Because the white states (including the Soviet Union) continue to profit from contemporary conditions and resist any attempt at fundamental change, China's is the persuasive voice "recruiting racial as well as economic discontent to the cause of revolution." He sees a cohesive revolutionary force emerging among the poor, and argues that containing revolution aims to perpetuate poverty and privilege.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Social Aspects of Economic Development. By Chester L. Hunt. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966. 255 pp. $7.00. An examination of such social factors as family and class structure, educational trends, ethnic diversity, land tenure, and population growth in relation to economic development. Dr. Hunt shows how these factors in less developed countries operate differently than similar factors in industrialized nations, how economic development depends on far more than technical knowledge and capital accumulation, and how social barriers and problems contribute to economic stagnation.

Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time. By Carroll Quigley. New York: Macmillan, 1966. 1348 pp. $12.50. An interpretation of 20th-century history by the author of *The Evolution of Civilizations.* He explains in detail the significance of events in the transition from the pre-1914 world dominated by Europe, through the disruption of Europe (1914-1945), to the emergence of a two-bloc and then a three-bloc world in the post-World War II era. In separate chapters he examines the rise of international socialism and the Soviet challenge; the intricate financial and commercial patterns that have greatly influenced the course of history; the policy of appeasement of the 1930's; and the rise and fall of the Second and Third Reichs. Throughout, he shows the influence of science and technology on human life.

The United Nations and the Superpowers: United States-Soviet Interaction at the United Nations. By John G. Stoessinger. New York: Random House, 1965. 206 pp. $1.95 (paper). The author's purpose is "to study the dynamics of the United States-Soviet relationship at the UN; to point up the effects of this relationship on the development of the United Nations itself; and to evaluate the significance of this development for the future of superpower relations with the Organization." He has selected nine case studies for analysis: the veto; the problem of membership and the China question; Soviet and American attacks on the Secretariat; the Suez crisis and UNEF; the Congo crisis and the UN operation; the UN's financial crisis; the International Refugee Organization; the International Atomic Energy Agency; and Cuba and the Special Fund.

II. Military Affairs, Arms Control, Technology

The Legal Effects of War. (Fourth edition.) By Lord McNair and A. D. Watts. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1967. 469 pp. $27.50. The authors, both British, are concerned with the legal consequences of war and lesser conflicts in which the United Kingdom has been either a belligerent or a neutral. Consideration is given to the application of British municipal law to both citizens and aliens on British soil but the book does not pretend to deal with the body of similar law existing in other countries. Topics covered in this fourth edition include legal definitions of war, determination of nationality and alien status, restrictions on the performance of contracts, trading with the enemy, international law concerning belligerent occupation of territory, and requirements of neutrality.

This New Ocean: A History of Project Mercury. Prepared by the National Aeronautical and Space Administration. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1966. 681 pp. $5.50. This documentary account of the United States' first manned space venture describes the origins, preparation and nature of the Mercury project and provides a managerial and technological history of it.

The United States in a Disarmed World: A Study of the U.S. Outline for General and Complete Disarmament. By Arnold Wolfers and others. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966. 236 pp. $8.50 ($2.25, paper). Arnold Wolfers, Robert E. Osgood, Paul Y. Hammond, Laurence W. Martin, Robert W. Tucker,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Charles Burton Marshall and Livingston T. Merchant examine the means by which the United States could protect its interests in a world in which the U.S. *Outline* (1962) for general and complete disarmament had been accepted by all nations. They inquire into the resources for deterrence and defense that the United States would command during and after the GCD process, and evaluate the practicality and effectiveness of proposed peacekeeping measures as supplements and substitutes for national armaments that would gradually be eliminated —except for police forces to maintain internal security.

A World of Nuclear Powers? Edited by Alastair Buchan. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, for The American Assembly, 1966. 176 pp. $1.95 (paper). These papers were prepared as background reading for the discussions held in June 1966 at the International Assembly on Nuclear Weapons in Scarborough, Ontario, Canada. The editor has written an introduction on the problem of proliferation; Leonard Beaton estimates the capabilities of nonnuclear powers; Stanley Hoffmann considers the broad topic, "Nuclear Proliferation and World Politics"; Lord Chalfont explores the possibilities of "inhibition by agreement"; Urs Schwarz looks at the role of the nonnuclear powers; and Theo Sommer, Sisir Gupta, Karl Birnbaum, and Kei Wakaizumi examine the objectives, dilemmas and experiences of Germany, India, Sweden and Japan, respectively.

III. United States and Canada

America in the Twentieth Century. (Second edition.) By Frank Freidel. New York: Knopf, 1965. 651 pp. $10.75 (text, $7.50). This revised and updated edition carries the chronological narrative of American history in the 1900's through the Presidential election of 1964. A new introductory chapter sketches the major events from the Civil War to the Spanish-American War, and another new chapter examines intellectual, social and cultural trends during the Progressive era. Throughout the book there is increased emphasis on these latter factors, although the focus continues to be on political and economic developments and foreign affairs.

American Strategy in the Nuclear Age. By David W. Tarr. New York: Macmillan, 1966. 140 pp. $1.50 (paper). In this volume in the "Government in the Modern World" series, Professor Tarr of the University of Wisconsin elucidates the relationship between U.S. military power and foreign policy; shows how the United States has employed its power in such situations as the collapse of Nationalist China, the Berlin blockade, the Korea War, the Cuban crisis, and the Vietnamese conflict; and explains the development of the doctrine of deterrence and the reliance of the U.S. government on nuclear weapons.

America's Foreign Policy. (Revised edition.) Edited by Harold Karan Jacobson. New York: Random House, 1965. 782 pp. $3.95 (paper). This revised edition of a standard supplemental reading text for university courses on U.S. foreign policy has been updated to include new materials, especially in the fields of Soviet-American relations, national security policy, Europe and NATO, the challenge of Communist China, and political and economic development in the emerging countries.

The Consumer Society: A History of American Capitalism. By Peter d'A. Jones. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1965. 407 pp. $1.25 (paper). In this skillfully written chronological narrative of American economic history, Professor Jones stresses that social democracy, mobility and opportunity are the foundations on which American prosperity has been built, and that American economic growth can be sustained so long as the "plural and open society" is preserved. The author, a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Yorkshireman trained at the London School of Economics, is now Associate Professor of History at Smith College.

Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1965. Edited by Richard P. Stebbins with the assistance of Elaine P. Adam. New York: Harper & Row, 1966. 498 pp. $9.50. The latest annual in the Council on Foreign Relations series, cross-referenced to the narrative discussion in its companion volume, *The United States in World Affairs, 1965,* contains documents bearing on every aspect of U.S. foreign policy in 1965, as well as a cumulative 1961-1965 index. Complete coverage is given to the growing involvement in Viet Nam and the Dominican intervention.

The Evolution of American Foreign Policy. (Second edition.) By Dexter Perkins. New York: Oxford University Press, 1966. 168 pp. $1.65 (paper). First published in 1948 and here revised and updated, this little book serves as a clear and balanced summary of the origins and unfolding of American foreign policy from the Revolution to the Viet Nam conflict.

Readings in the Making of American Foreign Policy. Edited by Andrew M. Scott and Raymond H. Dawson. New York: Macmillan, 1965. 551 pp. $7.95. This collection of readings provides an introduction to the formulation of U.S. foreign policy. Sections are devoted to the world setting; public opinion, pressure groups and the press; Congressional influence and powers; the powers and roles of the President, Department of State, Department of Defense and the National Security Council; the policy planning and budgetary processes; the contributions of the scientific, intelligence and research communities within and outside government; and the overseas administration of U.S. foreign policy.

The Southerner and World Affairs. By Alfred O. Hero, Jr. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1965. 676 pp. $12.00. This book is the product of research, sponsored by the World Peace Foundation, into the behavior of Southerners and their Congressmen toward world affairs since the mid-1930's. *The Uncertain South: Its Changing Patterns of Politics in Foreign Policy* (1964) by the late Charles O. Lerche, Jr., dealt with Southern Congressmen; Hero's book treats of their constituents back home. In Part I he examines Southern interest, knowledge and opinion with respect to such issues as immigration, collective security, trade, colonialism, foreign aid, international organization, and defense; and in Part II he considers major Southern educational, social, occupational, psychological, attitudinal, religious and ethnic groups in terms of their reactions to these international issues. The author is Executive Secretary of the World Peace Foundation and Managing Editor of *International Organization.*

The Uncertain Giant, 1921-1941: American Foreign Policy Between the Wars. By Selig Adler. New York: Macmillan, 1965. 340 pp. $6.95. The Samuel Paul Capen Professor of American History at the State University of New York at Buffalo examines U.S. foreign policies of the interwar years as well as American attitudes toward world affairs. Some of the topics treated include isolationism, reparations, tariffs, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the Good Neighbor Policy, the rise of fascism in Italy, Germany and Japan, Soviet communism, and the gradual U.S. entanglement in World War II. The author provides a 46-page annotated bibliography.

IV. Western Europe and the Atlantic Community

The Churchills: The Story of a Family. By A. L. Rowse. New York: Harper & Row, 1966. 577 pp. $8.95. By deleting much of the detailed research materials, notes and references, A. L. Rowse has produced this shorter version of his

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

original two-volume study of the Churchill family. Like the original, the present book is a magnificent history, from the early 17th century to the present, of this most illustrious English family.

The Eurocrats: Conflict and Crisis in the European Community. By Altiero Spinelli; translated by C. Grove Haines. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966. 229 pp. $5.95. The author, a leading member of the European Federalist Movement, surveys the evolution of European Community institutions. Included is an examination of European theories of functionalism, supranationalism and federalism, as well as an assessment of the levels of integration achieved in the ECSC High Authority, the Euratom Commission, and the EEC Commission. Professor Spinelli describes relations between the bureaucracies of the European Communities and the national governments, and discusses the operation of interest groups in the ECSC and EEC.

Haven't We Met Before Somewhere? By Ronald Searle and Heinz Huber. New York: The Viking Press, 1966. 190 pp. $10.00. In penetrating, witty text and more than 150 wry drawings, the authors lay bare the Germany of fact and myth and the German people of whom both fact and myth are so much a part. Huber writes of his puzzling country: "Germany's shape vacillates throughout its history, as does its image. . . . At one moment the German peacock with its eagle's claws drags its tail modestly through the dusty backyards of European history; at another it spreads that dusty, provocative, vain and metallic tail across the length and breadth of the continent." Searle, an Englishman, has produced his album of drawings from yearly travels in West Germany, and sometimes over the Wall into East Berlin. The text translation is by Constantine FitzGibbon.

Lost Soldiers: The French Army and Empire in Crisis, 1947-1962. By George Armstrong Kelly. Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1965. 404 pp. $10.00. An extremely lucid, absorbing account of the discontent and vicissitudes of the French Army which, for fifteen years, "was torn to its depths by conflicts it had neither the means nor the luck to surmount, heaped with abuse it did not merit, and led to react in a way that was aberrant and dangerous but finally understandable." The author ties together the threads of decolonization, institutional failure, conflicts in Indochina and Algeria, Cold War events, doctrinal struggle, and Gaullism in his analysis of the French Army as "a unique, peculiar, and powerful instance of the long French tradition of extraparliamentary protest."

A New Europe? A Timely Appraisal. Edited by Stephen R. Graubard. Boston: Beacon Press, 1967. 691 pp. $3.45 (paper). This symposium of essays treating nearly all facets of modern Europe originally appeared as the special Winter 1964 issue of *Daedalus*. Three papers were not in the original collection: "Technology, Pluralism and the New Europe" by Ernst B. Haas; "The Adenauer Era in German History" by Klaus Epstein; "Theological Currents in Europe Today" by Hans Küng.

V. Communist Bloc

Basic Tactics. By Mao Tse-tung; translated and with an Introduction by Stuart R. Schram and a Foreword by Samuel B. Griffith, II. New York: Praeger, 1966. 149 pp. $4.95. This translation of a stenographic copy of a series of lectures given by Mao at the Anti-Japanese Military-Political University in 1938 during the Yenan period of Chinese communism is a primer on guerrilla tactics and a basic manual for new recruits to the movement. The lectures are significant as an illustration of the non-ideological "guerrilla" component in Mao's thought, a strain that complements the Marxist-Leninist and nationalist elements of Maoism.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Introduction and Foreword assign the lectures to their proper place in the development of Mao's thought and Chinese political culture.

Behind the Great Wall: An Appraisal of Mao's China. By Lorenz Stucki. New York: Praeger, 1965. 154 pp. $4.95. A Swiss journalist, editor and political commentator, associated with the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung,* reports on a two-month stay in Communist China. Despite the restrictions, controls and supervision he encountered, he has managed to write a balanced account of many aspects of life in China—economic progress and problems, education and propaganda, culture and agriculture.

The Comintern—Historical Highlights. Edited by Milorad M. Drachkovitch and Branko Lazitch. New York: Praeger (for the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace), 1966. 430 pp. $10.00. Founded by Lenin and molded by Stalin, the Third Communist International spanned the turbulent period between the two world wars. This volume, made up of essays, recollections and documents, illuminates controversial and little-explored aspects of its *modus operandi.* There are eight original essays by authorities on the history of communism such as Stefan T. Possony and Bertram D. Wolfe. Topics covered in the three first-person recollections are: "Stalin and the 'Rebellion' of Tasca and Humbert-Droz"; "The Moscow Origin of the French 'Popular Front'"; and "The Founding of the Cominform." The documents, pertaining to the earliest internal problems of the German and French communist parties, disclose the relationship between Moscow and individual sections of the Comintern.

Eastern Europe in Transition. Edited by Kurt London. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966. 364 pp. $8.95. This symposium from the Fifth International Conference on World Politics (Noordwijk, The Netherlands, 1965) examines various political, social and economic changes that have tended to transform the Soviet satellites into a less rigidly controlled collection of semi-independent nation-states within the "socialist camp." Major topics discussed are the upsurge of nationalism, the effect of the Sino-Soviet conflict, Soviet aims in Eastern Europe, relations among East European peoples, the reduction of centralized economic management, areas of unrest, and Western policy considerations.

Food and Agriculture in Communist China. By John Lossing Buck, Owen L. Dawson and Yuan-li Wu. New York: Praeger, 1966. 171 pp. $6.00. In this Hoover Institution publication, the authors gauge China's progress toward attaining a self-sufficient food supply, complicated as it is by population expansion and the nuclear development program which pre-empts so much of the country's resources. Dr. Buck provides the statistics on food grain production in mainland China before and during the communist regime; Dr. Wu's essay on the economics of China's agriculture gives attention to aspects of measurement, interpretation and evaluation; and Mr. Dawson writes on fertilizer supply and irrigation developments.

Foundations of Maoism. By Ram Swarup. Delhi: Ashok Kaushik, Jyotsna Prakashan (Impex India, distributors), 1966. 144 pp. $5.00 (Rs. 15.00). A selection of eight articles by the author, Part I dealing with Chinese politics, economics and culture—the three constituents of the "New Democracy"—and Part II with the dynamics of China's outward expansion and the danger she poses for India and other countries of Asia. The discussion centers on Maoist doctrines and principles of organization, strategy and tactics, ethics, theory of war and revolution, and internal and external expressions, ending with a description of Maoism in action in the streets of Calcutta in March-April 1966.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Peaceful Coexistence: International Law in the Building of Communism. By Lt. Col. Bernard A. Ramundo. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967. 262 pp. $6.95. This study explores the Soviet position on basic questions of international law and contemporary international legal problems. Its purpose is to determine how the Soviets utilize international law to support policy objectives, and whether their approach differs from that of other countries. In Part I the author focuses on the impact of peaceful coexistence upon traditional legal concepts; in Part II he illustrates how the principles of peaceful coexistence, based on a general foreign policy line, are used to support specific Soviet policies on peace and war, colonialism, collective security, international organization, the peaceful settlement of interstate disputes, arms control and international relations.

Soviet Attitudes Toward Authority: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Problems of Soviet Character. By Margaret Mead. New York: Shocken Books, 1966. 148 pp. $1.75 (paper). As Dr. Mead explains in the new preface, this is the paperback edition of a book written in 1951, a book "about the national characteristics of the newly emerging Soviet citizen discernible in the late 1940's" and the nature of the authority system's hold on him. The analysis was developed from the only sources then available: Soviet newspapers, professional journals, movies, records of party congresses and selected interviews with exiles, and integrated within an anthropological framework. Its findings are still pertinent to an understanding of the Soviet people, whose adults today carry the marks of the Stalinist period.

Ten Years After: The Hungarian Revolution in the Perspective of History. Edited by Tamas Aczel. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967. 253 pp. $5.95. Twelve distinguished historians, sociologists, political scientists and Sovietologists put the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 into historical perspective, analyzing its international implications as well as its aftermath in Hungary. Michael Polanyi points out in his "Message" that the June 1956 rebellion of Hungarian writers against the corruption of the arts bred by subservience to party teachings sparked opposition to the Stalinists; that this was a "change of mind of dedicated Communists." The rebellion of the intellectual avant-garde spread rapidly under the noses of the secret police to workers and the military. "Since 23 October, ideas have never ceased to circulate freely in Hungary. Though you cannot fully print them, you can yet effectively spread them by word of mouth." This process, taking place in other Soviet countries, is as important for statesmen to understand as the menace of nuclear weapons and overpopulation.

VI. Middle East and Africa

African Trade Unions. By Ioan Davies. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1966. 256 pp. $1.25 (paper). African trade unions are not mere carbon-copies of European or other models. Representing the interests of industrial labor—a privileged economic elite—they are inextricably involved in politics, either as props or critics of the new governments. Union-government relations therefore form the core of this study. The author also discusses union aims, organization and achievements; attempts to act free of the ideological commitments of communist and Western pressure groups; and the prospects for the cohesion of the growing African working class.

The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party: History, Ideology and Organization. By Kamel S. Abu Jaber. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1966. 218 pp. $6.50. A history of Arab socialism, and an account of Ba'ath Socialism in Syria, with special reference to the questions of relations with Egypt (in the UAR) and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with Iraq after the 1958 crisis. The Arab-born and U.S.-educated author depicts an ideological party little understood in the United States—a movement which, although it owes a debt to Western socialism, prefers to stress its Arabic and Islamic origins, and seeks to pursue a neutralist course between the West and communism.

Concise Encyclopaedia of Arabic Civilization: The Arab West. By Stephan and Nandy Ronart. New York: Praeger, 1966. 410 pp. $14.50. A companion volume to an earlier encyclopaedia on the Arab East, this new reference work covers the history, politics, philosophy, literature and culture of the Arabic peoples of the Maghreb—Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya. Nearly all the entries are identified by proper names of countries, individuals, movements and organizations, only few by functional topic headings.

The Covenant and the Sword: Arab-Israeli Relations, 1948-1956. By Earl Berger. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965. 245 pp. $5.75. Dr. Berger, correspondent for Toronto's *The Globe and Mail* and former lecturer in politics at the University of Ghana, examines Israel's relations with each of her neighbors from 1948 to 1956; the armistice negotiations and conciliation efforts of 1949; the armistice regime; the refugee problem and the struggle for the Jordan River waters; and the growing antagonism between Israel and Egypt after Nasser's rise to power. He concludes that the Israelis invaded Sinai in 1956 as a last resort to prevent the Arab states, once they had obtained sufficient arms, from destroying Israel.

The Economic History of the Middle East, 1800-1914. Edited by Charles Issawi. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966. 543 pp. $12.50. A distinguished Arab economist, now at Columbia University, brings together from Middle Eastern, European and American publications 62 readings which cast light on the economic growth of the Middle East from the beginning of the 19th century to the outbreak of World War I. The collection, organized around Turkey, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia and the Sudan, focuses on the modernization of the region and its integration into the international commercial-financial system.

Egypt and the Fertile Crescent, 1516-1922. By P. M. Holt. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966. 337 pp. $7.50. The Professor of Arab History at the University of London traces the history of the Arab lands from the Euphrates to the Nile Valley, and from the zenith of the Ottoman Empire in the early 16th century down to the British declaration of independence for Egypt after World War I. Holt covers Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Palestine; for each region he provides geographical and social background and relates the history of the region to the history of Ottoman political institutions.

Gabon: Nation-Building on the Ogooué. By Brian Weinstein. Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1966. 287 pp. $12.50. An analytical and sympathetic study of the nation-building process as it occurs in the Republic of Gabon. Gabon's potential for development rests on vast mineral and forestry resources and the dynamism of the dominant ethnic group, the Fang, which has sensed the need for building a national community and national loyalties through increasing shared experience. Its peculiar problems are underpopulation (barely 500,000 in a land about half the size of France), poor communications systems and ethnic cultural barriers.

Italian Colonialism in Somalia. By Robert L. Hess. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966. 234 pp. $7.95. This history of Italy's little-known colonial adventures on the Somali coast of East Africa is unusual because Italy lacked a consistent colonial ideology and was never fully committed to the responsibilities

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of being a colonial power. Except for the aggressions of the fascist period under Mussolini, her indirect rule in Somalia was limited mainly to stopping inter-tribal warfare, and her colonialism came to an end with the signing of the Paris peace treaty in 1947. Yet Italy in 1950 commenced a ten-year United Nations trusteeship of her former colony in which she helped Somali political parties to develop the institutions of self-government in preparation for independence. The present Somali Republic is the political descendant of that administration.

The Malagasy Republic: Madagascar Today. By Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965. 504 pp. $12.50. In describing political, economic and socio-cultural developments in contemporary Madagascar, the authors also shed light on the psychology of its insular, docile, averse-to-change people. This points up the puzzle of the Malagasys' violent, brutally suppressed revolt against French rule in 1947, which had little connection with the peaceable transition to independence 13 years later. Part I, devoted to Malagasy history and politics, includes chapters on the colonial period, the 1947 revolt and its aftermath, the coming of independence, and the functioning of the new government in domestic and foreign matters. Parts II and III survey social and cultural changes and the economy.

The New Elites of Tropical Africa. Studies Presented and Discussed at the Sixth International African Seminar at the University of Ibadan, Nigeria, July 1964. Edited with an Introduction by P. C. Lloyd. New York: Oxford University Press, 1966. 390 pp. $8.00. Eighteen papers, in English or French, each with a summary in the other language, analyze the nature of contemporary elites in West, East and Southern Africa—their development and educational progress, their part in traditional and modern associations, their distinctive social characteristics, cultural values and aspirations, the inter-elite competition, and the relationship between the elite and the uneducated masses. Of the five types of elites predominating in African states (educated, artisan, commercial, traditional, military), the category here studied embraces the young, Western-educated and comparatively wealthy.

The Shaping of the Arabs: A Study in Ethnic Identity. By Joel Carmichael. New York: Macmillan, 1967. 407 pp. $7.95. An interpretive history of the Arab peoples, probably intended more for the educated nonspecialist than for the scholar, yet well researched and competently done. The reader is shown the interrelation of Islam, the classical Arabic language, and the ways of life of a people from the days of the Prophet down to the stirrings of nationalism, the desire for modernization, anti-Westernism and anti-Zionism—all of which have helped to mold an ethnic self-awareness.

Southern Africa in Transition. Edited by John A. Davis and James K. Baker. New York: Praeger (for the American Society of African Culture), 1966. 427 pp. $8.50 ($2.95, paper). More than 40 specialists on Africa and African statesmen discuss the urgent political and social issues facing South Africa, Zambia, Malawi, Rhodesia, Basutoland, Bechuanaland, Swaziland, South West Africa and the Portuguese territories of Angola and Mozambique. Their papers, taken from the Fourth International Conference of the American Society of African Culture held at Howard University in 1963, have been brought up to date by extensive revisions and editorial postscripts, and each section of the book concludes with comments by conference discussants.

The Third Reich and the Arab East. By Lukasz Hirszowicz. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966. 403 pp. $10.00. A lecturer in the modern history of the Middle East at the University of Warsaw presents a thoroughly documented chronicle of Germany's role in the Arab world from the mid-1930's, when the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

issue of Jewish immigration into Palestine became acute, until the defeat of Rommel's army in Tunisia. Although the author's ideological bias is not entirely muted, the work is an impressive piece of research.

U.S. and U.S.S.R. Aid to Developing Countries: A Comparative Study of India, Turkey, and the U.A.R. By Leo Tansky. New York: Praeger, 1967. 192 pp. $15.00. Following a discussion of the objectives, magnitude and character of U.S. and Soviet economic aid programs, used as a competitive foreign policy instrument, Dr. Tansky assesses the impact of the U.S. program on Turkey, the Soviet program on the United Arab Republic, and both programs on India. He concludes that despite some favorable returns from their investments, both countries are frustrated by the lack of more than short-range achievements, and that they will have to continue foreign aid for some time to come in order either to generate self-sustaining economic growth under democratic and politically stable governments or to convince the non-Western world that communism offers better prospects for rapid economic development.

VII. East Asia and the Pacific

Asia's Population Problems, With a Discussion of Population and Immigration in Australia. Edited by S. Chandrasekhar. New York: Praeger, 1967. 311 pp. $8.50. In 11 essays demographers, economists and sociologists relate the population problems of China, India, Japan, Indonesia, Pakistan, Malaysia, Taiwan and Australia to the national, economic and political framework of each country and to current international demographic attitudes and policies. The editor examines programs of agricultural development, industrialization, emigration, voluntary migration and family planning, and concludes that the solution to Asia's pressing population problems lies as much in population control as in measures for economic and social betterment: "In the long run, Asia must be enabled to lower both her birth and death rates to civilized levels."

Behind the Lines—Hanoi. By Harrison E. Salisbury. New York: Harper & Row, 1967. 243 pp. $4.95. Mr. Salisbury elaborates on his celebrated dispatches to the *New York Times* written from "behind the lines" in North Viet Nam during December 1966 and January 1967. He describes what he saw, reports on his conversations with communist leaders, and comments on why he believes that "a settlement of the Vietnam war by negotiation [lies] within our grasp." He believes that "the vital ingredients of the Liberation Front program . . . a mixed economy, free rights for all parties, neutral foreign policy, no alliances—would permit construction of [a viable coalition] government. Its stability could be insured by United States economic aid, guarantees by Asian powers and the Great Powers, guarantees by Hanoi." But he is concerned that Washington—"stale" and "tired"—will miss its opportunity, that U.S. military warriors want victory, and that our struggle in Viet Nam is only a prelude to war with China.

Corregidor: The Saga of a Fortress. By James H. Belote and William M. Belote. New York: Harper & Row, 1967. 273 pp. $6.95. This historical account of the development of Corregidor as the "Gibraltar" of the Far East begins with an explanation of U.S. defense strategy in the early 1900's which led to the selection of Corregidor as a fortress, and continues through the construction of its fortifications, its fall to the Japanese, and its subsequent recapture in 1945.

Foreign Aid and Politics in Nepal: A Case Study. By Eugene Bramer Mihaly. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1965. 202 pp. $6.75. This detailed inquiry into the aims, methods and results of an abundance of aid programs operating in the Himalayan kingdom

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of Nepal points up the ineffectiveness of economic aid as a political tool. The author finds that foreign aid, particularly that designed to fulfill short-term political objectives, has probably harmed rather than furthered Nepal's long-range prospects for economic growth and political stability, while failing in its purpose to advance the donors' political interests. "The lesson of Nepal would seem to be this: in a nation that is politically and otherwise unprepared for change, and therefore for economic development, economic aid . . . can be politically effective . . . only in those few instances where its efficacy is not dependent on the attainment of economic goals."

Indonesia. By Bruce Grant. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1967. 247 pp. $1.65 (paper). In this updated edition of a book first published in 1964, the author, an Australian foreign correspondent and currently a Fellow in Political Science at the University of Melbourne, surveys various aspects of the Indonesian scene: the record of President Sukarno; the ups and downs of the communist party; the role of the military; and the nation's economy, culture, people, and foreign relations.

Japan and Korea: America's Allies in the Pacific. By James W. Morley. New York: Walker and Company, 1965. 152 pp. $1.95 (paper). Dr. Morley, Director of Columbia University's East Asian Institute, briefly discusses the evolving political situation in Korea and Japan; the nature, causes and likely development of the strained relations between these two U.S. allies; the dilemmas confronting U.S. statesmen caught in the middle, and the policy alternatives open to them. One-half of the book is an appendix of political, economic, military and cultural information, and a chronology of key events.

Malayan and Indonesian Studies. Edited by John Bastin and R. Roolvink. London: Oxford University Press, 1964. 357 pp. 84/-. This *Festschrift* for Sir Richard Winstedt, on the occasion of his 85th birthday anniversary, contains 19 essays on subjects ranging from an interpretation of a 7th-century Palembang inscription and the opening of relations between China and Malacca in 1403-1405 to 18th-century British commercial and strategic interests in the Malay Peninsula and recent religious changes in Bali.

The Rise of Indonesian Communism. By Ruth T. McVey. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965. 510 pp. $10.00. In this study of the formative years (1914-1927) of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), Dr. McVey, a Research Associate with the Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, provides a balanced view of the PKI's role within the colonial East Indies and its participation in international communist affairs. This first volume of a general history of the PKI records the reasons for its birth even before the Bolshevik Revolution, its place among the various nationalist and revolutionary movements, and its influence on the colonial government; and examines the economic, social and political factors influencing the rise of the party, the relationship between communism and Islam, and the PKI's temporary eclipse in 1927 after a disastrous attempt at revolution.

The Social History of an Indonesian Town. By Clifford Geertz. Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1965. 218 pp. $7.50. Based on material gathered by the author during an 18-month anthropological field study in 1952-1954, this book traces the social history of a single Javanese town from about the middle of the 19th century to the early 1950's. Dr. Geertz, Professor of Anthropology and a member of the Committee for the Comparative Study of New Nations at the University of Chicago, seeks to "present a picture of the interaction of ecological, economic, social-structural, and cultural factors over a reasonably extended period of time

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and to come to some conclusions as to the relative importance of these factors in shaping human life."

South Asian Politics and Religion. Edited by Donald Eugene Smith. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966. 563 pp. $15.00. These 24 essays by scholars from six disciplines form a valuable and much-needed comparative study of the relationships between religion and politics in Pakistan, India and Ceylon. The topics include: a brief history of the Jana Sangh; the effectiveness of Muslim representation in India; communal interest groups in Kerala; the concept of change in Hindu, socialist, and neo-Gandhian thought; Islam as a factor in Pakistan's foreign policy; ideological dilemmas in Pakistan's culture; Pakistan and the secular state; the Sinhalese Buddhist revolution; and Buddhism in Ceylon politics, 1960-1965.

Southeast Asian Tribes, Minorities, and Nations. (Two volumes.) Edited by Peter Kunstadter. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967. 902 pp. $22.50. Most of the papers in these volumes—in which 20 anthropologists and other specialists report their observations on the relationship between rural minority groups and central governments in Southeast Asia—grew out of a conference conducted by Princeton University's Center of International Studies in May 1965. The editor has written a comprehensive general introduction, as well as introductions to the various sections covering Burma, China, India, Laos, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam. Mainland China's inclusion is pertinent because minorities in Southeast Asia are also to be found in China, and because the communists were quick to recognize the strategic importance of such groups, both in the immediate military situation and in the long-run development of nation-states. Descriptions of tribal life and government programs, supplemented by charts, tables, maps and photographs, provide a wealth of data on the distribution, languages, social customs, economic and religious backgrounds of minority populations while explaining why they are an important factor in nation-building and Southeast Asian relations.

Twelve Doors to Japan. By John Whitney Hall and Richard K. Beardsley. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965. 649 pp. $9.95. As an introduction to the study of Japanese culture and society, this book grew directly out of a graduate course taught for a decade and a half at the Center for Japanese Studies, University of Michigan. The two major authors prepared nine of the "doors" to modern Japan, on geography, cultural anthropology, history, visual arts, religion and philosophy, personality psychology, education, the political system, and economic development. B. James George, Jr., writes on law, and Joseph K. Yamagiwa on language and literature.

U.S. Aid to Taiwan: A Study of Foreign Aid, Self-Help, and Development. By Neil H. Jacoby. New York: Praeger, 1967. 364 pp. $8.50. Early in 1965 Dr. Jacoby assessed the U.S. aid program to the Republic of China for the Agency for International Development. *U.S. Aid to Taiwan* is the product of research and field work undertaken for that evaluation. It reveals that when the AID program, totaling more than $1.4 billion in economic assistance since 1951, came to a successful end in mid-1965, Taiwan had been transformed from a condition of near destitution to self-sufficiency, with an average yearly growth rate of well over 7 per cent. There were flaws—the lack of long-range targets, poor coordination of aid instruments, failure to measure the military burden on the economy and to study the political and social effects of aid—but the record stands as a signal success in international economic cooperation. The Taiwan experience also identifies policies that can propel a country ripe for development into self-help measures, especially those creating a favorable climate for private enterprise.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

VIII. LATIN AMERICA

Nationalism in Contemporary Latin America. By Arthur P. Whitaker and David C. Jordan. New York: The Free Press, 1966. 229 pp. $6.95. In examining Latin America's multiform nationalism as it has accelerated during the last 35 years, the authors point out that its expression differs from that noted in other developing areas because it has been in keeping with democratic traditions and institutions. Their study, centering on political considerations, still relies on belief in national character as a chief ingredient, and economic, social and cultural factors receive full due. Against the general background, ten countries, representing the bulk of Latin America's population and wealth, its range of development and principal ethnic groups, are discussed individually. The various types of nationalism are found to have two common features, escalation due to the people's rising aspirations and growing participation in public affairs, and identification with modernization and social justice. They can be grouped in four main categories forming interrelated pairs: ideological (revolutionary) vs. pragmatic (evolutionary), and populist (the masses are the "real" nation) vs. comprehensive (general-welfare).

The Organization of American States: An Introduction. By O. C. Stoetzer. New York: Praeger, 1965. 213 pp. $6.50 ($1.95, paper). This is the American edition of a handbook published in German (Hamburg, 1964) to acquaint German-speaking Europeans with the background, structure and activities of the OAS. Dr. Stoetzer places special emphasis on the General Secretariat's weakness and the crisis of leadership brought about by Hispanic distrust of supranational executive powers which could be used for collective intervention. More than half of the book is devoted to relevant documents (the Rio Treaty, the Pact of Bogotá, the OAS and Punta del Este Charters), charts and tables.

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Summer 1967 Vol. XXI, No. 2

Political Theory and International Relations

Common Sense and the Study of International Relations . HANS MORGENTHAU
The Relationship Between Domestic and Foreign Politics .. RAYMOND ARON
The Lockean Tradition in American Foreign Policy ..... ROGER D. MASTERS
On the Concepts of Politics and Power ..... KARL DEUTSCH
International Structure, National Force, and the Balance of World Power ..... KENNETH WALTZ
The Concept of Sovereignty and the Relations Between States ..... F. H. HINSLEY
Normative Theory in International Relations ..... KENNETH THOMPSON
The Scholar and Foreign Policy ..... STANLEY HOFFMANN
Games International-Relations Scholars Play ..... JAMES N. ROSENAU

Related Reviews by W. T. R. Fox, Hedley Bull, Kenneth Thompson, Morton A. Kaplan

Single Copies, $1.50; Subscriptions: One Year, $2.75; Two Years, $5.00; Three Years, $7.50; Five Years, $12.00. Address Orders To:

Journal of International Affairs
622 West 113th Street, Room 102A
New York, New York 10025

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Monographs and Reports Received

The Civil Defense Debate: Differing Perceptions of a Persistent Issue in National Security Policy. By Leon Weaver. East Lansing: Michigan State University, Social Science Research Bureau, 1967. 75 pp. $1.50.

The Conditions of Civil Violence: First Tests of a Causal Model. By Ted Gurr with Charles Ruttenberg. Princeton: Princeton University, Center of International Studies, Research Monograph No. 28, April 1967. 111 pp. $2.50.

Copyright and Intellectual Property. By Julius J. Marke. New York: The Fund for the Advancement of Education, January 1967. 111 pp. n.p.

Denmark: Economic Survey. Prepared by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Paris: OECD, February 1967. 36 pp. 80 cents.

Documents on Disarmament, 1965. Prepared by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Washington: GPO, December 1966. 710 pp. $2.00.

The Economy of the American People. (Third edition.) By Gerhard Colm and Theodore Geiger. Washington: National Planning Association, Planning Pamphlet No. 123, January 1967. 218 pp. $3.00.

Greece: Economic Survey. Prepared by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Paris: OECD, April 1967. 52 pp. 80 cents.

Handbook on South and Southeast Asia and Vietnam Viewpoints: A Resource Guide. Prepared by the Foreign Policy Association. New York: FPA Intercom Series, January-February 1967. 72 pp. $1.00.

International Relations Research: Problems of Evaluation and Advancement. By E. Raymond Platig. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 20, 1967. 177 pp. $1.00.

Ireland: Economic Survey. Prepared by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Paris: OECD, March 1967. 33 pp. 80 cents.

Is the Chinese Communist Regime Stabilized? By Chang Ching-wen. Taipei: Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League, October 1966. 69 pp. 75 cents.

Japan Today and Tomorrow. By Lawrence Olson. New York: Foreign Policy Association, Headline Series, No. 181, February 1967. 63 pp. 75 cents.

Mao's Red Guards. By Lu Tsi. Taipei: Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League, October 1966. 27 pp. 35 cents.

Of Boundaries and Bridges: A Report on a Conference on the Interdependence of National and International Political Systems. By James N. Rosenau. Princeton: Princeton University, Center of International Studies, January 1967. 66 pp. $1.50.

Problem of the Second Generation and Successors of Chinese Communist Regime. By Ting Chu-yuan. Taipei: Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League, October 1966. 63 pp. 70 cents.

Republic of China's Viewpoint on Fallacies to Appease Chinese Communists. Taipei: Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League, October 1966. 96 pp. $1.00.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

MONOGRAPHS AND REPORTS RECEIVED

South Asia: A Strategic Survey. Prepared by the Department of the Army. Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army, DA Pamphlet No. 550-3, September 30, 1966. 175 pp. n.p.

Sweden: Economic Survey. Prepared by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Paris: OECD, March 1967. 42 pp. 80 cents.

The U.S. Book of Facts, Statistics and Information. Published by the U.S. government in September 1966 as *Statistical Abstract of the United States;* with introductions by Daniel J. Boorstin and J. A. Livingston. New York: Washington Square Press, distributed by Simon & Schuster, 1966. 1039 pp. $4.95 ($1.95, paper).

U.S. Policy Toward Communist China. By Robert Blum; edited by A. Doak Barnett. New York: Foreign Policy Association, Headline Series, No. 180, December 1966. 82 pp. 75 cents.

Journal of Common Market Studies

Volume V **June 1967** **Number 4**

Ernst Haas *The Uniting of Europe* and the Uniting of Latin America

Leon Lindberg The European Community as a Political System

Karl Kaiser The U.S. and EEC in the Atlantic System: The Problem of Theory

F. Alting von Geusau External Representation of Plural Interests

Bryce Wood Research on International Organization: the European Experience

PRICE 12s.6d. ANNUAL SUBSCRIPTION 42s.

Published by BASIL BLACKWELL, OXFORD, ENGLAND

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Contributors to this Issue

Ralph I. Straus, business executive and economic consultant; Member of the Board of The Atlantic Council; Member of the Board and one of the founders of The Committee for a National Trade Policy. Formerly, one of eight divisional directors of The Marshall Plan (Paris); Special Assistant to C. Douglas Dillon, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.

Paul C. Davis, Senior Political Scientist, Advanced Studies Group, Systems Operations Division, Westinghouse Electric Corporation. Formerly, Assistant Director, Psychological Strategy Board, Office of the President; Research Associate, Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University.

Lewis A. Frank, economist and consultant on national security affairs; formerly, associated with the Institute for Defense Analyses and the Office of National Security Studies, Bendix Systems Division.

Elliot R. Goodman, Associate Professor of Political Science, Brown University; recipient of Guggenheim and NATO Research Fellowships which made possible a study of de Gaulle's foreign policy.

Charles R. Dechert, Professor of Political Science, Purdue University; formerly, Visiting Professor of Comparative Economic and Social Policy at the International University of Social Studies "Pro Deo" in Rome, author of *Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi: Profile of a State Corporation* (1963), and editor and co-author of *The Social Impact of Cybernetics* (1966).

Edward Taborsky, Professor of Government, University of Texas; formerly, Personal Aide to Edward Beneš, President of Czechoslovakia, and Czechoslovakia's Ambassador to Sweden. Author of *Communism in Czechoslovakia, 1948-1960* (1961).

Stefan T. Possony, Director of International Studies, The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford University; Associate, Foreign Policy Research Institute.

Reuben S. Nathan, Director of the Fairfield Institute for Political Psychology and International Communication, an association of consultants. As Colonel, U.S. Army Reserve, he has been recalled to active duty twice during the Vietnamese conflict, to direct the Planning Staff of the Joint U.S. Political Affairs Office and to develop a National Psychological Operations Plan for Viet Nam.

Lionel Gelber, Canadian writer; author of *America in Britain's Place: The Leadership of the West and Anglo-American Unity* (1961), *The Rise of Anglo-American Friendship: A Study in World Politics, 1896-1908* (revised, 1966), and *Alliance of Necessity* (1966). Formerly, Special Assistant to Prime Minister Diefenbaker of Canada.

Lorand B. Szalay, Research Scientist, Center for Research in Social Systems, The American University; co-author of several studies in the fields of communications, propaganda and social psychology, including *Cultural Meanings and Values: A Method of Empirical Assessment* (1965) and *Persuasion Overseas* (1965).

Warren I. Cohen, Assistant Professor of History, Michigan State University; author of *The American Revisionists: The Lessons of Intervention in World War I* (1967).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE

Ladis K. D. Kristof, Research Associate, Studies of the Communist System, Institute of Political Studies, Stanford University; formerly, Associate Director of the Inter-University Project on the History of the Menshevik Movement; author of articles in the fields of Marxism, political theory, and geopolitics.

Petrus J. Idenburg, founder and first director of the African Studies Center at Leyden University in The Netherlands, where he teaches constitutional law and contemporary political history of Africa; Vice-President and past President of the International African Law Association, London, and member of the (American) African Studies Association.

Bishwanath Singh, lecturer in political science, Patna University, and research fellow in international law, Indian School of International Studies, New Delhi; International Development Fellow in 1966-1967 at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh.

Hyobom Pak, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Virginia Polytechnic Institute; currently engaged in an English translation of Chinese communist documents to be published under the title "An Anatomy of Chinese Subversion, 1927-1934: A Documentary Study."

Bryce F. Denno, Colonel, USA (Ret.); Associate Director for Instruction and Research, The Military Assistance Institute, Arlington, Virginia; formerly, Senior Adviser, I Vietnamese Corps.

David B. King, Associate Professor of History, Oregon State University.

René Peritz, Associate Professor of Political Science, Indiana State University.

David S. Crist, Colonel, USAF (Ret.); Research Staff Member in Political-Military Affairs and Strategic Intelligence, Economic and Political Studies Division, Institute for Defense Analyses.

ÖSTERREICHISCHE
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR
AUSSENPOLITIK

keeps you informed on Austrian foreign policy and international relations.

Recent issues contained articles by:

Zbigniew *Brzezinski,* Europa und die deutsche Frage

Karl Theodor zu *Guttenberg,* Braucht Deutschland eine neue Aussenpolitik?

Theo *Sommer,* Deutsche Nuklearpolitik

Rainer *Waterkamp,* Crisis management in der Deutschland- und Europafrage

Documents on Austria and the Economic Integration of Europe

Chronicle of Austrian Foreign Policy

Reviews

Annual Subscription $8.50—450 pages in six copies a year.

Published by:

ÖSTERREICHISCHE GESELLSCHAFT FÜR AUSSENPOLITIK UND INTERNATIONALE BEZIEHUNGEN

1010 WIEN I, JOSEFSPLATZ 6

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A good way to keep informed about European and World Affairs is to read regularly the journal of the German Society for Foreign Affairs:

EUROPA-ARCHIV

Zeitschrift für internationale Politik

Edited by Wilhelm Cornides

EUROPA-ARCHIV, now in its twenty-second year of publication, contains articles and documents on international relations and a current chronology of world events as well as a monthly bibliography of recent publications in the field of international relations.

Articles in recent issues:

Wilhelm Grewe:	Uber den Einfluss der Kernwaffen auf die Politik
Gerd Schmückle:	Differenzen und Ubereinstimmungen im Atlantischen Bündnis
Dieter Weiss:	Indien in der Wachstumskrise
Curt Gasteyger:	Probleme und Reformen des Warschauer Paktes
Niels Grosse:	Amerikanische Direktinvestitionen in Europa

Annual subscription (24 issues): DM 65,—plus postage

Specimen copies on request

EUROPA-ARCHIV, VERTRIEB

6 Frankfurt/M, Postfach 3685

THE WORLD TODAY

The monthly review of the Royal Institute of International Affairs provides the general reader with up-to-date and authoritative information on current world problems.

Recent numbers include articles on:

UNEMPLOYMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES	*Sir Arthur Lewis*
CRISIS IN JORDAN	*Eric Rouleau*
INTERNATIONAL LAW, RHODESIA, AND THE U.N.	*Rosalyn Higgins*
THE SOVIET UNION AND THE ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE	*John Erickson*
THE CHANGING SCENE IN GERMANY	*Fritz René Allemann*

Annual Subscription 35s. (U.S.A. and Canada $5.30). 3s. per issue.

Orders may be sent to booksellers and newsagents, or to the Oxford University Press, Press Road, Neasden, London N.W.10.

THE ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

CHATHAM HOUSE, 10 ST. JAMES'S SQUARE, LONDON S.W.1.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Subscribe to one of the World's Leading Political Science Journals

Journal of Politics

The May 1967 issue contains:

Science and the Public Life
Avery Leiserson

International Law and Guantanamo
Gary L. Maris

Social and Political Sources of Political Fragmentation in Japan
Lee W. Farnsworth

Judicial Structure and its Political Functioning in Society: New Approaches to Teaching and Research in Public Law
Theodore L. Becker

Social Backgrounds and Judicial Decisions: Notes for a Theory
Joel B. Grossman

The Structure of Electoral Politics
David M. Olson

Children's Orientations toward the President: Some Additional Theoretical Considerations and Data
Dean Jaros

Presidential Assassination: A Case Study in the Dynamics of Political Socialization
Karen Orren and Paul Peterson

Published Quarterly by

The Southern Political Science Association

Peabody Hall, University of Florida
Gainesville, Florida 32601, U.S.A.

Subscription and Membership Fee: $6.00 U.S.A.; $6.50 Foreign; $3.00 Student

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

the quarterly journal of the World Peace Foundation offering the most inclusive and up-to-date account of the recent activities of international organizations

SPRING 1967 **VOLUME 21, NUMBER 2**

ARTICLES

The Study of Political Influence in the General Assembly	Robert O. Keohane
The United Nations Association Panel Report: A Comment	George Taylor
Consensus and Authority Behind United Nations Peacekeeping Operations	Yashpal Tandon
The Common System of Salary Allowances and Benefits	Theodor Meron
France and United Nations Peacekeeping	James J. Combs

COMPREHENSIVE SUMMARIES

Recent activities of the United Nations, the UN specialized agencies, and the principal political, regional, and functional international organizations.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Recent books and articles, both United States and foreign.

$6.00 a year
$16.00 for three years

$2.00 a copy
Student rate: $4.00 a year

WORLD PEACE FOUNDATION

40 Mt. Vernon Street, Boston, Massachusetts 02108

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Australian Journal of POLITICS and HISTORY

Editor: GORDON GREENWOOD

Vol. XIII No. 1 April 1967

Problems of Australian Foreign Policy, June-December 1966 ..... W. J. Hudson

The 1965 Federal Redistribution .. Colin A. Hughes and E. E. Savage

The Life and Political Thought of Huang Hsing: Co-Founder of the Republic of China ..... Chün-tu Hsüeh

The Australian Government and Appeasement ..... E. M. Andrews

The Significance of the Schlieffen Plan ..... L. C. F. Turner

Labour and the Living Wage 1890-1910 ..... P. G. Macarthy

The Gold Rushes and Australian Politics ..... J. A. La Nauze

Australian Political Chronicle: Book Reviews

Price: $1.50

Published three times yearly

UNIVERSITY OF QUEENSLAND PRESS

ST. LUCIA, BRISBANE, QUEENSLAND, AUSTRALIA

Registered in Australia for Transmission by Post as a Periodical

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED